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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES 
 
L. W. Wolhuter 
 
LLD Thesis, Department of Public Law, University of the Western Cape 
 
The thesis draws on the author’s own contribution to a co-authored text 
Wolhuter, et al, 2009), which was aimed at introducing students to the legal 
landscape pertaining to victims’ rights in England and Wales. All the 
arguments presented and issues addressed in this contribution constitute the 
author’s own work, and were developed without any form of collaboration 
with the co-authors. While the thesis incorporates the basic issues that arose 
for consideration in the author’s contribution to this text, it goes beyond this 
contribution to develop a systematic framework for the recognition of 
enforceable victims’ rights flowing from the overarching rules of EU law.  
 
The thesis explores the extent to which the entrenchment in English law of 
enforceable rights for victims of crime in general, and socially unequal 
victims in particular, will reduce secondary victimisation at the hands of 
criminal justice agencies. The absence of such rights in English law 
constitutes a significant lacuna in the state’s responses to victims, particularly 
in light of the recent recognition of enforceable victims’ rights in EU law. The 
thesis accordingly seeks to contribute to the generation of a victims’ rights 
discourse in the UK, with the aim of encouraging the introduction of 
enforceable rights for victims. To this end, it engages in a comparative 
analysis of victims’ rights in EU law, European human rights law and 
American law. It contends that the United Kingdom ought to agree to be 
bound by the Draft Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime (2011, the “Victims’ Directive”), which will render the 
victims’ rights enshrined therein directly enforceable in national courts. In 
addition, it considers each of the rights in the Framework Decision on the 
standing of victims in criminal proceedings (2001/220/JHA), and its 
prospective successor, the Victims’ Directive, including the rights to 
information, respect and recognition, protection, participation and 
compensation, pointing to ways in which these rights may be given full effect 
in English law. In particular, the thesis advocates the recognition of active 
victim participation to empower victims in the pre-trial and trial processes. It 
maintains that the models of active victim participation in German and 
Swedish law, namely auxiliary prosecution and victims’ lawyers, reduce 
secondary victimisation, particularly for vulnerable victims of serious 
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offences, and ought to be introduced in English law. The thesis also evaluates 
the position of socially unequal victims, namely women victims of gender-
based violence, minority ethnic victims of racially and religiously motivated 
crime, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”) victims of 
homophobic and transphobic crime, and victims of elder abuse. It locates 
these victims within the framework of international and European human 
rights law, and recommends reforms to English law that would facilitate and 
enhance their exercise of the victims’ rights that it advocates. The thesis 
concludes by delineating the contours of a victims’ rights’ model, which 
encompasses the recognition of victims’ rights as enforceable human rights, 
the correlation of these rights with the right to freedom from discrimination, 
and the introduction of active procedural rights in the pre-trial and trial 
processes. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING VICTIMS – VICTIMOLOGY AND VICTIMS’ 
POLICY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The last century has witnessed marked changes in the position of victims of 
crime (see section 3 below) with victims becoming “key player[s]” instead of 
“forgotten actor[s]” in the criminal justice process (Zedner, 2002: 419). 
However, the reforms to criminal justice policy and practice that have effected 
these changes have been premised, for the most part, on meeting victims’ 
needs rather than on granting them enforceable rights. This thesis aims to 
demonstrate that the reduction of secondary victimisation at the hands of 
criminal justice agencies (see chapter 2) requires the entrenchment of 
enforceable rights for victims of crime in general, and socially unequal 
victims in particular. The absence of such rights in English law constitutes a 
significant lacuna in the state’s response to victims, particularly in light of the 
recent recognition of enforceable victims’ rights in the law of the European 
Union (“EU law”). The thesis accordingly seeks to contribute to the 
emergence of a victims’ rights discourse in the United Kingdom (“UK”), with 
the aim of encouraging the introduction of enforceable rights for victims. To 
this end, it engages in a comparative analysis of victims’ rights in EU law, 
European human rights law and American law. It contends that the UK ought 
to agree to be bound by the Draft Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and 
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protection of victims of crime (2011; the “Victims’ Directive”) and that 
victims’ rights legislation ought to be introduced in pursuance thereof. In 
addition, it considers each of the rights in the Council of Europe Framework 
Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (2001/220/JHA
 
, 
the “Framework Decision”) as well as those in the Victims’ Directive, which 
is due to replace the Framework Decision in the near future (see chapter 2). 
These rights include the rights to information, respect and recognition, 
protection, participation and compensation. The thesis points to ways in which 
these rights may be given full effect in English law. In particular, it advocates 
the recognition of active victim participation to empower victims in the pre-
trial and trial processes. It maintains that the models of active victim 
participation in German and Swedish law, namely auxiliary prosecution and 
victims’ lawyers, reduce secondary victimisation, particularly for vulnerable 
victims of serious offences, and ought to be introduced in English law (see 
chapter 4). The thesis also evaluates the position of socially unequal victims, 
namely women victims of gender-based violence, minority ethnic victims of 
racially and religiously motivated crime, lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (“LGBT”) victims of homophobic and transphobic crime, and 
victims of elder abuse, locating them within the framework of international 
and European human rights law (see chapter 6). It recommends the correlation 
of the rights enshrined in the Equality Act 2010 (“EA”) with the above-
mentioned general victims’ rights, in order to facilitate and enhance the 
exercise of such rights by socially unequal victims. The thesis concludes by 
 
 
 
 
 3 
delineating the contours of a victims’ rights’ model, which encompasses the 
recognition of victims’ rights as enforceable human rights, the inclusion of a 
right to non-discrimination in the exercise and enjoyment of these rights, and 
the introduction of active procedural rights in the pre-trial and trial processes.  
 
However, in order to highlight the contribution of this analysis of victims’ 
rights to current victims’ discourse in the UK, it is necessary to situate it 
within the context of the victimological theorising and criminal justice policy 
pertaining to victims that has informed the state’s response to primary and 
secondary victimisation. This introductory chapter accordingly assesses the 
various strands of victimological theory that have influenced the development 
of victims’ policy as well as the key developments in such policy from the end 
of the Second World War to the present. It concludes by providing a brief 
synopsis of the substantive chapters of the thesis. 
 
2. VICTIMOLOGICAL THEORY 
 
The birth of the sub-discipline of victimology after World War II gave rise to 
an academic focus on victims of crime (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 69-70). 
Victimological theories embody several strands, each with their own specific 
impact on criminal justice policy regarding victims. This section assesses the 
tenets of each of these strands. The manner in which each strand has 
influenced criminal justice policy and practice is explored in section 3 below.  
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2.1 Positivist victimology 
 
2.1.1 Early positivist victimology 
 
 There is some dispute concerning the origin of the term “victimology”. 
Dussich ascribes the first usage of the term to an article by the European 
scholar Mendelsohn in 1956 (Dussich, 2006: 116). Goodey also attributes the 
origin of the term to Mendelsohn, but contends that he first used it in a paper 
presented “at a congress meeting held in Rumania in 1947” (Goodey, 2005: 
11). Kearon and Godfrey, on the other hand, maintain that Mendelsohn coined 
the term in 1940 (Kearon & Godfrey, 2007: 26). By contrast, Zedner states 
that it was first used by the European scholar Wertham in 1949 (Zedner, 2002: 
420). Whatever the exact source of the term, it is clear that its advent is 
attributable to scholars writing in the positivist tradition.   
 
These early scholars were concerned to identify scientific, value-free facts 
about victims of crime that are universally and objectively valid (Hoyle, 2007: 
148). Cultural, social or historical variations were not recognised. In 
accordance with this scientific method, scholars attempted to locate “patterns, 
regularities and precipitative characteristics of victimising events” which were 
encapsulated in a series of victim typologies (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 10). 
Consequently, positivist victimology has been defined as comprising 
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the identification of factors in individuals or their environment that 
conduce to a non-random risk of victimisation, a concentration on 
inter-personal crimes of violence, and the identification of victims who 
may be held to have contributed to their victimisation (Miers, 1989: 
3).   
 
 The work of the so-called “founding fathers of victimology” (Mawby & 
Walklate, 1994: 12), Von Hentig and Mendelsohn, testifies to the positivist 
predilection for victim typologies which are infused with notions of victim 
proneness and victim precipitation. In his book The criminal and his victim 
(Von Hentig, 1948: 436, quoted in Fattah, 2000: 22), Von Hentig, 
highlighting the relationship between victims and offenders, contended that 
many victims play a causative role in the victimising event. He devised a 
victim typology illustrating the victim proneness of certain groups of victims 
(Zedner, 2002: 420). His general categories encompassed young persons, 
elderly persons, women, persons with mental disabilities, immigrants, 
members of minority groups and “dull normals”, whereas his psychological 
categories included “... the depressed, the acquisitive … the wanton ...” 
(Spalek 2006: 34) and the “tormentor” (Goodey, 2005: 12). He maintained 
that the depressive murder victim, for instance, “... lacks ordinary prudence 
and discretion ...”, whereas the wanton murder victim exhibits “female 
foibles” (Rock, 2007: 43). The tormentor, typified by “... the ‘nagging’ wife 
who is beaten by her husband ...”, provokes her victimisation (Goodey, 2005: 
12). Furthermore, he argued that some sexual offence victims “... are 
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themselves ‘wanton’ ...” and that, in view of their gullibility, black persons 
are “... more likely to become the victim of confidence tricksters ...” 
(Williams, 1999: 16). 
 
In a similar vein, Mendelsohn maintained that there was a relation between 
victim culpability and the victimising event. He devised the concept of victim 
precipitation to describe the role of those victims who are culpable in their 
own victimisation. According to Rock, the concept refers to “... the criminally 
provocative, collusive or causal impact of the victim in a dyadic relation … 
called the ‘penal couple’” (Rock, 2007: 42). Only victims who are entirely 
innocent do not feature in this dyadic relation. Mendelsohn thus contended 
that there were degrees of victim culpability, which ranged from complete 
innocence to the highest level of guilt (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 12). The 
greater the degree of victim precipitation, the greater would be the degree of 
the victim’s guilt. For instance, a person who casts the first blow in a fight and 
consequently receives injuries would be a guilty victim, whereas an aged 
victim of a mugging would be innocent (Goodey, 2005: 96-97). Likewise, 
young persons, “sexually vulnerable” persons and “socially respectable” 
persons would be innocent victims in contrast to those who are unemployed or 
homeless (Goodey, 2005: 96-97). 
 
The concept of victim precipitation was taken up by Wolfgang in his book 
Patterns in criminal homicide (1958). In his view, victim precipitation 
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occurred in cases where the victim directly and positively precipitated the 
offence (Zedner, 2002: 420). He examined homicides that had taken place in 
Philadelphia between 1948 and 1952, contending that 26 per cent had been 
precipitated by victims (Zedner, 2002: 420). Wolfgang’s doctoral student, 
Amir, applied the concept of victim precipitation to rape cases (Spalek, 2006: 
34). Amir’s work, Patterns of forcible rape (1971), comprised an analysis of 
police records of forcible rape in Philadelphia, in which he maintained that 19 
per cent were precipitated by victims (Zedner, 2002: 420). He developed a 
victim typology ranging “... from the ‘accidental victim’ to the ‘consciously’ 
or ‘unconsciously seductive’ victim ...” (Spalek, 2006: 34). In his view, victim 
precipitating behaviour included “... meeting an offender in a bar, picnic or 
party, possessing a ‘bad’ reputation … consuming alcohol ...” (Rock, 2007: 
45), initially agreeing to sexual intercourse but changing one’s mind and 
failing to resist the offender’s advances (Zedner, 2002: 420).    
 
The concepts of victim proneness and victim precipitation have been subject 
to extensive criticism, particularly by feminist scholars. Walklate has argued 
that the concept of victim precipitation is gender-blind, being premised on an 
equality between victim and offender that may not exist, particularly in cases 
of sexual assault. It is thus incapable of application to situations involving 
unequal power relations (Walklate, 2004: 34). Furthermore, it is founded on a 
legalistic concept of rationality that is often synonymous with white male 
rationality (Walklate, 2004: 36-37). When applied to socially unequal victims, 
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such as victims of gender-based violence, and racially motivated and 
homophobic hate crime, it amounts to blaming victims for the unequal social 
conditions that frame offenders’ abuse of power. In defence of the concept of 
victim precipitation, Fattah has argued that it ought not to be viewed as 
blaming victims, but rather as attempting to determine factors that account for 
the victimisation of certain individuals (Spalek, 2006: 35). However, as 
Spalek has stated, there is “... a thin line between blame and account, 
especially within discourses [such as the Thatcherite notion of active 
citizenship] that emphasise the duty of citizens to avoid victimisation” 
(Spalek, 2006: 35; see section 3 below for a discussion of the concept of 
active citizenship in the Thatcher era). 
 
Besides these critiques of victim proneness and victim precipitation, criticism 
has also been directed more broadly at the methodological shortcomings of 
the early positivist work. It has been contended that the positivist typologies 
individualised victimisation, failing to consider its broader structural 
underpinnings (Goodey, 2005: 99). In consequence, these typologies did not 
give recognition to the ways in which victimisation is socially reproduced 
(Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 12). Furthermore, the positivist acceptance of the 
legal definition of victimhood precluded an analysis of hidden crimes, such as 
corporate crime and domestic violence (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 12, 9). It 
also obscured the ways in which criminal justice agencies cause secondary 
victimisation (Dignan, 2005: 33). 
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However, despite these shortcomings, positivist victimology has had a lasting 
impact on criminal justice policy, particularly as regards the use and 
development of victim surveys (Dignan, 2005: 32). In addition, the concept of 
victim precipitation informs recent work on repeat victimisation, which has 
emphasised the high rate of re-victimisation of certain groups, such as victims 
of racist violence, as well as of certain neighbourhoods (Goodey, 2005: 98).  
 
2.1.2 Lifestyle and routine activity theory 
 
The lifestyle approach and routine activity theory drew on and extended the 
concept of victim precipitation, which, having been employed to explain 
individual victimisation, did not adequately explain patterns of victimisation. 
In order to account for such patterns, Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo, in 
their work Victims of personal crime: an empirical foundation for a theory of 
personal victimisation (1978), developed the concept of lifestyle (Walklate, 
2004: 35), defined as the manner in which “... ‘individuals allocate their time 
to vocational activities and leisure activities’ ...” (Spalek, 2006: 36). They 
contended that factors, such as the amount of time spent outside the home, the 
nature of activities pursued and the means of transport used (Walklate, 2004: 
35) are correlated to the risk of victimisation because they affect the 
likelihood of coming into contact with offenders at certain times and places 
(Spalek, 2006: 36).  
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Similarly, routine activity theory, developed by Cohen and Felson (1974), 
maintained that “direct-contact predatory violations” occur when three 
elements, namely “... motivated offenders, suitable targets, and absence of 
capable guardians ...” converge in time and space (Fattah, 2000: 30). Cohen 
and Felson contended that socio-economic changes after the Second World 
War have generated changing patterns of routine activity, such as “... work, 
leisure [and] social interaction ...” (Spalek, 2006: 36), facilitating such 
convergence. These changes include greater mobility and ease of moving 
goods, altered employment patterns causing homes to be vacant and the 
increase of “... single-person households with their weak guardianship ...” 
(Rock, 2007: 50).  
 
Drawing on the lifestyle and routine activity approaches, amongst others, 
Fattah has listed ten factors that are conducive to an increased risk of 
victimisation, namely opportunities, risk factors, motivated offenders, 
exposure of victims, associations of victims, dangerous times and places, 
dangerous behaviour, high-risk activities, the absence of defensive or 
avoidance behaviours on the part of victims, and structural or cultural 
proneness to victimisation. He explains each of these factors as follows: 
opportunities refer to those “... closely linked to the characteristics of potential 
targets … and to [their] activities and behaviour”; risk factors refer to factors 
linked to “sociodemographic characteristics”; motivated offenders “... select 
their victims/targets according to specific criteria”; “... exposure to potential 
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offenders and to high-risk situations and environments enhances the risk of 
criminal victimization”; associations refer to the fact that persons who 
associate with potential offenders “... run a greater risk of being victimized 
than those who [do] not”; “... dangerous times such as evening, late night 
hours and weekends ...” and “... dangerous places such as places of public 
entertainment ...” carry a greater risk of victimisation; dangerous behaviours 
such as “provocation”, “negligence and carelessness” increase the chance of 
victimisation; high-risk activities, such as “... the pursuit of fun, which may 
include deviant and illegal activities ...” and “prostitution” enhance the risk of 
victimisation; absence of defensive or avoidance behaviours refers to the fact 
that “... risk-takers are bound to be victimized more often than risk-avoiders”; 
and structural/cultural proneness refers to the “... positive correlation between 
powerlessness, deprivation and the frequency of criminal victimization” 
(Fattah, 2000: 30-32). 
 
Several criticisms have been levelled at the lifestyle approach and routine 
activity theory. Spalek has argued that they focus on conventional crimes, 
including street crime and burglary, and consequently fail to address crimes 
such as racially motivated crime, gender-based crime and corporate crime 
(Spalek, 2006: 37). Furthermore, by imposing a duty on victims to change 
their lifestyles or routine activities in order to reduce the risk of victimisation, 
they blame victims who do not adopt such measures to avoid being victimised 
(Spalek, 2006: 37). Despite having extended the concept of victim 
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precipitation to include patterns of victimisation rather than individual 
victimising events, these approaches do not escape the positivist failure to 
embed victimisation within its socio-structural context.  
 
2.2 Radical victimology 
 
2.2.1 General 
 
Radical victimology emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Mawby & 
Walklate, 1994: 13), taking issue with the individualised account of 
victimisation and the uncritical acceptance of a legal definition of victimhood 
by positivist victimology (Dignan, 2005: 33). Schwendinger and 
Schwendinger, for instance, contended that, by emphasising legally defined 
crimes, positivists failed to consider the harms caused by the powerful 
(Spalek, 2006: 38). By contrast, radical victimology was concerned with the 
manner in which victimhood is socially constructed (Spalek, 2006: 39), 
placing this question within the broader structural determinants of the 
capitalist system. In so doing, it highlighted the ways in which the state, the 
law and the criminal justice system rendered certain forms of victimisation 
invisible (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 13). Victims of such forms of 
victimisation, namely “... victims of police force, the victims of war, the 
victims of the correctional system, the victims of state violence, [and] the 
victims of oppression of any sort ...”, were thus the focus of radical 
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victimologists (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 13). Marxist victimologists added a 
concern for the victimisation of workers, focusing on work-related harms such 
as deaths and injuries arising from “... unsafe work practices and conditions 
...” (Spalek, 2006: 39). 
  
Victims of everyday crimes, such as burglary and theft, and the reality of their 
experiences of victimisation were accordingly ignored (Rock, 2007: 30). Fear 
of everyday crime was regarded as “false consciousness” or the consequence 
of “penal populism” (Rock, 2007: 30). Furthermore, radical victimology 
tended to conceive of “ordinary” offenders as victims of state crime, thus 
diverting attention from the experiences of those whom they victimised 
(Dignan, 2005: 33).  
 
 In their concern to address the way in which the state produces victims, some 
radical victimologists, such as Elias, adopted the framework of human rights 
(Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 14). From this perspective, a human rights 
violation constitutes a crime, consequently generating victimisation (Spalek, 
2006: 39). These scholars adopted a broad definition of human rights, 
spanning civil and political rights, such as the right to liberty and equality, as 
well as socio-economic rights, such as the right to housing, food and 
healthcare (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 16). The victimisation that was 
consequent upon a violation of these rights was also broadly defined, and 
included victims of “... state oppression, war, and corporate crime ...” (Spalek, 
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2006: 39). Mawby and Walklate have maintained that, despite its importance, 
the use of a human rights framework has not been subject to sufficient 
theoretical analysis in radical victimology (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 16). 
 
 Radical victimology, both in general and in its human rights variant, has been 
subject to considerable criticism. Mawby and Walklate have argued that, in 
view of their focus on class to the exclusion of other axes of inequality such 
as “... gender, race and age ...”, radical victimologists presented a partial 
account of victimisation (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 16). Furthermore, they 
were insensitive to the experiences of victims of “ordinary” crime (Mawby & 
Walklate, 1994: 17). In consequence, radical victimology has had a limited 
impact on criminal justice policy. In addition, the human rights perspective 
has given rise to very little research (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 14). 
 
2.2.2 Radical left realism 
 
 Radical left realism appeared in the 1980s (Spalek, 2006: 41) in response to 
the failure of radical victimology to address the lived experiences of victims 
of “ordinary” crime. While its main proponents in the UK were Young, 
Matthews, Lea and Kinsey (Spalek, 2006: 41), it was also influential in the 
United States of America (“US”) and elsewhere, with “the Crime and Justice 
Collective in California” devoting considerable attention to the “... need for a 
left-wing programme on crime control” (Young, 1986: 25). Young contended 
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that left realism “... necessitates an accurate victimology ...” that steers a 
middle course between radical conceptions that “... play down victimisation 
...” and right-wing accounts that “... celebrate moral panics” (Young, 1986: 
23). Utilising the notion that “... intervention should occur at all points in the 
square of crime (state agencies, public involvement, the structural causes of 
offending and victim support) ...” (Young & Matthews, 1992: 3), left realists 
set out to document the ways in which crime was experienced differentially 
on account of gender, race, age, class and geographic location (Spalek, 2006: 
41). They thus attempted to depict the lived realities of people in communities 
at high risk of criminal victimisation (Spalek, 2006: 41). Their methodology 
remained largely positivist, insofar as they used victim surveys to document 
these differential experiences of victimisation. However, they adopted local 
surveys, such as the Islington Crime Survey, contending that such surveys 
revealed the impact of structural inequality on peoples’ experiences of 
victimisation more accurately than national surveys (Goodey, 2005: 100).  
 
In the UK, left realists pursued a political agenda, demanding “an ‘engaged’ 
criminology” that was exhibited by their connection to local authorities 
controlled by the Labour Party and concretised by their opposition to the 
positivist focus on victimisation patterns that were abstracted from their social 
context (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 15-16). In addition, they advocated a 
socialist concept of citizenship in terms of which citizens (and hence also 
victims) have both rights and obligations (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 16). 
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They were accordingly “left” because they emphasised the structural 
underpinnings of victimisation and “real” because they highlighted victims’ 
lived experiences of victimisation (Goodey, 2005: 100).  
 
Despite the fact that they espoused a more practical approach than their “left 
idealist” radical victimological counterparts, left realists nonetheless attracted 
considerable criticism. Walklate has contended that their use of victim surveys 
led them to accept the concept of lifestyle that informs such surveys 
(Walklate, 2004: 36), and hence implicitly to engage in the victim blaming 
that characterises positivist approaches. In a similar vein, Mawby and 
Walklate have argued that the use of victim surveys has restricted left realists’ 
ability to depict social reality fully (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 15). In 
particular, left realism is open to criticism on account of its incomplete 
understanding of racially motivated victimisation, its failure to portray 
women’s lived experiences of victimisation and its oversight of the 
victimisation experienced by men (Spalek, 2006: 41). Furthermore, it focused 
predominantly on street crime at the expense of other, hidden forms of crime, 
such as corporate crime (Spalek, 2006: 42).  
 
Left realism has also attracted criticism at a theoretical level for its inability to 
theorise the relation between agency and social structure. It did not explain the 
ways in which peoples’ experiences are shaped by structural constraints in 
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cases where they are not aware of such constraints, or the ways in which 
people resist their structural conditions (Spalek, 2006: 44).  
 
2.3 The contribution of feminism to victimology 
 
 Several victimological concepts have been viewed with unease by feminist 
scholars. They contend that the term “victim” itself, which bears the female 
gender in French, imports “passivity and powerlessness” and that the concept 
of “victim precipitation” implicitly blames victims for their own victimisation 
(Walklate, 2004: 54). Consequently, victimology has been regarded as a tool 
for women’s oppression (Walklate, 2004: 54). It is thus difficult to conceive 
of a feminist victimology. Nevertheless, feminist theory has had a marked 
impact on the development of critical victimology (see section 2.4 below) as 
well as criminal justice policy and practice. This section considers two strands 
of feminist theory, namely radical feminism and critical race feminism, each 
of which have made significant contributions to victimological theory and 
criminal justice policy pertaining to victims. In addition, it briefly explores 
recent work on masculinity theory that challenges the radical feminist focus 
on violence against women and documents men’s experiences of 
victimisation. 
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2.3.1 Radical feminism 
 
Radical or second-wave feminism developed in the 1970s, contesting the 
tenets of a number of theoretical approaches. First, it aimed to address the 
limitations of liberal feminism, which proceeded on the assumption that the 
social order recognised the equality of men and women, that women were 
denied equality in law only and that the feminist project was accordingly to 
achieve gender equality through a process of legal reform (Walklate, 2004: 
41). The radical feminist response was to highlight the existence of a 
patriarchal social structure that generated unequal gender relations. The 
attainment of gender equality thus necessitated the dismantling of patriarchy, 
rather than mere legal reform. In addition, radical feminism pointed to the 
failure of liberal feminism to recognise the family as a site for the oppression 
of women, arguing that this rendered domestic violence invisible (Hoyle, 
2007: 147). 
 
Second, radical feminists maintained that “malestream” criminological and 
victimological theory, having failed to capture the reality of gender relations 
under patriarchy, were unable to explain women’s experiences of 
victimisation. Radical feminists castigated positivist victimology for its 
reliance on concepts such as victim precipitation that blamed women, 
particularly rape victims, for their own victimisation (Walklate, 2004: 56), 
and for the methodological shortcomings of the early victim surveys, which 
 
 
 
 
 19 
obscured women’s lived realities of gender-based violence (Hoyle, 2007: 148) 
by focusing on the public at the expense of the private sphere (Mawby & 
Walklate, 1994: 11). In addition, they contended that the failure of radical 
criminology (and victimology) to address the reality of women’s experiences 
of gender-based violence amounted to “... an analytic and empirical gap ...” 
(Rock, 2007: 44) that arose from its focus on class oppression under 
capitalism to the exclusion of other forms of oppression, particularly gender 
oppression. In her work Women, crime and criminology (1976), for instance, 
Smart criticised the exclusion of women offenders as well as women victims 
from the ambit of radical criminology, advocating the development of a 
theory which not only comprises “a critique of sexism” but also the inclusion 
of “a woman’s perspective” (Smart, 1976: 183; Rock, 2007: 44). 
 
Radical feminism was thus concerned with a macro-level analysis of gender 
relations under patriarchy. Scholars such as MacKinnon contended that such 
an analysis revealed that women’s oppression is maintained by male power 
expressed in gender-based violence (MacKinnon, 1989: 127-128). 
Furthermore, the state reinforces this oppression by adopting a male 
perspective. For MacKinnon –  
The state is male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women 
the way men see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and 
authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interests of men as a 
gender - through its legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and 
substantive policies (MacKinnon, 1989: 161-162). 
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The infusion of this male perspective into law and criminal justice policy 
renders gender-based violence invisible by exempting the private sphere from 
state scrutiny and thereby sustains male dominance. One of the central aims of 
the feminist project was accordingly “... to make visible what has been 
invisible ...” (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 10-11) by articulating women’s lived 
realities of gender-based violence (Spalek, 2006: 42).  
 
In order to theorise these lived realities, radical feminists contended that it was 
necessary to develop a feminist epistemology that challenged “malestream” 
theory’s claim to universality, rationality and objectivity. They maintained 
that the objective and value-free science of positivist victimology was 
premised on a male perspective that has been obscured by “... ‘the regime of 
rationality’, rooted in the idea of an abstract knower ...” (Walklate, 2004: 55). 
By contrast, for radical feminists, a feminist way of knowing focused on 
women’s concrete experiences. The fact that these experiences straddle the 
public as well as the private sphere generates knowledge, which is more 
objective than that of “malestream” victimology and makes it possible to 
expose processes that have hitherto been invisible (Walklate, 2004: 55).  
 
Radical feminism thus advocated a feminist methodology that involved 
women doing empirical research about women (Walklate, 2004: 55-56). Such 
research involved qualitative rather than quantitative methods to “... describe 
and explain women’s experiences of and responses to victimisation” (Hoyle, 
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2007: 148). Feminist-inspired empirical research highlighted the endemic 
nature of rape, sexual assault and domestic violence under patriarchy, and has 
had a significant impact on criminal justice policy and practice pertaining to 
victims in the UK (see section 3 below). It also revealed that many women did 
not passively accept their oppression but actively resisted it and managed their 
lives around the violence they experienced (Spalek, 2006: 42). Stressing 
women’s agency, radical feminism thus rejected the term “victim” and 
adopted the term “survivor”, which denotes strength and optimism (Cook & 
Jones, 2007: 129).   
 
In highlighting women’s experiences of gender-based violence, radical 
feminism has challenged entrenched orthodoxies about victimisation and has 
undoubtedly “... saved some women’s lives” (Hoyle, 2007: 165). It has 
nonetheless attracted considerable criticism, particularly on two accounts. 
First, critical race feminists have argued that radical feminism is premised on 
an essentialist perspective of womanhood that ignores the differential 
experiences of minority women. Second, masculinity theorists have contested 
the view of masculinity portrayed by radical feminism and have maintained 
that its focus on women obscures men’s experiences of victimisation. The 
following sections explore these two concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
2.3.2 Critical race feminism: The concept of intersectionality 
 
Critical race feminists take the view that gender essentialism, viz. the equation 
of women’s experiences as victims with the experiences of white women, 
regardless of race, excludes the experiences of minority women (see 
Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 25-26). Critical race theory likewise negates these 
experiences due to its essentialist equation of minority ethnic experiences with 
those of minority men. Consequently, minority women’s experiences are 
downgraded to a space “... that resists telling” (Crenshaw, 1993b: 1242). In 
order to give expression to this space, a multivalent, or a fluid, perspective 
must be developed “... that sees back and forth across boundary” (Williams, 
quoted in Laster & Raman, 1997: 211).   
 
Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality reflects such a multivalent 
perspective. In her view, an intersectional analysis highlights the uniqueness 
of minority women’s experiences rather than fragmenting them into women’s 
or racial minorities’ experiences (Crenshaw, 1993a: 385). Intersectionality is 
founded upon the recognition that “individuals experience the complex 
interplay of multiple systems of oppression operating simultaneously in the 
world” (Bond, 2003: 76). Consequently, it must be differentiated from an 
additive approach, in terms of which gender is the focal axis of subordination 
and other axes, such as race, are regarded as aggravating rather than 
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qualitatively transforming the experience of gender oppression (Bond, 2003: 
145).   
 
An intersectional analysis of South Asian women’s experiences of domestic 
violence in the UK exemplifies the way in which the concept of 
intersectionality is able to capture the uniqueness of these experiences. South 
Asian communities are founded upon a dual hierarchy that subordinates 
women, not only to their husbands and other male members of their family on 
the basis of gender, but also to their mothers-in-law and other older female 
members of their family on the basis of age (Chana, 2005: 38). Furthermore, 
the morality of their conduct is framed by the cultural dyad of honour and 
shame, in which male honour and shame is privileged (Gill, 2004: 474; 
Bhopal, 1997: 64-65). Honour emphasises putting the needs of the family 
first. Consequently, victims of domestic violence are required to keep the 
domestic violence private in order to avoid shaming the family (Gill, 2004: 
474). Defying this cultural norm opens women to the risk of serious 
punishment and even death (Chana, 2005: 29). In addition, no support is 
forthcoming from senior female members of their families, because it is 
regarded as more important to “... [save] face and family unity ...” than to 
ensure one’s own safety (Gill, 2004: 477). Cultural constraints, founded on 
gender and age subordination, thus preclude minority women from reporting 
their victimisation to criminal justice agencies (Chana, 2005: 18). 
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These constraints are coupled with racial “othering” by the white community 
(Bhopal, 1997: 77), which filters into the outlook of criminal justice agencies. 
In a bid to avoid the perception that they are culturally insensitive, criminal 
justice agencies have been reluctant to intervene in domestic violence 
incidents involving minority communities (Chana, 2005: 24). Such a lack of 
intervention exacerbates the isolation of minority victims. Furthermore, 
victims’ perceptions of police racism compound the problem of low reporting 
rates. Gill contends that, in order to appreciate the reasons for the reluctance 
of minority women to report domestic violence, criminal justice agencies 
must be imbued with an understanding of “... the historical impact of 
institutional racism” (Gill, 2004: 467). 
   
The above analysis indicates that the lived experiences of South Asian women 
are interwoven with gender, race, culture and age oppression in a manner that 
almost inevitably silences them. An intersectional analysis is able to depict the 
multifaceted nature of these experiences in a way that is not possible in a 
radical feminist analysis. The value of an intersectional analysis is beginning 
to be recognised in recent mainstream feminist work (Hoyle, 2007: 153) and, 
to a lesser extent, in English law and criminal justice policy (see chapter 6).  
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2.3.3 Masculinity theory  
 
Recent work on masculinity has challenged the view of manhood adopted by 
radical feminists. Connell, for instance, has contended that the slogan 
characteristic of radical feminism, namely that “all men are potential rapists”, 
universalises male behaviour in a manner that is inconsonant with social 
reality (Walklate, 2004: 72; see Connell, 1987: 56-58). Furthermore, the 
radical feminist conflation of “man” with masculinity assumes the existence 
of a static and universally applicable masculinity (Walklate, 2004: 72), 
obscuring different masculinities that do not all foster male dominance. 
Connell has argued that the dominant form of masculinity (“hegemonic 
masculinity”) in contemporary society is heterosexual masculinity (Connell, 
1987: 186; Walklate, 2004: 74). Men who behave according to heterosexist 
norms and values exercise hegemonic power, thereby denigrating other forms 
of masculinity, such as homosexuality, as well as femininity (Walklate, 2004: 
74, see Connell, 1987: 183, 186). It is the expression of this form and not 
other forms of masculinity that underpins violence against women.  
 
In addition, masculinity theorists have contended that the focus of radical 
feminism on women masks the fact that many men also experience sexual 
assault and domestic violence (Rock, 2007: 46). This contention is supported 
by recent research showing a significant increase in the number of male rapes 
reported to the police (Rumney, 2001: 213) as well as the prevalence of male 
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victims of domestic violence. Some scholars, such as Fergusson, have gone so 
far as to suggest that there is gender symmetry in domestic violence and that it 
is accordingly “... not determined by gender or patriarchy” (Hoyle, 2007: 
149). However, such claims have been contested. It has been argued that 
scholars who have found that equal numbers of men and women commit acts 
of domestic violence conflate serious forms of domestic violence with 
aggressive behaviour, such as slapping (Hoyle, 2007: 150-151). By contrast, 
those studies that focus on serious forms of domestic violence reveal that most 
men are the perpetrators (Hoyle, 2007: 151). However, despite the differences 
in the various studies, it is clear that a significant number of men are victims 
of domestic violence perpetrated by women. Masculinity theorists thus 
advocate the reconfiguration of radical feminist theory in order to reflect this 
reality.   
 
2.4 Critical victimology 
 
Critical victimology emerged in the 1990s as a challenge to positivist and 
radical victimology, particularly as regards their notions of agency and 
structure (Spalek, 2006: 44). It contested the positivist conception of victim 
passivity, which obscured the extent to which victims may resist their 
victimisation, as well as the absence in positivist victimology of an analysis of 
the way in which social structure shapes victimisation. It criticised the focus 
of radical victimology on a class analysis to the exclusion of other structural 
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factors such as race and gender (Spalek, 2006: 44). Furthermore, it was 
concerned to rectify the division between academic victimology and victim 
advocacy, suggesting “... a combined critical reading ...” in which theoretical 
and activist approaches to victimisation are construed within “... the context of 
a ‘social reality’ that reflects social and political developments ...” (Goodey, 
2005: 95).   
 
Drawing on insights from feminist theory, the primary proponents of critical 
victimology, Mawby and Walklate, aimed to place victims’ lived realities 
within a critical theoretical analysis of the relationship between agency and 
structure (Spalek, 2006: 44). Such an analysis must commence with an 
empirical inquiry into “... what constitutes the real ...”, namely an inquiry that 
considers the processes that play a role in “... the construction of everyday 
reality” (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 18-19). These processes include –  
 people’s conscious activity, their ‘unconscious’ activity (that is, 
routine activities people engage in which serve to sustain, and 
sometimes change, the conditions in which they act), the generative 
mechanisms (unobservable and observed) which underpin daily life, 
and finally, both the intended and the unintended consequences of 
action which feed back into people’s knowledge (Mawby & Walklate, 
1994: 19).  
 
This understanding of “the real” facilitates the exposure of victimisation that 
has been obscured by mainstream victimology, such as gender-based violence, 
racially motivated crime, homophobic crime and elder abuse. By documenting 
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victims’ lived realities in this way, critical victimology was able to explain 
victims’ subjectivity more accurately and to include an analysis of agency, 
namely the ways in which victims negotiate and resist their experiences of 
victimisation (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 19). Mawby and Walklate 
contended that this conception of “the real” does not necessitate the rejection 
of victim surveys, but does require an acknowledgment that they are not able 
to depict “... the generalities of victimisation ...” as well as the specifics of 
lived reality (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 19). A critical empirical method must 
thus employ not only victim surveys, but also “... imaginative comparative 
and longitudinal studies ...” (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 20). 
 
Critical victimology situated this empirical analysis of victims’ lived realities 
within a critical structural framework that focuses on the role of the state and 
the law in the construction and reconstruction of these realities (Mawby & 
Walklate, 1994: 20; Spalek, 2006: 44). The relationship between structure and 
agency is not determinist but recursive (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 20), in that 
structure and agency mutually shape one another in a way that brings about 
social change. Within the context of this recursive relationship, critical 
victimology attempted “... to appreciate how the generative mechanisms of 
capitalism and patriarchy set the material conditions in which different 
victims’ movements have flourished” (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 21) and, at 
the same time, to explore ways in which victims (or groups of victims) 
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negotiate these material constraints to bring about changes in their social 
conditions (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 177).  
 
Mawby and Walklate contended that the recognition of victims’ rights 
constitutes one of the central ways of effecting these social changes. A needs-
based response that does not translate needs into rights would merely produce 
a “discretionary response” from criminal justice agencies that would not 
empower victims (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 178). However, a victims’ 
rights discourse has certain limitations. In light of the fact that the criminal 
justice system uses the terms “complainant” and “defendant”, the term 
“victim” has no legal meaning. Even if it were legally recognised, its usage 
would nonetheless be open to criticism as it draws on a neutral concept of 
victimhood that obscures the structural underpinnings of victims’ lived 
realities (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 178; see also section 2.3 above for a 
feminist critique of the term “victim” and its replacement with the term 
“survivor”). For Mawby and Walklate, a rights claim ought thus to be “... 
based upon structural inequities rather than on … criminal victimisation 
alone” (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 178).  
 
In an attempt to resolve these concerns with victims’ rights, Mawby has 
advocated a “justice-based approach” in terms of which victims have 
substantive rights that are recognised independently of their needs (Mawby & 
Walklate, 1994: 179). However, Mawby and Walklate maintained that this 
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approach must not be restricted to “... a narrowly defined range of criminal 
victimizations ...” but must reflect the reality that victims have differential 
power to access and enforce their rights (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 179). It 
must accordingly be informed by a concept of victims’ rights as human rights 
that highlights the structural underpinnings of victimisation (Mawby & 
Walklate, 1994: 179).  
 
Furthermore, drawing on the insights of radical feminists such as MacKinnon, 
Mawby and Walklate pointed to the fact that criminal justice agencies 
function within “... a deeply embedded patriarchal framework ...” which 
hinders the effectiveness of a rights-based agenda (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 
185). In order to facilitate the viability of this concept of victims’ rights as a 
vehicle for social change, it must thus be accompanied by advocacy for 
transformation of the laws, policies and practices of the patriarchal (and 
capitalist) state by which it is structurally constrained (Mawby & Walklate, 
1994: 186).  
 
The contribution of critical victimology to victimological theory has been 
significant (see section 3 below). Not only has it emphasised the importance 
of the social context in which victimisation occurs, it has also highlighted the 
contested nature of the concepts of “victim” and “victimisation” and the fact 
that they are “... historically and culturally specific” (Dignan, 2005: 35). In 
addition, its focus on victims’ lived realities has explicated the link between 
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victimisation and social inequality on the grounds of gender, race, age and 
sexual orientation, amongst others. However, its inclusion of “unconscious” 
victimisation has been criticised. Critics have argued that it may not be ethical 
to “... claim positions for [victims] that they do not claim themselves” 
(Spalek, 2006: 45). Despite this criticism, the emphasis of critical victimology 
on the importance of using victims’ capacity for active resistance to develop 
strategies for social change, particularly by means of advocating the 
recognition of victims’ rights as human rights, constitutes the theoretical 
approach that most strongly promotes the kind of victims’ advocacy that 
accommodates the diversity of victims’ experiences. It accordingly forms the 
theoretical framework for the arguments for the recognition of enforceable 
victims’ rights put forward in the thesis (see chapter 2). 
 
3 KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
The development of victimological theory since the Second World War has 
been matched by a proliferation of criminal justice policies pertaining to 
victims in the UK. This section addresses the key moments in the growth of 
this victims’ policy against the backdrop of the various victimological 
theories, indicating which theoretical approaches have received the most 
government support (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 1-6). 
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In the early post-War years criminal justice policy regarding victims was 
founded on the welfarism that informed the state’s duty to shield its citizens 
from “... disease, squalor, and ignorance, idleness, and want” (Mawby & 
Walklate, 1994: 70). This duty was premised on the view that citizens, as 
parties to an implied social contract, have the right to be insured against such 
conditions (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 70-71). A welfarist philosophy 
underpinned the call for victim compensation by Margery Fry in the 1950s. 
Relying on the principles of collective responsibility and collective social 
insurance, Fry maintained that that the government was under an obligation to 
compensate victims for injuries due to criminal victimisation (Dignan, 2005: 
43).   
 
After Fry’s death, Justice, an advocacy group, continued her work, and their 
efforts culminated in the introduction of the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Scheme (“CICS”) in 1964 (Dignan, 2005: 43; Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 75). 
Compensation was only awarded to “deserving” victims of violent crime 
(Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 75). Like positivist victimology, this operated to 
exclude victims who precipitated or played a part in their victimisation (see 
section 2.1.1 above). 
 
Nevertheless, the CICS was founded on the importance of catering for the 
needs of victims, a concern which was taken up by Victim Support in the 
1970s. The first Victim Support scheme, in Bristol, was funded by the 
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National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (“NACRO”) 
(Goodey, 2005: 104). Other schemes emerged surprisingly quickly, and the 
National Association of Victim Support Schemes (which eventually became 
Victim Support) was set up in 1979 (Goodey, 2005: 104).   
 
Victim Support expanded in the 1980s, receiving significant funding from the 
government. Mawby and Walklate have ascribed its good standing with the 
government to three reasons. First, unlike other organisations such as Rape 
Crisis (see below), Victim Support was not critical of the government 
(Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 80). Second, it did not urge dependence upon 
government, but encouraged victims to empower themselves as “active 
citizens”. This approach coalesced with the Thatcher government’s dislike of 
“the dependency culture” that had emerged after the Second World War 
(Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 80-81). Third, the provision of victim services 
consolidated the concept of citizens as consumers of public services that the 
Conservative government wished to instil in public attitudes (Mawby & 
Walklate, 1994: 81). The concept of consumerism accorded with the 
government’s view that citizens have responsibilities in addition to rights 
(Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 85). 
 
By virtue of the extensive funding it received from the government, Victim 
Support was soon able to provide assistance to victims of crime nationally 
(see chapter 3). In light of its political neutrality, Victim Support initially 
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assisted “neutral” victims of street crime and property offences, although it 
did extend its services to victims of rape (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 80, 82).   
 
As has been indicated in section 2.3.1 above, radical feminism focused on 
violence against women and children, situating it within the patriarchal social 
structure. It accordingly contested the positivist notion of victim precipitation, 
maintaining that it constituted victim-blaming that masked the patriarchal 
structure in which gender-based violence was embedded. Academic radical 
feminism provided the impetus in the 1970s for the establishment of women’s 
organisations, such as Rape Crisis, that supported victims and called for legal 
reforms (Dignan, 2005: 56; see chapter 3).   
 
In the 1980s, the government turned its attention to the issue of violence 
against women and children. “Rape suites” were set up in police stations to 
enable victims to report rapes in a more comfortable, less threatening 
environment. The Home Office imposed duties on the police to use their 
powers of arrest more often in cases of domestic violence. In addition, live TV 
links were introduced to facilitate the testimony of child victims of sexual 
abuse (Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 82; see chapter 3)   
 
The government also began to use national and local victim surveys more 
regularly in the 1980s (Goodey, 2005: 15). However, this was due primarily 
to the government’s inability to lower the crime rates than to the emergence of 
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a victim-centred perspective. Nevertheless, these surveys documented 
information about fear of crime and the impact of crime on victims, which 
resonated with the importance attached by left realists to responding to the 
reality of victims’ experiences of crime (Goodey, 2005: 15; see section 2.2.2 
above). 
 
A corresponding level of interest in victims developed in the Council of 
Europe in the 1980s. It adopted the European Convention on the 
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crime (the “Compensation Convention”) 
in 1983, which imposed a duty on Member States to play a part in 
compensating victims of intentional crimes of violence who have been 
seriously injured (see chapter 5). In the same way as the CICS, the 
Compensation Convention is founded on the concept of “deserving” 
victimhood, enshrining the view that victims who precipitate their 
victimisation should not be awarded compensation.   
 
The 1980s also saw the introduction of two important recommendations by 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The first, 
Recommendation No. R (85) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on the position of the victim in the framework of criminal law and 
procedure (1985), required Member States to take cognisance of victims’ 
interests in the criminal process. The second, Recommendation No. R (87) 21 
of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on assistance to victims and 
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prevention of victimization (1988), introduced state duties to cater for victims’ 
needs outside of the criminal justice system (see chapter 3). These instruments 
evinced a growing realisation by the Council of Europe that the interests of 
victims had been marginalised in the past, and that reforms were necessary to 
give effect to these interests.      
 
While the concern for victims in the UK and in Europe in the 1980s 
represented a discernible change from previous decades, the concern was to 
provide for victims’ needs rather than grant them legally enforceable rights. 
By contrast, the 1990s heralded the beginning of a victims’ right discourse. As 
has been indicated in section 2.4 above, rights for victims were proposed by 
critical victimologists to ensure that victims’ lived experiences of 
victimisation were made the subject of an effective government response 
(Mawby & Walklate, 1994: 179). By the 1990s Victim Support had shed 
much of its political neutrality in favour of a more activist stance. 
Consequently, it played a significant role in the emergence of this rights-
discourse by advocating the introduction of victims’ rights (Dignan, 2005: 53; 
Victim Support, 1995; see chapter 3). Unfortunately, the government 
vacillated. The first Victim’s Charter (Home Office, 1990) was not 
enforceable and merely contained “guiding principles” for victims’ treatment 
(Dignan, 2005: 66-67). The second Victim’s Charter (Home Office, 1996) 
only introduced “service standards”. These standards did not enshrine 
enforceable rights for victims, but merely granted them an expectation that 
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criminal justice agencies would, amongst other things, provide them with 
information, respect and support. However, although the Victims’ Charter 
(Home Office, 1996) lacked enforceability, Rock has maintained that its 
significance resided in the fact that it was the government’s first formal 
commitment to victims and amounted to a “substantial improvement” in their 
“lot” (Rock, 2004: 162; see chapter 2). 
 
Other important events also characterised the 1990s. Victim Support received 
funding from the government to pilot the Witness Service in a number of 
Crown Courts. The Witness Service was aimed at providing support and 
assistance to victims at court. By 2002, all Crown Courts and magistrates’ 
courts in England and Wales had a Witness Service (Victim Support, 2002: 
18; see chapter 3). In addition, the government introduced comprehensive 
measures for the protection of victims in court. The Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (“YJCEA”) enshrined various victim-centred 
reforms to the law of evidence. In appropriate circumstances, victims were 
allowed to testify with the aid of special measures, such as a live TV link or 
video recording. Furthermore, defendants were prevented from cross-
examining rape complainants in person, and the admissibility of sexual 
history evidence was prohibited, except in narrowly delineated circumstances 
(see chapter 3). These reforms were premised on the need to encourage 
victims, especially vulnerable victims, to testify by alleviating their 
experiences of secondary victimisation during the court process.   
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By the beginning of the twenty first century, victims were substantially closer 
to the centre of criminal policy than had hitherto been the case. However, 
governmental discourse on victims was framed in the language of needs rather 
than rights, and victims remained Crown witnesses with no legal standing. 
 
By introducing enforceable victims’ rights, the Framework Decision ushered 
in a new era in regard to victims of crime. The Framework Decision, which 
binds the UK, grants victims a range of rights, including the right to 
information and the right to protection (see chapter 2). Although the Labour 
government reacted to the Framework Decision by undertaking to introduce 
statutory victims’ rights (Home Office, 2001), no such rights materialised. 
Instead it returned to the discourse of “needs” and “services” for victims 
(Home Office, 2002; see chapter 2).    
 
The Code of Practice for victims of crime (2005; the “Victims’ Code”), 
enacted in response to the Framework Decision, reflects this discourse. It was 
introduced in pursuance of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 
2004 (“DVCVA”) and imposes duties on criminal justice agencies, including 
the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”), to provide victims 
with information, protection and respect, amongst other things. However, the 
Victims’ Code restricts victims’ avenues for redress to a complaints 
mechanism rather than granting them enforceable rights (see chapter 2).   
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The twenty first century has also witnessed the introduction of a range of 
other victim-centred reforms. In October 2001, Victim Personal Statements 
(“VPS”) were introduced nationally, enabling victims to explain how the 
crime has affected them. VPS are considered by the courts at the stage of 
sentencing. As such, they give victims a “voice” during sentencing but do not 
permit them to participate actively in the proceedings (see chapter 4). In 
addition, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (“CJA 2009”) effects several 
reforms to the provisions of the YJCEA pertaining to special measures for 
vulnerable and intimidated witnesses (see chapter 3). 
 
Criminal justice agencies have also introduced specific measures for socially 
unequal victims. For example, the police have a pro-arrest policy and the CPS 
has a positive prosecution policy in domestic violence cases. Sexual Assault 
Referral Centres (“SARCs”) have been established for rape and sexual assault 
victims. The police and the CPS have implemented positive policing and 
prosecution policies in order to improve their responses to racially and 
religiously motivated victimisation, as well as homophobic and transphobic 
crime. The growth of these policies testifies to the increasing significance 
accorded by the government to the broader structural underpinnings of 
victimisation (see chapter 6). In addition, the EA, which has been enacted 
recently, grants victims of discrimination and harassment rights of action 
against public authorities, including those who discriminate against or harass 
them in the provision of services or the performance of public functions. This 
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right of action heralds a new era in which socially unequal victims are granted 
legal standing in appropriate cases (see chapter 6). 
 
Very significantly, the close of the first decade of the twenty first century has 
been marked by the drafting of a proposed Victims’ Directive, which will 
consolidate and extend enforceable rights for victims across Europe, and 
which will replace the Framework Decision. Unfortunately, it is as yet 
uncertain whether the UK will accept this Directive (see chapter 2). 
 
The last three decades have seen the emergence of a plethora of restorative 
justice initiatives that seek to respond to victims’ needs outside of, or in 
tandem with, the formal criminal process (see chapter 5). These initiatives 
include family group conferencing, restorative cautioning and community 
conferencing, processes which aim to restore the relationships between 
victims, offenders and communities that have been fractured by crime (Obold-
Eschleman, 2004: 572). However, while restorative justice does evince a 
concern for victims, its concern to meet the needs of offenders and the 
community precludes it from propounding “... a radical vision of victim 
empowerment” (Braithwaite, 2002: 160). Consequently, restorative justice is 
not founded on a victims’ rights discourse. 
 
The foregoing analysis indicates that concern to meet victims’ needs has led 
to a wide range of laws and policies aimed at supporting victims that make 
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significant inroads into the traditional criminal process. While these laws and 
policies have progressively brought victims into the centre of criminal justice 
policy, there has been no change to the formal status of victims. They are not 
regarded as parties to criminal proceedings and have no enforceable rights to 
insist that criminal justice agencies discharge their obligations. Despite the 
fact that other common law jurisdictions, such as the US, and civil law 
jurisdictions, such as Germany, grant victims comprehensive enforceable 
rights (see chapters 2 and 4), the UK has refused to do likewise. On the basis 
of the rights in the Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive, as well as 
the legal position in other jurisdictions, the thesis contends that the UK ought 
to introduce such enforceable rights. 
 
4 OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
 
Against the backcloth of the above analysis of the development of criminal 
justice policy pertaining to victims, and drawing on insights derived from 
critical victimology and critical race feminism, the substantive chapters of the 
thesis advocate the introduction of enforceable rights for victims in the UK. In 
order to highlight the need for the introduction of such rights, chapter 2 
commences by outlining the nature and extent of secondary victimisation in 
the criminal process. Thereafter it evaluates the emergence of a victims’ rights 
discourse in EU law and in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”) and, to a surprisingly large extent, also in the jurisprudence 
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of the English courts. However, the chapter demonstrates that, even though 
the UK government has introduced the Victims’ Code, it has no firm plans to 
act on this discourse by introducing enforceable rights. By way of 
comparison, the chapter considers the American Crime Victims Rights Act 
2004 (“CVRA”). It maintains that the UK ought to accept the Victims’ 
Directive and enact legislation similar to the CVRA that entrenches 
enforceable rights. However, the chapter highlights the importance of 
supplementing such rights with specific measures for socially unequal groups 
to enhance their ability to access these rights effectively. 
 
Each of the subsequent chapters of the thesis considers the extent to which 
English law and policy is congruent with the various rights in the Framework 
Decision and the Victims’ Directive. Chapter 3 commences by setting out the 
provisions of the Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive pertaining 
to the support and assistance of victims. It assesses the services and functions 
of Victim Support and other “unofficial” agencies, and contends that the fact 
that victims have no enforceable right to support and assistance has not 
prevented the UK from complying with its duties in terms of EU law. In 
addition, the chapter evaluates the degree to which the Victims’ Code and the 
provisions for vulnerable victims in the YJCEA, as amended by the CJA 
2009, are consonant with the government’s obligations in the Framework 
Decision and the Victims’ Directive to provide victims with information and 
protection, amongst other things. It maintains that, despite the fact that the 
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government has broadly complied with these obligations, the lack of 
enforceability of the Victims’ Code and the fact that the measures in the 
YJCEA, as amended by the CJA 2009, are discretionary, minimise the utility 
of these instruments for victims.    
 
Against the backdrop of the right to be heard in the Framework Decision and 
the Victims’ Directive, chapter 4 engages in a comparative assessment of 
victim participation in criminal proceedings. It considers the strengths and 
weaknesses of VPS in the UK, and argues that, as they do not generate party 
status for victims, they amount merely to passive participation. The chapter 
analyses the auxiliary prosecution procedure in German and Swedish law, 
highlighting the fact that, as it confers full party status on victims, it amounts 
to active participation. The chapter also explores the provisions permitting 
victims’ lawyers in these legal systems, as well as in the US. It maintains that 
if Sweden, a jurisdiction with adversarial trials, is able to use auxiliary 
prosecution and victims’ lawyers effectively, the introduction of such 
procedures in the UK will not be inconsistent with adversarial principles. 
 
The first part of chapter 5 examines victims’ right to compensation in light of 
the government’ obligations in the Compensation Convention, the Framework 
Decision and the Victims’ Directive. It contends that, barring some 
discrepancies, the CICS is consonant with the Compensation Convention. In 
addition, the chapter considers the existing provisions for imposing 
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compensation orders on offenders, arguing that, while they are congruent with 
the Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive, certain difficulties, such 
as ineffective enforcement mechanisms, hinder their utility for victims. The 
first part of the chapter concludes by surveying recent reform proposals by the 
coalition government.  
 
Chapter 5 then turns to an analysis of restorative justice initiatives in England 
and Wales in light of the provisions of the Framework Decision and Victims’ 
Directive, as well as of international instruments. It maintains that restorative 
justice initiatives harbour several dangers for victims, particularly socially 
unequal victims, which may compound secondary victimisation. 
Consequently, it applauds the inclusion in the Victims’ Directive of 
safeguards for victims in restorative processes. The chapter concludes by 
arguing that the UK ought to focus on the introduction of enforceable rights in 
the formal process rather than on the expansion of restorative initiatives.  
 
Chapter 6 evaluates the position of victims from a range of unequal social 
groups, namely victims of gender-based violence, racially and religiously 
motivated crime, homophobic and transphobic crime, and elder abuse, in 
English law. The decision to restrict the chapter to victims from these groups 
is not meant to suggest that other victims, such as child victims and victims 
with disabilities, do not also experience social inequality. Instead, it flows 
from the author’s view that a comprehensive analysis of the position of child 
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victims and victims with disabilities necessitates the inclusion of a psycho-
sociological perspective that is beyond the ambit of the thesis. Consequently, 
the chapter only explores the extent to which criminal justice responses to the 
above-mentioned forms of victimisation comply with the UK’s obligations in 
terms of international and European human rights law. It demonstrates that, 
apart from elder abuse, criminal justice agencies have effected significant 
reforms to their responses to victims of such crimes, but that a range of flaws 
continue to beset these responses. The chapter concludes by considering the 
rights granted to victims in terms of the EA to institute actions against public 
authorities for discrimination and harassment in the provision of services and 
the performance of public functions, and argues that, in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of these rights, the enforceable victims’ rights that it advocates 
ought to be supplemented by a right to non-discrimination in their enjoyment 
and exercise.  
 
 Chapter 7 comprises a synopsis of the primary arguments raised and the main 
conclusions reached in the thesis. In addition, it delineates the contours of a 
proposed victims’ rights model for the criminal process.  
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CHAPTER 2: SECONDARY VICTIMISATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF A VICTIMS’ RIGHTS DISCOURSE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter commences by assessing victims’ experiences of secondary 
victimisation at the hands of criminal justice agencies, with particular 
reference to victims of gender-based violence and racially motivated and 
homophobic crime. Thereafter, it considers the UK’s response to secondary 
victimisation in light of the emergent discourse of victims’ rights in EU law 
and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (“ECHR”). As the present author has contended 
elsewhere (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 119), one of the key characteristics of a 
right is that it enables the right-bearer to institute legal proceedings for its 
enforcement. This chapter shows that, whereas the Council of Europe, the 
ECtHR and the English courts are moving to the recognition of enforceable 
rights for victims, the English government is, with certain limited exceptions, 
reluctant to follow suit.  
 
In order to demonstrate that this movement to enforceable rights is not 
restricted to Europe, the chapter highlights the recent recognition of 
enforceable victims’ rights in the American CVRA. It contends that English 
law ought to introduce enforceable rights for victims in order to bring the UK 
into line with such international trends. However, it draws attention to the fact 
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that, even if such enforceable rights are recognised, they may be inaccessible 
to victims from socially unequal groups. The introduction of enforceable 
rights thus must be accompanied by measures designed to facilitate their 
accessibility to victims from such groups. 
 
2. SECONDARY VICTIMISATION 
 
 Secondary victimisation may be conceived as the insensitive and inadequate 
treatment of victims by criminal justice agencies, particularly the police, the 
CPS and the courts (Spalek, 2006: 11-12). Research has shown that, while all 
victims experience secondary victimisation, victims from socially unequal 
groups, such as victims of gender-based violence, racially motivated crime 
and homophobic crime suffer particularly seriously at the hands of criminal 
justice agencies. This section briefly assesses the secondary victimisation 
experienced by victims generally and focuses on the experiences of victims 
from socially unequal groups (In order to demonstrate the deleterious impact 
of secondary victimisation on victims, this section assesses the nature and 
extent of secondary victimisation prior to the introduction of reforms to the 
criminal justice process. Reforms to ameliorate secondary victimisation for 
victims in general are discussed fully in chapters 3, 4 and 5, while reforms to 
address the experiences of victims from socially unequal groups are discussed 
in chapter 6).  
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2.1 Victims in general 
 
In the ordinary course, victims’ first experience of the criminal justice system 
occurs when they report an offence to the police. Early research into victims’ 
experiences demonstrated that many victims perceived the police as 
insensitive and unhelpful (Wright, 1996: 24). Police were criticised as being 
“... helpful towards themselves ...” rather than helpful to victims (Wright, 
1996: 24). For instance, they took statements from victims who were still 
reeling from the immediate aftermath of the offence (Wright, 1996: 24). One 
of the central complaints made by victims, however, is that police did not 
provide them with information concerning the progress of their cases, leaving 
them feeling confused and marginalised (JUSTICE, 1998: 26). In particular, 
police ignored the relatives of murder victims, leaving them in the dark 
regarding the progress of the case (JUSTICE, 1998: 55). There was also a 
tendency to hand the matter to the CPS for prosecution against the victim’s 
wishes, which caused distress (Wright, 1996: 24). In addition, the CPS, in 
deciding whether to prosecute offences, did not consult victims (Dignan, 
2005: 72).  
 
 In view of the fact that victims have no formal party status in criminal 
proceedings, there was a tendency to treat victims as “evidentiary cannon 
fodder” not deserving of “common courtesy” when they were required to 
attend court to testify (Dignan, 2005: 64). Victims frequently incurred 
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expenses and sustained loss of earnings in order to testify at court, receiving 
little or no compensation from the state (Wright, 1996: 25). Upon their arrival 
at court, victims were not told where the case was to be heard (JUSTICE, 
1998: 65). Many victims were consigned to waiting rooms shared with the 
defendant’s family and friends and were given no refreshment facilities 
(Dignan, 2005: 74). Inadequate measures existed to protect victims from 
intimidation by the defendant’s family and friends (JUSTICE, 1998: 74). In 
addition, court buildings lacked sufficient child-care facilities (JUSTICE, 
1998: 68-9). Victims were also given no opportunity to meet CPS barristers 
(JUSTICE, 1998: 70-71). Furthermore, they were subjected to numerous 
adjournments and delays (Dignan, 2005: 74), were not informed when the 
case was about to commence and were often not told that a defendant had 
belatedly pleaded guilty (JUSTICE, 1998: 65, 66).   
 
 Victim satisfaction with the courts was accordingly low. Wright has pointed 
to a study indicating that more than a third of victims did not receive 
sufficient advance notice of the date and time of their testimony, and more 
than half of them felt that they were not “... consulted adequately about the 
date, and were not told what to do in the courtroom” (Wright, 1996: 25). 
Furthermore, the roles of various court officials were not explained to three 
quarters of victims (Wright, 1996: 25). 
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 The adversarial courtroom procedure exacerbated victims’ experiences of 
secondary victimisation. Victims frequently complained that they were not  
permitted to “... tell their story in their own words ...” but were required 
instead to furnish exact answers to questions by Crown counsel (Wright, 
1996: 25). In light of the fact that the aim of defence counsel is to cast 
aspersions on the veracity of victims’ testimony and to attack their credibility, 
victims’ experiences of cross-examination were particularly traumatic 
(Dignan, 2005: 64). Many victims experienced cross-examination as intrusive, 
humiliating and degrading, and were left wondering why they were subjected 
to such hostility at the hands of defence counsel (Ellison, 1998: 607-608). The 
trauma associated with cross-examination has led many victims to choose not 
to report their victimisation (Wright, 1996: 26). Those victims who did choose 
to report and whose “offenders” were convicted experienced complete 
exclusion at the stage of sentencing (Dignan, 2005: 65). 
 
 Despite the introduction of several far-reaching reforms to the criminal 
process (see chapters 3, 4 and 5), victims continue to experience secondary 
victimisation. Dignan has contended that the adversarial restrictions on victim 
participation inevitably consign victims “... to a limited, partisan and 
confrontational role within the criminal justice process” (Dignan, 2005: 85).  
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2.2 Victims of gender-based violence 
 
 This section considers the secondary victimisation experienced by rape and 
domestic violence victims. Although the emphasis is on women as victims, 
the experiences of men as victims are also discussed.   
 
2.2.1 Rape victims 
 
Over and above the traumatic experience of the rape itself, rape victims suffer 
further victimisation by criminal justice agencies (Temkin, 2002: 3). Victims 
who report rapes to the police are treated insensitively (Williams, 1999: 61). 
Prior to the introduction of reforms to police policy (see chapter 6), victims 
were required to make statements as soon as they reported the rape, regardless 
of whether they were still in a state of shock. Furthermore, they were 
subjected to intrusive and irrelevant questions. A documentary by Roger 
Graef, which was screened on television in 1982, depicted a rape victim being 
questioned by the police. She was asked questions such as “‘Have you ever 
been on the game? How many times have you had sex? How many men have 
you had sex with? Can you count them on the fingers of one hand?’” (Spalek, 
2006: 106).  
 
Although the furore that followed this documentary led to the introduction of 
several reforms, such as the use of rape suites (Spalek, 2006: 106), police 
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attitudes to rape victims continued to be grounded in a patriarchal 
understanding of women’s sexuality (Williams, 1999: 61) that generated 
insensitive treatment and attitudes of disbelief. Temkin has contended that 
many police officers are unsympathetic to rape victims because they believe 
that victims frequently make false allegations of rape (Temkin, 2002: 4). 
Although some women do make false complaints, the rate of such false 
complaints is no higher in rape cases than in any other cases (Temkin, 2002: 
5). Erroneous beliefs in false allegations have led to the “no criming” of cases, 
particularly where the victim knows the perpetrator (Spalek, 2006: 106), and 
have caused victims to withdraw their statements (Temkin, 2002: 5). Even in 
cases where the police have taken further action in response to the report of 
rape, victims have complained that they received little or no information 
concerning the progress of their cases (Williams, 1999: 62), leaving them 
anxious and confused. 
 
Besides the trauma associated with their interactions with the police, rape 
victims must face the further ordeal of a medical examination. Victims have 
stated that the experience of undergoing a medical examination amounted to 
the worst form of secondary victimisation. Some characterised it as “... a 
further sexual assault and an ordeal in its own right” (Temkin, 1996: 14). 
Prior to the introduction of reforms (see chapter 6), police surgeons, who were 
predominantly male, frequently displayed insensitivity and even hostility to 
victims (Temkin, 1996: 2). Moreover, victims were “... often given no advice 
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about pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases” (Temkin, 1996: 2). 
Temkin’s study of women who had undergone medical examinations in the 
area of Sussex between 1991 and 1993 (Temkin, 1996: 4) found that 86 per 
cent of victims “... were wholly, mainly or partly negative about their 
experiences of the examination” (Temkin, 1996: 8). 
 
Having been required to endure traumatic contact with the police and an even 
more harrowing medical examination, victims’ next encounter is with the 
CPS. The practice on the part of the CPS of accepting pleas to lesser offences 
such as indecent assault has caused “... considerable anger and distress for 
women who have made the difficult decision to report rape” (Williams, 1999: 
62). Furthermore, victims have complained about the absence of 
communication with Crown counsel prior to the trial. A study by Victim 
Support has indicated that victims were disappointed and frustrated by 
prosecutors’ unwillingness to discuss the case with them prior to the trial and 
criticised them as “distant” (Ellison, 2007: 701). This absence of prosecutorial 
support, coupled with the denial of party status and the right to legal 
representation, left victims to fend for themselves in the run up to the trial as 
well as during the trial itself. 
 
Victims have labelled their experiences of cross-examination – the hallmark 
of adversarial trials – as tantamount to a “second rape” or as generating the 
feeling that they, rather than the defendant, are the ones on trial (Lees, 2002: 
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106). Research by Victim Support has demonstrated that victims regard “... 
cross-examination as ‘patronising’, ‘humiliating’, ‘being made to feel as if 
they were on trial’ and ‘worse than the rape’” (Ellison, 1998: 607). These 
experiences have been ascribed to the tactics employed by defence counsel to 
cast aspersions on victims’ characters in order to undermine their credibility 
(Ellison, 2007: 695) and to depict the alleged rape as consensual sexual 
intercourse (Easton, 2000: 179). For instance, defence counsel have drawn on 
rape myths and stereotypes to contend that the absence of physical injuries 
points to consent and the delay in reporting indicates fabrication by the victim 
(Ellison, 2007: 695). They have also used evidence of the victim’s past sexual 
activity to suggest that she consented to the alleged rape (Temkin, 2002: 9). In 
addition, in order to portray victims as deviating from the norm of appropriate 
womanhood, defence counsel have scrutinised victims’ personal lives, 
questioning them about their provocative clothing and behaviour, their 
financial position, their motherhood role and their use of alcohol and drugs 
(Ellison, 2000: 41). Apart from these strategies, defence counsel have also 
employed bullying tactics, such as rapid-fire and repetitive questioning about 
intimate details of the alleged rape (Ellison, 2000: 43), in order to try to distort 
victims’ versions of events and to render them consistent with consensual 
intercourse (Temkin, 2002: 9).  
 
Critics have expressed concern at the lack of judicial intervention to curb such 
defence tactics (Temkin, 2002: 9). However, Ellison has contended that the 
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“macho adversarialism” of criminal proceedings encourages the use of 
intimidating and humiliating tactics by defence counsel (Ellison, 2000: 45). 
Moreover, the adversarial concept of judicial detachment and passivity 
precludes the judiciary from intervening for “fear of appearing partisan ...” 
(Ellison, 2000: 48-49). Consequently, Ellison has argued that secondary 
victimisation consequent upon cross-examination is embedded within the 
principle of adversarialism itself and cannot be removed without radical 
transformation of the adversarial process (Ellison, 2000: 57). 
 
On the other hand, however, there is evidence to suggest that judicial apathy 
was located not only in the dictates of adversarialism but also in patriarchal 
attitudes on the part of the judiciary. The following summing up to the jury by 
Judge Wild in the Cambridge Crown Court in 1982 testifies to the existence 
of such attitudes:  
 Women who say no do not always mean no. It is not just a question of 
saying no, it is a question of how she says it, how she shows and 
makes it clear. If she doesn’t want it, she only has to keep her legs shut 
and she would not get it without force and there would be marks of 
force being used (Temkin, 2002: 10). 
 
In light of the above features of secondary victimisation, the offence of rape 
has had a markedly high rate of attrition. Many cases were not reported, but 
even those that were reported were subjected to “no-criming”, prosecutorial 
downgrading of offences and plea-bargaining. Furthermore, a study by Harris 
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and Grace revealed that a mere 6 per cent of rape cases “... recorded by the 
police as rape resulted in convictions and that cases broke down at each stage, 
no-criming, no further action, acquittals and downgrading to lesser offences” 
(Easton, 2000: 168-169).  
 
Williams has argued that reforms are only capable of effecting limited change 
to the experiences of rape victims “... as attitudes towards rape have their 
origins in patriarchal assumptions about women’s sexuality … and change in 
this area is bound to be slow, resisted as it is by a male establishment and the 
individual vested interests of men” (Williams, 1999: 61). 
 
However, recent research has demonstrated that it is not only women rape 
victims but also their male counterparts that have experienced secondary 
victimisation. Male victims of rape have reported that they receive insensitive 
treatment at the hands of the police (Rumney, 2001: 206). In addition, they 
have been subjected to aggressive and humiliating cross-examination by 
defence counsel, as well as the use of tactics to undermine their credibility. 
For instance, counsel have pointed to the lack of physical resistance and 
injury as evidence that the victim consented to the alleged rape (Rumney, 
2001: 208). They have drawn on victims’ past sexual activity to cast doubt on 
their credibility or to argue that they consented (Rumney, 2001: 209). These 
tactics are strikingly similar to those employed in cross-examining women 
rape victims (Rumney, 2001: 212), and suggest that men’s experiences of 
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sexual violence are embedded in masculinist perceptions of male sexuality 
that do not accord with their lived experiences (see chapter 1). 
 
2.2.2 Victims of domestic violence 
 
Prior to the advent of recent reforms (see chapter 6), domestic violence 
victims experienced severe secondary victimisation. Police responded 
insensitively to reports of domestic violence, adopting the attitude that 
domestic violence is a family matter and not “real” police work. Such 
responses prompted criticism that the police did not take domestic violence 
seriously (JUSTICE, 1998: 52), leading many victims to choose not to report 
or to withdraw their statements.  
 
Minority women faced (and continue to face) the additional burden of police 
racism, expressed in hostility and lack of interest, causing them to be more 
hesitant than white women to report domestic violence (Gill, 2004: 466, 467; 
Sundari & Gill, 2009: 174). The barriers to reporting are compounded for 
undocumented immigrant women, whose fears of police xenophobia coupled 
with the threat of deportation consign them to remain in abusive relationships 
rather than seek police assistance (Gill, 2004: 478, 479). There are also 
language and cultural barriers to minority women’s access to victim support 
services (Spalek, 2002a: 70). Many victim support services fail to understand 
the importance of religion in the lives of minority women, and may “... judge 
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them for conforming to … prejudiced assumptions about the controlling and 
patriarchal nature of religion” (Spalek, 2006: 111). Furthermore, research has 
shown that Victim Support contacts more white women than women from 
minority ethnic communities (Spalek, 2002a: 70). Minority women thus are 
marginalised not only by police racism, but also by cultural insensitivity on 
the part of victim support agencies.   
 
Women whose cases were referred by the police to the CPS faced the frequent 
CPS practice of reducing charges, particularly from assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm to common assault (Cretney & Davis, 1997: 148). Prosecutors 
justified this practice on the basis that reduced charges ensure that the matter 
will be heard in the magistrates’ court, which is more favourably disposed to 
hearing domestic violence cases than the Crown Court (Cretney & Davis, 
1997: 149). On the other hand, Cammiss has contended that prosecutors have 
minimised the seriousness of domestic violence cases due to their expectation 
that the victim will reconcile with the defendant and accordingly withdraw her 
complaint (Cammiss, 2006: 707). In view of the high rate of withdrawals, this 
expectation is not unjustified. Hoyle and Sanders, for instance, have found 
that most domestic violence victims refused to make statements or withdrew 
their statements (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000: 16). However, those women that did 
not wish to withdraw their complaints perceived such charge reductions as a 
signal that the criminal justice system devalued their experiences (Cretney & 
Davis, 1997: 149).  
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Furthermore, women have complained of lack of adequate communication 
with prosecutors (Cretney & Davis, 1997: 150). Many victims feared 
attending court on account of actual or threatened intimidation by the abuser if 
they testified (Spalek, 2006: 107). Prior to the introduction of the Witness 
Service (see chapter 3), the absence of prosecutorial contact was particularly 
traumatic for such victims as there was no one to make arrangements for their 
safety. In addition, the courts were (and still are) unwilling to permit the 
statements of domestic violence victims who are too afraid to testify to be 
admitted in terms of the exceptions to the hearsay rule (see chapter 3). Many 
women thus choose to withdraw their complaints or do not attend court due to 
fear for their safety. 
 
The experiences of those victims whose cases reached court are similar to 
those of rape victims. Victims felt unable to narrate their testimony fully, 
reporting that prosecutors often presented a truncated version to the court 
(Cretney & Davis, 1997: 151). During cross-examination, defence counsel 
either depicted the couple as having reconciled, or employed images of the 
victim as “... a woman scorned, a jealous woman, or a drunken woman ...” 
(Cretney & Davis, 1997: 151). Victims thus experienced the court process as 
eliding their interests and marginalising their experiences of victimisation. 
These experiences were compounded by patriarchal attitudes on the part of 
many magistrates. In a study of magistrates’ attitudes to domestic violence as 
reflected in their proposed sentences in six vignette cases, Gilchrist and 
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Blissett found that magistrates regarded cases not requiring medical treatment 
where the woman’s behaviour challenged gendered conceptions of the “good 
wife” and the “good mother” as the least serious forms of domestic violence 
(Gilchrist & Blissett, 2002: 350, 360). Other studies have shown that 
sentencing in domestic violence cases was premised on a conception of 
domestic violence as “... trivial and non-criminal” (Cretney & Davis, 1997: 
152). Women victims thus viewed the outcomes of domestic violence cases as 
failing to reflect the seriousness of their experiences of domestic violence 
(Cretney & Davis, 1997: 153). 
 
2.3 Victims of racially motivated crime 
 
Minority ethnic victims of “ordinary” (i.e. non-racially motivated) crime 
suffered (and continue to suffer) extensive secondary victimisation by 
criminal justice agencies, particularly the police. Research has shown that the 
police fail to take adequate action to investigate ordinary everyday crime 
against minority ethnic groups (“MEGs”) and that those reporting 
victimisation may suffer harassment in the form of “... rough treatment, 
inappropriate questioning and immigration checks” (Bowling & Phillips, 
2002: 122).  
 
However, victims of racially motivated crime fare much worse than do 
minority victims of “ordinary” crime. The police often fail to discern the 
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racial element in racially motivated crime and, even where they do, they tend 
to place racial incidents at the “... lower end of the hierarchy of police 
relevance” (Hall, 2005: 193, 197). Furthermore, they are slow to respond, 
unwilling to investigate and frequently hostile to victims (Hall, 2005: 193). A 
study undertaken in North Plaistow revealed criticisms that police were not 
doing enough, were failing to keep victims informed of the progress of the 
investigation and generally did not appear interested (Hall, 2005: 193-194). 
Victims have also complained that they are treated as suspects rather than 
victims (Victim Support, 2006a: 66) and that the police have insufficient 
interpreters to overcome language barriers (Phillips & Sampson, 1998: 130).  
 
In addition, it has been found that the police completely disregard low-level 
racial harassment (Hall, 2005: 178). Such attitudes ignore the reality that 
racially motivated victimisation is often repeated and occurs on a continuum 
that ranges from low-level harassment to serious violence (Bowling & 
Phillips, 2002: 113). This disregard of low-level harassment fuels perceptions 
of police racism and discrimination on the part of MEGs. The Commission for 
Racial Equality indicated that it frequently received complaints concerning 
police discrimination against minority ethnic victims (Field & Roberts, 2002: 
497). 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that such discrimination is not restricted to 
victims in urban areas but also occurs in rural areas (Garland & Chakraborti, 
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2004; Garland & Chakraborti, 2006). Rural victims reported secondary 
victimisation that is similar to their urban counterparts. However, incidents of 
police racism and insensitivity may occur more frequently due to the fact that 
police in rural areas “... are not as used to dealing with racist incidents as 
those working in urban areas” (Garland & Chakraborti, 2006: 60). Criticisms 
of the police treatment of minority ethnic victims also extend to their 
inappropriate and insensitive responses to religiously motivated victimisation. 
In the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, for instance, Muslims 
who reported Islamophobic harassment were told by the police to “stay at 
home” (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2002). The Islamic Human 
Rights Commission has contended that advice of this nature “... legitimises 
the further isolation and marginalisation of an already excluded community 
...” and compounds Muslim victims’ lack of confidence in the police (Islamic 
Human Rights Commission, 2002). 
 
 Studies have demonstrated that police racism is not the preserve of a few “bad 
apples” but is deeply embedded within police occupational culture (Lea, 2000: 
221-222). Some officers have sympathy for whites who regard their areas as 
having been “taken over” by MEGs, and who deprecate the fact that Asian 
people speak and dress in ways that differ from whites. Such racist views are 
conveyed in the ways in which police treat victims (Bowling & Phillips, 2002: 
123). 
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Racism within police culture received the urgent attention of the government 
in the wake of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence, an African-Caribbean 
teenager, in southeast London in 1993 (McGhee, 2005: 16-17). The 
investigation by the London Metropolitan Police Service (“MPS”) into the 
murder was appallingly inadequate and the perpetrators were not prosecuted. 
Racist stereotyping caused the police to regard Stephen Lawrence’s friend, 
Duwayne Brooks, who witnessed the murder, as a suspect “... rather than the 
victim of an unprovoked attack” (Davie, 2007: 90). The MPS also treated Mrs 
Lawrence, the victim’s mother, in a patronising way. Furthermore, the MPS 
attempted to discredit Imran Khan, the family’s solicitor. The primary error on 
the part of the MPS was its refusal to admit to the racist motivation of the 
murder as well as the racism that underpinned the police investigation 
(McGhee, 2005: 20).  
 
The incident gave rise to the MacPherson Inquiry, which found that “the 
investigation was marred by a combination of professional incompetence, 
institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers” 
(MacPherson, 1999: para 46.1). The Inquiry defined institutional racism as –  
The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and 
professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or 
ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and 
behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting 
prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which 
disadvantage minority ethnic people (MacPherson, 1999: para 6.34). 
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The Inquiry made several recommendations for the eradication of institutional 
racism from within the MPS as well as other police forces throughout the UK, 
which have generated widespread reforms to police policy and practice. 
Despite these reforms, however, minority ethnic victims continue to 
experience racism and insensitivity on the part of the police (see chapter 6). 
 
 The secondary victimisation that minority ethnic victims experience is not 
restricted to their interactions with the police. Victims have reported 
insensitive treatment by other statutory and voluntary agencies. For instance, 
research concerning the Crime and Disorder Partnerships established in terms 
of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (“CDA”) to respond, amongst other 
things, to racially motivated victimisation “... has been equivocal at best, and 
damning at worst” (Bowling & Phillips, 2002: 123-124). Studies have shown 
that participants in these initiatives tended to deny the significance of racist 
victimisation, adopted victim-blaming attitudes and were hesitant “... to 
investigate or take action against perpetrators for fear of a white backlash” 
(Bowling & Phillips, 2002: 124). A study by Phillips and Sampson of multi-
agency responses to racist victimisation on an East London housing estate 
found that the multi-agency initiative failed for these reasons (Phillips & 
Sampson, 1998: 129). 
 
 Victims of rural racism have also complained that statutory and voluntary 
agencies, such as Citizens Advice Bureaux, respond inadequately to reports of 
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racist victimisation (Garland & Chakraborti, 2006: 61). Studies have 
demonstrated that agencies in rural areas fail to regard racist victimisation as 
important and assume that, in light of the small numbers of MEGs in rural 
areas, the extent of such victimisation is insignificant (Garland & Chakraborti, 
2004: 135-136). 
 
In addition, minority ethnic victims have expressed misgivings about Victim 
Support. It is regarded as linked to the police and has an image of being a 
white, middle class organisation (Victim Support, 2006a: 43). Many victims 
are unable to communicate with Victim Support volunteers in view of their 
inability to speak English and the lack of interpreters or foreign language 
speakers (Victim Support, 2006a: 64). Many victims thus choose to turn to 
their own community agencies, such as the Muslim Community Helpline, 
rather than Victim Support (see chapter 3).  
 
Very little research has been conducted into minority ethnic victims’ 
experiences of the CPS and the court process. The available research shows 
that victims are often fearful of testifying and lack the motivation to do so, 
particularly in view of their perception that a conviction is unlikely (Victim 
Support, 2006a, 46). However, 75 per cent of the respondents in a study by 
Victim Support stated that they would testify if the offender were to be 
prosecuted. Many victims were disappointed and frustrated at the lack of 
proceedings against offenders (Victim Support, 2006a: 52).  
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The rate of prosecutions for racially motivated offences is very low, with the 
CPS prosecuting only one in four racially aggravated offences (McGhee, 
2005: 30). Prosecutors have been criticised for downgrading racially 
aggravated offences too easily or accepting pleas to lesser offences that do not 
reflect the element of racist motivation (Burney, 2003: 31). However, studies 
have shown that the reasons for such downgrading have less to do with racism 
and insensitivity on the part of the CPS than with the difficulties of proving 
racial motivation or hostility, which is an element of the aggravated offences 
(Burney, 2003: 31). Similar concerns have been raised regarding the 
prosecution of religiously motivated offences, with scholars pointing to the 
low rate of prosecution for such offences (Spalek, 2006: 146), as well as the 
difficulty of proving religious motivation and hostility (Idriss, 2002: 908). 
Minority victims of racially or religiously motivated crime thus rarely become 
involved in the court process.  
 
2.4 Victims of homophobic crime 
 
The literature concerning the treatment of victims of homophobic crime by 
criminal justice agencies is sparse. However, the available evidence suggests 
that the majority of victims choose not to report incidents to the police for fear 
of secondary victimisation (Williams & Robinson, 2004: 215; Hall, 2005: 
194-195). Victims’ fears include fear of police discrimination and ill-
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treatment as well as fear of the consequences of acknowledging their sexual 
orientation (Hall, 2005: 195).  
 
Victims’ perceptions of police homophobia (Victim Support, 2006a: 66) have 
been verified by research documenting the existence of homophobic attitudes 
within police occupational culture. These attitudes find expression in 
discriminatory practices and harassment of lesbian, gay and bisexual (“LGB”) 
people (Williams & Robinson, 2004: 214-215) and have led scholars to 
contend that, like racism, police homophobia is institutionalised (McGhee, 
2005: 129). The police fail to take reports of homophobic crime seriously 
(Moran, 2004: 928) and reports result in few police investigations (McGhee, 
2005: 128). Furthermore, prosecutions and convictions of homophobic crimes 
are rare (McGhee, 2005: 128). LGB victims thus experience marginalisation 
and exclusion from the criminal justice process.  
 
3. ENGLISH LAW AND POLICY: VICTIMS’ NEEDS OR VICTIMS’ 
RIGHTS?  
 
From the 1970s onwards, and particularly since the 1980s, victims’ 
organisations have urged the British government to introduce reforms to 
eliminate secondary victimisation (see chapter 1). This section, which draws 
on the present author’s work (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 128-131), analyses the 
government’s response to such victim advocacy, indicating that, with some 
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exceptions, it is founded on the notion that victims have needs that generate 
entitlements or expectations rather than legally enforceable rights. It engages 
in a brief overview of the Victim’s Charters (Home Office, 1990; Home 
Office, 1996) and the government policy that preceded the introduction of the 
Victims’ Code. Thereafter it assesses the legal nature of the Victims’ Code.  
 
3.1 The position prior to the Victims’ Code 
 
The Victim’s Charters 1990 and 1996 (Home Office, 1990, Home Office, 
1996) constituted the first wide-ranging attempts on the part of the state to 
meet the needs of victims in the criminal justice system. Although the 
Victim’s Charter 1990 was entitled a “Statement of rights of victims of 
crime”, it merely contained “guiding principles” concerning the treatment of 
victims and was not legally enforceable (Dignan, 2005: 66-67). It was 
criticised for “... falsely raising victims’ hopes by dressing service standards 
in the language of rights ...” (Goodey, 2005: 127).   
 
The Victim’s Charter 1996 relinquished the language of rights, being entitled 
“A statement of service standards for victims of crime”. It granted victims 
entitlements to or expectations of services from criminal justice agencies 
(Rock, 2004: 160) and was not legally enforceable. These services included 
victims receiving information, amongst other things, about the progress of the 
police investigation, the trial proceedings and the release of offenders; having 
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their views considered by the CPS and the courts, amongst others; being 
treated with respect and sensitivity in court; and being offered emotional and 
practical support, such as assistance in claiming compensation. 
 
Although the Victim’s Charter gave victims the expectation of such services, 
the fact that it lacked enforceability meant that it granted victims no rights as 
consumers of these services or substantive rights as citizens (Goodey, 2005: 
131). However, it nonetheless provided “... a formal authority to act” (Rock, 
2004: 162), thereby facilitating gains as regards the consideration of victims’ 
interests which may otherwise not have been achieved.   
 
The government’s attitude to the recognition of enforceable rights for victims 
has fluctuated. On the one hand, the then Lord Chancellor expressed strong 
disapproval of the establishment of “... a new comprehensive tier of legally 
enforceable rights for victims” (Rock, 2004: 535). On the other hand, in 
response to the Framework Decision (see section 4 below), the government 
stated that it aimed to establish statutory rights for victims (Home Office, 
2001b; Home Office, 2001c), including the rights to be treated with dignity 
and respect; to support; to protection; to give and receive information; to 
compensation or reparation; and to a transparent criminal justice process 
(Home Office, 2001b: para 3.104). 
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Despite these statements of intent, however, enforceable statutory rights for 
victims were never enacted. Instead, state discourse reverted to the language 
of victims’ “needs” and “services” for victims. In Justice for all (Home 
Office, 2002b), the government stressed the importance of putting victims at 
the “heart” of the criminal justice system, and rebalancing the system in 
favour of victims (Home Office, 2002b: paras 0.22, 0.3). At the same time its 
talk of statutory victims’ rights gave way to an intention to introduce a 
Victims’ Code of Practice imposing responsibilities on criminal justice 
agencies “... to ensure that the needs of victims and witnesses are met” (Home 
Office, 2002b: para 2.43). Likewise, in A new deal for victims and witnesses 
(Home Office, 2003c) it stated that the “overarching aim” of its victims’ 
strategy “... is to improve services to victims and witnesses and to increase 
their satisfaction with those services” (Home Office, 2003c: para 3.1). 
 
This reversion to the language of needs as opposed to rights has attracted 
criticism. For instance, Jackson has contended that, rather than uttering 
rhetorical statements of commitment to victims’ interests, the government 
should ensure the existence of specific remedies for victims whose rights have 
been infringed, resulting in “... consequences for criminal justice agencies 
which failed to deliver these rights” (Jackson, 2003: 326). 
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3.2 The Victims’ Code  
 
In accordance with the above government policy, the Victim’s Code imposes 
service obligations on various criminal justice agencies. These obligations 
include the provision of information throughout the criminal justice process, 
appropriate protection, such as special measures, and sensitivity and respect 
(see chapter 3). The Victim’s Code binds, inter alia, the following criminal 
justice agencies: the police (para 5); the Joint Police/CPS Witness Care Units 
(para 6); the CPS (para 7); Her Majesty’s Court Service (para 8); and the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (para 13). 
 
The Victim’s Code does not grant victims enforceable rights but merely 
affords them a mechanism for instituting complaints. As De Than has argued, 
it lacks “... real status and courtroom enforceability” (De Than, 2003: 182). 
Paragraph 16.1 provides that, in the first instance, if victims are of the view 
that any of the agencies have not fulfilled their obligations in terms of the 
Victims’ Code, they should discuss the matter with the person with whom 
they have been dealing at the relevant agency. If they remain dissatisfied, they 
should “... make a complaint through the internal complaints procedure of that 
service provider”. If their complaint is not addressed satisfactorily, they may 
complain to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, who is empowered in terms of 
s.47 and schedule 7 of the DVCVA to investigate and report to Parliament on 
such complaints. The number of complaints that have been made to the 
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Ombudsman is surprisingly low. Only three complaints were made in 2007, 
and only two in 2008 (Reeves & Dunn, 2010: 54). The reasons for such a low 
rate of complaints are not known (Reeves & Dunn, 2010: 54).    
 
Section 48 of the DVCVA provides for the appointment of a Commissioner 
for Victims and Witnesses, who is currently Louise Casey (Ministry of 
Justice, undated). In terms of s.49(1), the Commissioner’s functions are to 
promote victims’ and witness’s interests, to take appropriate steps to 
encourage “... good practice in the treatment of victims and witnesses ...”, and 
to keep the operation of the Victims’ Code under review. However, the 
Commissioner may not exercise these functions to take up particular victims’ 
causes or as regards “... anything done or omitted to be done by a person 
acting in a judicial capacity or on the instructions of or on behalf of such a 
person” (s.51). 
 
Section 34(1) of the DVCVA expressly provides that, if an agency breaches a 
code duty, no criminal or civil liability may ensue. However, in terms of 
s.34(2), the Victims’ Code “... is admissible in criminal or civil proceedings 
and a court may take into account a failure to comply with the code in 
determining a question in the proceedings”. It is as yet uncertain when a 
breach would be deemed relevant to such a question, but Ward and Bird 
suggest that it may be relevant to “... questions about whether special 
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measures directions should be made under the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999” (Ward & Bird, 2005: 92).  
 
It is thus clear that, in general, there are no statutorily enforceable rights for 
victims of crime. Although the coalition government has yet to produce a 
comprehensive policy on victims, it has recently indicated its commitment to 
devising “... ways to match the responsibility shown by victims ... in 
participating in criminal justice with a clearer set of rights” (Ministry of 
Justice, 2010: para 83).    
 
4. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN EU LAW 
 
There is a striking contrast between the English distaste for enforceable 
victims’ rights and the drive to establish such rights in EU law. The 
burgeoning discourse of victims’ rights in Europe may be said to have 
emerged in three waves. The first wave, which commenced in the 1980s, is to 
be found in non-binding Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe (see Wolhuter et al, 2009: 120-121). The first one – 
Recommendation No. R (85) 11 on the position of the victim in the framework 
of criminal law and procedure (1985) – emphasised the importance of 
providing information to victims concerning, amongst other things, the date 
and place of the hearing, opportunities to claim compensation and the 
availability of legal assistance (article 9). It also recommended the provision 
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of information regarding victims’ injuries and losses to the court to enable it 
to consider victims’ compensation needs in sentencing (article 12). In 
addition, it provided that victims should be able to request a review of a 
decision not to prosecute, and be granted the right to institute a private 
prosecution (article 7). However, it did not advocate enforceable victims’ 
rights or active victim participation in criminal proceedings. It nonetheless 
marked the birth of a consciousness of the significance of victims’ interests on 
the part of the Council of Europe. 
 
Recommendation No. R (87) 21 of the Committee of Ministers on assistance to 
victims and prevention of victimization (1987) dealt with the provision of 
support and assistance to victims outside the criminal justice system. It has 
been replaced by Recommendation Rec (2006) 8 on assistance to crime 
victims (2006), which is placed firmly within a victims’ rights framework. 
Article 2 provides that states must ensure that victims’ rights are recognised 
and respected with reference to human rights, particularly the rights to “... 
security, dignity, private and family life ...” and that the measures in Rec 
(2006) 8 must be “... made available to victims without discrimination”. These 
measures include the imposition of the following duties on Member States: to 
provide victims with medical, psychological and social assistance and to 
ensure that vulnerable victims have access to special measures to assist them 
in testifying (article 3); to ensure that victims have access to information 
about support services, court procedure, protection, legal advice, etc. (article 
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6); and to provide compensation to victims of serious, intentional, violent 
crimes and their families if the victim has died (article 8). 
 
Although Rec (2006) 8 is not binding on Member States, it is nevertheless 
noteworthy for the way in which it elaborates and concretises the rights 
enshrined in the Framework Decision (see chapter 3 for a detailed discussion 
of the provisions of Rec (2006) 8). 
 
The Framework Decision, which is binding on Member States, represents the 
second wave of the discourse of victims’ rights at the European level, and 
signifies the formal inclusion of this discourse in EU law (see Wolhuter, et al, 
2009: 121-122). It was adopted in 2001 in pursuance of article 34(2) of the 
pre-Lisbon Treaty on European Union (“TEU”). Article 34(2)(b) provided 
that, in order to approximate the laws and regulations of Member States, the 
Council of Europe may adopt framework decisions, which are binding as 
regards “... the result to be achieved ...” but not as to the “... form and methods 
...” of achieving such results. Framework decisions do not have “direct 
effect”. The Framework Decision grants victims several rights, including the 
right to receive “... information of relevance for the protection of their 
interests ...” throughout the criminal justice process (article 4; see chapter 3); 
the right to protection, particularly as regards their safety and privacy, 
including, where necessary, the right to testify in a manner that shields them 
from “... the effects of giving evidence in open court ...” (article 8; see chapter 
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3); the right to have the possibility of being heard and to give evidence 
safeguarded  (article 3; see chapter 4); and the right to compensation (article 
9; see chapter 5). 
 
The extent to which these rights are enforceable appears from the decision of 
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in Criminal Proceedings Against 
Pupino [2005] 3 WLR 1102. The ECJ held that the principle of harmonious 
interpretation (indirect effect) applies to framework decisions (Fletcher, 2005: 
872), and thus that the Framework Decision obliges national authorities, 
particularly national courts, to interpret domestic law “... in conformity with 
Community law” (para 34). However, the interpretation must accord with 
Convention rights, particularly the right to a fair trial (para 59) and may not 
result in “... an interpretation of national law contra legem” (para 47).  
 
Pre-Lisbon article 35(1) TEU clothed the ECJ with jurisdiction “... to give 
preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions 
… and on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them”. 
In terms of article 35(2) TEU, Member States who had made a declaration 
accepting such jurisdiction could refer matters to the ECJ. In Pupino the ECJ 
took the view that the existence of this jurisdiction meant that individuals 
could invoke the Framework Decision in national courts to obtain “... a 
conforming interpretation of national law” (para 38). 
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The principle of indirect effect, coupled with the right of individuals to invoke 
the Framework Decision in national courts, thus constituted a mechanism for 
the enforcement of victims’ rights (Fletcher, 2005: 875). However, the UK did 
not make the requisite declaration (Lööf, 2006: 429), depriving victims of the 
opportunity to request a referral to the ECJ. Pre-Lisbon, the scope for victims’ 
reliance on the Framework Decision in the UK was thus dependent upon the 
extent to which domestic courts were willing to uphold their duty to give it 
indirect effect. 
 
The changes effected by the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community 2007 
(“the Lisbon Treaty”) paved the way for the third wave of victims’ rights 
discourse in EU law. In terms of the Lisbon Treaty, the legislative instruments 
of the EU no longer include framework decisions, and the principle of indirect 
effect no longer applies. Instead, all matters falling within the erstwhile Third 
Pillar (which included victims’ rights) now fall to be regulated legislatively by 
the usual EU legislative instruments, namely regulations, directives and 
decisions, which have direct effect (Fletcher, 2011: 19). Fletcher takes the 
view that, in light of the similarity between framework decisions and 
directives, the latter is likely to replace the former as the “instrument of 
choice” (Fletcher, 2011: 19). 
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In addition, article 1.51 of the Lisbon Treaty abolishes article 35 TEU, with 
the result that all erstwhile Third Pillar matters are subject to the general 
jurisdiction of the ECJ (Barents, 2010: 719), which is renamed the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (“CJ”; Barents, 2010: 709). Consequently, the 
restrictions on the preliminary rulings procedure discussed above no longer 
apply (Piris, 2010: 188). 
 
However, in terms of article 10.1 – 10.3 of the Lisbon Treaty Protocol on 
Transitional Provisions, the powers of the CJ in regard to Third Pillar law that 
pre-dates the Lisbon Treaty continue to be restricted, as set out in the pre-
Lisbon article 35, for a period of five years, unless the relevant legislation “... 
is replaced or amended ... after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty” 
(Piris, 2010: 189). Consequently, if a framework decision is repealed or 
amended within this period, it becomes subject to the general jurisdiction of 
the CJ. After the expiry of the five-year period, all unchanged legislation will 
be subject to the general jurisdiction of the CJ (Fletcher, 2011: 20). 
 
As regards the UK, the transformative consequences of a victims’ rights 
instrument with direct effect and subject to the general jurisdiction of the CJ 
have been muted. Article 10(4) of the Transitional Protocol provides that, six 
months before the five-year period expires, the UK may decide not to “... 
accept the new powers of the ECJ, in which case all pre-existing [Third Pillar] 
legislation (which has not since been amended) will cease to apply to it” 
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(Fletcher, 2011: 20). However, article 10(5) permits the UK to “... opt-back 
into some of the measures as it sees fit” (Fletcher, 2011: 20). In addition, 
when an amendment to a Third Pillar instrument is proposed, the UK may 
decide to “opt out” of it, rendering the instrument non-binding and non-
applicable in the UK (Piris, 2010: 199). The combined effect of these “opt 
out” provisions means that the UK is able to sidestep the application of post-
Lisbon instruments in the erstwhile Third Pillar if it chooses. 
 
One such instrument, which is of central importance to the entrenchment of 
victims’ rights in EU law, and which represents the third wave of victims’ 
rights discourse in the EU, is the proposed Victims’ Directive. Paragraph (6) 
of the Preamble states that the Victims’ Directive will replace the Framework 
Decision. The Victims’ Directive grants victims several rights, some of which 
are more extensive than those contained in the Framework Decision. They 
include the following: the right to information (articles 3 and 4; see chapter 
3); “... the right to interpretation and translation” (article 6; see chapter 3); the 
right to support (article 7; see chapter 3); the right to protection, with specific 
reference to the protection of vulnerable victims (articles 17 – 23; see chapter 
3); various rights to participate in the criminal process (articles 8, 9 and 10; 
see chapter 4); and rights in regard to compensation, mediation and restorative 
justice processes (articles 11 and 15; see chapter 5). If it is enacted, the 
Victims’ Directive will have direct effect and will be subject to the general 
jurisdiction of the CJ. Consequently, domestic courts will be required to give 
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effect to it, and aggrieved victims will have standing to raise the issue of the 
non-compatibility of domestic law with its provisions in criminal proceedings. 
However, as paragraph (29) of the Preamble indicates, the consequences of 
the enactment of the Victims’ Directive for the UK are currently uncertain, as 
the UK has to decide whether to opt in or out of its provisions.  
 
5. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CONVENTION JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 As the above analysis has sought to demonstrate, despite the establishment of 
a discourse of enforceable victims’ rights in EU law, the UK government has 
been reluctant to open itself to the introduction of such rights in domestic law. 
However, the English judiciary has recently been displaying great willingness 
to follow the victims’ rights jurisprudence that has been developed by the 
ECtHR in the interpretation of the ECHR.  
 
Although the ECHR does not explicitly enshrine victims’ rights, the ECtHR 
has integrated victims’ rights into its jurisprudence in three primary respects 
(Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 122). First, it has accorded victims an independent 
civil right to a fair trial in certain circumstances. Second, it has incorporated 
victims’ rights/interests into the proportionality requirement of the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial in article 6 ECHR. Third, it has imposed 
positive obligations on Member States to ensure that victims’ rights to life in 
article 2 ECHR, freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
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punishment in article 3 ECHR, and respect for private and family life in 
article 8 ECHR are upheld. This integration of victims’ rights into Convention 
jurisprudence has been replicated by the English judiciary in several recent 
judgments. This section assesses the case law of the ECtHR and the English 
courts in the above three respects. 
 
5.1 Independent civil right to a fair trial  
 
In terms of article 6(1) ECHR, in the determination of their civil rights and 
obligations, all persons are “... entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. 
As the present author has noted (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 123), the ECtHR has 
recognised that victims have rights to a fair trial in civil proceedings in certain 
circumstances. In Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245, for instance, it held that 
article 6(1) applies to a victim who wishes to sue the police in negligence for a 
failure to investigate effectively and to prevent the crime (paras 139-140). It 
also held that the domestic court’s refusal to entertain the victim’s claim 
constituted a blanket police immunity that unjustifiably restricted the victim’s 
right (para 151).  
 
In Perez v France (2005) 40 EHRR 39 it confirmed that, as article 6(1) 
applies to “... the determination of civil rights and obligations”, it applies to a 
partie civile, who is a party to the criminal proceedings for the purpose of 
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pursuing his/her compensation claim (paras 71-72). However, because the 
partie civile’s interest in the proceedings is limited to compensation, and does 
not extend to the “... criminal aspect of the proceedings ...”, his/her “... rights 
in relation to the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial system are 
not the same as those of the accused in relation to the prosecutor” (Gorou v 
Greece (No. 4) (2010) 50 EHRR 27, para 26). 
 
Like the ECtHR, the English courts have recognised victims’ civil right to a 
fair trial in certain circumstances (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 133-134). For 
instance, although the UK does not recognise the partie civile procedure, it 
does afford victims a civil right to claim compensation from the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Authority (“CICA”). In C v Secretary of State for the 
Home Office [2003] EWIJC 1295, the Court of Queen’s Bench affirmed that, 
as the CICS is statutory, “... a well-founded claim to compensation under the 
Scheme is a ‘civil right’ ...” and the applicant is accordingly entitled to a fair 
hearing in terms of article 6(1) (para 43; see also S v Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board [2004] SLT 1173, para 144). 
 
However, the ECtHR has adopted a different view. In August v UK 
(Application no. 36505/02, 21 January 2003) it held that the Scheme is ex 
gratia and that it is accordingly not apparent that victims have a civil right to 
claim compensation. It held further that, even if article 6(1) was engaged, the 
substantive content of a civil right is a matter for the domestic authorities not 
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the ECtHR (para 2). It is submitted that the ECtHR erroneously regarded the 
English Scheme as ex gratia. The English judiciary, as well as CICA itself, 
distinguish between the common law scheme that preceded the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Act 1995 and subsequent schemes (see R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Fire Brigades Union and Others 
[1995] 2 AC 513, 553; Rock, 2004: 284). The former was clearly ex gratia 
and only afforded victims a legitimate expectation of compensation. On the 
other hand, the later schemes are statutory and therefore grant a civil right to 
applicants with well-founded compensation claims (see chapter 5). 
 
5.2 Incorporation of victims’ rights/interests into defendant’s right to fair 
trial 
 
The victim’s right to a fair trial expressly applies only to civil cases and article 
6 ECHR refers only to the defendant’s right to a fair trial in criminal 
proceedings. Nonetheless, the ECtHR and the English judiciary have 
incorporated the victim’s rights/interests into the proportionality requirement 
of the defendant’s right to a fair trial (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 123). The 
instances in which they have done so have concerned the limitation of the 
defendant’s right in article 6(3)(d) “... to examine or have examined witnesses 
against him”. The courts have taken the view that, where witnesses are too 
afraid to testify, their rights/interests may legitimate the use of anonymous 
evidence, hearsay evidence or special measures, such as the relaying of pre-
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recorded interviews. In appropriate circumstances, the limitation on the 
defendant’s right in article 6(3)(d) that such measures entail may be justified.    
 
Doak has contended that these measures do not dilute the protection given to 
defendants. Although the defendant’s rights are clearly not subject to those of 
the victim, it is erroneous to assume “... that the victim is not worthy of basic 
minimum standards of protection within the criminal process” (Doak, 2003: 
26). The rest of this section is concerned with an analysis of the way in which 
the courts have given victims such minimum standards of protection in the 
context of article 6 ECHR. 
 
5.2.1 Witness anonymity 
 
In Doorson v The Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330, which concerned 
witnesses granted anonymity because of fear of reprisals from the defendant, a 
drug dealer, the ECtHR held that there was no violation of article 6(3)(d) (see 
Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 124). It justified this view by arguing that the interests 
of victims and witnesses, while not expressly protected by article 6, are 
protected by other Convention rights, such as the rights to life, liberty and 
security of the person, and respect for private and family life (para 70). The 
principles of a fair trial thus require that defence interests must be balanced 
against victims’/witnesses’ interests in appropriate cases (para 70). Measures 
such as anonymous testimony may be used in order to protect witnesses, 
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provided that they are strictly necessary and that the limitations on the 
defendant’s right are “... sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures 
followed by the judicial authorities” (para 72). However, the ECtHR 
emphasised that convictions must not be founded “... solely or to a decisive 
extent on anonymous statements” (para 76). 
 
The issue of witness anonymity has come to the fore in recent English 
decisions. In R v Davis; R v Ellis and Others [2006] 2 Cr App R 32 (see 
Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 134-135), the appellants argued that their rights to 
examine witnesses in article 6(3)(d) had been violated by the use of 
anonymous witnesses. The Court of Appeal took the view that the issue of 
witness anonymity engages not only the defendant’s right to a fair trial, but 
also the witness’s rights in terms of articles 2 and 8 ECHR. It emphasised that 
witness anonymity is not expressly prohibited by article 6, provided that it is 
possible for the witness to be examined by or on behalf of the defendant (para 
30). It held that the purport of ECtHR jurisprudence is that witness anonymity 
is not inconsonant with the right to a fair trial, provided that the need for such 
anonymity is clearly established, that cross-examination of the anonymous 
witness is possible, and that, overall, the trial is fair (para 51). Very 
significantly, it took the view that this jurisprudence does not lead to the 
conclusion that, as regards an anonymous witness who is justifiably and 
genuinely afraid, “... the trial will inevitably be considered unfair, and the 
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conviction unsafe, simply because the evidence of the anonymous witness 
may be decisive to the outcome” (para 51). 
 
However, the court stressed that, in order to prevent disadvantage to the 
defendant, a court must examine an application for witness anonymity “... 
with scrupulous care ...” and must “... ensure that necessary and appropriate 
precautions are taken to ensure that the trial itself will be fair” (para 59). On 
the facts, the court found that there was sufficient independent evidence in 
support of the anonymous testimony and that the trials were fair and the 
convictions were safe (paras 101, 140). 
 
On appeal, in R v Davis [2008] 2 Cr App R 33, the House of Lords came to a 
different conclusion. Having surveyed the Strasbourg jurisprudence, Lord 
Mance, with whom the majority of their Lordships agreed, stated that “... it is 
considerably less certain ...” that the ECtHR has imposed “... an absolute 
requirement that anonymous testimony should not be the sole or decisive 
evidence, or whether the extent to which such testimony is decisive may be no 
more than a very important factor to balance the scales” (para 89). However, 
he took the view that the ECtHR would not have permitted anonymous 
testimony on the facts of the present case. The testimony was the sole or 
decisive basis for the defendant’s conviction. Moreover, the defence cross-
examination was restricted severely by the anonymity of the witness, as well 
as by the distortion of their voices and the use of screens to shield them from 
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the view of the defendant and his counsel. There were no counter-balancing 
measures in place, and article 6(3)(d) was accordingly violated (para 96).  
 
In Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK (2009) 49 EHRR 1, the ECtHR was faced 
with a contention by the UK government, reflective of Lord Mance’s above 
dictum, that the purport of the Strasbourg case law was not to impose “... an 
absolute rule, prohibiting the use of statements if they are the sole or decisive 
evidence, whatever counterbalancing factors might be present” (para 37). Its 
response, which was made within the context of both anonymous and hearsay 
evidence (para 36; see section 5.2.2 below), was to express doubt whether any 
counterbalancing measures could justify the admission of such a statement 
(para 37). While not imposing an unequivocal prohibition on the admission of 
such evidence, ECtHR jurisprudence has achieved a greater degree of 
certainty than Lord Mance suggested.  
 
Nonetheless, the ECtHR was prepared to recognise that “special 
circumstances” obtain where the matter concerns identified witnesses who are 
prevented from testifying by fear caused by the defendant. In such cases, 
hearsay evidence may be admissible even if it is the sole or decisive evidence 
against the defendant (para 37; see section 5.2.2 below). In Davis, Lord 
Carswell, albeit obiter, expressed support for the view that such a principle 
ought to apply to anonymous witnesses (para 60). However, the ECtHR in Al-
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Khawaja made no mention of a similar exception pertaining to anonymous 
witnesses. 
 
Having found a violation of article 6(3)(d) in Davis (see above), Lord Mance 
went further, holding that, in view of the fact that Convention jurisprudence 
does not require Member States to recognise witness anonymity, the matter 
fell to be decided in terms of English law (para 97). In principle (barring 
exceptional circumstances that do not apply to frightened witnesses), English 
law does not permit anonymous testimony, and the decision to introduce it is 
one for Parliament, not the courts, to determine (paras 97, 98). Consequently, 
the appeal was allowed.  
 
Parliament responded to this invitation by enacting temporary legislation in 
the form of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 
(“CEWAA”), in terms of which courts have the power to grant witness 
anonymity orders. The provisions of the CEWAA were given permanent 
effect by the CJA 2009. The fact that anonymous evidence is the sole or 
decisive evidence against the defendant is not an automatic bar to the 
admission of such evidence, but merely a factor to be considered by the court 
(s.89(2)(c); see chapter 3 for a discussion of the relevant provisions of the 
CJA 2009). It remains to be seen whether the ECtHR will regard this 
approach as Convention compliant. However, in the recent decision of the 
Supreme Court in R v Horncastle [2010] 1 Cr App R 17, Lord Phillips, 
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speaking for the court, held that the Strasbourg “sole or decisive” rule must 
not be applied in English law, either in the case of anonymous evidence or in 
the case of hearsay evidence, despite the ECtHR decisions to the contrary 
(paras 50, 108; see section 5.2.2 below for a full discussion of Lord Phillips’ 
judgment). 
 
5.2.2 Witness statements (hearsay) 
 
The present author has pointed to the willingness of the ECtHR to admit 
witness statements in certain cases where the witness is reluctant to testify 
(Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 124). In Lucà v Italy (2003) 36 EHRR 46, which 
concerned a co-accused who refused to testify (para 33), the ECtHR stated 
that it may be necessary in certain cases to refer to witness statements made 
during the investigation stage, particularly where the witness is too afraid to 
testify. Provided that the defendant has been afforded the opportunity to 
challenge the statements, either when they were made or at a later stage in the 
proceedings, their admission will not contravene article 6(3)(d). The court 
emphasised, however, that a conviction based “... solely or to a decisive 
degree ...” on a witness statement where the defendant has not been able to 
examine the witness at any stage of the proceedings violates article 6 (para 
33). 
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This situation occurred in PS v Germany (2003) 36 EHRR 61, a decision 
concerning a child victim of sexual abuse who was too traumatised to testify 
in court (para 27). The ECtHR stated that the importance of arranging 
criminal proceedings in a way that protects the interests of young witnesses, 
particularly in sexual offence cases, must be considered in terms of article 6 
(para 28). However, it held that, primarily because the victim’s statement was 
the only direct evidence, the conviction was based to a decisive extent on this 
statement and thus that article 6(3)(d) had been violated (paras 30-32). 
 
The English courts have adopted an expansive approach to the admission of 
hearsay evidence in the case of frightened witnesses that goes further than that 
of the ECtHR (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 135-136). In R v M (KJ) [2003] 2 Cr 
App R 21, the essential or only witness would not testify because of fear (para 
59). The trial judge admitted the witness’s statement in terms of the hearsay 
provisions of s.23 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (“CJA 1988”; see chapter 
3). The Court of Appeal took the view that the rule that a “... conviction based 
solely or mainly on the impugned statement of an absent witness … violates 
the right to a fair trial ...” does not admit of no exceptions, because if it did, 
that would lead to unacceptable witness intimidation (paras 59-60). However, 
on the facts, it found that the witness was flawed and that the admission of his 
statement had breached the defendant’s right to a fair trial, particularly as the 
defendant, being unfit to stand trial, could not testify (paras 61-62).  
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This approach was applied in R v Sellick and Sellick [2005] 2 Cr App R 15, 
which also concerned the hearsay provisions of s.23 of the CJA 1988. The 
Court of Appeal held that in cases where the witness was kept away by the 
defendant causing the witness to fear, article 6(3)(d) would not be infringed if 
the witness’s statement was read without the defendant having an opportunity 
to challenge the witness, even where the evidence was the “sole or decisive 
evidence” against the defendant (paras 51-52). The court added, however, that 
courts must take care to ensure that the hearsay provisions in the CJA 1988, as 
well as the new provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“CJA 2003”; see 
chapter 3) are not abused. They must scrutinise all the circumstances carefully 
prior to exercising their discretion to admit the evidence, particularly where it 
is decisive evidence. They must warn juries to take account of the defendant’s 
difficulty in not being able to cross-examine the witness (para 57). The Court 
of Appeal in R v Xhabri [2006] 1 Cr App R 26, albeit not concerned with the 
hearsay evidence of frightened witnesses but with other hearsay provisions of 
the CJA 2003, held that article 6(3)(d) does not encompass an absolute right 
for defendants to cross-examine every witness against him/her and that it was 
not infringed by these hearsay provisions (paras 42-44).  
 
O’Brian (2005: 494) has argued that the courts’ approach to the right in article 
6(3) is not consistent with its plain language, as it is a “minimum” right that 
must be upheld in order to ensure that the trial is fair. O’Brian’s view has been 
vindicated, in part, by the judgment of the ECtHR in Al-Khawaja. The ECtHR 
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held that article 6(3)(d) is indeed a minimum right that must be granted to 
defendants, and cannot be construed as a mere illustration of issues that must 
be considered in determining whether the trial is fair (para 34). It reiterated its 
existing jurisprudence that the admission of hearsay evidence, which is the 
sole or decisive evidence against a defendant who has had no opportunity to 
challenge it, violates article 6(1)(d). It expressed strong doubt whether “... any 
counterbalancing factors ...” could justify the admission of a hearsay 
statement in such cases (para 37). However, approving Sellick, it stated that 
such counterbalancing factors would be present in the “special circumstances” 
where a witness is being kept from testifying “... through fear induced by the 
defendants” (para 37). Consequently, it is only untested hearsay in cases 
where the fear emanates from a source other than the defendant, and which 
amounts to the sole or decisive evidence against the defendant, that falls foul 
of article 6(3)(d).   
 
In the recent decision in Horncastle, the Supreme Court has crossed swords 
with the ECtHR. Lord Phillips, speaking for the court, stated that the rationale 
for the “sole or decisive test” in Strasbourg jurisprudence, namely that “... the 
risk of an unsafe conviction based solely or decisively on ... hearsay evidence 
is so great that such a conviction can never be permitted”, has been given 
effect in English law by the safeguards contained in the CJA 2003 (para 92). 
These safeguards include the fact that the judge is obliged, in terms of s.78 of 
PACE, to exclude evidence that “... would have such an adverse effect on the 
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fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it”. They also 
include the duty of the judge, in terms of s.125(1) of the CJA 2003, to stop the 
proceedings if “... the case against the defendant is based wholly or partly on 
...” hearsay evidence and such evidence is “... so unconvincing that, 
considering its importance to the case against the defendant, his conviction of 
the offence would be unsafe” (para 36).  
 
Lord Phillips expressed the view that these safeguards would, in most cases, 
lead to the same result as the application of the Strasbourg rule (para 92). He 
also stated that the ECtHR case law, particularly as regards the “sole or 
decisive rule”, “... has developed largely in cases relating to civil law rather 
than common law jurisdictions ...” and has not taken sufficient account of 
these safeguards (para 107). Consequently, he held that the hearsay provisions 
of the CJA 2003, and not the “sole or decisive” rule, must be applied in 
English law.  
 
However, this difference of opinion between Strasbourg and the English 
courts is yet to be resolved. The UK has referred the decision in Al-Khawaja 
to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR and its judgment is awaited (European 
Court of Human Rights, 2010). 
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5.2.3 Special measures 
 
As the present author has demonstrated (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 125), the 
ECtHR has recognised that victims’ interests must be taken into account in the 
proportionality element of the defendant’s right to a fair trial in instances 
where special measures such as pre-recorded testimony are used in order to 
free the witness from having to testify in court. This approach was adopted in 
SN v Sweden (2004) 39 EHRR 13, a case concerning a victim of sexual abuse 
whose testimony was admitted via video and audio recordings (para 35). This 
testimony was “... virtually the sole evidence ...” upon which the applicant’s 
conviction was based (para 46).   
 
The ECtHR held that, because sexual offence victims experience trials as an 
ordeal, their right to respect for private life must be considered in determining 
whether the defendant has received a fair trial. However, the special measures 
must not prevent the defendant from being able to exercise his/her rights 
adequately and effectively (para 47). The court took the view that the use of 
pre-recorded video and audio testimony had not done so in casu as the 
applicant’s counsel had consented to the victim being interviewed by the 
police without the applicant (or his counsel) being present (paras 49-51), and 
thus that article 6(3)(d) had not been violated.   
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In terms of the YJCEA, witnesses cannot testify only by means of pre-
recorded video evidence but must also employ other special measures such as 
live television links (see chapter 3). Consequently, the English judiciary has 
not been required to determine the compatibility of pre-recorded evidence on 
its own with article 6 ECHR. However, in R (D) v Camberwell Green Youth 
Court; R (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Camberwell Green Youth Court 
[2005] 2 Cr App R 1, the House of Lords held that the provisions of s.21 
YJCEA were compatible with article 6(3)(d) ECHR (see Wolhuter, et al, 
2009: 136-137). Section 21 pertains to child witnesses in need of special 
protection, viz. child witnesses in certain listed offences, particularly sexual 
offences, whose evidence must be given by live television link as well as 
video recording, if the latter is available (s.21 YJCEA has been amended by 
s.100 CJA 2009. See chapter 3 for a discussion of the amended provisions). 
Baroness Hale of Richmond held that, as these measures afford the defendant 
an opportunity to challenge the witness directly during the trial, they do not 
infringe article 6 (para 51).   
 
Relying on SN v Sweden, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry stated that the ECtHR has 
not interpreted article 6(3)(d) as requiring the defendant to be given a right to 
be present in the room where the witness is testifying and that the defence 
may nonetheless be given a proper opportunity to question and challenge 
prosecution witnesses even in cases where, on good grounds, the defendant is 
not present during the questioning. Good grounds exist in the case of s.21, as 
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its provisions aim “... to further the interests of justice by adopting a system 
that will assist truthful child witnesses to give their evidence to the best of 
their ability” (para 15).    
 
5.3 Positive obligations 
 
The third way in which the ECtHR has incorporated victims’ rights into 
Convention jurisprudence is by imposing positive obligations on Member 
States to ensure that victims’ rights to life, freedom from torture and inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, and respect for private and family life 
are upheld (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 125). The ECtHR has emphasised that 
these obligations require the state, not only to take positive measures to 
protect victims from state action in violation of their rights, but also to protect 
them from the infringement of their rights by private individuals. These rights 
thus apply both vertically and horizontally (Klug, 2004: 113). Until recently, 
the English courts have been hesitant to follow the ECtHR. However, a series 
of recent judgments reveals that, in some respects, they are becoming more 
willing to do so. This section engages in an overview of the Convention 
jurisprudence in this respect. 
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5.3.1 Right to life 
 
Article 2.1 ECHR provides that – 
Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of 
a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is 
provided by law. 
 
The present author has documented the ECtHR’s reliance on article 2 to 
impose positive duties on criminal justice agencies to protect victims (see 
Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 125-126). In Osman v UK the second applicant argued 
that the state’s failure to protect him from being assaulted and his father from 
being killed by a person that the police knew or ought to have known was a 
danger to them, amounted to a violation of his right to life in article 2 ECHR. 
The ECtHR held that, in principle, Member States have a positive obligation 
in terms of article 2 to take all reasonable steps “... to avoid a real and 
immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge” (para 
116). On the facts, however, it held that the applicants were unable to 
demonstrate that the police knew or ought to have known that there was such 
a risk to life, and thus that article 2 had not been violated (paras 121-122). 
 
However, in Edwards v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 19, the ECtHR found that both 
the substantive and procedural elements of article 2 had been violated. The 
applicants’ son had been killed by his prison cellmate. As regards the 
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substantive element, the ECtHR held that, despite the fact that the prison 
authorities knew or ought to have known that the cellmate was a “... real and 
serious risk to others...”, they had failed to pass on known information about 
him and had screened him inadequately. The state had accordingly breached 
article 2 (paras 60, 64). In regard to the procedural element, the ECtHR 
affirmed that the state’s duty to protect life in article 2, read with its duty in 
terms of article 1 to “... secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires that it undertake an 
effective investigation into the death (para 69). It emphasised the importance 
of the next-of-kin’s involvement in the procedure of the investigation “… to 
the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests” (para 73).  It 
found, on the facts, that the applicants were only entitled to attend the inquiry 
held by the state when they were testifying, and that they were not entitled to 
legal representation or to question witnesses.  The state had accordingly 
breached the procedural obligation of article 2 (paras 84, 87).   
 
The ECtHR held further that the state had infringed the right to an effective 
remedy in article 13 by failing to provide the applicants with an effective 
domestic remedy.  It stressed that article 13 requires that the victim or the 
victim’s family must have access to “… a mechanism for establishing any 
liability of State officials or bodies for acts or omissions involving the breach 
of their rights under the Convention”, which had not occurred in casu (paras 
97, 101). 
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In the recent decision in Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28, which involved 
the failure of the criminal justice authorities to take effective steps to prevent 
the killing of the applicant’s mother by her (the applicant’s) abusive husband 
(para 118), the Osman test was applied successfully. The court found that, 
within the context of an “escalating” situation of domestic violence, and “... a 
significant risk of further violence ...” (para 134), the criminal justice agencies 
“... could have foreseen a lethal attack ...” by the applicant’s husband (para 
136). Despite the foreseeability of such an attack, the agencies “... failed to 
address the issues at all” (para 147) and gave “... exclusive weight to the need 
to refrain from interfering with what they perceived to be a ‘family matter’” 
(para 143). They failed to exercise “... due diligence ... to protect the right to 
life of the applicant’s mother ...”, resulting in a violation of art 2 ECHR (para 
149; Opuz v Turkey also concerned a violation of article 3 ECHR. See section 
5.3.2 below for a discussion of this aspect of the decision). In addition, the 
ECtHR held that, against the backdrop of international law, and within the 
context of the level of domestic violence in Turkey (see paras 184-198), the 
killing of the applicant’s mother constituted “... gender-based violence which 
is a form of discrimination against women” (para 200). The failure of the 
criminal justice agencies to take protect her from being killed thus 
contravened article 14, read with article 3 ECHR (para 202). 
 
The positive obligation in article 2 ECHR, and its relationship to the common 
law of tort, has been subject to differing opinions on the part of the Court of 
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Appeal and the House of Lords. In Van Colle v Chief Constable of 
Hertfordshire [2006] HRLR 25 (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 137-138), the 
claimant’s son, a prospective prosecution witness, had been killed by the 
defendant, and the claimant instituted action against the police in terms of s.7 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) for unlawfully breaching article 2 
ECHR. The Court of Appeal held that prosecution witnesses constitute a 
special category entitled to more protection than private citizens in general 
(para 49). It stated that, in the case of such witnesses, “... the Osman threshold 
of a real and immediate risk … is too high. If there is a risk on the facts, then 
it is a real risk, and ‘immediate’ can mean just that the risk is present and 
continuing at the material time, depending on the circumstances” (para 56). 
 
Although the case fell to be decided in terms of the HRA and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR was accordingly applicable (para 77), the court 
also considered the position at common law. It referred to the decision in Hill 
v The Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53, where the House of 
Lords held that the police were not under a general duty of care to “... identify 
or apprehend an unknown criminal ...” or to protect private persons who may 
suffer harm from such a criminal, unless “... their failure to apprehend him 
had created an exceptional added risk, different in incidence from the general 
public at large from criminal activities, so as to establish sufficient proximity 
of relationship between the police officers and the victims of the crime”. 
According to the House of Lords, public policy requires police immunity from 
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liability for negligence in investigating and suppressing crime (para 68). The 
court also referred to the House of Lords’ decision in Brooks v Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner [2005] UKHL 24, where Lord Steyn stated that, in light 
of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the rule in Hill concerning police 
immunity requires reformulation “... in terms of the absence of a duty of care” 
(para 70). 
 
The court took the view that the House of Lords in both Hill and Brooks had 
recognised the possibility of exceptional circumstances where a duty of care 
would be established (para 72). It held that circumstances justifying a 
successful claim against the state for breach of its positive obligation to 
protect life in terms of article 2 ECHR would also justify the finding of a duty 
of care in terms of the common law and the concomitant recognition of a 
remedy in negligence (para 76). 
 
On the facts, the court found that the state had breached a positive duty under 
article 2 ECHR to protect the life of the claimant’s son, as the fact that he had 
been threatened was known to the police and generated an immediate risk to 
life, which the police knew or ought to have known. In addition, the police 
failed to take appropriate measures which were reasonably available to 
alleviate the risk (paras 87-88). The court also found a violation of article 8 
ECHR as the failure of the police to protect the son’s life and, consequently, 
his loss of life, destroyed his family life entirely (para 94). It accordingly 
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awarded the claimants damages because, in its view, such damages were 
necessary to afford them just satisfaction (para 108). 
 
Unfortunately, however, the House of Lords in Van Colle v Chief Constable 
of the Hertfordshire Police; Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police 
[2009] 1 AC 255 was unwilling to uphold this expansive approach by the 
Court of Appeal. The appeal concerned two cases heard together. The first, 
Van Colle, was brought pursuant to sections 6 and 7 of the HRA, and was 
founded on a violation of article 2 ECHR only (para 64). The second, Smith, 
constituted an action in negligence for breach of an alleged duty of care on the 
part of the police to take steps to stop the appellant’s ex-partner “... from 
carrying out his threats to kill him ...”, resulting in the appellant sustaining “... 
serious and permanent injury ...” (para 64). 
 
As regards Van Colle, Lord Hope, for the majority, held that, on the facts, the 
test in Osman had not been satisfied (para 68) and that, being “invariable”, it 
did not permit the use of a lower threshold in cases such as Van Colle (para 
70). Consequently, there had been no breach of article 2 ECHR (para 71).  
 
As regards Smith, Lord Hope, also for the majority, took the view that, by 
stating that “a retreat from the [core] principle in Hill’s case would have 
detrimental effects for law enforcement” (para 30), Lord Steyn in Brooks had 
laid “... down a principle of public policy that was to be applied generally” 
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(para 73, 74) and which did not admit of exceptions in specific cases (para 
75). Furthermore, the law of tort ought not to be extended in light of article 2 
ECHR to impose a duty of care on the police, as cases falling within the 
purview of the test in Osman can be brought pursuant to the HRA (para 82). 
Consequently, victims whose right to life has been infringed because the 
police did not act to prevent “... a real and immediate risk to life ...” are 
constrained to pursue a remedy under the HRA and not under the common 
law. 
 
5.3.2 Freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment 
 
In terms of article 3 ECHR, “no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The ECtHR has emphasised 
the importance of imposing positive obligations on the state to protect people 
from harm falling within the ambit of article 3 (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 
127-128). Most of the judgments of the ECtHR in this regard have concerned 
the state’s failure to protect vulnerable persons, such as children and women, 
from physical and sexual abuse. In A v UK (1999) 27 EHRR 611 the 
applicant, who had been seriously assaulted by his stepfather, argued that the 
state had breached article 3 by failing to ensure that the criminal law 
effectively protected him. The ECtHR held that the provisions of article 1 (see 
above), read with article 3, impose a duty on Member States to adopt 
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measures to ensure that persons, particularly children and other vulnerable 
persons, “... are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment ...” by the state or by private persons (para 22). The fact that 
English law recognised a defence of “reasonable chastisement” to assault 
meant that the UK was in violation of this duty (paras 23-24). Section 58 of 
the Children Act 2004 has addressed this violation by criminalising the 
corporal punishment of children if it results in “actual bodily harm” or 
constitutes “cruelty” (Allen, 2005: 335).  
 
In Opuz v Turkey, the ECtHR held that the applicant, who was subjected to 
extensive domestic violence at the hands of her husband, was a vulnerable 
person within the meaning of the rule in A v UK (para 160), and that the 
violence was “... sufficiently serious to amount to ill-treatment within the 
meaning of art. 3 of the Convention” (para 161). It found, on the facts, that the 
criminal justice agencies had failed to take effective steps to protect the 
applicant from the violence and that, consequently, article 3 ECHR was 
breached (para 176). Very significantly, the ECtHR also found that, in light of 
the provisions of international law on violence against women, and within the 
context of the documented incidence of violence against women in Turkey 
(see paras 184-198), the domestic violence experienced by the applicant 
constituted “... gender-based violence which is a form of discrimination 
against women” (para 200). The failure of the criminal justice agencies to take 
effective steps to protect the applicant from such violence accordingly 
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amounted to a contravention of article 14, read with article 3 ECHR (para 
202). 
 
Much of the Strasbourg and English jurisprudence on the application of article 
3 ECHR to vulnerable persons has concerned the obligations of local 
authorities in child abuse cases. In Z and Others v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 3, the 
applicants had been subject to severe abuse by their fathers and argued that 
the local authority had violated article 3 by failing to take steps to terminate 
the abuse. On the facts, the ECtHR found that the abuse had been brought to 
the attention of the local authority, who had failed to comply with its statutory 
duty to protect the applicants, and that there was accordingly a breach of 
article 3 (paras 74-75). It went further, however, and held that the fact that 
domestic law did not provide the applicants with the means to ensure a 
determination of their allegations or the possibility of receiving compensation 
constituted a breach of the duty in article 13 to provide an effective remedy 
(para 111). 
 
The ECtHR likewise found breaches of article 3 and article 13 in E v UK 
(2003) 36 EHRR 31, a case concerning the failure of the local authority to 
take steps to protect the child applicants from sexual abuse (paras 101, 116). 
In DP and JC v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 14, which involved a claim by the child 
applicants that the state, in the form of the local authority, had breached its 
duty to protect them from serious sexual abuse by their stepfather, the ECtHR 
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found no violation of article 3, but nonetheless found that article 13 had been 
infringed (paras 114, 138). 
 
The English courts, albeit initially unwilling to impose positive obligations on 
local authorities in abuse cases, have recently signified a commitment to 
doing so. As the present author has indicated (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 138-
139), the obstacle to the success of the domestic claims of the applicants in Z 
v UK and E v UK was the judgment in X v Bedfordshire County Council 
[1995] 2 AC 633. The House of Lords held that, for policy reasons, the local 
authorities did not owe the applicants a duty of care in such circumstances.  
 
In the subsequent decision in S v Gloucestershire County Council; L v Tower 
Hamlets London Borough Council and Another [2001] Fam 313, the 
claimants brought actions against the local authorities in negligence, alleging 
that they had breached their duty of care by failing to protect the claimants 
against sexual abuse by their foster fathers. Unlike the applicants in Z v UK 
and E v UK, the claimants had already been removed from their parents and 
placed in the care of foster parents by the local authorities. The Court of 
Appeal held that it is unlikely that a local authority would be able to raise a 
defence involving a blanket immunity and that the House of Lords in 
Bedfordshire County Council did not purport to hold that “... child abuse cases 
are bound to fail as a class” (Gloucestershire County Council, 338). 
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However, the decision in Gloucestershire County Council dealt not with a 
violation of article 3 ECHR, but with the preliminary question of whether the 
local authorities could successfully apply for the claims to be struck out. On 
the facts, the court found that it could not be said that the first claimant’s 
claim had no real prospect of success and could thus not be struck out, but that 
the second claim had no such prospect and must be struck out (paras 344, 
347). In light of the ECtHR’s approach in Z v UK, the court’s willingness to 
refuse to strike out a claim in negligence against a local authority for failing to 
protect children from abuse may pave the way for future courts to hold local 
authorities liable for unlawfully violating article 3 ECHR in such cases. 
 
The Court of Appeal in D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and 
Another [2004] 2 WLR 58 refused to follow the decision in Bedfordshire 
County Council. Although the case concerned claims against local authorities 
regarding erroneous allegations of abuse (para 1), and thus did not fall within 
the ambit of article 3 ECHR, it is nonetheless significant for the development 
of the case law concerning the obligation on local authorities in abuse cases. 
Lord Phillips expressed the view that, in cases under the HRA, English courts 
must consider Strasbourg jurisprudence. In cases concerning an alleged 
violation of article 3 ECHR, “... the court is likely to have to consider whether 
the local authority knew, or should have known, that positive action was 
called for. This will necessarily involve consideration of the conduct of the 
individuals involved” (para 79). Consequently, the policy reasons relied on by 
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the House of Lords in Bedfordshire County Council to decide that local 
authorities do not have a duty of care to children in abuse cases “... will 
largely cease to apply” (para 81). Very significantly, he concluded that 
Bedfordshire County Council “... cannot survive the Human Rights Act” (para 
83). While claims concerning conduct arising after the HRA may be brought 
in terms of the HRA, claimants bringing claims concerning conduct arising 
before the HRA would have no remedy. Accordingly, local authorities must 
be held to have a duty of care in negligence as well as a positive obligation 
under the HRA (para 83). Lord Phillips concluded that – 
it will no longer be legitimate to rule that, as a matter of law, no 
common law duty of care is owed to a child in relation to the 
investigation of suspected child abuse ... It is possible that there will 
be factual situations where it is not fair, just or reasonable to impose a 
duty of care, but each case will fall to be determined on its individual 
facts” (para 84).  
  
In D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust and Others [2005] 2 AC 
373, which concerned a claim in negligence by the parents against the local 
authorities regarding the erroneous claims of abuse (para 1), the House of 
Lords did not subject the Court of Appeal’s decision to refuse to follow 
Bedfordshire County Council to any adverse comment and must thus be taken 
to have approved it (Steele, 2010: 421). 
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5.3.3 Respect for private and family life 
 
Article 8.1 ECHR provides that “everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence”. In terms of article 
8.2 –  
 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
The present author has pointed out that it has been settled law for many years 
that article 8 not only imports a negative state duty to avoid interfering with 
private and family life, but also a positive state duty to take steps to ensure 
respect for private and family life, both by the state itself and by private 
individuals (Wolhuter; et al, 2009: 128). In X and Y v The Netherlands (1986) 
8 EHRR 235, the ECtHR held that this positive duty includes the duty to 
protect the applicants from sexual abuse by ensuring the existence of an 
effective criminal law (para 23). It affirmed this approach in Stubbings v UK 
(1997) 23 EHRR 213, stating that sexual abuse victims have a right to be 
protected by means of effective deterrent measures from such serious invasion 
of their private lives (para 62).  
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The positive duty on the state to respect private and family life that is implicit 
in article 8 ECHR has both substantive and procedural elements (see 
Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 139). In other words, it extends not only to the 
substantive protection of respect for private and family life, but also to 
procedural propriety in instances involving potential impairment of the right. 
In the English decision in R (TB) v Stafford Crown Court [2006] EWHC 1645 
(Admin), the judge in a sexual offence trial ordered the disclosure of the 
complainant’s medical records. She instituted proceedings claiming that such 
disclosure violated article 8 ECHR.   
 
The Administrative Court took the view that the procedural requirement 
implicit in article 8 required that the complainant must have been involved in 
the decision-making process to a sufficient extent to ensure that her interests 
were protected. If this did not occur, her right to respect for private and family 
life has been violated and “... the interference resulting from the decision will 
not be capable of being regarded as ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Art. 8” 
(para 23). The court held that the fact that the complainant had not been given 
notice of the defendant’s application for disclosure of her medical records or 
the opportunity to make representations before the court ordered such 
disclosure, constituted an unjustifiable violation of article 8, and that the trial 
court had thus acted unlawfully (para 25).  
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 It appears from the above discussion that the ECHR has been given a 
generous interpretation by the ECtHR to further the development of victims’ 
rights. Moreover, the English judiciary is demonstrating increasing 
willingness to follow this jurisprudence and, at times, even to adopt a broader 
approach than it requires (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 128). 
 
6. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
 The role of the courts in upholding victims’ rights is not restricted to the 
interpretation and application of Convention jurisprudence. By contrast, the 
English judiciary is displaying a growing readiness to use its powers of 
judicial review to take cognisance of victims’ rights. However, in light of the 
fact that victims are only given standing to apply for judicial review in 
narrowly delineated circumstances, the power of the courts in this regard is 
necessarily limited. The present author has pointed to three circumstances in 
which the courts have exercised their powers of judicial review to consider 
victims’ rights (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 131-133). 
 
First, CPS decisions not to prosecute are subject to judicial review (see, inter 
alia, R v Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex parte C [1995] 1 Cr App R 136; 
R v Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex parte C [2000] WL 281275; R v 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex parte Manning [2001] QB 330; R (on the 
application of Patricia Armani da Silva) v Director of Public Prosecutions, 
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Independent Police Complaints Commission [2006] EWHC 3204 (Admin)). 
However, the grounds on which the courts will exercise their power to review 
such decisions are restricted. In R v The Director of Public Prosecutions ex 
parte C [2000] WL 281275, the court affirmed that it may only intervene if it 
is shown that the Director of Public Prosecutions decided not to prosecute due 
to an unlawful policy, or failed to act in terms of his/her own policy contained 
in the Code of Practice for Crown Prosecutors, or made a perverse decision 
which no reasonable prosecutor could have made (para 7). The court held that 
the failure by the CPS to consult a victim about a decision not to prosecute 
does not fall within any of these factors and thus does not constitute a 
procedural impropriety entitling the court to intervene (para 31). 
 
There are nonetheless recent signs that the judiciary is adopting a more 
flexible approach. In Ex parte Manning the Court of Appeal quashed a 
prosecutorial decision not to prosecute in a case involving a death in custody. 
Although it took the view that the power to review must be “sparingly 
exercised,” it added that the threshold for review should not be too high, as 
judicial review constitutes the only method of obtaining “... redress against a 
decision not to prosecute and if the test were too exacting an effective remedy 
would be denied” (para 23). Burton (2001: 376-377) has taken the view that, 
although the courts purport to be unwilling to intervene in discretionary 
prosecutorial decisions, they are “... increasingly recognising the need for 
some accountability to themselves”.  
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   Second, as was affirmed in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex 
parte A [1999] 2 AC 330, it is settled law that a victim has standing to apply 
for judicial review of the decisions of CICA. The applicant’s compensation 
claim had been refused due to insufficient evidence. She applied for judicial 
review on the basis that the attention of the Board had not been drawn to the 
existence of medical evidence in support of her claim (Ex parte A, 343). The 
House of Lords held that there had been a violation of the rules of natural 
justice, quashed the Board’s decision and remitted the matter to it for 
reconsideration (Ex parte A, 345, 347). 
 
Third, s.35 of the DVCVA accords victims the right to receive relevant 
information from the Probation Board concerning the release of sexual and 
violent offenders who have been sentenced to at least twelve months’ 
imprisonment, and to make representations concerning conditions for their 
release (see chapter 3). Ward and Bird take the view that victims have 
standing to challenge matters pertaining to these provisions in judicial review 
proceedings (Ward & Bird, 2005: 95). 
 
Although the judiciary thus has some oversight of decisions affecting victims 
of crime, judicial review does not enable victims to claim damages for losses 
suffered in consequence of the violation of their rights and is thus, on its own, 
an insufficient means of protecting victims’ rights. 
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7. TOWARDS ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS 
 
The above analysis shows that, while EU law has enshrined enforceable rights 
for victims, and is in the process of extending them, the UK government is 
unwilling to follow suit (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 139-141). Instead, it has 
chosen to impose service obligations on criminal justice agencies, which, if 
breached, only entitle victims to complain. By contrast, following the example 
of the ECtHR, the English judiciary has begun to employ its power to 
scrutinise state action in terms of the HRA to grant rights to victims in certain 
respects. It has also adopted a more expansive approach to judicial review 
within the context of victims’ rights. However, in view of the nature of legal 
development by casuistic means, the gains that have been made are 
unfortunately ad hoc and fragmented, being limited to the contours of the 
claims brought to court. Consequently, victims are without legal remedies in 
all the areas that fall outside these contours.  
 
In order to bring English law into line with international trends, the 
unenviable position of such victims ought to be rectified. The UK ought to 
exercise its power to “opt in” to the Victims’ Directive, making it directly 
applicable in English law, and entitling aggrieved victims to rely on it in a 
domestic court in order to ensure that the rights it enshrines are upheld.   
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In pursuance of the Victims’ Directive, the government could introduce 
enforceable statutory rights for victims, as has recently occurred in the US. 
The American CVRA was adopted after a protracted but unsuccessful attempt 
on the part of victims’ rights advocates to obtain a constitutional victim’s 
rights amendment to the American Constitution (Kyl, et al, 2005: 591). It 
enshrines broad rights such as “... ‘the right to be treated with fairness and 
with respect for the victims’ dignity and privacy’ and the right to ‘reasonable 
protection’ ...”. In addition, it provides for specific rights, including the right 
to notice, the right “... not to be excluded from public proceedings ...” and the 
right “... to be reasonably heard at public proceedings involving release, plea, 
or sentencing” (Beloof, 2005: 342). The CVRA expressly grants victims the 
right to approach the courts in respect of a breach of its provisions. It provides 
for a non-discretionary writ of mandamus, which requires the court to 
determine the victim’s application forthwith and to “... order such relief as 
may be necessary to protect [his or her] ability to exercise the rights” (Beloof, 
2005: 343). The CVRA accordingly enshrines enforceable rights, in respect of 
which victims are given legal standing. Whether or not similar legislation is 
enacted in the UK depends on the existence of the political will to do so, 
which unfortunately presently appears to be lacking.   
 
However, even if the UK were to accept the Victims’ Directive and enact 
legislation enshrining enforceable victims’ rights, such rights may be 
inaccessible to victims from socially unequal groups. Section 2 above has 
 
 
 
 
 116 
illustrated the ways in which victims of rape and domestic violence 
experience secondary victimisation by criminal justice agencies, discouraging 
them from reporting crimes. Likewise, racially discriminatory attitudes and 
practices on the part of criminal justice agencies reinforce the unwillingness 
of victims of racially motivated crimes to report their experiences. There are 
similar levels of under-reporting of homophobic victimisation, which are 
linked to fear of police homophobia. Moreover, elder abuse is a “hidden” 
crime that is rarely reported (see chapter 6).   
 
Within this context, many victims may be unable to access rights enshrined in 
victims’ rights legislation. Spalek has argued that, in order to respond more 
effectively to victims’ lived experiences, victims’ rights must be “... 
conceptualised in a wider framework ...” that recognises that “... racial, sexual 
and economic (alongside other forms) of equality are dependent upon wider 
cultural, social, political and economic processes” (Spalek, 2006: 115, 126). 
Victims’ rights legislation thus must be correlated more directly with human 
rights and anti-discrimination law, as Rec (2006) 8 suggests (see section 4 
above). In addition, it must be supplemented by multi-agency strategies on the 
part of criminal justice and community agencies designed to generate 
effective responses to the victimisation experienced by victims from socially 
unequal groups (see chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of these concerns). 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has documented the ways in which victims, particularly victims 
of gender-based violence and racially motivated and homophobic crime, 
experience secondary victimisation at the hands of criminal justice agencies. It 
has emphasised that, while EU law has chosen to entrench enforceable 
victims’ rights to address such secondary victimisation, the UK government 
has been loath to follow suit (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 141-142). It has also 
pointed to the emergence of a victims’ rights’ discourse in the Convention 
jurisprudence developed by both the ECtHR and the English courts, but has 
noted the limitations of achieving the empowerment of victims by casuistic 
means only.  
 
The chapter has contended that the UK government ought to follow its 
European counterparts by accepting the Victims’ Directive and introducing 
statutory rights for victims along the lines of the American CVRA. However, 
it has highlighted the fact that victims’ rights legislation may be inaccessible 
to victims from unequal social groups and has introduced the argument 
(which is taken up in chapter 6), that such legislation must be linked to human 
rights and anti-discrimination law and underpinned by specific criminal 
justice policies to facilitate access by victims from such groups.   
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CHAPTER 3: SERVICE RIGHTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ashworth distinguishes between service and procedural rights for victims of 
crime. Whereas the former encompass rights such as the right to support and 
assistance and the right to information, the latter include the right to legal 
representation and the right to participate in criminal proceedings (Ashworth, 
1993: 498-499). This chapter evaluates the content of the service rights 
(which are, for the most part, unenforceable) and the corresponding 
obligations on criminal justice agencies, where applicable, recognised in 
English law, against the backdrop of the relevant provisions of EU law (the 
question of procedural rights for victims is considered in chapter 4).  
 
The chapter commences by considering the right to support and assistance, 
focusing on the work of Victim Support and selected unofficial agencies. 
Thereafter, it assesses the rights to information, recognition and respect, and 
the correlative duties imposed on criminal justice agencies in terms of the 
Victims’ Code. Finally, it addresses the right to protection, documenting the 
duties placed on criminal justice agencies in terms of the Victims’ Code to 
protect the safety and security of victims, and pointing to the ways in which 
the rules of evidence and procedure have been altered to accommodate 
vulnerable and intimidated victims and witnesses.  
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The chapter contends that, while the rules of English law and policy 
pertaining to service rights comply with European standards in most respects, 
the retention of judicial discretion in areas such as the admission of sexual 
history evidence and hearsay evidence creates the space for these standards to 
be sidestepped.  
 
2. SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE 
 
 Drawing on the present author’s work (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 143-154), this 
section documents the provisions of Council of Europe instruments and the 
proposed Victims’ Directive pertaining to the duties on Member States to 
encourage the support of and assistance to victims of crime. It assesses the 
work of Victim Support, the Witness Service and the joint police/CPS 
Witness Care Units (“WCUs”) in light of these provisions, maintaining that, 
by supporting and promoting the work of these agencies, the government has 
complied with its duties. However, as many victims from unequal social 
groups, such as victims of gender-based violence, and racially motivated and 
homophobic crime, do not report their victimisation, and are thus not referred 
to Victim Support by the police, this section also considers various 
“unofficial” victims’ organisations who work to support such victims. 
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2.1 EU Law 
 
The Framework Decision (see chapter 2), contains provisions governing the 
duties of Member States concerning the support of and assistance to victims. 
Article 13.1 requires Member States to promote such support and assistance, 
either by providing trained criminal justice personnel or by recognising and 
funding victim support organisations. In terms of article 13.2, they must 
encourage criminal justice personnel or victim support organisations to 
provide victims with information and assistance and to accompany them 
during criminal proceedings, to the extent to which this is “necessary and 
possible”.   
 
The Council of Europe Recommendation Rec (2006) 8 on assistance to crime 
victims, which, albeit not binding, is nonetheless of persuasive value (see 
chapter 2), supplements the above provisions. Article 5 repeats the obligation 
on Member States to “provide or promote” victim support services, stating 
that these services must, inter alia, give victims free “... emotional, social and 
material support ...”, deal competently with their problems, give them 
information about their rights and available services, and ensure that their 
services are confidential. 
 
The proposed Victims’ Directive extends the right to support in some 
respects. Unlike its predecessor, article 7.1 provides that “Member States shall 
 
 
 
 
 121 
ensure that victims and their family members, in accordance with their needs, 
have access to free of charge, confidential victim support services”. These 
services must include the provision of “... information, advice and support ...” 
regarding their rights and “... their role in criminal proceedings”; information 
about “specialist services” or referral to such services; “... emotional and 
psychological support ...”; and practical and financial advice (article 7.2). In 
addition, Member States must “... facilitate the referral of victims ... to victim 
support services” (article 7.3) and must “... promote ... specialist support 
services, in addition to general victim support services” (article 7.4). The 
tenor of article 7 is thus to require Member States to take on more positive 
duties in the provision of support of and assistance to victims. 
 
These duties are imposed on Member States in respect of all victims. The 
instruments do not expressly address the support needs of victims from 
unequal social groups, particularly racial minority, LGBT and elderly victims 
(see chapter 6), who may face structural, societal and/or cultural barriers to 
accessing official agencies. However, the UK provides significant support to 
such victims through its “unofficial” agencies, and Victim Support has 
recently begun to focus on improving its services to them (see sections 2.2 
and 2.4 below).  
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2.2 Victim Support 
 
Victim Support, a national charity providing assistance and support to victims 
of crime, has its origins in a small local group established in Bristol in 1974 
(Victim Support, 2004b: 2). Until recently, it comprised a network of 77 
Victim Support schemes throughout England and Wales (Victim Support, 
2008: 6). However, in consequence of a decision taken in June 2007, these 
schemes merged to form a single national charity (Victim Support, 2008: 6). 
In the financial year 2009-10, it had about 1,500 paid staff as well as 
approximately 6,500 volunteers (Victim Support, 2010a: 19) and provided 
services to about 1.2 million victims (Victim Support, 2010a: 12). More or 
less 90 per cent of these victims are contacted through police referrals (Victim 
Support, 2008: 15). 
 
In view of its independent status, Victim Support is not bound by the Victims’ 
Code. However, it is heavily dependent on government funding, and receives 
approximately £30 million per year. It received an additional £5.8 million 
from the Office of Criminal Justice Reform in 2008 in order to roll out its 
enhanced services for victims (Victim Support Plus) nationally (Victim 
Support, 2008: 17; see section 2.2.1 below). In the financial year 2009-10 it 
received an additional £8 million due to the fact that it was asked by the 
government to take responsibility for the National Victims’ Service (Victim 
Support, 2010a: 4; see section 2.2.1 below). In the financial year 2009-10 the 
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total amount received from the Ministry of Finance was £38.6 million (Victim 
Support, 2010a: 30). Victim Support also supplements its funds through 
fundraising (Victim Support, 2004b: 2).  
 
In the early stages of its development, Victim Support addressed the needs of 
stereotypical victims, such as victims of domestic burglary. From the mid-
1990s onwards, however, its focus has included the provision of support and 
assistance to all victims of crime (Dignan, 2005: 50). It has also evolved from 
a politically neutral organisation, which was perceived as closely related to 
the state, to a more overtly political one, which engages in advocacy to change 
government policy. Furthermore, it has sought to forge links with other 
community agencies, and has committed itself to the extension of its presence 
in the local community. In 2007, it accepted the government’s invitation to 
roll out Victim Support Plus, an enhanced set of services for victims that is 
now available nationally (Victim Support, 2008: 8; see section 2.2.1 below). 
In 2010, it agreed to work with the government as the “... key agency 
delivering a new National Victims’ Service” (Victim Support, 2010c; see 
section 2.2.1 below). 
 
Consequently, Victim Support’s work has several dimensions, comprising the 
provision of services, advocacy and inter-agency work. In addition, it has 
introduced, and retained oversight of, the Witness Service. 
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2.2.1 Services 
 
At the request of the government, Victim Support has recently enhanced its 
services in two main respects. First, in 2008 it rolled out Victim Support Plus 
nationally. Second, in 2010 it agreed to play the leading role in the provision 
of the National Victims’ Service (Victim Support, 2010c). Prior to these 
changes, Victim Support offered a range of more basic services to victims of 
crime and their families and friends. These services included the provision of 
information, practical help and emotional support (Victim Support, 2006c: 
25). The information provided concerned, amongst other things, the criminal 
justice system, compensation claims, housing and medical assistance. 
Practical help took the form of assistance with compensation claims, 
insurance claims, housing applications or medical services. Emotional support 
comprised listening and the provision of comfort and reassurance to victims 
(Williams, 1999: 90). 
 
Contact was usually initiated telephonically or by letter, although there was 
also a practice of “cold-calling” in limited cases. If the victim wished to 
accept Victim Support’s services, a volunteer would visit the victim at his/her 
home. In non-serious cases, there was usually only one visit. However, in 
serious cases, such as sexual assault or rape, victims could be visited more 
than once, depending on their wishes. Although Victim Support used a limited 
number of specially trained volunteers in the case of serious offences, who 
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worked with victims over a longer period, the usual practice was to refer such 
victims to specialist counselling services (Williams, 1999: 90-91). 
 
In 2005, the government proposed the introduction of Victim Care Units 
(“VCUs”) to provide an enhanced level of support to victims (Criminal 
Justice System, 2005b). VCUs were successfully piloted by Victim Support 
from October 2006 to March 2007 in Salford, Nottingham and York 
(Government News Network, 2007). The success of these pilots led to the 
establishment of Victim Support Plus (rather than VCUs) throughout England 
and Wales by October 2008 (Victim Support, 2008: 8). 
 
Victim Support Plus comprises several improvements to the services offered 
by Victim Support. Opening hours for victim services have been extended. 
Victims are contacted by telephone more quickly after they have been referred 
to Victim Support. Needs assessments are now routinely completed when 
volunteers first make contact with victims (Victim Support, 2008: 8). The 
purpose of these assessments is to determine whether immediate practical help 
is required, such as the emergency fitting of locks or assistance with transport 
or childcare (Victim Support Nottinghamshire, undated). In addition, there is 
follow-up contact in order to determine whether the initial services have been 
helpful and whether further assistance is required. Furthermore, more 
resources are available for practical assistance (Victim Support, 2008: 8). 
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Over and above these services, a national telephonic service, the Victim 
Supportline, has been in existence since 1998 (Victim Support, 2004b: 5). Its 
aim is to increase self-referrals and enable victims who have not reported the 
crime to contact Victim Support (Dignan, 2005: 52). The line, which is 
located in the National Office in London, is staffed by approximately seven 
members of staff and 42 volunteers (Spalek, 2006: 96). Research has 
demonstrated that victims, particularly those from racial minority 
communities, have been slow to use the Supportline (Spalek, 2006: 96). It 
may be the case, however, that more victims will use the line as it becomes 
more widely known. 
 
Although Victim Support provides services to a wide range of victims, it has 
focused recently on improving its services to victims from unequal social 
groups. It has contended that more services are required to assist child victims 
of “ordinary” offences, such as theft, burglary or violence, as the majority of 
children’s charities focus on supporting victims of child abuse (Victim 
Support, 2004b: 12). It has advocated enhanced and more widely accessible 
services for victims of rape and domestic violence (Victim Support, 2004b: 
12-13). It has acknowledged that support for victims of homophobic crime is 
inadequate, and has stressed the importance of having trained specialist 
volunteers to provide services to such victims (Victim Support, 2004b: 13).  
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The spearheading of the National Victims’ Service, which is Victim Support’s 
most recent enterprise, has enabled it to introduce heightened national 
services, first, to the family members of homicide victims and, thereafter, to 
victims of all crimes (Victim Support, 2010a: 8). These services include, 
amongst others, making contact with victims quickly “... to determine their 
support needs, seven days a week ...”; using electronic resources to maintain 
contact with and provide support to victims; engaging in thorough needs 
assessments with a view to devising “... an individually-tailored support 
strategy …”, and providing “… immediate emotional support from a trained 
support worker …” if necessary (Victim Support, 2010a: 8).  
 
2.2.2 Advocacy 
 
As was mentioned in section 2.2 above, Victim Support has adopted a 
progressively more politicised attitude to its work with crime victims. 
However, unlike many of the “unofficial” agencies considered in section 2.4 
below, Victim Support has not set itself against the government, preferring to 
work in collaboration with it. It is a member of the government 
interdepartmental Victims Steering Group, and is thus able to exercise an 
influence on the development of government policy regarding victims 
(Dignan, 2005: 53). Despite the fact that it is an independent charity, it may 
thus be described as engaging in advocacy from within. In this respect, its 
priorities have included lobbying for the introduction of victims’ rights, 
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proposing the extension of victim services into the realm of social welfare, 
recommending the reform of the law regulating victim compensation, and 
suggesting that services to specific groups of victims be enhanced.   
 
The emergence of Victim Support’s more pro-active attitude to advocacy, 
which occurred in 1995, was signalled by arguments in favour of the 
recognition of victim’s rights (Dignan, 2005: 53). The rights that it advocated 
included the core rights to information and explanation, protection, 
compensation, and respect and assistance (Victim Support, 1995: 9-10). 
However, it did not initially recommend that these rights be legally 
enforceable, maintaining that victims ought not to be saddled with decision-
making responsibilities in the criminal justice system (Victim Support, 1995: 
8).   
 
However, by 2001 it had changed its stance, and began calling for the 
enactment of enforceable victims’ rights legislation, which provided “... clear 
remedies if the rights are breached” (Victim Support, 2001). It noted that most 
of the rights in the Framework Decision are available to victims in the UK, 
but that there were some gaps, such as the limited availability of legal aid for 
victims (Victim Support, 2002b: 9, 12). It also urged the government to 
appoint a Commissioner for Victims of Crime (Victim Support, 2001) and 
played an important role in influencing the content of the DVCVA (Victim 
Support, 2004b: 9). These advocacy strategies have had a measure of success, 
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with the government enacting the Victims’ Code. However, in view of the 
government’s refusal to introduce enforceable rights for victims, Victim 
Support has not won its battle entirely (see chapter 2). It has recently called on 
the coalition government to sign the Victims’ Directive (Victim Support, 
2011), which would lead to such enforceable rights (see chapter 2). It remains 
to be seen whether the government will respond positively to this call.  
 
Besides advocating the introduction of victims’ rights, Victim Support has 
contended that imposing obligations on criminal justice agencies to address 
victims’ needs is insufficient to fulfil all their needs effectively. In addition, 
obligations ought to be imposed on social welfare agencies outside the 
criminal justice system, such as health, housing and education (Victim 
Support, 2002a: 5). For instance, victims should be granted access to free 
healthcare services (including counselling and psychiatric treatment) that are 
geared to meeting their needs. In addition, victims’ housing needs (such as the 
need to move to safe accommodation) ought to be given priority (Victim 
Support 2002a: 6, 10; Dignan, 2005: 55). The government has responded 
positively to these proposals by requiring government departments outside the 
criminal justice system “... to recognise and support victims and witnesses” 
(Victim Support, 2004b: 9). 
 
Victim Support has also been very critical of the restrictiveness of the rules 
concerning victim compensation. It has argued, for instance, that the “same 
 
 
 
 
 130 
roof” principle, in terms of which no compensation is payable for injuries 
sustained prior to 1 October 1979 where the victim and offender were living 
together, causes “extreme distress” and self-blame to victims and ought to be 
abolished (Victim Support, 2003: 6). In addition, it has criticised the 
introduction of fixed surcharges for convictions, as they reduce the amount 
available for compensation orders against defendants of limited financial 
means (Victim Support, 2004a; see chapter 5).    
 
The evolution of a more politicised attitude on the part of Victim Support is 
signified not only by its advocacy in favour of victims’ rights, but also, from 
the 1990s onwards, by its recommendations for the development of specific 
measures to address the needs of victims from unequal social groups. In a 
research paper published in 1996, it recommended, amongst other things, that 
victims of rape and sexual assault be given information, support, protection 
and assistance to ameliorate their experiences of secondary victimisation by 
police and medical examiners. It also suggested that the procedures for 
evidence-in-chief and cross-examination be reformed to reduce the trauma of 
testifying (Victim Support, 1996: 59). Most of these recommendations have 
since been implemented (see sections 3 and 4 below, as well as chapter 6).  
 
In recent years, Victim Support has commissioned research into the 
experiences of victims of racially and religiously motivated crime, as well as 
victims of homophobic crime (Victim Support, 2006a). The research suggests, 
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amongst other things, that Victim Support should develop a coherent service 
delivery framework for such victims that forms part of its national strategy 
(Victim Support, 2006a: 70) and that the police should encourage reporting by 
victims “... whose immigration status or other activities may make them 
reluctant to report such crimes” (Victim Support, 2006a: 73). It also 
recommends that Victim Support and other community agencies should “... 
seek to engage the CPS in hate crime work” (Victim Support, 2006a: 74). 
 
However, despite Victim Support’s recent efforts to engage in advocacy on 
behalf of victims who experience victimisation based on race, religion or 
sexual orientation, research has shown that it receives few police referrals 
pertaining to such victims. The 2002/3 statistics for Victim Support referrals 
demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of referrals related to violent and 
sexual offences, burglary, theft and criminal damage, whereas domestic 
violence referrals and referrals for racially motivated crimes (approximately 5 
per cent and 2 per cent respectively) accounted for a very small percentage of 
the total number of referrals (Dignan, 2005: 51). 
 
Victim Support has also conducted research into the experiences of families of 
homicide victims (Victim Support, 2006b), expressing the view that it should 
ensure that its services for victims bereaved by homicide be managed more 
effectively, and develop partnerships with police Family Liaison Officers and 
other community agencies (Victim Support, 2006b: 91-92). It has stressed the 
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importance of campaigns highlighting the needs of such victims, particularly 
as regards legal advice and representation (Victim Support, 2006b: 93).   
 
Most recently, Victim Support has called on the coalition government to 
ensure, in its proposed sentencing reforms (Ministry of Justice, 2010), that, as 
victims and witnesses will derive great benefit from “effective rehabilitation”, 
such rehabilitation should “... be at the heart of the prison system” (Victim 
Support, 2010b: 32). It has also recommended that sentences should be 
explained clearly to victims to enable them to understand the effect of 
sentencing more fully (Victim Support, 2010b: 33). In addition, in order to 
obviate situations where offenders delay, or fail to make, payment pursuant to 
compensation orders, a compensation fund should be established to pay 
victims the amount ordered upfront. Any amounts subsequently received from 
the offender should then be paid into the fund (Victim Support, 2010b: 33; see 
chapter 5). 
 
2.2.3 Community and inter-agency work 
  
Over the past few years, Victim Support has developed working partnerships 
with criminal justice agencies as well as community organisations. Victim 
Support’s National Standards require that Victim Support be “... represented 
on local racial harassment, hate crime forums, sexual assault referral centres 
and domestic violence forums” (Victim Support, 2006c: 32). This requirement 
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has arisen in consequence of the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
(“CDRPs”) that have been established in terms of the CDA (see chapter 6). 
Victim Support is involved with many of the initiatives of such partnerships 
(Spalek, 2006: 97).  
 
Besides its involvement in CDRPs, Victim Support has forged working 
partnerships with other community organisations, such as Women’s Aid and 
Kidscape, in a bid to share knowledge and resources (Spalek, 2006: 94). It 
also works in partnership with, and supports SAMM (Support After Murder 
and Manslaughter), a small charity providing support to the relatives of 
homicide victims (Dignan, 2005: 52). 
 
The above analysis demonstrates that Victim Support, having grown from a 
small group of volunteers in Bristol, has been central to the emergence of 
victim support and assistance in the UK. By comparison to other support 
organisations in Europe, it is regarded widely as “... an unparalleled success 
story” (Goodey, 2005: 105).   
 
2.3 Witness Support 
 
This section evaluates the measures for the support and assistance of 
witnesses at court by the Witness Service, which operates under the aegis of 
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Victim Support, and by the joint police/CPS WCUs that have been established 
recently. 
 
2.3.1 Witness Service 
 
In response to complaints by victims that they received inadequate 
information, support or protection during court proceedings, Victim Support 
advocated the introduction of a Witness Service. It obtained government 
funding and ran pilot Witness Services in seven Crown Courts in 1989 
(Spalek, 2006: 95). By 1996, it had established a Witness Service in every 
Crown Court in England and Wales (Dignan, 2005: 53). However, Victim 
Support took the view that the Witness Service ought to be extended to 
magistrates’ courts, as more than 90 per cent of criminal cases are heard in 
these courts. In 1999, it obtained government funding to do so, and by 2002, a 
Witness Service had been established in all magistrates’ courts (Victim 
Support, 2002a: 18). 
 
In principle, the Witness Service provides support for prosecution and defence 
witnesses, as well as their family and friends (Victim Support, 2006c: 27). 
However, in practice, it supports few defence witnesses, as such witness are 
rarely referred to it (HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 69). One of the 
objectives of the Witness Service is to ensure that all witnesses are given pre-
trial court familiarisation visits. It also provides witnesses with information 
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about court procedure and the process of giving evidence (Williams, 2005: 
122). In the case of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, if the witness 
consents, the Witness Service will inform the court that s/he requires special 
measures to facilitate the process of testifying (Spalek, 2006: 95; see section 
4.3.1 below for a discussion of special measures).  
 
In addition, Witness Service volunteers, who have received training 
concerning court procedure, will accompany the witness to court on the day of 
the trial, if s/he so wishes, in order to provide moral and emotional support. 
However, volunteers may not provide legal advice or discuss the evidence 
with witnesses (Williams, 2005: 122-123). Volunteers will also provide 
support if witnesses are distressed after testifying, and will refer them to 
Victim Support for further support, should they wish (Victim Support, 2006c: 
27). In certain areas, the Witness Service has been given funds recently to 
expand its services to vulnerable and intimidated witnesses. These enhanced 
services include earlier contact with witnesses, more preparation for the trial, 
visits by volunteers outside the court premises, and post-trial support 
(HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 113). 
 
Witness uptake of the Witness Service has been good. The Witness 
Satisfaction Survey (2002) indicates that eight out of ten witnesses are offered 
assistance from the Witness Service, and Victim Support has stated that 95 
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per cent of witnesses using the Service are satisfied or very satisfied (Spalek, 
2006: 96).  
 
2.3.2 Witness Care Units 
 
Joint police/CPS WCUs were established in pursuance of the government’s 
No witness, no justice programme, which was successfully piloted in Essex, 
Gwent, North Wales, South Yorkshire and the West Midlands in 2003 and 
2004 (Criminal Justice System, 2004).  
 
There are presently 165 WCUs in England and Wales (Reeves & Dunn, 2010: 
46), which are staffed, inter alia, by Witness Care Officers. Although WCUs 
are a joint police/CPS initiative, members of staff are drawn “... 
predominantly from the police with varying and often minimal CPS presence” 
(HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 85). One of the functions of WCUs is to 
supervise the care of witnesses from the time a charge is laid until the case is 
concluded (Criminal Justice System online, undated). To facilitate the 
discharge of this function, WCUs are required to perform needs’ assessments 
for all witnesses (HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 50). The existence of this 
duty complies with the requirement in article 18.3 of the Victims’ Directive 
that all victims must be needs-assessed to determine vulnerability (see section 
4.1 below). WCUs have a duty in terms of the Victims’ Code to keep 
witnesses informed of the progress of the case and the time at which they are 
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required to give evidence (see section 3.2.3 below for a discussion of this 
duty). They also provide practical assistance with matters such as childcare 
and transport (Criminal Justice System online, undated). In addition, they 
assist vulnerable witnesses to obtain special measures (Criminal Justice 
System, 2004).  
 
Although WCUs refer witnesses to the Witness Service for practical and 
emotional support and assistance (Criminal Justice System online, undated), 
their relationship to the Witness Service is somewhat unclear. As many of 
their functions are also performed by the Witness Service (see section 2.3.1 
above), there is a danger of unnecessary duplication of services.  
 
2.4 “Unofficial” agencies 
 
As many victims from unequal social groups approach non-governmental 
organisations that are sympathetic to their needs rather than criminal justice 
agencies or Victim Support, this section evaluates the activities of a selection 
of these organisations.   
 
2.4.1 Organisations responding to gender-based violence 
 
Sexual assault and domestic violence have been central concerns of the 
feminist movement since the 1960s. Certain non-governmental organisations, 
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such as Rape Crisis, which emerged in the 1970s, provide services to victims 
from an overtly feminist perspective, which views gender-based violence as 
flowing from the exercise of male power within a patriarchal society. In 2008, 
there were 38 affiliated Rape Crisis centres grouped together under the 
umbrella organisation, Rape Crisis (England and Wales) (Women’s Resource 
Centre and Rape Crisis (England and Wales), 2008: 2).  
 
Rape Crisis centres are run predominantly by volunteers, although there are 
usually one or two paid staff members (Williams, 1999: 93). The centres 
provide “specialist support” as well as “counselling and information” to 
women victims of rape (Rape Crisis, undated). Staff and volunteers are trained 
in non-directive counselling and provide long-term counselling, if necessary 
(Williams, 1999: 95). Although most centres provide services to women and 
girls only, a few support male victims as well (Women’s Resource Centre and 
Rape Crisis (England and Wales), 2008: 30). The majority of victims who 
approach Rape Crisis have experienced sexual abuse many years previously, 
with relatively few victims having recent experiences of sexual abuse 
(Women’s Resource Centre and Rape Crisis (England and Wales), 2008: 34). 
The centres emphasise victim confidentiality and there is thus no pressure to 
report the rape to the police if the victim is unwilling to do so (Williams, 
1999: 95).  
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In addition to its practical services for victims, Rape Crisis also engages in 
advocacy in order to raise awareness of the patriarchal underpinnings of 
violence against women (Dignan, 2005: 56). It has thus contributed to the 
government’s recognition of the need to reform law and policy to better 
respond to rape victims’ lived realities of both primary and secondary 
victimisation (see chapter 6).  
 
Although the various centres are financed primarily through fund-raising, they 
also receive grants from central and local government (Women’s Resource 
Centre and Rape Crisis (England and Wales), 2008: 6). However, over the 
years, financial assistance has been sparse and sporadic, which led to a serious 
funding crisis in the first decade of the twenty first century. Nine centres were 
forced to close, and existing centres were constrained to cut back on the 
services that they provide to victims (Women’s Resource Centre and Rape 
Crisis (England and Wales), 2008: 8, 31). Rape Crisis ascribed this crisis to 
the “... lack of responsibility taken by Government to address funding to, and 
closures of, Rape Crisis centres” (Women’s Resource Centre and Rape Crisis 
(England and Wales), 2008: 25). Fortunately, however, Rape Crisis has 
recently received substantial funding from the coalition government. In 
January 2011, the government announced the creation of a “Rape Support 
Fund” for three years for “... existing Rape Crisis Services” (Rape Crisis, 
2011a). In March 2011, the Ministry of Justice announced its intention to 
award Rape Crisis about £600,000 for the establishment of an additional four 
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Rape Crisis Centres (Rape Crisis, 2011b). The receipt of this new funding will 
enable Rape Crisis to avert the closure of existing Centres and extend its 
services to victims (Rape Crisis 2011a; Rape Crisis 2011b).  
 
In view of the commitment of Rape Crisis to radical feminist principles (see 
chapter 1), it has not devised an agenda that reflects the experiences of racial 
minority women adequately. Consequently, most services to racial minority 
victims of gender-based violence have been provided by other organisations, 
such as the Southall Black Sisters (“SBS”), a London-based charity 
established in 1979. SBS adopts a critical race feminist perspective, 
emphasising the way in which the intersection between race and gender 
discrimination shapes racial minority women’s experiences of rape and 
domestic violence (see chapter 1). SBS’s funding is drawn mainly from non-
governmental sources. It provides a range of services to women in its 
catchment area of Ealing. Such services include the provision of practical help 
and support by one of the organisation’s three case-workers, as well as 
counselling, which includes psychotherapy and group support. SBS also runs 
a national telephonic advice service, and will refer women from outside its 
catchment area to appropriate support agencies (Southall Black Sisters, 
undated).  
 
Besides these services, SBS engages in advocacy and campaigning regarding 
domestic and other forms of gender-based violence. For instance, one of its 
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campaigns concerns the issue of forced marriage. It has expressed concerns 
about the government’s reluctance to intervene in such cases, contending that 
non-intervention amounts to racism and that all women have a right to state 
protection (Southall Black Sisters, undated). SBS also made submissions to 
the government in the course of the enactment of the DVCVA, arguing for the 
provision of full protection to minority women who are victims of domestic 
violence and who are subject to immigration control and the “no recourse to 
public funds” rule (Southall Black Sisters, undated; see chapter 6). In 
addition, it has established a “No Recourse Fund”, which is used to provide 
accommodation and subsistence for immigrant women victims of domestic 
violence who have no recourse to public funds (Southall Black Sisters, 
undated). 
 
SBS has called on the coalition government, in the course of its development 
of a strategy to end violence against women and girls (HM Government, 
2011a; see chapter 6), to take account of its duties in terms of the EA and “... 
to ensure issues affecting BME women and girls have a specific focus ...” in 
the strategy, rather than being added on “... as an after-thought” (Southall 
Black Sisters, 2011). In particular, it has advocated the provision of “specialist 
services” designed to “empower” BME women and girls and to respond to 
intersectional discrimination (Southall Black Sisters, 2011). The coalition 
government has evinced a commitment to consider these recommendations 
(HM Government, 2011a: 6). 
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Support and assistance for minority women who experience rape and 
domestic violence is also available from a range of other, smaller charities and 
non-profit organisations. For instance, the Muslim Community Helpline 
provides a telephonic service to support Muslim women experiencing a range 
of social problems, including sexual abuse (Muslim Community Helpline, 
2010). For many racial minority women, it may be preferable to seek 
assistance from organisations such as the SBS and the Muslim Community 
Helpline, because, unlike secular agencies, including Victim Support and 
Rape Crisis, these organisations are sensitive to their cultural and religious 
views and needs (Spalek, 2006: 110). 
 
2.4.2 Organisations responding to racism and Islamophobia 
 
Several organisations provide services to, and advocate on behalf of, victims 
of racially motivated crime and Islamophobia. For example, the Forum 
Against Islamophobia and Racism (“FAIR”), established in 2001, is an 
independent organisation aiming to eradicate racism and religious hatred of 
British Muslims. It conducts campaigns, including the Fair Justice for All 
Campaign, which was launched in 2002 after the Bradford disturbances of 
2001. This campaign aimed to contest the disproportionate sentences imposed 
on those involved in the disturbances and to provide support for those in 
prison and their families (FAIR, undated b).   
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FAIR is a member of the Muslim Safety Forum, which established a reporting 
scheme, Don’t Suffer in Silence, in collaboration with the police and other 
agencies, in Tower Hamlets, London, in 2004, to encourage Muslims to report 
religiously motivated crimes (FAIR, undated a). It also monitors and records 
incidents of Islamophobia (FAIR, undated a). In addition, it has recently 
engaged in inter-faith advocacy, calling for an end to Islamophobic and Anti-
Semitic victimisation (FAIR UK and the Joseph Interfaith Foundation, 2009). 
However, it is primarily a campaigning organisation and does not provide 
counselling or practical assistance to individual victims. 
 
The Islamic Human Rights Commission also advocates the eradication of 
Islamophobia and religiously motivated hate crime against Muslims. In 2001, 
it launched a campaign against hate crime aimed at addressing the increase in 
anti-Muslim violence and harassment in the aftermath of September 11. It also 
monitors and reports on the incidence of such Islamophobic incidents in the 
UK. (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2002). In addition, it has recently 
set up “... a pilot project ... to assess the levels of hostility and discrimination 
faced by Muslims in Europe” (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2010: 16). 
 
The Islamic Human Rights Commission provides services, such as advocacy, 
advice and conflict resolution to individuals who have experienced racism and 
Islamophobia. In addition, it refers individuals to specialist services in 
appropriate cases (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2010: 6-7). 
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While these organisations are, for the most part, engaged in advocacy rather 
than victim support and assistance, they may be viewed as “unofficial” victim 
support agencies because their advocacy has assisted the government to 
recognise the need for a criminal justice response to victims of religiously 
motivated crime (see chapter 6), which inures to the benefit of victims. 
Furthermore, their activities may also have contributed to Victim Support’s 
concern to extend its services to victims of racially and religiously motivated 
crime (Victim Support, 2006a). 
 
2.4.3 Organisations responding to homophobic and transphobic victimisation 
 
Several non-governmental organisations provide support and advocacy for 
members of the LGBT community who experience homophobic and 
transphobic crime, as well as secondary victimisation by criminal justice 
agencies, particularly the police (see chapter 6). The Gay London Police 
Monitoring Group (“GALOP”) was established in 1982 with the objective of 
exposing police harassment of gay men and providing services to gay men 
who were victims of police harassment (GALOP, undated). By 1990, GALOP 
was providing services to lesbians as well, and by the end of the 1990s, it had 
extended its services to the entire LGBT community. In 2004, it officially 
included transgender persons within its remit (GALOP, undated). 
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The services provided by GALOP include a helpline for members of the 
LGBT community to report homophobic or transphobic incidents, as well as 
to receive advice and assistance regarding the reporting of incidents to the 
police. GALOP also makes provision for the online reporting of such 
incidents, assists victims who have difficulties with the police and is willing 
to report incidents to the police on victims’ behalf (GALOP, undated). In 
addition, it has established a live online interactive help facility to enable 
victims to chat live online with one of the GALOP advisors (GALOP, 
undated). GALOP also engages in research and advocacy in order to 
challenge and reduce the incidence of homophobia and transphobia. 
 
Stonewall, a non-governmental organisation established in 1989, is engaged 
in advocacy, and campaigns for equality for LGBT persons and for the 
elimination of homophobic/transphobic discrimination and victimisation. Its 
campaigns include the Education for All campaign, which was launched in 
2005 to assist in the task of eradicating homophobia and homophobic bullying 
in schools (Stonewall, undated). It has also recently published The gay British 
crime survey 2008 (Dick, 2008), in which it explores the incidence of 
homophobic crime in England and Wales (see chapter 6). In addition, it has 
engaged in research on homophobic hate crime for the Equalities and Human 
Rights Commission (Dick, 2009; see chapter 6). Although it works with a 
range of community organisations to cater for the needs of LGBT persons, 
and runs a telephonic information service giving victims information about 
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referrals, it does not provide individual support or assistance (Stonewall, 
undated). 
 
The advocacy and campaigning activities of organisations such as GALOP 
and Stonewall have contributed significantly to an increased public awareness 
of homophobic and transphobic victimisation, and may be said to have 
encouraged criminal justice agencies to develop appropriate policies to 
address such victimisation (see chapter 6). They may also have played a role 
in Victim Support’s re-assessment of its services to the LGBT community 
(Victim Support, 2006a). 
 
3. INFORMATION, RESPECT AND RECOGNITION 
 
Against the backdrop of the relevant provisions of the Framework Decision 
and the Victims’ Directive, this section considers the measures in the Victims’ 
Code imposing duties on criminal justice agencies to provide victims with 
information, to treat them with respect, and to recognise their interests. It 
contends that, although these measures comply with European standards, the 
fact that the duties are not enforceable may undermine their effectiveness, 
particularly for victims from socially unequal groups. 
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3.1 EU Law 
 
As the present author has documented (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 155-156), the 
Framework Decision (see chapter 2) places obligations on Member States to 
ensure that criminal justice agencies give victims relevant information, and to 
accord them respect and recognition. 
 
In terms of article 4, which regulates the duty to give information, Member 
States must ensure that, as of their first contact with criminal justice agencies, 
victims have access to information that is relevant to “... the protection of their 
interests”. Such information includes, amongst other things, details of the time 
when and the manner in which victims may report the offence, the nature of 
the procedures that follow the report and the victim’s role in these procedures, 
as well as the manner and circumstances in which victims may receive 
protection (article 4.1). Furthermore, victims who so wish must be kept 
informed of the outcome of their complaint, of the progress of the proceedings 
(unless exceptional circumstances exist, which may impede the proper 
conduct of the matter if the victim receives such information), and of the 
sentence (article 4.2). In addition, in terms of article 4.3, in cases where 
victims’ safety may be at risk, Member States must ensure that victims are 
informed of the offender’s release. Article 4, which expressly grants victims a 
right to information that corresponds with these duties, thus applies 
throughout the criminal process, from the making of a complaint to the 
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offender’s release (see article 6 of Recommendation Rec (2006) 8 on 
assistance to crime victims (Rec (2006) 8), which contains similar provisions 
regarding victims’ right to receive information). 
 
The provisions of articles 3 and 4 of the Victims’ Directive, which regulate 
the duty of Member States to provide information, are broadly the same as the 
provisions of article 4 of the Framework Decision. In an important respect, 
however, they go further. The provisions of article 4.2 of the Framework 
Decision, detailing the victim’s right to information concerning the outcome 
and progress of the case, and the sentence, receive significant elaboration in 
article 4.1 of the Victims’ Declaration. Article 4.1 imposes a duty on Member 
States to make sure that victims are informed that they have a right to 
information (and are in fact given this information if they so choose) 
concerning “... any decision, including reasons for that decision, ending the 
criminal proceedings ..., such as a decision not to proceed with or to end an 
investigation or prosecution, or a final judgment in a trial, including any 
sentence” (article 4.1(a)). The inclusion of information concerning decisions 
not to continue investigations and prosecutions is significant, in that it ensures 
that victims are apprised of the necessary information to enable them to seek 
reviews of these decisions. In addition, victims must be informed that they 
have a right to information (and are in fact given this information if they so 
choose) about “... the time and place of the trial ...” (article 4.1(c)).  
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The Victims’ Directive goes further than the Framework Decision in an 
additional respect. Unlike the Framework Decision, which makes no reference 
to facilities for interpretation and translation, article 6.1 of the Victims’ 
Directive expressly provides that “... victims who do not understand or speak 
the language of the criminal proceedings ...” have the right to receive free 
interpretation services at the pre-trial stage as well as in court. In addition, 
article 6.4 provides that such victims have the right to be given free 
translations of their complaints, decisions to end the proceedings, and other 
information that is “... essential to the victim’s exercise of their rights in 
criminal proceedings”. 
 
Article 2.1 of the Framework Decision enshrines duties to treat victims with 
respect and to recognise their rights and interests. It provides that Member 
States must “... ensure that victims have a real and appropriate role ...” in the 
criminal justice system, that they “... are treated with due respect for the 
dignity of the individual during proceedings ...” and that their rights and 
legitimate interests, particularly as regards criminal proceedings, are 
recognised. In terms of article 15, Member States must take steps to create 
progressively the necessary conditions to enable secondary victimisation to be 
eliminated and to prevent victims from being pressurised unnecessarily, 
especially in fora such as police stations and courts. While article 2.1 does not 
confer an express right on victims to be treated with respect and recognition of 
their interests, it does place unconditional duties on Member States. 
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Consequently, it is arguable that such a right is implicitly recognised. 
However, as the duty in terms of article 15 is only to create progressively the 
conditions that eliminate secondary victimisation, it may be construed as 
merely giving victims a legitimate interest rather than a fully-fledged right. 
 
By contrast, the Victims’ Directive places less emphasis on respect and 
recognition. Article 1 merely provides that the aims of the Victims’ Directive 
include ensuring that victims “... are recognised and treated in a respectful, 
sensitive and professional manner, without discrimination of any kind”. 
Consequently, recognition and respect of victims are goals to be pursued 
rather than the object of a right on the part of victims. In addition, unlike 
article 15 of the Framework Decision, article 25.2 merely enjoins Member 
States to ensure that criminal justice and support agencies collaborate to “... 
minimise ... the risks of secondary and repeat victimisation”. Consequently, it 
provides for neither a fully-fledged duty to eliminate secondary victimisation, 
nor a duty to create progressively the conditions in which such victimisation 
may be eliminated. 
 
3.2 Duties in the Victims’ Code 
 
 The foregoing discussion shows that EU law imposes far-reaching obligations 
on Member States concerning victims’ rights to information, and (to a lesser 
extent) to respect and recognition. This section evaluates the duties imposed 
 
 
 
 
 151 
on criminal justice agencies in terms of the Victims Code to determine 
whether the government has discharged these obligations (see chapter 6 for a 
detailed discussion of the government’s duties and criminal justice responses 
vis-à-vis victims of gender-based violence, racially and religiously motivated 
crime, homophobic and transphobic crime, as well as elder abuse).  
 
3.2.1 Police 
 
In terms of paragraph 5 of the Victims’ Code, the police have several duties to 
provide information to victims who report offences (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 
158). They must ensure that victims have access to information about Victim 
Support and other local support services. If this information is given in the 
form of the “Victims of crime” leaflet, the police must, provided resources are 
available, ensure that it is “... in a language or format the victim can 
understand” (para 5.3). This provision contains the only reference in the 
Victims’ Code to a duty to accommodate the needs of victims who do not 
understand English. There is no general requirement that victims be granted 
access to interpretation and translation services. In this respect, therefore, the 
Victims’ Code does not comply with the duty of Member States to provide 
interpretation and translation to victims in article 6 of the Victims’ Directive 
(see section 3.1 above). 
 
 
 
 
 
 152 
With the exception of minor property offences (para 5.5), and sexual offences, 
domestic violence and homicide unless the victim expressly consents (para 
5.6), the police must explain to victims that their details will be given to 
Victim Support unless they do not wish this to be done (para 5.4).   
 
In cases where there is no suspect, the police must inform victims of the 
progress of the case until the investigation is closed (para 5.9). They must also 
inform victims of the reasons for not charging a suspect (para 5.10). Where a 
suspect is arrested, the police must provide victims with information 
concerning all the central stages of the criminal justice process, including 
arrest, release on bail, and decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute (paras 
5.14-5.26).   
 
A recent study has shown that, although the police are aware of their duties in 
terms of the Victims’ Code, they are “... not always clear about its detail, such 
as timescales for completion of notifications and updates to victims” 
(HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 28). Furthermore, while the satisfaction of 
victims with police progress updates is improving, the level of this satisfaction 
is “... lower than that for other aspects ...” of victims’ involvement with the 
police (HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 28). 
 
 Over and above these duties in terms of the Victims’ Code, the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (“ACPO”) has produced various guidelines for police to 
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follow in responding to the needs of victims, particularly those from unequal 
social groups. The various police forces have also established internal policies 
for responding to such needs (see chapter 6). 
 
3.2.2 Crown Prosecution Service 
 
As the present author has pointed out (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 158-159), 
s.32(5)(b) of the DVCVA provides that the Victims’ Code may only impose 
duties on the CPS that do not relate to the discharge of a function involving 
the exercise of a discretion (see chapter 4). Accordingly, the duties regarding 
the provision of information, as well as respect and recognition, are 
formulated in a manner that avoids restricting the CPS’ discretion. 
 
As regards its duty to provide information, the CPS must inform victims of 
the following decisions: to continue a prosecution, that there is insufficient 
evidence to bring a prosecution, and to alter or drop any charge. However, it 
need not do so if it is of the opinion that such notification is “inappropriate or 
unnecessary”, or that legal reasons prohibit the provision of any “... 
explanation beyond setting out the tests in the Code for Crown Prosecutors” 
(paras 7.2-7.5). The Victims’ Code will fall short of the Victims’ Directive in 
this respect, as article 4.1 of the Victims’ Directive imposes an unqualified 
duty on Member States to provide victims with information regarding the 
ending of prosecutions (see section 3.1 above).  
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The Victims’ Code also requires the CPS to provide victims with reasons for 
delays to the proceedings, and to indicate the likely length of the delay (para 
7.10). A recent HMCPSI assessment has shown that, in a substantial number 
of cases, prosecutors do not comply with these duties to provide information 
(HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 42).  
 
In addition, the Victims’ Code imposes duties on the CPS to respect and 
recognise the interests of victims. In cases involving homicide, child abuse, 
sexual offences, racially and religiously motivated crimes and homophobic or 
transphobic crimes, the CPS is required to offer to meet victims if they decide 
not to bring a prosecution or to drop or alter the charges, unless it takes the 
view that, in the circumstances, no meeting should take place. If this view is 
taken, the prosecutor must record his/her reasons in writing (paras 7.6, 7.7; 
see chapter 6). If possible, prosecutors must introduce themselves to victims 
at court, and answer any questions that victims may have (para 7.9). 
 
Besides the duties contained in the Victims’ Code, the CPS has established 
policies for responding effectively to certain groups of socially unequal 
victims, such as victims of rape, domestic violence, racially and religiously 
motivated crime and homophobic/transphobic crime (see chapter 6). 
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3.2.3 Witness Care Units 
 
In addition to duties to provide support and assistance, the Victims’ Code 
imposes duties regarding the provision of information on the joint police/CPS 
WCUs (see section 2.3.2 above; Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 160). Paragraph 6.3 
provides that WCUs must inform victims if they are required to give live 
evidence. Furthermore, they must ensure that adult witnesses receive the 
“Witness in court” leaflet, and that witnesses younger than seventeen years, in 
cases involving sex, violence or cruelty, receive the “Young witness” 
information pack (paras 6.5, 6.6). These documents provide witnesses with 
information concerning matters such as the court layout and the way in which 
they are expected to behave when they testify.   
 
WCUs must inform victims of the outcome of all pre-trial hearings, the dates 
of all court hearings, the verdict and/or sentence, the details of appeals lodged 
and the results of such appeals. They must explain the meaning and effect of 
sentences imposed, and answer victims’ questions (paras 6.7-6.9). 
Consequently, besides providing support and assistance to victims (see section 
2.3.2 above), WCUs function as conduits between criminal justice agencies, 
on the one hand, and victims, on the other, in order to facilitate the smooth 
flow of information. However, recent research has revealed that the 
performance of WCUs as regards notifying victims of court hearings and 
outcomes is “less than satisfactory” (HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 59).   
 
 
 
 
 156 
3.2.4 Court Service 
 
In terms of the Victims’ Code, the Court Service has several duties to relay 
information to victims through WCUs and the police, as well as to respect 
victims and recognise their interests (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 160-161). As 
regards the provision of information, the Court Service must notify the WCUs 
of the court dates for hearings, as well as decisions concerning bail, all later 
hearings, adjournments, postponements, appeals and the outcome of appeals 
(paras 8.2, 8.3, 8.9-8.12). In addition, it must notify the police of bail 
decisions (para 8.3). Furthermore, if possible, the Court Service must ensure 
the existence of an information point where victims may receive information 
about their case (para 8.8).  
 
The duty of the Court Service to provide victims with respect and recognition 
of their interests underpins its duty to ensure, if possible, that victims wait no 
more than two hours to testify, and to ascertain their telephone numbers so 
that they may leave the court building and be contacted when they are 
required to testify (paras 8.6, 8.7). However, recent research has shown that 
waiting times are too long, and that this is a concern for many witnesses 
(HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 72). 
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3.2.5 Probation Service and Parole Board 
 
 The DVCVA grants victims the right to receive relevant information 
concerning the release of sexual and violent offenders, as well as the right to 
“make representations” concerning conditions for the offenders’ release (see 
Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 169-170). The Victims’ Code reiterates and amplifies 
the provisions of the DVCVA. Despite the fact that the right to make 
representations forms part of victims’ right to be heard (see chapter 4), it is 
discussed in this section in view of its statutory relation to the right to receive 
information. 
 
In terms of s.35 DVCVA, where an offender has been convicted of a sexual or 
violent offence and has been sentenced to at least twelve months’ 
imprisonment or detention, the local probation board “... must take all 
reasonable steps ...” to determine whether the victim wants to make 
representations. These representations must concern “... whether the offender 
should be subject to any licence conditions or supervision requirements ...” 
upon release and, if so, what these conditions or requirements should be. The 
probation board must also “... take all reasonable steps ...” to determine 
whether the victim wants to receive information about the licence conditions 
or supervision arrangements (if any) that are to apply to the offender upon 
release (s.35(1)-(5)). 
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 If the victim makes representations, the probation board must forward them to 
the requisite decision-making body (s.35(6)). If the victim wishes to receive 
information, the probation board “... must take all reasonable steps ...” to give 
the victim information regarding the licence conditions or supervision 
arrangements concerning contact between the offender and the victim (and 
his/her family), as well as any other appropriate information (s.35(7)). The 
DVCVA includes similar provisions pertaining to victims’ rights to be given 
information and to make representations where offenders convicted of sexual 
or violent offences are given hospital orders and hospital directions, amongst 
other things, instead of sentences of imprisonment (ss.36-44). 
 
The Victims’ Code provides that, where sexual or violent offenders are 
imprisoned for twelve months or more (or are given hospital orders, hospital 
directions, etc.), WCUs must provide the victim with a copy of the “National 
Probation Service Victim Contact Scheme” leaflet and refer the victim’s 
details to the Probation Service (para 6). This duty exists to ensure that 
victims are notified about their rights to be given information and to make 
representations regarding the offender’s release, and to notify the Probation 
Service that victims have a potential interest in the matter. 
 
 In addition, the Victims’ Code repeats the duties imposed on probation boards 
in the DVCVA (para 10). It also provides that the Probation Service has a 
discretion, in consequence of information obtained from a victim, to 
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recommend the inclusion of conditions concerning non-contact or exclusion 
on prisoners’ licences (para 11.3). Furthermore, prisons must ensure that the 
Probation Service is furnished with information concerning conditions in 
prisoners’ licences so that it may notify the victim. The National Offender 
Management Service must ensure that victims are able to telephone the Prison 
Service helpline if they receive unwanted contact from a prisoner or if they 
wish to voice concerns about the prisoner’s release (para 11.2). 
 
 The Parole Board must consider victims’ representations and must reflect this 
consideration in parole decisions (para 12). It must inform the Probation 
Service of any conditions regarding victims, in order that victims may be 
informed. Furthermore, it must “... consider any information regarding the 
victim that relates directly to the current risk presented by a prisoner in 
deciding whether or not to grant or recommend release and reflect this in the 
parole decision.”  
 
 Padfield and Roberts point out that the imposition of conditions on an 
offender’s release may impinge on his/her right to respect for private and 
family life in article 8 ECHR in certain cases (Padfield & Roberts, 2010: 269). 
In the decision in R (on the application of Craven) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2001] All ER (D) 74 (Oct) (discussed in Padfield and 
Roberts, 2010: 269-270), the family of a murder victim and the offender were 
from the same area. Consequently, the family requested the Parole Board not 
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to permit the offender to return to the area (para 5). The Parole Board 
excluded the offender from that area (paras 1, 3).  While the court found that 
the exclusion engaged article 8 ECHR (para 27), it held that the interference 
with this right was proportionate (para 45). It took the view that – 
  A democratic society should be sensitive to the emotional harm caused 
to victims of crime, particularly of the most serious of crimes, to their 
anxieties and concerns, and to the risks of emotional or psychological 
harm in the event of an encounter between  [a] convicted murderer and 
the family of his victim (para 35). 
 
 The provisions of the DVCVA, giving victims the above rights to make 
representations and receive information, constitute the only statutorily 
entrenched victims’ rights currently recognised in English law. As such, it is 
likely that they may be enforced by way of applications for judicial review 
(see chapter 2). 
  
4. PROTECTION 
 
 This section assesses measures for the protection of victims in the Victims’ 
Code and in recent statutes, such as the YJCEA, the CJA 2003 and the CJA 
2009 against the backdrop of the relevant provisions of the Framework 
Decision and the Victims’ Directive. It contends that, although these measures 
comply with European standards, the fact that they are subject to judicial 
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discretion may impede their effectiveness, particularly for victims from 
unequal social groups. 
 
4.1 EU Law 
 
 As the present author has documented (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 156-157), 
article 8 of the Framework Decision obliges Member States to provide victims 
with protection. Victims, as well as their families and other persons in a 
similar position, where appropriate, must be given “... a suitable level of 
protection ...” where there is “... a serious risk of reprisals ...” or evidence of a 
“... serious intent to intrude upon their privacy” (article 8.1). Suitable 
measures must be adopted in court proceedings in such cases to protect their 
“... privacy and photographic image ...” (article 8.2). In addition, contact 
between victims and offenders on court premises must be prevented, and 
separate waiting areas for victims must be provided progressively (article 8.3).  
 
 In terms of article 8.4, Member States must ensure that, where victims, 
especially vulnerable victims, need protection “... from the effects of giving 
evidence in open court ...”, they may be permitted to testify in a way that will 
facilitate such protection, using any suitable means that accord with the 
principles of the relevant legal system (see article 10 of Rec. (2006) 8 for 
similar provisions). Article 8 expressly grants victims a right to these 
protective measures. 
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 The Victims’ Directive expands the ambit of the right to protection 
significantly. Article 17.1 provides that measures must be made available by 
Member States for the protection of victims and their families “... from 
retaliation, intimidation, repeat or further victimisation”. This provision 
encompasses a broader range of safety issues than the narrower concept of 
“reprisals” in article 8.1 of the Framework Decision. Article 17.2 itemises 
these measures, providing that they must include measures for “ physical 
protection”, for the avoidance of contact between victims and offenders in 
criminal proceedings, and for minimising “... the risk of psychological and 
emotional harm to victims during questioning or when testifying”. The 
provisions of article 23.1 concerning the protection of victims’ “... privacy 
and photographic images ...” are broadly the same as those of article 8.1 of the 
Framework Decision. 
 
 Article 18 contains provisions not found in the Framework Decision. It lists 
categories of vulnerable victims, namely “children”, “persons with 
disabilities”, and “... victims of sexual violence ... and human trafficking” 
(articles 18.1 and 18.2).  In addition, article 18.3 requires non-enumerated 
victims to be assessed “... to determine whether they are vulnerable”.  
Moreover, all vulnerable victims must be assessed to decide “... which special 
measures ... they should benefit from” (article 18.4). 
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 In terms of article 20, all victims have a right to be questioned “without 
unjustified delay” at the pre-trial stage. Interviews must be restricted to a 
minimum number, and victims have the right to “... be accompanied, where 
appropriate by their legal representative, or a person of their choice, unless a 
reasoned decision has been made to the contrary.” 
 
 Article 21 specifies the special measures to which vulnerable victims are 
entitled. In terms of article 21.2, pre-trial interviews must be conducted in 
designated premises by trained professionals, and all interviews must be “... 
conducted by the same persons unless this is contrary to the good 
administration of justice.” Furthermore, sexual violence victims are entitled to 
interviews “... by a person of the same sex”. Article 21.3 provides for special 
measures in court “... to avoid visual contact between victims and defendants 
...”; to enable victims to testify “... without being present ...”; to avert 
irrelevant questions about victims’ private lives; and to conduct hearings in 
camera. Additional special measures must be provided for child victims, 
namely the use of video-recorded evidence and the appointment of “a special 
representative” where the child cannot be represented by parents or guardians 
(article 22).  
 
 The provisions of the Victims’ Directive concerning the right to protection, 
particularly as regards vulnerable victims, constitute a welcome extension of 
the comparatively sparse protection provisions of the Framework Decision. 
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However, the non-binding Recommendation No. R (97) 13 concerning 
intimidation of witnesses and the rights of the defence (1997) (“Rec. No. R 
(97) 13”) contains more expansive provisions concerning the right to 
protection, which will continue to supplement the Victims’ Direction in the 
same way as they currently supplement the Framework Decision.  
 
 In view of the fact that Rec. No. R (97) 13 applies to vulnerable victims in 
general, its provisions are discussed within the present context of the right to 
protection. However, it also contains several provisions pertaining to the 
protection of victims from some of the unequal groups discussed in chapter 6, 
namely victims of domestic violence, rape and elder abuse. 
  
 Article 17 requires Member States to take “... legislative and practical 
measures ...” to protect vulnerable witnesses from intimidation and to ease 
pressure when they give evidence against family members in criminal cases. 
Children (article 19), as well as victims of domestic violence and elder abuse 
(article 21), must be afforded special protection. Article 27 recommends that 
pre-recorded video statements be used to prevent “... face to face 
confrontation and unnecessary repetitive examination”. It also provides that 
audiovisual techniques may be used at trial to enable the court to hear the 
witnesses away from each other’s presence. In terms of article 28, the judge 
must supervise the examination of the witness closely, and in cases, especially 
sexual offence cases, where cross-examination may traumatise a witness 
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excessively, s/he must “... consider taking appropriate measures to control the 
manner of questioning”. Furthermore, criminal justice agencies must attempt 
to avoid subjecting vulnerable witnesses to secondary victimisation (article 
23). 
 
 In terms of article 10, Member States may grant witnesses anonymity as “... 
an exceptional measure ...”. There must be “... a fair balance between the 
needs of criminal proceedings and the rights of the defence ...”, which must 
include giving the defence an opportunity to contest the need for anonymity, 
the credibility of the witness, and the source of his/her knowledge. Anonymity 
should only be permitted where the witness’s life or freedom, or the ability of 
an undercover agent to engage in future work “... is seriously threatened” 
(article 11). Additional measures to protect witnesses, such as screens, facial 
disguise or voice distortion, should be available, if appropriate (article 12). 
Significantly, article 13 provides that a conviction must “... not be based 
solely or to a decisive extent ...” on anonymous evidence (see section 4.3.5 
below for a discussion of this criterion).  
 
4.2 Duties in the Victims’ Code 
 
In addition to duties to provide victims with information, and to respect and 
recognise their interests (see section 3.2 above), the Victims’ Code imposes 
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duties on criminal justice agencies to protect vulnerable and intimidated 
victims and witnesses.  
 
The police (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 158) must “... take all reasonable steps 
to identify vulnerable or intimidated victims ...”, and, if these victims qualify 
for special measures and must testify, the police must explain the measures to 
them (paras 5.7, 5.8). A recent study has revealed that police officers are not 
always familiar with the legal meaning, and distinction between, vulnerable 
and intimidated victims (see section 4.3.1 below for definitions of vulnerable 
and intimidated victims and witnesses), and that many use “common sense” to 
identify such victims. This lack of knowledge may cause officers to fail to 
identify victims who are eligible for special measures, or to give ineligible 
victims false hopes (HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 25). Furthermore, 
Burton, et al (2006: 237-238) maintain that the existence of stereotypical 
views of “ideal” victims has impeded the recognition of victims as vulnerable 
or intimidated in domestic violence cases, as well as in cases where the victim 
and the defendant have a close relationship.    
 
Paragraph 7.8 of the Victims’ Code imposes duties on the CPS (see Wolhuter, 
et al, 2009: 159) pertaining to the protection of vulnerable and intimidated 
victims. The CPS is required to ensure that procedures are in place to aid 
prosecutors to determine whether to apply for a special measures direction in 
cases concerning vulnerable or intimidated victims (see section 4.3.1 below 
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for a discussion of special measures directions). Recent research has shown 
that, at the charging stage, prosecutors identify vulnerable victims in only 55 
per cent of cases, and intimidated victims in only 50 per cent of cases 
(HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 36; see also Burton, et al, 2006: 234). 
Likewise, Hoyano (2007: 851) points to studies indicating that special 
measures for all vulnerable and intimidated victims have not “… become 
embedded in the routine practice of the police and the Crown Prosecution 
Service”. Consequently, many eligible victims are left without protection until 
much later in the criminal process – sometimes as late as the day of trial 
(HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 39). Police and prosecutorial practice will 
have to be improved in this respect in order to ensure compliance with the 
Victims’ Directive (see section 4.1 above). 
 
 The Victims’ Code also imposes duties to protect victims, particularly 
vulnerable and intimidated victims, on the Court Service (see Wolhuter, et al, 
2009: 160-161). In terms of paragraph 8.4, the Court Service must ensure that 
victims have access to separate waiting areas and seats in the courtroom that 
are not near to those of the defendant’s family and friends. In addition, where 
the court has made a special measures direction, the Court Service must 
ensure that special measures are available, if possible (para 8.5; see section 
4.3.1 below for a discussion of special measures directions). A recent study 
has shown that almost all courthouses have separate waiting areas for 
witnesses (HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 71). Furthermore, all courthouses 
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in the study have “... the full range of special measures ...” 
(HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 76). Unfortunately, however, these 
measures are not always available in each courtroom, and many courthouses 
experience technological difficulties with the equipment, causing 
inconvenience and delays for witnesses (HMCPSI/HMICA/HMIC, 2009: 76, 
77).      
 
4.3 Protective measures in court 
 
The secondary victimisation experienced by victims of rape and domestic 
violence during the trial, particularly in evidence-in-chief and cross-
examination, has been outlined in chapter 2. These experiences are shared by 
other vulnerable victims, such as children (Ellison, 2001: 12). Drawing on the 
present author’s work (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 161-169), this section evaluates 
the relevant provisions of the YJCEA, the CJA 2003 and the CJA 2009, which 
contain protective measures to alleviate secondary victimisation in the trial 
process. These measures comprise the use of special measures to assist 
victims to testify, the restriction of sexual history evidence, cross-examination 
and reporting of cases, and the admission of hearsay evidence and anonymous 
evidence in certain circumstances. These measures uphold the right to 
protection of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, as required by the 
Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive (see section 4.1 above). 
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4.3.1 Special measures 
 
The YJCEA, as amended by the CJA 2009, contains an array of provisions 
governing the use of special measures to assist vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses to testify (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 161-163). Section 16 (which 
pertains to vulnerable witnesses), provides that a witness qualifies for special 
measures if s/he is younger than eighteen at the time of the hearing 
(s.16(1)(a)), or if, in the court’s opinion, the evidence is likely to be reduced 
in quality due to a mental disorder, “... a significant impairment of intelligence 
and social functioning ...”, or a physical disability or disorder (s.16(1)(b)).   
 
Section 17(1) (which pertains to intimidated witnesses) provides that a 
witness will qualify for special measures if the court is of the opinion that the 
quality of the evidence is likely to be reduced because of the witness’s fear or 
distress concerning the adducing of testimony. In order to decide whether this 
is the case, the court is required to consider several factors, such as the 
witness’s age, social and cultural background, ethnic origins, domestic 
circumstances, and religious beliefs (s.17(2)). Victims who are witnesses in 
sexual offence cases are automatically eligible for special measures, unless 
they inform the court that they do not want to use such measures (s.17(4)). 
Section 99 of the CJA 2009 inserts a new s.17(5), which provides that 
witnesses in proceedings pertaining to certain offences involving weapons, 
such as murder, manslaughter and non-fatal offences against the person (see 
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the new Schedule 1A to the YJCEA), automatically qualify for special 
measures, unless they inform the court that they do not wish to qualify. This 
provision enables victims from unequal social groups, such as victims of 
domestic violence, racially motivated and homophobic hate crime, whose 
victimisation involves weapons, to qualify automatically for special measures.    
 
Prior to the introduction of the CJA 2009, s.21 of the YJCEA regulated the 
provision of special assistance to child witnesses (under seventeen), especially 
child witnesses in need of special protection. Such witnesses included those 
giving evidence in sexual offence, kidnapping and assault cases. The court 
was required to admit pre-recorded video evidence (see below) by child 
witnesses in need of special protection and permit them to give evidence by 
live television link (see below) as regards any matter that had not been pre-
recorded, if the requisite measures were available (s.21(3), s.21(4)(a)). Apart 
from child witnesses in need of special protection, the court could dispense 
with special measures if it was of the view that such measures would not “… 
be likely to maximise the quality of the witness’s evidence” (s.21(4)(c), 
s.21(5)).  
 
The provisions of s.21 pertaining to child witnesses in need of special 
protection were criticised for disempowering child witnesses by depriving 
them of the opportunity to choose other methods of testifying (Hoyano, 2007: 
856-857). Consequently, a recent governmental review group proposed the 
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abolition of the distinction between child witnesses in need of special 
protection and other child witnesses, and recommended that special measures 
for child witnesses ought to “… be based on the ‘assessed need’ of the 
witness” (Hoyano, 2007: 857). Flowing from these proposals, the CJA 2009 
makes substantial changes to s.21. First, it abolishes the category of “… child 
witnesses in need of special protection …”, making s.21 applicable to child 
witnesses generally (s.100(2)). Second, it provides that, if the child witness 
does not wish to give evidence by pre-recorded video recording and/or by live 
link, the court may permit evidence to be given by other means if, in its 
opinion, this “… would not diminish the quality of the witness’s evidence” 
(s100(4)(b)). If, in consequence, the child is to testify in court, the court must 
make a special measures direction requiring the use of a screen (see below). 
Hoyano (2010: 351) states that the consequence of this provision is “… that 
the admission of the video interview and live link can now be challenged for 
every child witness …” and that this generates the possibility that the 
prosecution may have to show that, in the absence of these special measures, 
“… a child might otherwise give no, or incomplete, evidence”.  
 
Further, the court need not make a special measures direction requiring the 
use of a screen if the child does not want to use one and, in the court’s 
opinion, this “… would not diminish the quality …” of his/her testimony, or if 
it is of the view that using a screen “… would not be likely to maximise the 
quality …” of his/her testimony (s.100(5)). When deciding whether to accede 
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to the child’s wish not to testify by means of a pre-recorded video, live link or 
screen, the court must consider several factors, including the child’s age and 
maturity, the child’s ability to understand the consequences of his/her wish, 
any relationship between the child and the defendant, and the child’s “… 
social and cultural background and ethnic origins …” (s.100(6)). 
 
Besides its provisions pertaining to specific categories of vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses, the YJCEA also contains a range of special measures to 
assist such witnesses to testify. In terms of s.23, the witness may testify from 
behind a screen so that s/he cannot see the defendant. In terms of s.24, the 
witness may testify by way of a live television link (see also, s.51 CJA 2003). 
The CJA 2009 has amended s.24 to include a provision that a support person 
may accompany the witness while s/he is testifying by live link (s.102(1)).  
 
In addition, s.25 of the YJCEA provides that the court may exclude all 
persons except the defendant, legal representatives and interpreters from the 
courtroom while a witness is testifying in sexual offence cases, or in cases 
where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a witness may be 
intimidated. The court may also dispense with the wearing of wigs or gowns 
for the duration of the witness’s testimony (s.26).  
 
Furthermore, a video recording of an interview with the witness may be 
admitted as his/her evidence-in-chief (s.27).  However, if the judge is of the 
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opinion that the interests of justice require that the video-recorded evidence 
must not be admitted, s/he will not grant a special measures direction to this 
effect (s.27(2)). In addition, if “… the witness will not be available for cross-
examination …” and the parties have not agreed that the witness need not be 
available for cross-examination, the court may order that the video-recorded 
evidence may not be admitted (s.27(4)(a)). Prior to the CJA 2009, the YJCEA 
provided that, if the video-recorded evidence is admitted, the witness may not 
give evidence in any other way in regard to anything that “… has been dealt 
with adequately …” in his/her recorded evidence (s.27(5)(b)(i)), and may not 
do so regarding anything else in his/her recorded evidence without the court’s 
permission (s.27(5)(b)(ii)). The CJA 2009 removes the distinction between 
s.27(5)(b)(i) and (ii) by inserting a new s.27(5)(b) to the effect that the witness 
may not give evidence in any other way regarding anything in the pre-
recorded testimony, without the court’s permission (s.103(2)). If the court 
gives its permission, it may order that the evidence be given by live link 
(s.27(9)). 
 
In terms of s.28, in cases where video-recorded evidence has been admitted as 
evidence-in-chief, the court may also admit video-recorded cross-examination 
and re-examination. This provision, which has been highly controversial, has 
never been brought into force. Instead, a governmental review group has 
recommended recently that s.28 ought to be revised to apply to witnesses who 
are the most vulnerable, and then only if there is no other “… way in which 
 
 
 
 
 174 
they would be able to give evidence” (Hoyano, 2007: 855). Examples of 
eligible witnesses would include those who are very young, terminally ill or 
suffering from a mental incapacity (Hoyano, 2007: 855). The government has 
yet to respond to this recommendation.  
 
The YJCEA introduced two further special measures that only apply to s.16 
witnesses, namely the use of intermediaries (s.29) and devices to enable the 
witness to communicate or receive questions and answers despite having a 
disability, disorder or other impairment (s.30). Although s.29 has existed for a 
decade, the government only implemented the intermediary special measure 
nationally in June 2007 (Hoyano, 2007: 850), and it is too soon to know 
whether it will be effective.  
 
Apart from child witnesses in need of special protection, who are 
automatically entitled to the relevant special measures (see above), the court 
must determine whether any one or more of the special measures is likely to 
improve the quality of the witness’s evidence, and, if so, which measure(s) 
will be likely to do so. If it decides to allow the special measures, it must 
make a special measures direction in the requisite terms (s.19(2)). Special 
measures directions are always made conditional upon their availability in the 
relevant court (s.18). If testimony has been adduced by way of special 
measures in a jury trial, the court is required to warn the jury that this may not 
prejudice the defendant (s.32).  
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In R (D) v Camberwell Green Youth Court; R (Director of Public 
Prosecutions) v Camberwell Green Youth Court [2005] 2 Cr App R 1, the 
House of Lords held that the special measures contained in s.21 YJCEA do 
not infringe the defendant’s right to examine witnesses in terms of article 
6(3)(d) of the ECHR (see chapter 2). It is thus unlikely that the courts will 
find any of the other special measures in contravention of this right.  
 
The foregoing analysis indicates that special measures comply with the 
ECHR. They are also consonant with, and in several respects more 
encompassing than, the requirements of the Framework Decision and the 
proposed Victims’ Directive. However, Ellison has contended that the courts’ 
predilection for oral testimony has hampered the use of special measures for 
complainants in rape cases (Ellison, 2000:53). Consequently, the routine use 
of such measures requires a dramatic change in courtroom culture on the part 
of both prosecution and defence (Quinn, 2003:142; see also, Ellison, 2001: 
60-61).  
 
Fortunately, the CJA 2009 goes a long way to ensuring that pre-recorded 
video evidence is used more routinely in such cases. Section 101 inserts a new 
s.22A into the YJCEA making special provision for vulnerable (s.16) and 
intimidated (s.17) victims of sexual offences who are not under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the hearing, in cases where the trial does not take place 
in the magistrates’ court. If, on application for pre-recorded video evidence to 
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be used, the court determines that the victim qualifies for assistance in terms 
of s.16(1)(b) or s.17, it must grant the application, unless, in its opinion, 
testifying in such a way “… would not be likely to maximise the quality …” 
of the victim’s testimony.  
 
4.3.2 Restrictions on sexual history evidence 
 
The YJCEA introduced substantial restrictions on the admissibility of sexual 
history evidence (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 163-165). The purpose of these 
restrictions is to protect rape victims from traumatic and intrusive cross-
examination regarding their sexual past that causes significant secondary 
victimisation (see chapter 6 for a discussion of other measures to reduce such 
secondary victimisation). In sexual offence cases, no evidence or question 
under cross-examination concerning the victim’s past sexual behaviour may 
be adduced or asked by or on behalf of the defendant, unless the court allows 
it (s.41(1)). 
 
“Sexual behaviour” is defined in s.42(1)(c) as “... any sexual behaviour or 
other sexual experience, whether or not involving the accused or any other 
person, but excluding (except in s.41(3)(c)(i) and (5)(a)) anything alleged to 
have taken place as part of the event which is the subject matter of the charge 
against the accused”. The courts have construed this definition narrowly to 
exclude evidence of previous false allegations by the complainant, leaving 
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defendants free to cross-examine victims about these allegations. In R v M 
[2009] EWCA Crim 618 the Court of Appeal confirmed that “evidence or 
questions” concerning previous false allegations “... are not about any sexual 
behaviour of the complainant”. However, in order to find that the evidence or 
questioning does concern a false allegation, there must be “... a proper 
evidential basis for asserting that the previous complaint was made and was 
untrue” (para 21). This approach is open to criticism as encompassing a 
threshold for the admission of evidence of allegedly false complaints that is 
too low (Thomas, 2010: 795). A preferable approach for many is to admit 
such evidence only when the allegations are “demonstrably false” (Thomas, 
2010: 795). 
 
Where the evidence does concern the complainant’s sexual behavior, s.41(2) 
provides that the court may admit sexual history evidence in specifically 
delineated circumstances, provided that it is satisfied that to refuse leave may 
render the conclusion of the jury or court unsafe on a “... relevant issue in the 
case”.  
 
The first such circumstance is where the evidence or question, although 
relating to a “relevant issue”, does not relate to “an issue of consent” 
(s.41(3)(a)). For instance, s.42(1)(b) provides that the defendant’s belief in 
consent, as opposed to the existence or otherwise of consent itself, is not an 
issue of consent. Many defendants rely on a belief that the victim consented, 
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as an alternative to a contention of consent. Consequently, this provision 
generates a loophole that will enable many defendants to succeed in having 
sexual history evidence admitted (Temkin, 2002: 210). Furthermore, an 
allegation by the defendant that he did not have intercourse with the victim is 
not an issue of consent. Accordingly, he will be able to lead sexual history 
evidence in support of this allegation (Kelly, et al, 2006: 15). In cases 
involving sexual offences with children below the age of consent, sexual 
history evidence will also be admissible, as it will not relate to an issue of 
consent (Kelly, et al, 2006: 16). This is likely to cause significant secondary 
victimisation to child victims. 
 
The second exceptional circumstance applies where the evidence or question 
does involve a relevant “issue of consent”, but concerns the victim’s alleged 
sexual behaviour “... at or about the same time... ” as the incident giving rise 
to the charge (s.41(3)(b)). In R v A (No. 2) [2001] 2 Cr App R 21, Lord Steyn 
stated that evidence that the victim invited the defendant to have sexual 
relations with her earlier in the evening prior to the alleged rape would be 
admissible in terms of this provision. He added, however, that it is not 
possible to “... extend the temporal restriction to days, weeks or months” (para 
40). Despite this temporal restriction, the admission of such evidence is 
founded on the myth that a woman who had been raped would not have 
behaved in this way (Temkin, 2002: 213). 
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The third exceptional circumstance applies if the evidence or question does 
concern a relevant “issue of consent”, but concerns sexual behaviour of the 
victim, which was allegedly “so similar”, either to behaviour which occurred 
as part of the incident giving rise to the charge, or to any of the victim’s other 
sexual behaviour which occurred “... at or about the same time ...” as this 
incident, “... that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a 
coincidence” (s.41(3)(c)). The following hypothetical example provided by 
Kibble illustrates this provision. A woman was gang raped by a group of men 
whom she had met for the first time on the evening of the alleged rape, with 
whom she had been drinking and dancing, and with whom she had left 
voluntarily. The defendants wished to adduce evidence that the victim had 
been involved in similar conduct three weeks before the event, that she had 
suggested sexual activity, as she had done at the time of the alleged rape, and 
consequently that she had consented to the sexual intercourse (Kibble, 2005: 
195-197). The admission of this kind of evidence gives credence to the myth 
that women who have consented to morally dubious conduct in the past must 
have done so at the time of the offence. 
   
The last exception arises where the evidence or question concerns evidence 
adduced by the prosecution regarding the victim’s sexual behaviour, and the 
court is of the view that such evidence or question would not go further than 
is necessary to rebut or explain the prosecution’s evidence (s.41(5)). For 
instance, if the prosecution lead evidence that the victim was a chaste married 
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woman, the defence may lead evidence that she had committed adultery. In R 
v Hamadi [2007] Crim LR 635, 637, the Court of Appeal stated, albeit obiter, 
that, in its natural meaning, the phrase “... evidence adduced by the 
prosecution ...” in s.41(5) referred to evidence given by witnesses for the 
prosecution during evidence-in-chief as well as evidence elicited by the 
prosecution during cross-examination. However, in order to ensure that the 
defendant receives a fair trial, s.41(5) must be read broadly to permit the 
defendant to lead evidence to explain or rebut “... something said by a 
prosecution witness in cross-examination about the complainant’s sexual 
behaviour which was not deliberately elicited by defence counsel, and was 
potentially damaging to his case”. 
 
In terms of s.41(4), no evidence or question may be regarded as relating to “... 
a relevant issue in the case ...” if, in the court’s opinion, it may reasonably be 
assumed that the purpose (or primary purpose) of the evidence or question is 
to impugn the victim’s credibility. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal in R v 
Martin [2004] 2 Cr App R 22 has watered down the effectiveness of this 
limitation. It held that, even if one of the purposes of the evidence or question 
is to impugn the credibility of the victim, such evidence or question is 
admissible, if its purpose or main purpose is not to impugn her credibility 
(para 37). 
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The objective of s.41 was that, unless a victim’s past sexual behaviour fell 
within the ambit of one of the above exceptions, it was irrelevant. However, 
notwithstanding this objective, the House of Lords in R v A (No. 2) 
reintroduced the judicial discretion to admit sexual history evidence that does 
not fall squarely into one of these exceptions. Lord Steyn held that the 
provisions of s.41, in particular s.41(3)(c), insofar as they relate to previous 
sexual activity between the victim and the defendant, must be interpreted as 
being subject to the defendant’s right to a fair trial in terms of article 6 ECHR. 
Consequently, “... logically relevant sexual experiences ...” between a victim 
and a defendant may sometimes be admissible in terms of s.41(3)(c). Equally, 
however, there will be instances in which previous sexual activity between the 
victim and the defendant will be irrelevant, for instance, “... an isolated 
episode distant in time and circumstances ...” (para 45).  
 
The test, said Lord Steyn, is whether the evidence or question was “... so 
relevant to the issue of consent that to exclude it would endanger the fairness 
of the trial”. If it was so relevant, it ought not to be excluded (para 46). The 
trial judge must use his/her discretion to determine whether this test is 
satisfied (para 45). Lord Steyn emphasised, however, that, in applying this 
test, “due regard” must be given to the “... importance of seeking to protect 
the complainant from indignity and from humiliating questions” (para 46). 
Beyond positing the above example of an irrelevant relationship between the 
victim and the defendant, the court did not clarify the distinction between 
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relevant and irrelevant prior relationships. Accordingly, Temkin has argued 
that it is likely that evidence concerning a prior relationship “... will generally 
be admitted in the future for fear of a successful appeal” (Temkin, 2002: 224).  
 
Historically, the judiciary has displayed a gendered attitude to the 
admissibility of sexual history evidence (Lees, 2002: 151; Temkin, 2003: 219-
221). Recent research by Kelly, et al indicates that such gendered attitudes 
persist. For instance, one of the judges interviewed in their study stated that it 
is “... relevant whether a woman was a virgin or a whore ...”, and that, “... if a 
woman accepts a lift home in a car and she and the alleged offender end up in 
a cul-de-sac where she claims she is raped, then it is relevant whether she 
comes from a nunnery or whether she has had sex in a cul-de-sac six times 
before” (Kelly, et al, 2006: 50). The reinstatement of judicial discretion in R v 
A (No. 2) may thus be viewed by judges as an invitation to adopt an expansive 
approach to the admissibility of evidence of past sexual relations between 
victims and defendants. Kelly, et al found that the judges interviewed had a 
tendency to adopt a broad interpretation of R v A (No. 2) and to permit sexual 
history evidence on the basis that a fair trial would not result otherwise, 
regardless of the terms of s.41 (Kelly, et al, 2006: 73). Of even greater 
concern is their finding that sexual history evidence is allowed in many trials 
in the absence of s.41 applications, and with no objection from either 
prosecutors or judges (Kelly, et al, 2006: 45).   
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It is consequently arguable that the legislature’s attempt to protect rape 
victims from secondary victimisation has been unsuccessful. On the one hand, 
the provisions of s.41 themselves permit sexual history evidence that draws on 
rape myths in some cases (see above). On the other hand, R v A (No. 2) has re-
opened the door to the admission of the sexual history between victims and 
defendants based on gendered conceptions of women’s sexuality. While such 
loopholes will probably be held to be Convention compliant by the ECtHR 
due to the importance of balancing defendants’ rights and victims’ rights, they 
nonetheless place rape victims in an unenviable position. Temkin has 
contended that the position of rape victims in this respect may be ameliorated 
by the introduction of victims’ lawyers (Temkin, 2003: 241; see chapter 4). 
 
4.3.3 Restrictions on cross-examination 
 
The YJCEA introduced several restrictions on cross-examination by the 
defendant in person (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 165-166). The objective of 
these restrictions was to counter the secondary victimisation experienced by 
rape victims due to bullying tactics employed by unrepresented defendants 
who cross-examined them in person (Temkin, 2002: 320-321). Such bullying 
tactics included the defendant wearing the same clothes in court as he had at 
the time of the rape, as well as asking the victim “... intimate questions about 
sex, her sexual health, and her underwear” (Temkin, 2002: 320-322). In order 
to protect victims from such secondary victimisation, s.34 of the YJCEA 
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provides that the defendant in a sexual offence case may not cross-examine 
the victim in person regarding the sexual offence (or any other offence) with 
which he is charged (see chapter 6 for an analysis of other measures to 
alleviate the secondary victimisation of rape victims). 
 
Section 35 recognises that defendants representing themselves may also bully 
victims in other cases, such as child abuse cases. In terms of s.35(1), no 
defendant may cross-examine in person a protected witness regarding an 
offence covered by s.35, or any other offence with which s/he is charged. A 
protected witness is the complainant or a witness to the commission of the 
relevant offence, who is either a child or who is to be cross-examined after 
having testified by video-recording or other evidence made or given at the 
time he or she was a child (s.35(2)). The offences to which s.35 applies 
include sexual and physical offences against children (s.35(3)).  
 
In addition, in terms of s.36, a court may refuse to allow a defendant to cross-
examine in person in cases that do not fall within the purview of s.34 and s.35. 
The court may exercise this discretion if, in its opinion, it is likely that the 
quality of the witness’s testimony in cross-examination would be reduced if 
the defendant cross-examines in person and would be improved if such cross-
examination were disallowed, and that the prohibition of such cross-
examination would not be against the interests of justice. The courts thus have 
the power to protect vulnerable victims other than victims of rape and child 
 
 
 
 
 185 
abuse from experiencing secondary victimisation by unrepresented 
defendants. 
 
However, in order to ensure compliance with the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial in article 6 ECHR, the court must request the defendant to find a lawyer 
to conduct the cross-examination (s.38(2)). If the defendant does not do so, 
the court must decide whether the appointment of a lawyer to conduct the 
cross-examination is in the interests of justice (s.38(3)). If it is, the court must 
appoint a lawyer (s.38(4)) at state expense (s.40). If the court deems it 
necessary, it must warn the jury that the defendant must not be prejudiced by 
inferences being drawn from his/her inability to cross-examine in person, or 
by the fact that a court-appointed lawyer rather than the defendant’s own 
lawyer conducted the cross-examination (s.39). 
 
These restrictions have eliminated a significant aspect of secondary 
victimisation, signifying the government’s commitment to upholding victims’ 
right to protection. Unfortunately, however, they are insufficiently far-
reaching. Victims of rape, domestic violence and child abuse experience 
secondary victimisation, not only by unrepresented defendants cross-
examining them in person, but also by defence counsel (see Ellison, 1998: 
606; Cretney & Davis, 1997: 151; Ellison, 2001: 13). Ellison maintains that it 
is unsatisfactory that the debate has been restricted to the traumatic nature of 
cross-examination by the defendant in person, and has ignored “... the much 
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more frequent and often equally disturbing experience of cross-examination 
by defence counsel” (Quinn, 2003: 148). Chapter 4 argues that the 
introduction of victims’ lawyers, equipped with the right to object to 
confrontational questioning by the defence, is necessary in order to protect 
victims from this ordeal. 
 
4.3.4 Hearsay evidence 
 
The admission of hearsay evidence in certain circumstances may enable 
witnesses who are too afraid to testify to escape the harrowing experience of 
cross-examination by the defence (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 167-168). Before 
the CJA 2003, the circumstances in which hearsay evidence was admissible 
where witnesses were unwilling to testify due to fear were governed by the 
CJA 1988 (see below). The CJA 2003 has broadened these circumstances. 
Section 116(1), read with s.116(2)(e), provides that a statement not made in 
oral evidence is admissible as evidence of any matter stated if it is made by a 
person whose oral evidence on that matter would have been admissible in 
court; the person has been identified to the court’s satisfaction; through fear, 
the person does not testify (or continue to testify) orally, “... either at all or in 
connection with the subject matter of the statement ...”; and the court permits 
the statement to be adduced as evidence.  “Fear” must be given a broad 
construction, and includes, for instance, “... fear of the death or injury of 
another person or of financial loss” (s.116(3)).   
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The court may permit the admission of such a statement only if, in its opinion, 
the admission is required in the interests of justice (s.116(4)). The court must 
consider the following in making its decision: the contents of the statement; 
the risk that its admission or exclusion will be unfair to any party, with 
particular regard to the difficulty of challenging it if the person does not give 
oral evidence; the fact that a special measures direction may be made; and any 
other relevant circumstances (s.116(4)(a)-(d)). Nevertheless, the court may 
exclude the statement if, in its opinion, “... the case for excluding the 
statement, taking account of the danger that to admit it would result in undue 
waste of time, substantially outweighs the case for admitting it, taking account 
of the value of the evidence” (s.126(1)(b)). Furthermore, the court’s discretion 
to exclude the statement in terms of s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984, as well as any other relevant discretionary power, is preserved 
(s.126(2)). 
 
Section 116 has extended the circumstances in which the statements of 
frightened witnesses were admissible in terms of the CJA 1988. In terms of 
s.23(1), read with s.23(3), of the CJA 1988, a first-hand hearsay statement in a 
written document made to a police officer or another person “… charged with 
the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders …”, by a person who 
did not give oral evidence due to fear, amongst other things, was admissible.  
Section 116 applies, not only to written, but also to oral statements, and does 
not require the statement to be made to a police officer.  In addition, as stated 
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above, “fear” is construed broadly. According to O’Brian, the Law 
Commission Report (which preceded the CJA 2003) “… suggests that it 
would be enough to trigger this provision if the witness is ‘just scared of the 
process of giving evidence’” (O’Brian, 2005: 484).   
 
In R v Sellick and Sellick [2005] 2 Cr App R 15, the Court of Appeal held 
that, in cases where the defendant causes the witness to be too afraid to testify, 
the admission of hearsay evidence in terms of s.23(1), read with s.23(3), of 
the CJA 1988, complies with the defendant’s right to examine witnesses in 
article 6(3)(d) ECHR. This is so even if the evidence is the “sole or decisive 
evidence” against the defendant (paras 51-52). However, it emphasised that 
the courts must take care to ensure that these provisions, as well as those in 
s.116 of the CJA 2003, are not abused (para 57). This view has been endorsed 
by the House of Lords in R v Horncastle [2010] 1 Cr App R 17, para 104, and 
by the ECtHR in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK (2009) 49 EHRR 1, para 37 
(see chapter 2).  
   
Despite this expansive approach to the admission of hearsay evidence, the 
courts are reluctant to admit it in cases involving victims of racially and 
religiously motivated crime and homophobic and transphobic violence, where 
the victim is the only witness (see chapter 6). In view of the fact that such 
victims are among those who experience the most fear (which frequently 
emanates from the defendant or his/her associates), this judicial reluctance 
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hampers the admission of hearsay evidence in cases involving victims who 
have the greatest need for protection. While the hearsay provisions comply 
with the government’s duty to uphold victims’ right to protection, they may 
thus be less than effective in practice.   
 
4.3.5 Anonymous witnesses 
 
 Within the context of its commitment to putting victims at the heart of 
criminal justice (see chapter 2), the admissibility of anonymous testimony, 
particularly in the case of frightened witnesses, was one of the Labour 
government’s key concerns. The CEWAA, which was temporary legislation 
valid until the end of 2009, introduced witness anonymity orders. The CJA 
2009 effected the permanent enactment of the CEWAA. Section 86 empowers 
courts to grant a witness anonymity order requiring appropriate measures to 
be taken regarding a witness to preclude the disclosure of his/her identity, not 
only to the public, but also to the defence. Such measures include withholding 
the witness’s name and other details; using a pseudonym; prohibiting 
questions that may result in identification; screening the witness; and 
modulating the witness’s voice (s.86(2)). However, screens and voice 
modulation may not prevent the judge, jury or interpreter, if any, from seeing 
the witness and hearing his/her natural voice (s.86(4)). 
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 Before a court may grant a witness anonymity order, three conditions must be 
satisfied. Insofar as they apply to frightened witnesses, these conditions are as 
follows. First, the measures must be necessary to protect the witness’s safety, 
the safety of another, or “... serious damage to property” (s.88(3)(a)). When 
deciding whether the measures are necessary, the court must take cognisance 
of “... any reasonable fear ...” on the witness’s part that s/he, or another, “... 
would suffer death or injury ...”, or that “... serious damage to property” 
would result if s/he were identified (s.88(6)). In R v Mayers, Glasgow, 
Costelloe, Bahmanzadeh, R v P, V, R [2009] 1 Cr App R 30, the Court of 
Appeal held that the risk to the witness’s safety may emanate from any 
source, not only the defendant only (para 28).  
 
Second, the measures must “... be consistent with the defendant receiving a 
fair trial” (s.88(4)). Third, the order must be necessary “... in the interests of 
justice ...” because the court considers it important that the witness gives 
evidence, and s/he would not do so without the order, or that “... real harm to 
the public interest ...” would ensue if the witness does not testify 
anonymously (s.88(5). In Mayers, the court emphasised that the requirement 
that the witness will not testify without the order means that the witness must 
refuse to testify. Mere reluctance or unhappiness at the prospect of testifying 
is insufficient (para 26). 
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The court must consider several factors in determining whether the conditions 
have been fulfilled. These include the defendant’s right to know the witness’s 
identity; whether the witness’s testimony may be “the sole or decisive 
evidence” against the defendant; whether the testimony may be tested 
properly without disclosing the witness’s identity; and whether there are other 
“reasonably practicable” ways to protect the witness’s identity (s.89). In 
Mayers, the court held that the object of these factors is to protect the 
defendant’s interests (para 19). It stated further that, although the “sole or 
decisive evidence” criterion is merely a factor, and not a condition for the 
imposition of an order, it “directly impinges” on the second condition, namely 
that the measures must be consistent with a fair trial. If the evidence is both 
the sole and the decisive evidence, it may be more difficult to comply with the 
second condition (para 23).  
    
In terms of s.90, if a witness testifies anonymously in consequence of a 
witness protection order, the court is required to warn the jury in appropriate 
terms that the fact that the order has been made must not prejudice the 
defendant.  
 
 The CJA 2009 does not address the question whether anonymous hearsay 
evidence is ever admissible. The court in Mayers held that neither the 
CEWAA nor the hearsay provisions in the CJA 2003, permit the admission of 
such evidence, and that, should it wish to do so, the matter must be dealt with 
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by Parliament (para 113). Ormerod maintains that it is very unlikely that the 
ECtHR “... would ever condone a conviction based on anonymous hearsay” 
(Ormerod, 2009: 279). 
  
The provisions on anonymity comply in most respects with the Framework 
Decision, the Victims’ Directive and Rec. No. R (97) 13. However, the 
relegation of the “sole or decisive evidence” criterion to a mere factor, rather 
than a prerequisite for the granting of a witness anonymity order, is 
inconsonant with article 13 of Rec. No. R (97) 13 (see section 4.1 above). It is 
also inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. However, the Supreme 
Court has held in Horncastle that the ECtHR jurisprudence on the “sole or 
decisive” criterion must not be applied in the case of anonymous testimony in 
English law (para 50; see chapter 2). This consideration apart, it remains to be 
seen whether the courts will include victims from unequal social groups 
amongst those that it deems eligible for witness anonymity orders. 
 
4.3.6 Restrictions on reporting 
 
In order to ensure that certain victims who testify are not intimidated or 
traumatised in consequence of giving evidence, the YJCEA provides that their 
identity and other personal details may be protected (see Wolhuter, et al, 
2009: 168-169). A court may order that, for the duration of court proceedings, 
the personal details or images of a witness younger than eighteen may not be 
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published, if publication may cause people “… to identify him [or her] as a 
person concerned in the proceedings” (s.45).   
 
Upon application, a court may also make a reporting direction regarding adult 
witnesses in certain cases (s.46). In terms of such a direction, the witness’s 
personal details or images may not be published during his/her life, if 
publication may cause people “… to identify him [or her] as being a witness 
in the proceedings”. A reporting direction may be made if the court decides 
that the witness qualifies for protection, and that the direction may improve 
the quality of his/her testimony or the degree of his/her co-operation (s.46(2)). 
A witness qualifies if, in the court’s opinion, the quality of the witness’s 
evidence or the degree of his/her co-operation “… is likely to be diminished 
by reason of fear or distress … in connection with being identified by 
members of the public as a witness in the proceedings” (s.46(3)).  In order to 
determine a witness’s eligibility, the court must have regard to several factors, 
such as age, social and cultural background, ethnic origins, domestic 
circumstances, religious beliefs, as well as any views expressed by the witness 
(s.46(4), s.46(5)). 
 
These provisions may benefit victims from unequal social groups (see chapter 
6), such as victims of domestic violence and racially and religiously motivated 
crime, by preventing fear of possible reprisals by members of the victim’s or 
the defendant’s family or the public generally. They may also protect victims 
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of homophobic and transphobic crime from public scrutiny of their private 
lives and sexuality, as well as the possibility of further victimisation due to 
their sexuality.  Accordingly, these reporting restrictions conform to the duty 
in article 8 of the Framework Decision and article 23 of the Victims’ Directive 
to protect such victims’ privacy. 
 
5. EFFECTIVENESS OF SERVICE “RIGHTS” 
 
 The analysis of the support and assistance afforded to victims (see sections 
2.2 and 2.3 above) has shown that, with the help of Victim Support, the UK 
has gone beyond complying with its duties in the Framework Decision (as 
well as the proposed Victims’ Directive) to being at the forefront of service 
provision in Europe (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 154). The lack of an 
enforceable right to support and assistance, as well as the absence of statutory 
duties on Victim Support, has not hampered the quality of services to victims. 
However, use of these services by victims from unequal social groups, 
particularly racial minority and LGBT victims, has been limited, due to 
structural and cultural barriers to reporting. Nevertheless, these victims 
receive support and assistance from “unofficial” agencies. The advocacy of 
such agencies has contributed to the emergence of efforts by the government 
and Victim Support to enhance services to such victims.  
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 The same cannot necessarily be said of the other service rights discussed in 
this chapter (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 170-171). Although the measures 
giving effect to the rights to information, respect and recognition, and 
protection are consonant with European standards, several difficulties persist. 
The duties on criminal justice agencies in the Victims’ Code are not 
enforceable, merely entitling victims to complain if they are not discharged. 
Victims who face non-complying agencies thus have no legal standing to 
enforce compliance by court action (see chapter 2). In light of research 
indicating that agencies, particularly the police, do not always fulfil their 
obligations, especially to victims from unequal social groups (see chapter 6), 
the absence of legal standing places victims in an unenviable position. In 
addition, apart from the prohibition of cross-examination by the defendant in 
person in cases involving sexual offences and protected child victims, all the 
protective measures in the YJCEA are subject to judicial discretion. Victims 
thus cannot insist that the courts employ these measures.   
 
 Even the statutory right to information regarding the release of sexual and 
violent offenders is underpinned by an obligation on the Probation Service 
merely to take reasonable steps to provide such information. The vagueness of 
the “reasonableness” criterion enables the Probation Service to avoid its duties 
without victims being able to insist on the information. However, victims may 
institute proceedings for judicial review (see chapter 2).   
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 Although these measures demonstrate that the government is serious about its 
commitment to victims, the barriers to their practical effectiveness are causes 
for concern. Chapter 2 has argued that the coalition government must accept 
the Victims’ Directive and introduce enforceable victims’ rights granting 
victims legal standing to enforce the discharge of duties in terms of the 
Victims’ Code by court action, in order to strengthen the position of victims. 
An additional means of doing so, within the context of proceedings involving 
judicial discretion, is to afford victims the status of parties to the proceedings 
with enforceable procedural rights (see chapter 4). 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has evaluated the measures in English law and policy regulating 
service rights, namely support and assistance, information, respect and 
recognition, and protection, against the backdrop of the duties of Member 
States in EU law. It has found that, while most existing measures comply with 
these duties, improvements are necessary to ensure that victims, especially 
socially unequal victims, have access to these right. It has contended that the 
rights must be made enforceable (see chapter 2). As will be argued more fully 
in chapter 7, the recognition of such enforceable service rights is indispensible 
for the effective implementation of a conception of victims’ rights as human 
rights.   
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CHAPTER 4: PROCEDURAL RIGHTS  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
While chapter 3 has addressed victims’ rights to receive certain services from 
criminal justice agencies, this chapter considers the controversial question 
whether victims ought to be granted procedural rights in the criminal process. 
Fenwick defines procedural rights as those which “... afford the victim 
opportunities of influencing certain decisions at various stages of the criminal 
process … through consultation or participation in them” (Fenwick, 1997: 
318). These rights include the right to be consulted by the CPS in deciding 
whether to prosecute or to accept a plea; by the court in deciding sentence; 
and by the Parole Board in deciding whether the offender should be released 
(Ashworth, 1993: 499). More broadly, they also include the right to legal 
representation and the right to participate in the trial.  
 
As victims are merely witnesses for the Crown, they have no legally 
enforceable procedural rights (apart from the right to make representations 
concerning the release of offenders; see chapter 3). However, in order to 
alleviate their experiences of secondary victimisation (see chapter 2), recent 
reforms have granted them limited (unenforceable) procedural rights (see 
Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 173-174). In consequence of these reforms, the CPS 
must take into account the effect on victims of its decisions whether to 
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continue prosecutions and to accept pleas from the defendant. In addition, 
victims may make Victim Personal Statements (“VPS”) stating how the 
offence has affected them, for consideration by the court at the stage of 
sentencing.  
 
This chapter evaluates these procedural “rights” in light of the relevant 
provisions of EU law. In order to highlight their limitations, it analyses the 
measures granting victims procedural rights in the US, Germany, Sweden and 
the Netherlands. It contends that the US, which allows victims to make victim 
impact statements and, in certain cases, also permits victim statements of 
opinion on sentencing, opens the criminal  process to a punitive law and order 
ideology that violates defendants’ due process rights and fails to achieve real 
victim empowerment. However, it maintains that the willingness of the US to 
permit victims legal representation is a welcome sign of the incorporation of a 
traditionally inquisitorial measure into an adversarial system.    
 
The chapter also demonstrates that auxiliary prosecution, which is used in 
several Continental jurisdictions, grants victims of serious offences 
comprehensive procedural rights that ameliorate secondary victimisation 
extensively. In addition, almost all Continental jurisdictions permit legal 
representation for victims, which gives them a strong voice in the criminal 
process. In order to illustrate the compatibility of these procedures with 
inquisitorial as well as adversarial systems, the chapter analyses their use in 
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an inquisitorial system (German law) and in a mixed system, which has an 
adversarial trial (Swedish law). It maintains that, as these procedures have met 
with success in Sweden, they may be introduced in the UK without 
overhauling its adversarial system. The chapter also considers the adhesion 
procedure in Dutch law, in terms of which victims may join their civil 
compensation claims to the criminal proceedings. However, it argues that 
compensation orders, which are used in the UK, meet victims’ compensation 
needs adequately, and that the adhesion procedure would be of little value in 
the English criminal process.    
 
The chapter concludes by addressing the possible conflict between auxiliary 
prosecution and victims’ lawyers, on the one hand, and defendants’ due 
process rights, on the other. It contends that, in light of the increasing 
convergence between adversarial and inquisitorial systems, as well as the 
recognition of an inclusive concept of a fair trial that covers both defendants’ 
and victims’ rights, these measures do not violate defendants’ rights, as long 
as victims are not allowed to express opinions on sentence. 
 
2. FORMS OF PARTICIPATION 
 
The term “victim participation” has come to signify the exercise by victims of 
their procedural rights. Consequently, in order to facilitate the analysis of 
these rights, it is necessary to delineate the various meanings that have been 
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given to the term “victim participation” (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 174-175). 
Edwards maintains that such participation may take one or more of four 
possible forms. First, victims may have decision-making control, which would 
oblige criminal justice agencies to “... ascertain and apply the victim’s 
preference in the particular case” (Edwards, 2004: 974). In view of the 
probability that it would impede control by the prosecution of the 
proceedings, and violate defendants’ due process rights (see section 7 below), 
the UK is unlikely to favour this form of participation.   
 
Secondly, victims may have the right to be consulted, which would require 
criminal justice agencies to establish and consider victims’ views “... about 
the appropriate course of action at a particular stage of the process ...”, but 
would not grant victims the power to determine outcomes (Edwards, 2004: 
975). Victims in the UK have the right to be consulted regarding certain pre-
trial matters, such as decisions whether to continue prosecutions (see section 
4.1 below). Thirdly, victim participation may take the form of information-
provision. This form pertains to the need of criminal justice agencies “... to 
receive information from or about the victim” (Edwards, 2004: 976). 
Fourthly, victims may have the right to express themselves by providing 
information or communicating their feelings to such agencies (Edwards, 2004: 
976). The last-mentioned two forms of victim participation are commonly 
regarded as being achieved by the making of VPS (see section 4.3 below). 
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The forms of victim participation described by Edwards do not find formal 
expression in the English law of criminal procedure. In view of the fact that 
the procedural “rights” to which they relate are not enforceable, this is not 
surprising. By contrast, the concept of victim participation is firmly 
entrenched in the rules of criminal procedure in most European jurisdictions. 
Those victims, who act as auxiliary prosecutors, or civil parties using the 
adhesion procedure, are regarded as parties to the proceedings (see section 6.4 
below). Consequently, the concept of victim participation refers to the 
exercise of enforceable procedural rights by such victim parties. Although 
these procedural rights involve expression, consultation and the provision of 
information, they are not distinguished according to their function or purpose. 
Instead, they are defined by the extent to which they are active or passive. 
Within the context of auxiliary prosecution in German law, active procedural 
rights include the right to lead evidence, to request the recusal of a judge and 
the right, within limits, to appeal against a conviction. Passive procedural 
rights, on the other hand, encompass the right of access to the dossier, and the 
right to legal representation and legal aid (Niedling, 2005: 79-80). Contrary to 
passive rights, active rights permit victims to contribute positively to the 
criminal proceedings.  
 
From the perspective of English law, where victims’ strongest participation 
involves being heard at the stage of sentencing, all these rights, whether 
construed as active or passive from a European perspective, amount to active 
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victim participation. In terms of traditional English adversarialism, for 
instance, permitting a victim legal representation at trial constitutes an 
impermissible degree of victim participation that violates defendants’ due 
process rights. As against the comprehensive procedural rights granted to 
victims in European jurisdictions, the limited involvement of victims in the 
English criminal process may be viewed as passive. Consequently, this 
chapter defines active participation as the involvement of victims who are 
parties to the criminal proceedings with procedural rights, such as auxiliary 
prosecutors and civil parties. On the other hand, passive participation refers to 
the limited consultative or expressive involvement of victims in prosecutorial 
decisions, such as whether to continue a prosecution or accept a plea, and in 
the sentencing stage.   
 
Nevertheless, in light of the recent willingness in the US to recognise victims’ 
lawyers in certain cases, this distinction between active and passive 
participation is becoming a question of degree rather than an absolute divide. 
Although victims’ lawyers have been regarded traditionally as anathema in 
common law jurisdictions, they are becoming increasingly common in the US 
(see section 5.4 below). Furthermore, victim statements of opinion on 
sentence, which are permitted in some states in the US, introduce active 
participation into what would otherwise be a passive victim impact statement 
on the effects of the crime (see section 5.3 below). Apart from these changes, 
however, a fundamental dichotomy persists between the recognition of formal 
 
 
 
 
 203 
party status for victims in Continental jurisdictions and the absence of such 
party status in common law jurisdictions. 
 
3. EU LAW  
 
This dichotomy has led to a strongly held difference of opinion in the Council 
of Europe between Continental and common law jurisdictions (see Wolhuter, 
et al, 2009: 176-177). While the Council of Europe’s early statements on 
victims’ rights do not deal with this difference of opinion, the Framework 
Decision and the Victims’ Directive are premised on a compromise that 
permits Member States to choose the form of victim participation that most 
suits their criminal process.  
 
Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (85) 11 on the position of the 
victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure (1985) is concerned, 
for the most part, with passive participation. In terms of article 12, the court is 
required to receive “… all relevant information concerning the injuries and 
losses suffered by the victim …” in order that it may consider the victim’s 
need for compensation and “… any compensation or restitution by the 
offender …” in deciding the appropriate sentence. Nevertheless, it does 
provide for active victim participation, albeit to a limited extent. In terms of 
article 7, victims must have the right to subject decisions not to prosecute to 
review, or the right “… to institute private proceedings”. The right to the 
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review of prosecutorial decisions may involve active participation, but does 
not necessarily do so (see section 4.1 below). On the other hand, the right to 
institute a private prosecution clearly amounts to active participation 
(Niedling, 2005: 79). However, in light of the fact that private prosecutors are 
required to fund prosecutions themselves, they are not commonly encountered 
in practice and, consequently, are not considered in this chapter. 
 
The provisions regarding victim participation in the Framework Decision 
reflect the outcome of a heated debate between Member States from common 
law jurisdictions and those from civil law and Nordic jurisdictions.  Article 3 
provides that “each Member State shall safeguard the possibility for victims to 
be heard during proceedings and to supply evidence”.  However, according to 
sub article 9 of the preamble, Member States are not required to treat victims 
“… in a manner equivalent to that of a party to proceedings”. The Framework 
Decision thus leaves the decision whether to grant victims party status or to 
regard them as mere prosecution witnesses to individual Member States. 
 
Article 6 also manifests the above compromise. One the one hand, Member 
States must ensure that victims have access to non-legal advice regarding “… 
their role in the proceedings”, which must be gratuitous, if necessary. On the 
other hand, they must ensure that victims have legal aid, in appropriate cases, 
“… when it is possible for them to have the status of parties to criminal 
proceedings”.  This restriction of the obligation to ensure legal aid to victims 
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who are parties to the criminal process was due to the refusal of the UK and 
Ireland to accept the provisions of the original draft of article 6.  This draft 
provided that –  
Irrespective of the possibility of victims participating in procedure as a 
witness or a party, Member States shall ensure an opportunity for 
victims to participate as such, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Framework Decision. Member States shall ensure that all victims, 
regardless of their means, have access to legal advice, provided free of 
charge if need be (Rock, 2004: 517). 
 
As an unrestricted obligation to provide legal advice to all victims was 
unacceptable to the UK and Ireland (Rock, 2004: 517), the draft article 6 was 
amended to achieve agreement among Member States. Had the UK and 
Ireland not refused to accede to the draft article 6, legal advice for all victims 
would have become the norm throughout Europe. In consequence of this 
compromise, models of active participation, such as auxiliary prosecution and 
adhesion, as well as passive models, such as VPS, comply with the 
Framework Decision. 
 
The provisions of the Victims’ Directive are, with some modifications, 
broadly the same as those of the Framework Decision. Article 9 imposes a 
duty on Member States to “… ensure that victims may be heard during 
criminal proceedings and may supply evidence”. Article 10.1 expressly 
entrenches the right of victims “… to have any decision not to prosecute 
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reviewed”. Article 12 perpetuates the distinction in the Framework Decision 
between party and non-party victims by providing that Member States have a 
duty to make sure that victims are able to “… access … legal aid, where they 
have the status of parties to criminal proceedings”. 
 
4. VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN THE UK 
 
Victims are mere Crown witnesses in the English criminal process, and thus 
have no active participation rights. Although they have been given limited 
passive participation rights at the pre-trial and sentencing stages, they have no 
participatory rights during the trial. This section, which draws on the present 
author’s work (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 177-183), considers recent reforms that 
have introduced these limited forms of passive participation. 
 
4.1 Decisions to prosecute 
 
The Victims’ Code does not apply to prosecutorial decisions whether to 
prosecute. The reason for this is to be found in s.32(5)(b) of the DVCVA, 
which prevents duties being imposed on the CPS in regard to the discharge of 
a function involving the exercise of discretion (see chapter 3). The CPS 
exercises its discretion to make decisions whether to prosecute in pursuance of 
two tests in the Code for Crown Prosecutors (CPS, 2010a, the “Prosecutors’ 
Code”).  
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First, in terms of the evidential sufficiency test, there must be “... sufficient 
evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction” (para 4.5). Second, in 
terms of the public interest test, a prosecution must be in the public interest 
(para 4.11). In addressing the public interest test, the CPS must “... take into 
account any views expressed by the victim regarding the impact that the 
offence has had”. In addition, it should consider “... any views expressed by 
the victim’s family ...” in cases such as “... homicide or where the victim is a 
child or an adult who lacks capacity” (para 4.18). The Prosecutor’s Pledge 
(CPS, undated) reiterates these provisions. The requirement that the CPS must 
consider victims’ views enables victims to be involved in prosecutorial 
decisions. However, the extent of such involvement is limited, as the CPS is 
required to consider any views expressed by victims or their families, and not 
to take active steps to determine such views if victims do not make them 
known.  
 
Although CPS decisions not to prosecute may be taken on judicial review (see 
chapter 2), the courts’ powers of judicial review are restricted. In R v The 
Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte C [2000] WL 281275, for instance, 
the court held that the failure of the CPS to consult a victim about a decision 
not to prosecute does not constitute a procedural impropriety, and that the 
court cannot intervene in the CPS’s decision (para 31).  Consequently, victims 
have little leeway to participate in decisions whether or not to prosecute. 
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4.2 Decisions to accept pleas 
 
Victims may not participate in prosecutorial decisions to accept a guilty plea 
in exchange for a sentence discount or a guilty plea to a lesser charge. Only 
the prosecution and the defence may engage in plea bargaining. Moreover, 
plea bargaining is not subject to the Victims’ Code as it involves the exercise 
of discretion by the CPS (see section 4.1 above). In terms of the Prosecutors’ 
Code, however, in determining whether accepting a guilty plea is in the public 
interest, the CPS is required to “… ensure that the interests and, where 
possible, the views of the victim, or in appropriate cases the views of the 
victim’s family, are taken into account.” The CPS nevertheless retains the 
power to make the final decision (para 10.3). In terms of the Prosecutors’ 
Pledge (CPS, undated), the CPS has undertaken to determine the views of 
victims or their families by speaking to them, where practical, when deciding 
whether to accept a guilty plea.   
 
The Attorney General’s guidelines on the acceptance of pleas and the 
prosecutor’s role in the sentencing exercise (Attorney General, 2005) also 
require the CPS to ascertain victims’ views in deciding whether to accept 
pleas.  According to the guidelines, victims’ views are important as they “… 
may assist in informing the prosecutor's decision as to whether it is the public 
interest, as defined by the Code for Crown Prosecutors, to accept or reject the 
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plea” (para B.3).  The CPS has committed itself to complying with these 
guidelines (CPS, 2006). 
 
Despite these policies, however, the scope for victim involvement in plea 
decisions is limited. They may not contribute to plea bargaining negotiations 
and, unlike their American counterparts (see section 5.2 below), they may not 
participate in plea hearings. This inability to participate generates secondary 
victimisation as victims may not only feel marginalised, but also discontented 
by a conviction or sentence that does not reflect the impact of the crime 
accurately. Doak contends that this lack of participation “... may ... interfere 
with [victims’] right to have the truth of past events officially acknowledged” 
(Doak, 2008: 124). Ashworth and Redmayne maintain that guilty pleas benefit 
victims because they are spared the ordeal of testifying (Ashworth & 
Redmayne, 2005: 283).  However, they admit that victims may have more 
mixed responses to sentence discounts, and refer to research demonstrating 
that rape victims would prefer to testify to ensure that the defendant does not 
receive a sentence discount in exchange for a guilty plea (Ashworth & 
Redmayne, 2005: 283). 
 
4.3 Victim Personal Statements 
 
Since October 2001, victims have been permitted to make VPS in which they 
set out how the crime has affected them (Walklate, 2007: 116). This section 
 
 
 
 
 210 
explains the VPS Scheme and considers whether it is an effective method of 
involving victims at the sentencing stage. 
 
4.3.1 VPS scheme 
 
A VPS constitutes a statement in writing by the victim documenting the 
physical, emotional, psychological and financial impact of the crime. It may 
be made by any person who has been the subject of a prosecutable criminal 
act by another person. Furthermore, the family members or partners of victims 
of homicide and serious offences involving sexual and physical assault, as 
well as the parents of a child victim, are eligible to make VPS. Victims who 
are sole proprietors and small business partners are also eligible (Rock, 2004: 
211). 
 
There are two stages to the VPS. First, the victim makes a statement to the 
police when s/he makes the witness statement. At this stage, the statement 
includes “… matters such as bail, compensation, problems of vulnerability, 
medical and psychological damage, and the victim’s willingness to take part 
in restorative justice” (Rock, 2004: 210).  Second, the victim may make a 
further statement at a later stage once the long-term effects of the crime are 
manifest (Rock, 2004: 210).   
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The Court of Appeal has formulated a Practice Direction (Victim Personal 
Statements) [2002] 1 Cr App R 69 setting out the approach courts must adopt 
to VPS. Courts are required to consider and take into account the VPS as well 
as any supporting evidence before imposing sentence. However, they may not 
make unsubstantiated assumptions about the impact of the offence on the 
victim. Although courts may take the consequences to the victim into account 
when passing sentence, they must disregard his/her opinions on the sentence 
(para 3). 
 
Before the Practice Direction was issued, courts were known to consider 
victims’ opinions on sentence in certain cases (Edwards, 2002).  In R v Perks 
[2001] 1 Cr App R (S) 19, the Court of Appeal pointed to two exceptions to 
the rule that victims’ opinions on sentence were irrelevant. First, the sentence 
may be tempered to take cognisance of the fact that the sentence imposed on 
the offender is aggravating the victim’s distress.  Second, it may be reduced if 
the fact that the victim has forgiven the offender or does not wish to press 
charges shows “… that his or her psychological or mental suffering must be 
very much less than would normally be the case” (para 15).  
 
However, this approach is at odds with the decision in McCourt v UK (1993) 
15 EHRR CD 110 where the European Commission agreed with the Home 
Office that victims’ families are not sufficiently impartial to be involved in 
sentencing (para 1). This reasoning also applies to direct victims. It is 
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submitted that victims’ opinions on sentence are rightly irrelevant. While 
active participation in the pre-trial and trial processes is necessary to empower 
victims and alleviate secondary victimisation, the same reasoning does not 
apply to the inclusion of victims’ opinions on sentence. Taking cognisance of 
such opinions lends weight to a law and order ideology that harnesses “… 
victims in the service of severity” (Ashworth, 2000: 186) and constitutes an 
unjustifiable violation of defendants’ rights (see section 7 below). 
 
4.3.2 Effectiveness of VPS 
 
There is a difference of opinion concerning the effectiveness of VPS. 
Proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence contend that VPS facilitate catharsis 
and closure, which promotes healing for victims (Erez, 2000: 167; Erez, 1999: 
552). VPS also facilitate the communication by courts of the fact that the state 
has recognised “… the harm that victims have suffered” (Roberts & Erez, 
2010: 240). On the other hand, theorists of procedural justice maintain that 
granting victims an opportunity to “tell their stories” gives them control of the 
criminal process and increases their satisfaction with it, irrespective of the 
actual outcome (Erez, 2000: 167). In addition, it has been argued that VPS 
vindicate victims as parties to the criminal process (Goodey, 2005: 166). 
However, the legal status of victims in the UK, which, unlike that of their 
European counterparts (see section 6 below), is that of mere Crown witnesses, 
does not lend support to this view. 
 
 
 
 
 213 
 
Proponents of VPS also point to the ways in which VPS benefit the criminal 
justice system. VPS furnish criminal justice agencies with information, 
enabling them to comprehend the effects of the crime on the victim, which 
influences their decisions (Goodey, 2005: 166). Furthermore, taking 
cognisance of the ways in which crimes harm victims is said to encourage “… 
accurate or effective sentencing outcomes” (Edwards, 2001: 41). Drawing on 
their research regarding victim impact statements in South Australia, Erez and 
Rogers contend that such statements have enhanced sentence accuracy and 
proportionality without increasing punitiveness (Erez & Rogers, 1999: 235). 
In view of victims’ tendency “… to understate, rather than overstate …”, the 
impact of the crime, VPS have not led to sentences of increased severity 
(Goodey, 2005: 169; Erez, 1999: 549).  
 
Many scholars disagree strongly with the above analysis of the benefits of 
VPS. They maintain that VPS are inconsistent with traditional sentencing 
aims, and lack practical value for victims. Ashworth argues that VPS may 
result in the imposition of sentences on the basis of harm that was unforeseen 
by the offender. He questions the accuracy of an approach that permits an 
offender to “… receive a more severe sentence because his victim suffered 
abnormally serious after-effects”, while allowing another offender to “… 
receive a much lower sentence because his victim was counselled successfully 
and apparently recovered quickly” (Ashworth, 1993: 505-506). In addition, 
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VPS may inject more arbitrariness into the criminal process than already 
exists and, consequently, may violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
(Walkate, 2007: 117). 
 
Opponents also question whether VPS actually benefit victims. Ashworth 
maintains that research regarding the English VPS pilot projects indicates that 
the hopes of many victims that their statements would influence the outcome 
were dashed because the statements had little impact on the charge or the 
sentence (Ashworth, 2000: 198).   
 
Recent research shows that VPS have a negligible effect in practice. Tapley 
demonstrates that, despite being entitled to make VPS, victims are frequently 
not given the opportunity to do so (Walklate, 2007: 120). Erez contends that 
the ineffectiveness of VPS in practice is due to resistance from legal 
professionals (Erez, 2000: 178).  On the other hand, Sanders maintains that 
using VPS in traditional common law systems is not an appropriate way to 
obtain victim participation (Sanders, 2001: 457). Their lack of practical effect 
is thus not surprising.  Tagging victims’ input on to the tail end of the criminal 
process rather than permitting them to participate at the pre-trial and trial 
stages facilitates the expression of views that do not empower victims 
procedurally or prevent secondary victimisation (see section 7 below).  It is 
submitted that victim participation may only satisfactorily be achieved by 
introducing European procedures, such as auxiliary prosecution (see section 
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6.4.1 below).  However, as Erez emphasises, VPS constitute the only means, 
in the adversarial system as currently conceived, for victims to give voice to 
their experiences of victimisation (Erez, 2004: 499). 
 
4.4 Victims’ Advocate Scheme/Victim Focus Scheme 
 
The opportunity for victims to participate in the criminal process was 
expanded in April 2006 by the introduction of pilot schemes permitting the 
family members of homicide victims to make family impact statements 
(“FIS”) and to be legally represented at the sentencing stage (Walklate, 2007: 
115). These pilots were conducted from April 2006 to April 2008 (Sweeting, 
et al, 2008: 1) in the Central Criminal Court in London, as well as in the 
Birmingham, Cardiff, Manchester and Winchester Crown Courts (A Protocol 
issued by the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, 2006). 
 
Like VPS, the aim of FIS was to give family members an opportunity to 
explain the effect of the homicide to the court at the stage of sentencing. 
According to Rock, one of the primary purposes of FIS was to facilitate 
catharsis (Rock, 2010: 209).  However, FIS differed from VPS in that family 
members could choose whether to make an oral or a written statement and 
could be legally assisted (A Protocol issued by the President of the Queen’s 
Bench Division, 2006). The devising and presenting of the FIS occurred 
according to the following procedure. The FIS was initially made in writing 
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with the aid of a police Family Liaison Officer. Thereafter, it was considered 
by the court at the Plea and Case Management Hearing (“PCMH”). The 
family member had to indicate whether an oral or a written statement would 
be made at the sentencing stage, and whether s/he would be assisted by a 
lawyer or a “lay friend” (A Protocol issued by the President of the Queen’s 
Bench Division, 2006). If the family member opted for a lawyer “... paid for 
out of public funds ...”, the lawyer would be chosen immediately after the 
PCMH to give him/her time to prepare adequately (A Protocol issued by the 
President of the Queen’s Bench Division, 2006). To ensure that the lawyer 
was able to fulfil his/her duties properly, s/he had to be furnished with 
relevant information, including copies of prosecution and defence applications 
pertaining to matters such as “... advance sentence indication, reporting 
restrictions, special measures, details of dates of pre-trial hearings and the 
proposed trial date” (Criminal Justice System, 2005a, para 71). 
 
If the family member decided to make a statement orally at the sentencing 
stage, the procedure for adducing evidence-in-chief was followed. However, 
the lawyer had to confine his/her questions to the impact of the homicide on 
the family. To avoid violating the right to a fair trial, the defendant had to be 
given an opportunity to cross-examine (A Protocol issued by the President of 
the Queen’s Bench Division, 2006).  
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Despite the provision for lawyers to assist family members when delivering 
their statements, a recent study of the Victims’ Advocate Scheme pilots found 
that few family members used the services of a lawyer (Sweeting, et al, 2008: 
19). By contrast, family members preferred “... prosecution counsel to deliver 
the FIS”, leading the researchers to conclude that Family Liaison Officers and 
prosecution counsel “... had displaced any role that the independent advocate 
might play” (Sweeting, et al, 2008: 20). However, the study recommended 
that the question whether “... independent advocates should be rolled out ...” 
must be considered further by the government (Sweeting, et al, 2008: 60). A 
study by Rock of the pilots concluded that, although the FIS were aimed at 
... restoring respect to victims and their families ... they could not 
always accomplish their object because there was too much competing 
anguish, too deeply entrenched an adversarial system, and too many 
problems ... with staging a novel form of ritual performance (Rock, 
2010: 226). 
 
Prior to the completion of the pilots, the government chose not to implement 
the Victim Advocate Scheme nationally, but to introduce a different national 
scheme, the Victim Focus Scheme, in October 2007 (Rock, 2010: 225). The 
new Scheme comprises the handing of written FIS (renamed VPS) to the 
judge (Rock, 2010: 225) or having them read out in court by prosecution 
counsel (Sweeting, et al, 2008: 33-34). However, the scheme does not 
guarantee family members the opportunity to allocute (Sweeting, et al, 2008: 
34). Doak, et al maintain that this limitation of victims’ ability to allocute “... 
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will undoubtedly undermine any therapeutic potential that direct account 
making might have held” (Doak, et al, 2009: 675). In addition, the possibility 
of a lawyer reading out the VPS or participating in any way in the proceedings 
seems to have disappeared.  
 
5. VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN THE US 
 
In view of the fact that the limited avenues for passive victim participation in 
the UK are modelled on American measures, it is necessary to consider the 
relevant American law on the subject. Accordingly, this section assesses 
victims’ rights to participate in the pre-trial and sentencing stages in American 
law (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 183-186). Although it is concerned primarily 
with federal law, it adverts to state law briefly. 
 
The CVRA (see chapter 2), a federal statute, entrenches victims’ right to 
participate in the criminal process. In particular, victims have “the right to be 
reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving 
release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding”. Furthermore, the 
majority of states grant victims the right to be heard at these stages of the 
criminal process.  
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5.1 Decisions to prosecute 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the CVRA, the importance of prosecutorial 
independence in the American criminal process means that the prosecutor’s 
discretion to decide whether to prosecute is relatively unrestrained. Like 
his/her English counterpart, the final decision concerning prosecution rests 
with the prosecutor (Frase & Weigend, 1995: 337). Nonetheless, victims may 
require that the prosecutor consult them before exercising his/her discretion to 
prosecute (Gershman, 2005: 574). 
 
Some states also allow victims to bring applications for judicial review of 
prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute. However, such decisions are usually 
challenged in front of a grand jury. In consequence, victims have the power 
informally to sway decisions regarding charges (Beloof, 1999: 317). 
 
5.2 Decisions to accept pleas 
 
In terms of the CVRA, victims have the right to be heard at plea hearings. 
This right may be enforced by means of a writ of mandamus (Beloof, 2005: 
343). In addition, a number of states grant victims the right to participate at 
the plea stage. Twenty-two states require prosecutors to consult victims or 
ascertain their views regarding plea agreements (Verdun-Jones & Tijerino, 
2005: 198). In terms of the Code of Virginia (para 19.2-11.01), for example, a 
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plea agreement may not be accepted by the trial court unless the prosecutor 
has consulted the victim (Verdun-Jones & Tijerino, 2005: 198).   
 
Several states, including Minnesota, Rhode Island and Arizona, permit 
victims to be heard at plea hearings (Cassell, 2005: 866-867). In terms of the 
Arizona Criminal Code (para 13-4423), for example, victims are entitled to be 
present at plea hearings and make their views known to the court before it 
decides whether to accept a plea agreement (Verdun-Jones & Tijerino, 2005: 
199).    
 
Victim participation at the plea stage is restricted to these expressive and 
consultative forms of participation. Victims have no right to veto pleas in 
federal or state law, as the recognition of such a right would violate 
defendants’ due process rights to an unjustifiable extent.   
 
5.3 Victim participation in sentencing 
 
In terms of the CVRA, victims have the right to be “reasonably heard” at the 
stage of sentencing. All states thus allow victims to make written victim 
impact statements (“VIS”) indicating the impact of the crime. However, it was 
initially uncertain whether the right to be “reasonably heard” includes the 
right to allocute, which is recognised in some states.    
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This right was given a broad interpretation by the Ninth Circuit in Kenna v 
District Court 435 F.3d 1011 (9
th
 Cir. 2006; cited in Butler, 2006: 26). The 
court refused to accept the argument that a victim may not speak at the stage 
of sentencing, and that the right to be “reasonably heard” applies to written 
statements only. By contrast, it stated that the term “heard”, defined broadly, 
grants victims the “... right to provide oral and written impact statements” 
(Butler, 2006: 23). In the court’s view, the right to make an oral statement is 
“... a right to personally ‘allocute’, much like that of the defendant” (Baron-
Evans, 2006: 49). Consequently, it remitted the matter to the trial court, 
ordering it to avoid infringing the defendant’s constitutional rights, but to take 
account of the fact that, to comply with the victim’s right to allocute, the 
sentence must be vacated and a fresh hearing on sentence must take place 
(Baron-Evans, 2006: 54). Similarly, in United States v Degenhardt 405 
F.Supp. 2d 1341 (D. Utah 2005, cited in Beloof, 2006: 42), the court held that 
the CVRA permits victims to speak in person at the sentencing stage (Beloof, 
2006: 37).  
 
The Court in Kenna premised its decision on Congress’s intent that “... 
victims be full participants in the criminal justice system” (Butler, 2006: 23). 
Consequently, Beloof maintains that victims are independent participants at 
the stage of sentencing, who do not require the court’s permission or the 
request of the parties (Beloof, 2006: 41). However, the distinction in 
American law between “participant” and “party” must be borne in mind. 
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Victims are participants when they exercise their rights to participate in the 
criminal process. They are parties when they enforce rights that they have 
been denied in the criminal process by instituting action outside the 
parameters of the trial (Beloof, 2005: 272). Although the degree of their 
participation in the American criminal process is much more significant than 
the English criminal process, they are nevertheless not parties to criminal 
proceedings, as is the case in auxiliary prosecution and adhesion in European 
jurisdictions (see section 6.4 below). 
 
Having clarified the position of written and oral VIS in federal law, the 
decision in Kenna will probably encourage the recognition of victim 
allocution in all states. However, the question whether victims have the right 
to give opinions on sentence was not addressed by the court. A minority of 
states permit victims to furnish such opinions by way of Victim Statements of 
Opinion (“VSO”) (Beloof, 1999: 324).   
 
In In re Kenna (Kenna II) 453 F.3d 1136 (9
th
 Cir. 2006; cited in Baron-Evans, 
2006: 55), the victim’s counsel had contended in the district court that victims 
have the right, in terms of the CVRA, to obtain access to a pre-sentence report 
to enable them to recommend a sentence (Baron-Evans, 2006: 51). In making 
this contention, counsel referred to a senatorial statement in Congress that 
“victim impact” includes not only the impact of the crime on the victim but 
also “sentencing recommendations” (Baron-Evans, 2006: 51). The district 
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court held that the CVRA did not give victims the right to obtain a pre-
sentence report. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision. The 
implication of this decision is that victims do not have the right to make 
sentencing recommendations (Baron-Evans, 2006: 51).   
 
It is unfortunate that the court did not expressly state that victims have no 
such right. Nonetheless, the implication of the decision is a welcome 
corrective to the views of scholars such as Beloof and Cassell, who contend 
that victims have an interest in punishment, justifying the inclusion of their 
opinions on sentence (see Beloof, 2005: 311; Cassell, 2005: 893-894). To 
admit such opinions allows the infusion of individual vengeance that violates 
defendants’ due process rights, without empowering victims procedurally or 
alleviating secondary victimisation. It is to be hoped that the court’s refusal to 
permit VSOs at federal level will encourage states using VSOs to reconsider 
their position, and dissuade states who do not use them from entertaining the 
idea of introducing them. 
 
5.4 Victims’ lawyers 
 
Despite the American commitment to adversarialism, which would appear to 
preclude the recognition of victims’ lawyers, there is clear authority in both 
federal and state law for the use of such lawyers. 
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Victims are not expressly given the right to legal representation in the CVRA. 
However, if a material conflict of interest arises between a prosecutor and a 
victim, the prosecutor must advise the victim that s/he may seek legal advice 
(Cassell, 2005: 916). It is therefore permissible, in terms of the CVRA, for a 
victim to have legal assistance. Butler contends that it is “... implicit in the 
CVRA provisions regarding the court’s obligation to ensure that victims’ 
rights are afforded ...” that the court has the power to appoint victims’ 
lawyers. As authority, he cites the decision in United States v Stamper 766 
F.Supp. 1396, 1397 (D.N.C. 1991; cited in Butler, 2006: 28), where a “... 
federal court appointed counsel to represent a victim” (Butler, 2006: 24). 
However, the courts seldom appoint victims’ lawyers in practice (Beloof, 
1999: 321). 
 
Nevertheless, victims have the right to use private lawyers in federal court as 
well as in most state courts. Such lawyers are subject to the prosecutor’s 
control and participate in the trial with his/her permission (Beloof, 1999: 320; 
O’Hara, 2005: 236). For instance, the Tennessee Code (para 8-7-401(a)) 
provides that victims or their families may employ private lawyers to work 
alongside the district Attorney General or his/her deputies in prosecuting 
cases. The Attorney General has discretion to determine the extent to which 
such private lawyers may participate (Gershman, 2005: 564). In Hughes v 
Bowers 711 F.Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1989; cited in Gershman, 2005: 567), the 
 
 
 
 
 225 
federal district court held that the presence of such lawyers is not in and of 
itself constitutionally improper (Gershman, 2005: 567).   
 
At least as far as victims’ lawyers are concerned, the American approach to 
victim participation bears a stronger resemblance to the European approach 
(see section 6.3 below) than its English common law counterpart. However, 
contrary to the American position, victims’ lawyers in European jurisdictions 
are not restricted by prosecutorial control. 
 
6. EUROPEAN MODELS OF VICTIM PARTICIPATION 
 
Although victims in civil law and Nordic jurisdictions are witnesses for the 
prosecution, they may also be parties to the criminal proceedings, armed with 
procedural rights similar to those of the prosecution and defence. This section, 
which draws on the present author’s work (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 186-195), 
evaluates the models of victim participation in these jurisdictions.  While it 
focuses on the trial, it also considers the pre-trial process briefly.    
 
Most European jurisdictions have similar models of victim participation. This 
section analyses the use of victims’ lawyers and auxiliary prosecutors in 
German law, which is inquisitorial, and Swedish law, which is a mixed 
system with an adversarial trial process, in order to show that these models are 
compatible with inquisitorial as well as adversarial trial procedures. It also 
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considers the adhesion procedure in Dutch law, which has an adversarial trial 
process (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 647). 
 
6.1 Party and non-party victims 
 
European jurisdictions make a distinction between victims who are and 
victims who are not parties to the proceedings. As this distinction is unknown 
in common law jurisdictions, it is necessary to explain it prior to assessing the 
European models of victim participation. 
 
There is a distinction in German law between a victim in the broad sense 
(Opfer) and an injured person or party (Verletzte).  The term Verletzte is used 
within the context of victims’ procedural rights. However, it is not defined in 
the Strafprozeßordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure, “St.PO”), and, 
accordingly, its meaning must be sought within the context of the section in 
which it appears (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 362).  A Verletzte who is an 
injured person (a prosecution witness) is not a party to the proceedings, but 
has the right to a lawyer (s.406f(1) St.PO).  By contrast, a Verletzte who is an 
injured party is a full party to the proceedings with active participation rights, 
including the right to a lawyer.  Such an injured party is one who acts as an 
auxiliary prosecutor or who employs the adhesion procedure, in terms of 
which his/her civil claim for compensation is joined to the criminal 
proceedings. 
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A similar distinction is made in Swedish law. The term brottsoffer, which is 
the colloquial term for “victim of crime”, has no legal meaning. The 
appropriate legal term is målsägande, defined in s.8 of the Swedish 
Rättegångsbalk (Code of Judicial Procedure, “CJP”) as “the person against 
whom the offence was committed or who was affronted or harmed by it”. It 
refers either to an injured person or an injured party in the abovementioned 
sense (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 889). A slightly less complex distinction is 
made in Dutch law between a victim in the broad sense (slachtoffer), who is a 
prosecution witness, and an injured party (benadeelde partij), who uses the 
adhesion procedure and has active participation rights (Brienen & Hoegen, 
2000b: 668).  
 
6.2 Victim participation in the pre-trial stage 
  
Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands employ an inquisitorial pre-trial 
procedure. Accordingly, the investigation, which is conducted by the police 
and the prosecution, is overseen by an examining magistrate, who decides 
whether the dossier is ready for trial. The judiciary in these jurisdictions is 
thus much more actively involved in the pre-trial process than its counterpart 
in common law jurisdictions.  
 
Despite the inquisitorial nature of the pre-trial proceedings, the extent to 
which victims may participate differs between these jurisdictions. Victims 
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participate to a considerable extent in the German pre-trial process. Whether 
they are injured persons or injured parties, victims are entitled to have their 
pre-trial participation rights exercised by a lawyer on their behalf. However, it 
is uncertain whether this right applies to police questioning (Walther, 2006: 
114).   
 
The injured person/party is entitled to participate significantly in decisions to 
prosecute. Section 171 St.PO provides that prosecutors who decide not to 
prosecute or who stop the prosecution must furnish the injured person/party 
with the reasons for their decision. If the injured person/party is not satisfied 
with these reasons, s/he is entitled to follow a three-stage review procedure. 
First, having received the prosecutor’s reasons, the injured person/party may 
lodge objections to these reasons with the superior prosecutor. Secondly, if 
the superior prosecutor refuses to overturn the initial decision, the injured 
person/party may apply for judicial review. Thirdly, if, on review, the court 
decides against the injured person/party, s/he may appeal against this decision. 
 
However, the ambit of this right to appeal is restricted. It only applies where 
the prosecutor’s decision was premised on a lack of “substantial suspicion”, 
viz. that a conviction was unlikely due to “… lack of evidence or legal 
obstacles” (Walther, 2006: 114). Accordingly, the right is exercised rarely in 
practice (Frase & Weigend, 1995: 350). 
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Furthermore, injured persons as well as injured parties have a right to 
discovery, entitling them “… to see the prosecutor’s file and to inspect the 
evidence” (Akteneinsicht) (Walther, 2006: 115; s.406e(1) St.PO). However, 
injured persons must furnish a statement of good cause in order to qualify for 
Akteneinsicht, whereas injured parties who are acting as auxiliary prosecutors 
qualify automatically (Walther, 2006: 115). Consequently, auxiliary 
prosecutors have extensive participation rights in the pre-trial process. 
 
The pre-trial participation rights of victims in Swedish law are less extensive 
than those in German law. The prosecution must consider the injured person’s 
or injured party’s views in deciding whether to waive a prosecution in terms 
of s.7 CJP. In doing so, the prosecution must balance the injured 
person/party’s interest in prosecution against the public interest. The 
prosecution must notify the injured person/party if it decides not to continue 
the prosecution, and must furnish him/her with a clear explanation of the 
reasons for its decision (Wergens, 2002: 274). The injured person/party is 
entitled to appeal against the district or regional prosecutor’s decisions to “… 
the regional prosecutor or the Attorney General” respectively (Svensson, 
1995: 34). S/he has no right to appeal to a court. Furthermore, s/he has no 
right to discovery (Wergens, 2002: 275).  However, s/he does have the right to 
a lawyer at the pre-trial stage, including when being “… heard by the police or 
prosecutor” (Svensson, 1995: 38). 
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Dutch law only grants pre-trial participation rights to injured parties who use 
the adhesion procedure. As this procedure may be initiated at any stage, 
whether before or during the trial, the injured party’s pre-trial rights are 
considered in the discussion of adhesion (see section 6.4.2 below). 
 
6.3 Non-party victims’ lawyers 
 
German law permits injured persons (prosecution witnesses) to be represented 
by lawyers who have the right to be present while the injured person is being 
examined by the court and the prosecution, to object to questions on their 
behalf and to apply for the public to be excluded in certain cases (ss.406f(1)-
(2) St.PO). These lawyers are not paid for out of state funds. 
 
The Swedish Lag om Målsägandebiträde (Act Concerning Counsel for the 
Injured Person/Party) provides for the appointment of lawyers for injured 
persons and injured parties in serious offences, such as sexual offences, 
murder and kidnapping (ss.1(1)-(2)). Furthermore, if, in view of his/her 
personal relationship and other circumstances, s/he is deemed to be in 
particular need of a lawyer, the injured person/party is also entitled to a 
lawyer in the case of other offences punishable by imprisonment (s.1(3)). The 
state appoints and funds the lawyer (Bacik, et al, 1998: 288). It is the lawyer’s 
duty to protect the injured person/party’s interests in the case and to provide 
him/her with support and assistance (s.3). The role of the injured person’s 
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lawyer is limited to being present during the trial (Wergens, 2002: 277). 
However, it has been proposed that the injured person’s lawyer should be 
allowed to question the defendant, witnesses and experts (Temkin, 2002: 
293).   
 
Traditionally, lawyers for prosecution witnesses have been viewed as 
incompatible with adversarial principles (see section 7 below). However, the 
fact that such lawyers are permitted in American law (see section 5.4 above) 
indicates that this is not necessarily the case. Similarly, victims’ lawyers have 
not given rise to procedural irregularities in Swedish law, which also has an 
adversarial trial process (Herrmann, 1996: 129). 
 
6.4 Victim Parties 
 
This section evaluates the active procedural rights granted to injured parties 
acting as auxiliary prosecutors in German and Swedish law and as civil parties 
in adhesion proceedings in Dutch law. 
 
6.4.1 Auxiliary prosecution 
 
Not only Germany and Sweden, but also several other European jurisdictions, 
such as Austria, Denmark, Portugal (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 80, 218 & 
778) and Poland (Doak, 2005: 309), employ a tripartite procedure in terms of 
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which victims of serious offences may act as auxiliary prosecutors, alongside 
the state prosecutor, in the defendant’s trial.  The fact that Sweden, Denmark 
and Portugal have adversarial trials (Herrmann, 1996: 129) demonstrates that 
auxiliary prosecution is not a purely inquisitorial procedure. This section 
emphasises the similarities in the auxiliary prosecution procedure in Germany 
and Sweden, in order to illustrate that it is equally suitable to both inquisitorial 
and adversarial proceedings (Interestingly, victim participation in trials in the 
International Criminal Court has been referred to by Doak as an illustration of 
the use of such participation “… in a forum that largely adopts adversarial 
procedures without infringing the rights of the accused” (Doak, 2008: 137-
138)). 
 
In terms of s.395(1) of the German St.PO, victims of serious offences that “… 
have a very personal impact on the victim (or the victim’s family), including 
murder, assault, kidnapping, and sexual assault …” (Pizzi & Perron, 1996: 54-
55), may participate as an auxiliary prosecutor (Nebenklager) in the 
defendant’s trial. Such victims are thus both auxiliary prosecutors and 
prosecution witnesses. Their right to participate is premised on the rationale 
that victims ought to be able to give effect to their interest in gaining 
satisfaction for the harm they have suffered in consequence of the offence 
(Pfeiffer, 1993: 1603).  
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Victims must apply for permission to act as an auxiliary prosecutor by 
handing a declaration of joinder to the court (s.396(1) St.PO). This declaration 
only becomes effective upon preferment of public charges. Consequently, 
victims may only act as auxiliary prosecutors if the state institutes criminal 
proceedings. The court determines the application after having heard the 
prosecutor. The court’s decision is not subject to challenge (s.396(2) St.PO). 
 
If s/he is granted permission to participate, the auxiliary prosecutor becomes a 
party to the proceedings with active participation rights. His/her entitlement to 
a court-appointed lawyer is contingent upon whether the offence is serious or 
non-serious. Section 397a(1) St.PO makes a distinction between Verbrechen 
(serious offences) and Vergehen (non-serious offences), which is similar to 
the American distinction between felonies and misdemeanours (Brienen & 
Hoegen, 2000b: 355). If the offence is serious, such as sexual assault (Frey, 
undated: 63), the auxiliary prosecutor has the right to a court-appointed 
lawyer in respect of all the offences to which the auxiliary prosecution 
procedure applies.  However, if the offence is non-serious, s/he only has the 
right to such a lawyer if s/he is younger than 16 years or unable to look after 
his/her own interests properly. The state bears the costs of the lawyer, 
although the defendant will be ordered to pay these costs if s/he is convicted 
(Niedling, 2005: 103-104).   
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In cases that do not fall within the provisions of s.397a(1), the auxiliary 
prosecutor also has the right to legal aid if s/he cannot afford a lawyer, 
provided that the case concerns complex facts or law or s/he is unable to look 
after his/her own interests properly or cannot be expected to do so (s.397a(2) 
St.PO). The right to legal representation applies even if the victim who is 
entitled to act as an auxiliary prosecutor does not do so (s.406g(1) St.PO).     
 
The auxiliary prosecutor has several procedural rights. A brief explanation of 
German trial procedure is necessary to appreciate the significance of these 
rights. The procedure is inquisitorial, aimed at finding the truth, and judge- 
rather than party-centred (Bacik, et al, 1998: 234). Evidence is led by means 
of narrative (Walther, 2006: 116).  The defendant testifies first, and thereafter 
the victim (Pizzi & Perron, 1996: 46) and the witnesses follow. The judge 
calls witnesses, but the three parties’ lawyers may also request that evidence 
be led.   
 
The parties and the witnesses are questioned first by the trial judge and the lay 
judges. Thereafter, the parties’ lawyers may do so (Pizzi & Perron, 1996: 47).  
The defendant is not considered a witness and accordingly has an unlimited 
right to silence, which includes the right to refuse to answer questions (Pizzi 
& Perron, 1996: 62). As the judge is in charge of questioning, there is no 
distinction between the prosecution and defence cases, or between 
examination-in-chief and cross-examination (Pizzi & Perron, 1996: 55). 
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Section 239(1) St.PO allows cross-examination, provided that it is jointly 
requested by the prosecution and the defence. However, “… aggressive 
partisan ‘distortions’ of a witness’s recollection are seen as irreconcilable with 
the overall stress on inquisitorial methods of finding the truth”, and cross-
examination is consequently seldom used (Frase & Weigend, 1995: 357-358).  
The objective of questioning is thus to elucidate the evidence rather than to 
cast aspersions on the witness’s credibility.   
 
Within the above procedural context, the auxiliary prosecutor has active 
procedural rights that are congruent with those of the prosecution and the 
defence. These rights include the rights to be present throughout the trial, 
despite the fact that the auxiliary prosecutor also testifies as a prosecution 
witness; to request the recusal of a judge; to challenge an expert witness; to 
object to orders made by the judge; to object to questions; to apply for 
evidence to be adduced; and to make statements (s.397(1) St.PO).   
 
Furthermore, the defendant may be removed from the courtroom in certain 
cases, if the aims of finding the truth or protecting witnesses are endangered 
(Walther, 2006: 116). The auxiliary prosecutor may ask that the defendant be 
removed while s/he testifies (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 381). In addition, 
s/he may leave the courtroom if the proceedings cause too much distress, 
provided that his/her lawyer remains. Finally, like the prosecution and 
defence, the auxiliary prosecutor may present a closing argument (Frey, 
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undated: 62).  Although s/he may ask for a specific sentence, s/he is not 
allowed any dispositive involvement as “… questions of sentencing are 
considered to lie in the realm of professional prosecutors and judges” 
(Walther, 2006: 117). 
 
After the trial has concluded, the auxiliary prosecutor may appeal 
independently of the prosecution (s.401(1) St.PO). However, the right of 
appeal is not unrestricted. The auxiliary prosecutor may not appeal against the 
sentence, or appeal in order that the defendant be convicted of an offence in 
respect of which the auxiliary prosecution procedure does not apply (s.400(1) 
St.PO). Consequently, s/he may in effect only appeal against the merits of a 
decision concerning an offence for which auxiliary prosecution is permissible. 
Like counsel for the prosecution and defence, counsel for the auxiliary 
prosecutor may exercise the above-mentioned rights on his/her behalf (Bacik, 
et al, 1998: 237-238; s406f(2), s.406g(2) St.PO).   
 
Auxiliary prosecution in Swedish law bears a strong resemblance to its 
German counterpart. Section 8 CJP provides that “... when a prosecutor has 
instituted a prosecution, the [injured party] may support the prosecution”. The 
injured party has active procedural rights similar to those of the prosecution 
and defence (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 890). S/he is entitled to be 
represented by a lawyer funded by the state.    
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Unlike the position in German law, however, auxiliary prosecution in Swedish 
law operates within the context of an adversarial trial. Once the charge has 
been read and the defendant’s plea has been entered, oral testimony is 
adduced. The defendant and the witnesses, including the victim who acts as an 
auxiliary prosecutor, give narrative evidence (Herrmann, 1996: 144; 
Macphail, 2002). The victim testifies first, followed by the defendant and the 
witnesses. The victim and defendant are not required to testify under oath.   
 
The prosecutor, victims’ lawyer, defence counsel and judge, in turn, question 
the victim after s/he has testified. The lawyers question the defendant in the 
same sequence after s/he has testified, except that defence counsel questions 
the defendant before the victims’ lawyer does so. The witnesses are 
questioned first by the party who calls them, and thereafter by counsel for the 
other parties and the judge (Svensson, 1995: 26). The questioning takes the 
form of cross-examination, but is not aggressive (Wergens, 2002: 259). The 
judge must ensure that the victim is not treated inappropriately or asked 
irrelevant questions (Wergens, 2002: 279). After the court has decided that no 
further questions are needed, the prosecutor and counsel for the other parties 
present arguments. The court then retires to consider its verdict (Svensson, 
1995: 26).  
 
The auxiliary prosecutor’s lawyer has several procedural rights within the 
above context. These rights include the rights to be present for the whole trial; 
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to speak on the victim’s behalf; to object to prosecution and defence 
questions; to cross-examine the defendant; to request that witnesses be called 
on the victim’s behalf; and to address the court on guilt or innocence and the 
appropriate sentence (Bacik, et al, 1998: 288-289). The lawyer is also entitled 
to lodge and argue an appeal on the victim’s behalf (s.8 CJP). 
 
Apart from the right to request the recusal of a judge and the right to challenge 
an expert, as well as some procedural differences due to the adversarial nature 
of the trial, auxiliary prosecution is the same in Sweden as it is in Germany. 
Its use in both systems demonstrates that the common law antipathy to 
auxiliary prosecution is due more to traditionalist attitudes than to 
fundamental procedural differences. It is consequently quite possible to 
employ this procedure in the UK to alleviate secondary victimisation and to 
empower victims. As long as auxiliary prosecutors are not allowed to 
influence the sentence, the procedure does not violate defendants’ due process 
rights (see section 7 below). However, only victims of serious offences are 
eligible for auxiliary prosecution in German and Swedish law, and, it is 
submitted, the introduction of auxiliary prosecution in English law ought to be 
restricted in the same way.  
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6.4.2 Adhesion 
 
Most European jurisdictions (including, amongst others, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Liechenstein, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey; see Brienen & 
Hoegen, 2000: 77, 134, 217, 318, 363, 405, 440, 557, 586, 668, 735, 777, 856, 
890 & 974), permit injured parties to institute adhesion proceedings, namely 
proceedings joining the civil claim for compensation to the criminal 
proceedings. Many of these jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Spain, have adversarial trials (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 647; Herrmann, 
1996: 129). This section considers Dutch law to illustrate the operation of 
adhesion within the context of an adversarial trial. However, in light of the 
existence of compensation orders in English law, which constitute a penal 
sanction (s.130 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000; see 
chapter 5) and do not require an application by the victim (Brienen & Hoegen, 
2000b: 258), the adhesion procedure would contribute little to victims’ 
position in the English criminal process. 
 
In Dutch criminal procedure, victims are generally mere prosecution 
witnesses who do not participate actively in the proceedings (Ellison, 1997: 
78). However, if a victim has been harmed directly by a criminal act (Bijlsma, 
2005: 63), s/he may act as a civil claimant, joining the claim for material and 
non-material damages to the criminal proceedings against the defendant 
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(Ellison, 1997: 194). The victim may choose to join the proceedings at the 
pre-trial stage or during the trial (Bijlsma, 2005: 70). To join at the pre-trial 
stage benefits the victim by eliminating the need to appear at trial, as there is 
no rule of law requiring the victim to appear personally (Bijlsma, 2005: 62).   
 
A victim who has joined the proceedings in this manner becomes an injured 
party (benadeelde partij; Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 668). The injured party’s 
family members may also act as civil claimants (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 
668). If the prosecutor decides not to continue the prosecution after the victim 
has joined the proceedings, s/he is required to notify him/her in writing, 
providing reasons for the decision. The injured party may complain to the 
court about the prosecutor’s decision (Bijlsma, 2005: 63).   
 
The injured party is entitled to legal representation at the pre-trial stage as 
well as during the trial, and may be eligible for legal aid if s/he is in financial 
need (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 659, 669). However, Dutch law does not 
provide court-appointed lawyers or automatically state-funded lawyers in 
serious cases. Consequently, if the injured party is not eligible for legal aid, 
s/he must employ a privately funded lawyer.  
 
The injured party has a significant right of pre-trial discovery. S/he may 
inspect and photocopy the dossier, although she requires prosecutorial 
permission to do so. Permission may be refused “... to protect an ongoing 
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investigation, the rights of the defendants, or because of ponderous arguments 
of general interest” (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 669). However, the injured 
party may appeal to the Minister of Justice and, thereafter, to the Council of 
State, against a prosecutor’s refusal to grant permission (Brienen & Hoegen, 
2000b: 669). 
 
The Terwee Act 1995 provides that, at the trial stage, the court or the injured 
party may divide the civil claim into complex and simple components. The 
complex component will be determined by a civil court as an ordinary claim 
in tort. The simple component, on the other hand, will be decided in the 
criminal proceedings (Ellison, 1997: 195). Studies have demonstrated that 
judges are not well disposed to the adhesion procedure and readily consider 
civil claims (or parts of such claims) too complex to be decided in the 
criminal proceedings (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 688-689). Accordingly, an 
injured party who is ineligible for legal aid will be constrained to pay for the 
civil suit, the costs of which are significantly higher than the criminal 
proceedings. This state of affairs inures to the detriment of rape victims, as 
many legal professionals regard rape cases as complex matters requiring civil 
proceedings (Ellison, 1997: 195). 
 
Besides the above pre-trial rights, the injured party has procedural rights at 
trial, which may be exercised on his/her behalf by his/her lawyer. These rights 
comprise the rights to question witnesses or experts concerning the 
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compensation claim; to use an interpreter, if necessary; and to address the 
court concerning the compensation claim after each address by the prosecutor 
(Bijlsma, 2005: 72). While the injured party is not entitled to call witnesses or 
experts, s/he may ask the prosecutor to do so on his/her behalf (Brienen & 
Hoegen, 2000b: 669). The procedural rights of the civil claimant are 
accordingly more limited than the procedural rights of the auxiliary 
prosecutor.  
 
Before compensation may be awarded, the offender must be convicted and 
given a penal sanction. Although the injured party may appeal against the 
court’s refusal to grant the compensation claim, s/he may not appeal 
independently against an acquittal (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 669-670). The 
compensation claim must be enforced by the civil claimant. There is no state 
mechanism for the enforcement of such claims (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 
695). In addition to the expense of separate civil suits, this lack of state 
assistance restricts the accessibility of adhesion proceedings, and they are 
seldom used in practice (Ellison, 1997: 196). 
 
The German and Swedish auxiliary prosecution procedure grants victims of 
serious offences the most far-reaching procedural rights of the above 
European models of victim participation. While the procedural rights of non-
party victims are more circumscribed, the fact that they are entitled to lawyers 
empowers them much more extensively than their English counterparts. The 
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Dutch adhesion procedure has many practical shortcomings and is less useful 
to victims than the English compensation order, which, interestingly, the 
Netherlands has introduced (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000b: 658). 
 
7. VICTIM PARTICIPATION AND DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS  
 
Drawing on the work of the present author (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 195-198), 
this section argues that the use of auxiliary prosecutors for victims of serious 
offences in the UK would alleviate much of the secondary victimisation 
experienced by these victims in the criminal process. Amongst other things, 
this procedure would facilitate access to information, the ability to question 
witnesses, to lead evidence, to make statements, and to object to humiliating 
and intrusive cross-examination (Rock, 2004: 531). Victims from unequal 
social groups, such as victims of gender-based, racially motivated and 
homophobic crime (see chapter 6), frequently suffer serious fatal and non-
fatal offences against the person, and would consequently be eligible for the 
auxiliary prosecution procedure. Victims of less serious offences, who are 
intimidated by the criminal process but do not experience secondary 
victimisation to the same extent as victims of serious offences, ought to be 
allowed victims’ lawyers, despite the fact that they are witnesses for the 
Crown.   
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Common law opponents of such procedures premise their objections on the 
notion that the presence of a third party or a victims’ lawyer is incompatible 
with the adversarial principle of equality of arms (Doak, 2005: 298). Lord 
Justice Auld has expressed the view that the introduction of auxiliary 
prosecutors would be unfair (Doak, 2008: 145). The assumption that informs 
these perspectives is that such procedures would pit the shared interests of the 
victim and the prosecution against those of the defendant, and cause the latter 
to face a double onslaught (Beloof, 1999: 320). Within an adversarial context, 
active victim participation would consequently violate the defendant’s right to 
a fair trial. Spencer maintains that “... defendants must of necessity be the 
centre of the proceedings ...” and that the interests of victims and witnesses 
“... must inevitably take second place” (Spencer, 2004: 37).     
 
However, this representation of victims’ rights and defendants’ rights as 
inevitably riven by conflict obscures “... new avenues for criminal justice 
development” (Goodey, 2005: 180). One of these new avenues involves 
recognising the increasing overlap between adversarial and inquisitorial 
processes, as well as the significance of moving to an inclusive principle of 
fairness in criminal proceedings that encompasses both defendants’ and 
victims’ rights. For example, many civil law jurisdictions, including 
Germany, have adopted the principle of equality of arms, which has brought 
common law and civil law procedures into closer proximity (Frase & 
Weigend, 1995: 358). Furthermore, traditionally adversarial jurisdictions are 
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beginning to incorporate what have hitherto been perceived as inquisitorial 
processes. For instance, the US permits victims to be legally represented at 
trial (see Beloof, 1999: 320-321).     
 
Flowing from this growing convergence between the systems, an inclusive 
understanding of the principle of a fair trial has emerged. As Walther points 
out, “... the trial must be fair not only with regard to the position of the 
defendant but also with regard to the positions of witnesses and victims” 
(Walther, 2006: 113). In Doorson v The Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330, 
the ECtHR adopted such an inclusive concept of trial fairness, holding that the 
principles of a fair trial require that defendants’ and victim/witness’s interests 
be balanced in appropriate cases (para 70; see chapter 2). Furthermore, in 
Perez v France (2005) 40 EHRR 39, it held that a civil claimant in adhesion 
proceedings has a right to a fair trial in terms of article 6(1) ECHR and that 
this “… approach is consistent with the need to safeguard victims’ rights and 
their proper place in criminal proceedings” (paras 71-72; see chapter 2). 
Significantly, the ECtHR regards victims’ lawyers as an unremarkable feature 
of criminal proceedings (see, for instance, SN v Sweden (2004) 39 EHRR 13, 
where the fact that the victim had been legally represented had no bearing on 
the court’s determination that the defendant had received a fair trial). 
 
Notwithstanding its decisions favouring trial fairness for victims as well as 
defendants, the ECtHR’s concept of trial proceedings is deeply rooted in 
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adversarialism. In Doorson it held that, in general, trials must comprise public 
hearings in which all evidence must “… be produced in the presence of the 
accused … with a view to adversarial argument” (para 73). The incorporation 
of victims’ interests flowing from an inclusive concept of trial fairness has not 
been held to disturb the adversarial balance between the prosecution and 
defence. 
 
Sanders argues that tripartite proceedings such as auxiliary prosecution are 
consonant with trial fairness to both victims and defendants. He advocates a 
freedom model, in terms of which the criminal process must employ measures 
that “… maximize the totality of freedom …” of both victims and defendants 
(Sanders, 2002: 210). Auxiliary prosecution for victims of serious offences 
enhances the prospect of dialogue and understanding and decreases the 
likelihood of secondary victimisation. Accordingly, it maximises the freedom 
of victims without decreasing the freedom of defendants (Sanders, 2002: 222). 
Equally, legal representation for victims of less serious offences enhances 
dialogue and understanding and alleviates the ordeal of the criminal process. 
As such victims remain prosecution witnesses with limited procedural rights 
the defendant’s freedom is not decreased.  
 
However, victim statements of opinion on sentence do not enhance victims’ 
freedom as much as they hamper defendants’ freedom (Sanders, 2002: 210). 
Such statements open the door to the acceptance by the court of sentiments 
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based on vengeance (or forgiveness) that undermine the principle of 
proportionality in sentencing and violate the due process rights of the 
defendant.  
 
The increasing convergence of adversarial and inquisitorial systems, as well 
as the emergence of an inclusive concept of trial fairness, reveals that it is not 
the principle of adversarialism that precludes the introduction of procedures 
such as auxiliary prosecution and victims’ lawyers, but the existence of 
traditionalist views that regard these procedures as inquisitorial only (Goodey, 
2005: 180). These views, which are strongly held “… in some influential 
quarters …” of the legal establishment (Rock, 2004: 529), are premised on the 
assumption that active participation rights grant victims control of criminal 
proceedings. In reality, procedures such as auxiliary prosecution (and ipso 
facto also victims’ lawyers) do not involve victims in decision-making 
control, but grant them the important right “… to speak and to be heard” 
(Wemmers, 2005: 130). Nonetheless, as Doak states, it is likely that “… the 
institutional reluctance of lawyers to tolerate a third party …” (or a victim’s 
lawyer, for that matter) will not be easily defeated (Doak, 2008: 147).  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
The government cannot give effect to its rhetoric of “giving victims a voice” 
(Home Office, 2001b: 73) merely by providing victims with inconsequential 
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involvement in prosecutorial decisions and sentencing. As the present author 
has argued (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 198), to empower victims fully, and to 
alleviate secondary victimisation, victims need procedural rights throughout 
the criminal process. European procedures such as auxiliary prosecution and 
victims’ lawyers are not only the most effective means of doing so, but also 
ensure fairness to defendants. Far from being an inquisitorial feature whose 
introduction in an adversarial system ought to be resisted, active victim 
participation should be valued as a means of ensuring the dignity and respect 
due to victims as citizens in a participatory democracy (Edwards, 2001: 44). 
As is elaborated more fully in chapter 7, the recognition of procedural rights is 
a pre-condition for the effective use, on the part of victims, of the service 
rights examined in chapter 3 during pre-trial and trial proceedings.  
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CHAPTER 5: VICTIM COMPENSATION AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In many respects, victim compensation and restorative justice (“RJ”) are 
disparate measures that have little in common. For instance, while 
measures for victim compensation, whether by the state or by individual 
offenders, form part of the formal criminal justice system, RJ initiatives 
often operate alongside, or independently of, the formal system. 
Furthermore, the participatory process, involving victims, offenders and 
the community, that is the hallmark of RJ, is absent from compensatory 
measures. However, as Dignan has pointed out, insofar as state 
compensation may “... be seen as an embodiment of society’s resolve to 
repair the harm that has been caused by an offence ...”, and as a 
mechanism “... symbolically to reforge the social bonds that bind people 
together”, its aims are congruent with those of RJ (Dignan, 2005: 44-45). 
In addition, measures for the compensation of victims by offenders, such 
as compensation orders and reparation orders, “... are closely allied to ...” 
RJ initiatives (Dignan, 2005: 108). In light of these conceptual similarities, 
victim compensation and RJ are considered together in this chapter. 
 
The chapter commences by evaluating state compensation in the UK 
within the framework of the government’s obligations in terms of the 
European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes 
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1983 (the “Compensation Convention”; see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 199). It 
maintains that, whereas the early non-statutory CICS complied with these 
obligations, the current tariff-based CICS may fail to meet the 
requirements of the Compensation Convention in certain respects. The 
chapter also assesses the measures for individual offenders to compensate 
victims, including compensation orders, surcharges and recovery orders, 
against the backcloth of EU standards. It points out that these measures are 
consonant with the requirements of the Framework Decision and the 
Victims’ Directive, but contends that their efficacy is hampered by the fact 
that many offenders are unable to pay compensation and that orders are 
difficult to enforce.  
 
Thereafter, the chapter turns to a consideration of the RJ processes that are 
burgeoning in the UK (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 215). It highlights the 
increasing recognition of such processes in EU law, as well as 
international bodies, and discusses government policy and restorative 
initiatives in England and Wales. The chapter contends that the drawbacks 
of RJ for victims outweigh its advantages and that, notwithstanding the 
flaws in the CICS, its benefits for victims are greater than any benefits 
flowing from RJ. It contends further that victim-centred reform should be 
directed at the improvement of victims’ position within the formal 
criminal process rather than at the proliferation of RJ initiatives. In 
particular, it argues that RJ fails to consider social inequalities and that RJ 
processes are accordingly unsuitable for victims from unequal social 
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groups, such as victims of gender-based violence and racially motivated 
and homophobic crime.  
 
2. VICTIM COMPENSATION 
 
2.1 EU Law  
 
The Compensation Convention, which binds the UK, regulates the 
entitlement of victims to compensation by the state (see Wolhuter, et al, 
2009: 199-201). If compensation is not forthcoming from other sources, 
Member States are obliged to contribute to the compensation of victims 
who qualify for such compensation. Eligible victims are those who have 
suffered “... serious bodily injury or impairment of health directly 
attributable to an intentional crime of violence ...” as well as “... the 
dependants of persons who have died as a result of such crime” (article 
2.1). The perpetrator does not have to be prosecuted or punished in order 
for this duty to arise (article 2.2). 
 
Article 3 provides that Member States in whose territory an offence is 
committed are required to compensate victims who are citizens of any 
Member State that is party to the Compensation Convention, as well as 
citizens of Member States of the Council of Europe who reside 
permanently in the state where the offence occurred. In Ian William 
Cowan v Tresor Public 1989 ECJ 195, the ECJ held that, in order to 
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circumvent a contravention of article 7 of the EEC Treaty, which prohibits 
discrimination based on nationality, a state must compensate a citizen of 
another Member State on the same basis as it compensates its own 
citizens. It may not subject a compensation award for physical injury 
sustained by the victim of an assault in its territory to the condition that the 
victim has a residence permit or is a citizen of a country with which it has 
a reciprocal agreement (para 20). 
 
The Council Directive 2004/80/EC of 29 April 2004 relating to 
compensation to crime victims (the “Compensation Directive”) establishes 
the administrative procedures to be employed by Member States when 
dealing with such “cross-border” victims (see articles 1-11). It provides 
that Member States must pay compensation to victims of “... a violent 
intentional crime ...” who experienced such a crime in their territory 
(articles 1 and 2). In order to give effect to this duty, and to the 
administrative procedures it establishes, the Compensation Directive 
requires that Member States must have compensation schemes for “... 
victims of violent intentional crimes ...” that guarantee “... fair and 
appropriate compensation to victims” (article 12.2). 
 
In terms of article 4 of the Compensation Convention, Member States are 
required to compensate eligible victims for loss of earnings, medical 
expenses, hospital costs and funeral expenses, and, in the case of 
dependants of victims who have died, for loss of maintenance. The 
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Compensation Convention thus requires compensation awards that reflect 
victims’ losses due to the crime. However, there are certain restrictions on 
this loss-based criterion. For example, Member States are permitted to set 
upper and lower limits beyond which compensation will not be awarded 
(article 5). Furthermore, compensation may be denied or decreased due to 
the victim’s financial situation (article 7).  
 
Like the CICS (see section 2.2 below), the Compensation Convention is 
founded on a concept of “innocent” or “blameless” victimhood. 
Compensation may be denied or decreased on account of the victim’s, or 
the applicant’s, conduct “... before, during or after the crime, or in relation 
to the injury or death ...”; the victim’s, or the applicant’s, involvement in 
“organised crime” or membership of “... an organisation which engages in 
crimes of violence ...”; and the fact that an award, whether in full or at all, 
would be inconsistent with justice or public policy (article 8). 
 
In order to ensure that victims are not doubly compensated, Member States 
may deduct or reclaim sums received by the victim “... from the offender, 
social security or insurance or … any other source” (article 9). 
 
Recommendation Rec (2006) 8 on assistance to crime victims (2006), 
which is not binding but merely persuasive, also contains provisions 
regarding state compensation. It recognises categories of qualifying 
victims and types of losses that parallel those in the Compensation 
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Convention (see article 8). However, it does not provide for exclusions on 
account of victims’ conduct or financial circumstances and is accordingly 
not expressly founded on a concept of “innocent” victimhood. 
 
Besides the above provisions concerning state compensation, the Council 
of Europe has also recognised victims’ right to be compensated by 
offenders. In terms of article 9.1 of the Framework Decision, Member 
States are obliged to guarantee victims’ entitlement to receive a decision 
within a reasonable time, during criminal proceedings, concerning 
compensation by the offender, unless national law provides for 
compensation to be paid in another way. In addition, Member States are 
required to encourage offenders to compensate victims adequately (article 
9.2). Article 15 of the Victims’ Directive replicates these provisions. 
However, neither the Framework Decision nor the Victims’ Directive 
imposes duties regarding the enforcement of compensation orders. In view 
of the fact that the lack of enforcement measures hampers victims’ access 
to compensation by offenders (see section 2.3.1 below), the absence of 
enforcement duties constitutes a serious lacuna. 
 
2.2 Criminal injuries compensation  
 
This section briefly discusses the historical background to the CICS. 
Thereafter, it evaluates the schemes that have been introduced in terms of 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995.    
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2.2.1 Origins and development 
 
The CICS began as a non-statutory scheme to compensate “deserving” 
victims of violent crime (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 201-202). Established 
in 1964, it was the first victim compensation scheme in Europe (Dignan, 
2005: 43). Awards were made ex gratia, and victims thus had no right to 
compensation (Williams, 2005: 93). The CICS was open to victims of 
violent crime of any nationality and thus complied with the provisions of 
the Compensation Convention as well as the Compensation Directive (see 
section 2.1 above).   
 
Compensation was calculated largely in the same way as common law 
damages in tort law. It was accordingly aimed at putting the victim in the 
position s/he would have been in had the offence not been committed. 
However, the criterion of common law damages was limited by the 
existence of a minimum threshold for eligibility and a maximum limit for 
loss of earnings. Furthermore, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 
(“CICB”) was permitted to deduct all sums received by the victim from 
public funds in consequence of the crime (Duff, 1998: 114). In the same 
way as the Compensation Convention, the CICS also allowed the refusal 
or reduction of compensation due to the victim’s conduct or involvement 
in criminal activity.   
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In consequence of a swing of government opinion in the late 1970s and the 
1980s, the scheme (with some alterations) was entrenched in the CJA 
1988. The new statutory scheme retained the principle of common law 
damages and introduced a legal right to compensation (see R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Fire Brigades Union and 
Others [1995] 2 AC 513, 517). The scheme was to be brought into force 
by the Home Secretary (s.171(1)). However, by the early 1990s, the tide 
had turned, the government becoming increasingly concerned at the rising 
costs of awards based on common law damages. Consequently, instead of 
bringing the scheme contained in the CJA 1988 into force, the government 
decided to introduce a tariff-based scheme, in terms of which “… injuries 
of comparable severity would be grouped into 25 tariff levels, ranging 
from £1000 to £250 000, and there would be no separate payment made 
for loss of earnings or expenses” (Duff, 1998: 125). 
 
However, the new scheme, which was brought into force by the Home 
Secretary in 1994 (Duff, 1998: 133), was short-lived. In Ex parte Fire 
Brigades Union and Others, the majority of the House of Lords held that 
the introduction of the tariff scheme was unlawful. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson stated that s.171 of the CJA 1988 obliged the Home Secretary 
to consider whether to bring the statutory scheme into force. By using his 
prerogative power to introduce the tariff scheme, he had failed to exercise 
this statutory duty and had thus acted unlawfully (Ex parte Fire Brigades 
Union and Others, 554).   
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2.2.2 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 
 
The government responded by enacting the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Act 1995 (the “1995 Act”), which repeals the relevant 
provisions of the CJA 1988 (s.12(1)) and introduces a modified tariff 
scheme (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 202-209). In terms of s.1 of the 1995 
Act, the Home Secretary is empowered to devise and implement the 
scheme. Compensation must henceforth be calculated by reference to a 
standard amount reflecting the nature of the injury; an additional amount 
for loss of earnings and special expenses in cases specified by the Home 
Secretary; and a further amount in cases of fatal injury (s.2(2)). 
 
The standard amount must be determined in accordance with a tariff 
devised by the Home Secretary. If the injury is not reflected in the tariff, 
the standard amount must be computed in terms of other relevant 
provisions of the scheme (s.2(3)). Consequently, the usual award is the 
tariff-based amount, but it may be supplemented by additional sums in 
appropriate cases. The 1995 Act also gives victims the right to the internal 
review of compensation decisions, as well as the right to appeal against 
such review decisions (sections 4 and 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 258 
(i) The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1996  
 
The first modified tariff scheme was brought into force on 1 April 1996 
(Duff, 1998: 134). The CICS (Home Office, 1995, the “1996 Scheme”) 
replaced the CICB with the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority 
(“CICA”), who was henceforth to administer the Scheme (para 85). While 
the 1996 Scheme has been superseded, first, by the CICS 2001 (Home 
Office, 2001a, the “2001 Scheme”; see section 2.2.2 (ii) below) for claims 
brought after 1 April 2001, and, more recently, by the CICS 2008 
(Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, 2008, the “2008 Scheme”; see 
section 2.2.2. (iii) below) for claims brought after 3 November 2008, most 
of its provisions have not been changed. Consequently, this section 
encompasses a detailed assessment of the provisions of the 1996 Scheme 
regarding eligibility for compensation and the method of computing such 
compensation before addressing the changes brought about by the 2001 
and 2008 Schemes.  
 
(a) Eligibility 
 
Like the Compensation Convention and the common law scheme, the 
1996 Scheme was founded on a concept of “innocent” victimhood. It 
recognised a range of circumstances purporting to denote culpability that 
exclude victims from eligibility for compensation (see below). 
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Victims who suffered a criminal injury on or after 1 August 1964, as well 
as close relatives of deceased victims (para 6), qualified for compensation, 
even if the offender had not been convicted (para 10). A criminal injury 
encompassed one or more personal injuries, including physical injury and 
mental injury and disease, sustained in the UK and “directly attributable” 
to a violent crime, amongst other things (para 8, read with para 9). The 
Scheme contained no definition of a violent crime, and CICA and the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeal Panel (“CICAP”) were thus left to 
decide whether, on the facts of the case, the relevant conduct amounted to 
such a crime (Miers, 2006: 696). 
 
This absence of a definition caused some disagreement in R (August) v 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel; R (Brown) v Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel [2001] QB 774. August and Brown 
were victims of sexual offences that had been committed while they were 
under the age of 16. They had consented to the commission of these 
offences. CICAP had refused their claims for compensation, holding that, 
by virtue of their consent they had not been victims of crimes of violence 
and, consequently, did not qualify for compensation (August, 778). On 
review, the court confirmed CICAP’s decision, acceding to the view that 
indecent acts with underage children do not all amount to crimes of 
violence (August, 786, 793).  
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This judgment was upheld by the ECtHR in August v UK (Application no. 
36505/02, 21 January 2003). The ECtHR took the view that, in light of the 
fact that the offender had been subject to criminal sanctions, the UK had 
complied with its duty, in terms of article 8 ECHR, to protect the 
applicant. It held that article 8 does not encompass a right to receive 
compensation and that the courts’ refusal to regard sexual offences against 
children as violent crimes in all cases is not tantamount to the violation of 
the applicant’s right to protection (August v UK, 5). 
 
The effect of this approach is that, although sexual conduct with an 
underage child is a criminal offence regardless of his/her consent, the 
child’s consent prevents the crime from being characterised as a crime of 
violence for the purpose of a compensation claim. It fails to recognise that 
child sexual offences involve an abuse of power that renders the conduct 
violent and that consequently ought to negate the child’s consent. Victim 
Support has contended that the existence of such an abuse of power 
effectively deprives victims of the freedom to refuse, and that they ought 
to qualify for compensation (Victim Support, 2003: 4). 
 
A further controversial exception was entrenched in para 7(b) of the 1996 
Scheme. It provided that, in cases where a criminal injury was suffered 
prior to 1 October 1979 while the victim and the offender were living 
together as family members, no compensation was payable. This principle 
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(referred to as the “same roof” principle) excluded victims of domestic 
violence and intra-familial sexual abuse from eligibility for compensation.  
 
In S v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board [2004] SLT 1173, CICA had 
refused to grant compensation to the petitioner, who had been sexually 
abused by her father while she lived with him. The court confirmed 
CICA’s decision on the basis of the “same roof” principle. It held further 
that this decision did not amount to unjustified discrimination in terms of 
article 14 read with article 6(1) ECHR. Being excluded from eligibility for 
compensation by the “same roof” principle, the petitioner did not have a 
civil right. Consequently, the facts did not fall within the ambit of article 
6(1) (para 145). The court added that, even if the facts did fall within the 
ambit of article 6(1), the discrimination was justified. The “same roof” 
principle was a proportionate method, based on financial considerations, 
of attaining the legitimate aim of having a scheme to compensate victims 
of crime (paras 153-154). While the court accepted that ECtHR 
jurisprudence requires “very weighty reasons” to justify discrimination 
based on race, sex or religion, it held that the same standard does not apply 
to compensation claims (para 154). 
 
Regrettably, a similar interpretation of the “same roof” principle was 
adopted by the ECtHR. In Stuart v UK (Application no. 41903/98, 6 July 
1999), the applicant – a victim of child sexual abuse whose compensation 
claim had been denied due to the “same roof” principle – had contended 
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that this denial contravened articles 3, 8 and 14 ECHR. The ECtHR took 
the view that the positive obligations imposed on the state in pursuance of 
articles 3 and 8 do not extend to an obligation to compensate victims who 
suffer injury at the hands of private individuals (para 1). It rejected the 
applicant’s contention that the distinction in the 1996 Scheme between 
victims to whom the “same roof” principle applied and those to whom it 
did not apply amounted to a violation of article 14, holding that this 
distinction did not fall within the ambit of articles 3 or 8 (para 2). 
Consequently, the applicant’s claim failed. Victim Support maintains that 
the “same roof” principle generates distress and self-blame on the part of 
victims and that it should be abolished (Victim Support, 2003: 6).   
 
In terms of the 1996 Scheme, victims living in the same household as the 
offender were permitted, within certain limits, to claim compensation in 
cases occurring after 1 October 1979. Para 16 provided that if the victim 
and the offender were living together as family members in the same 
household (even if the offender did not actually inflict the injury), 
compensation would be denied, unless the following two grounds were 
present. First, with the exception of non-prosecution for good reasons, the 
offender had been prosecuted. Second, as regards adult intra-familial 
violence, the victim and the offender no longer lived together at the time 
of the claim, and were unlikely to live together in future. The second 
ground applied to spouses as well as unmarried persons who lived together 
as husband and wife. It did not apply to children who were injured in the 
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domestic environment, but CICA had to be satisfied that it would not be 
against the child’s interest to make an award (para 15). 
 
Further grounds for exclusion, reflecting those allowed by the 
Compensation Convention (see section 2.1 above), were contained in para 
13 of the 1996 Scheme. Compensation could be denied or decreased if the 
claimant did not take “... all reasonable steps to inform the police ...” or 
another appropriate body without delay; did not “... co-operate with the 
police or other authority in attempting to bring the assailant to justice ...”; 
did not provide “reasonable assistance” to CICA or another appropriate 
body concerning the claim; engaged in conduct “... before, during or after 
the incident ...” that rendered compensation partially or wholly 
inappropriate; or had unspent previous convictions or other evidence of 
poor character that likewise rendered compensation partially or wholly 
inappropriate. If the victim was deceased, para 13 applied to the deceased 
as well as the claimant (para 14).   
 
Barring the claims of victims who fail to report the crime or co-operate 
with the police may inure to the detriment of victims from unequal social 
groups, such as victims of domestic violence and racially motivated and 
homophobic crime, who face structural barriers to reporting (see chapter 
6). In addition, the refusal or reduction of compensation based on the 
claimant’s conduct and previous convictions may create difficulties for 
claimants. The effect of unspent convictions on a compensation claim is 
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established by means of “... a ‘sliding scale’ that attaches penalty points 
that depend on the nature of the sentence imposed and the lapse of time 
since its imposition” (Miers, 2006: 706-707). More or less one third of all 
compensation claims are denied on account of the claimant’s conduct or 
unspent convictions (Goodey, 2005: 146). A victim whose offending is 
related to his/her victimisation may be affected detrimentally by the denial 
or substantial reduction of his/her claim.   
 
In R (on the application of M) v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals 
Panel [2001] EWHC Admin 720
, 
CICAP had decreased the applicant’s 
compensation claim in respect of sexual abuse by two-thirds on account of 
her previous convictions, regardless of the fact that her offending had been 
caused by her abuse. The review court held that the decision to effect this 
reduction “required further elaboration” (para 80). As CICAP had failed to 
provide sufficient reasons for its decision, the court quashed it. Although 
this judgment benefited the applicant, many other victims whose cases are 
not heard by a court may have their claims denied or reduced on account 
of offending that is linked to their victimisation, and which should not 
affect their claims. Regrettably, as the Compensation Convention allows 
such exclusions without taking into account the fact that the victim’s 
offending may be related to his/her victimisation, the government has no 
obligation to abolish or alter this exclusion. 
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(b) Calculation of compensation 
 
The 1996 Scheme required that a “standard payment” must be made 
regarding a claim for compensation (para 22(a), read with para 25). This 
“standard payment” was calibrated along a scale of 25 different fixed 
levels of compensation that applied to various injuries. The tariff scheme 
that was declared unlawful by the House of Lords (see section 2.2.1 
above) was accordingly retained. However, the 1996 Scheme allowed the 
tariff to be increased by sums for loss of earnings and special expenses if 
the victim was incapacitated for longer than 28 weeks in consequence of 
his/her injury. The period of 28 weeks reflects the period in respect of 
which the victim may claim statutory sick pay (Duff, 1998: 134; subparas 
22(b) and (c)).   
 
The absence of payments for loss of earnings and special expenses in the 
case of victims who have not been incapacitated for longer than 28 weeks 
does not necessarily violate the requirement in the Compensation 
Convention that Member States must pay medical expenses, hospital costs 
and loss of earnings. The obligation to pay medical expenses and hospital 
costs is arguably discharged by the availability of the National Health 
Service. Furthermore, the obligation to pay loss of earnings is met by the 
payment of statutory sick pay to victims during the first 28 weeks. 
However, persons who are unemployed, self-employed, in receipt of low 
wages, or employed on short-term contracts do not qualify for statutory 
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sick pay (Duff, 1998: 136). As regards such persons, the 1996 Scheme 
thus failed to comply with the government’s obligations in terms of the 
Compensation Convention to pay loss of earnings. 
 
The 1996 Scheme also applied to certain categories of indirect victims. 
These categories comprised the parents and children of deceased victims, 
and their spouses and partners who had lived with them for a specified 
period or, as regards spouses or former spouses, who were financially 
dependent on them at the time they died (para 38). All these categories of 
persons were eligible for compensation. If the victim died in consequence 
of the victimisation, the compensation award included the standard tariff, 
claims for loss of dependency and claims for loss of parental services, 
where relevant (see paras 39-42). Consequently, the 1996 Scheme met the 
state obligation in the Compensation Convention to pay for funeral 
expenses and loss of maintenance (see section 2.1 above). 
 
The ceiling for a compensation award was set at £500,000 (para 23). With 
the exception of tariff-based awards, all compensation would be decreased 
proportionately where the victim received payments from other sources 
regarding the injury, such as insurance, social security benefits or court-
awarded damages from the offender (para 45; para 48). The objective of 
this rule, which mirrors that contained in the Compensation Convention, 
was to prevent victims from receiving double compensation at the expense 
of the taxpayer.  
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Before 1 October 2006 (see section 2.2.2. (ii) below), this rule, coupled 
with the rules of the social security system, had a two-fold impact on 
victims in receipt of social security. First, the compensation was decreased 
by the amount of social security paid to them on account of the injury. 
Second, the compensation was viewed “... as capital for the purpose of 
calculating means-tested benefits”, decreasing the benefits payments for 
many claimants (Williams, 2005: 95).    
 
In light of the strict preconditions for claims for loss of earnings and 
special expenses, most victims were only eligible for the standard tariff 
(Duff, 1998: 134). Notwithstanding the outcry that greeted the 
government’s attempt to introduce a tariff by executive action, therefore, it 
succeeded in entrenching a statutory tariff-based scheme that continues to 
apply to the present (see sections 2.2.2 (ii) and (iii) below). 
 
(ii) The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2001 
  
With effect from 1 April 2001, a new scheme was brought into force, 
which applied to all compensation claims received by CICA on or after 
that date. Apart from minor changes, its rules regarding eligibility 
reflected those contained in the 1996 Scheme (para 6 and para 8). 
Consequently, victims who suffered physical or mental injuries (para 9), 
which are “directly attributable” to violent crimes, amongst other things, 
qualified for compensation.   
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Like its forerunner, the 2001 Scheme retained the “same roof” principle 
(para 7(b)) and limited claims for compensation by victims of intra-
familial abuse who were victimised after 1 October 1979 (para 17). 
Furthermore, the same exclusions applied to victims who failed to 
cooperate with the authorities or who engaged in inappropriate conduct 
(para 13). However, the 2001 Scheme contained a new exclusion relating 
to the consumption of alcohol and drugs. Having considered a claimant’s 
conduct before, during and after the crime, a claims officer could deny or 
decrease an award if s/he believed that, by consuming alcohol or drugs 
excessively, the claimant contributed to the circumstances causing the 
injury, and that this contribution took place in a way that made “... a full 
award, or any award at all ...”, inappropriate (para 14). Victim Support has 
contended that intoxication, per se, ought not to be considered in 
determining eligibility for compensation (Victim Support, 2004a). The 
Compensation Convention allows exclusions based on the victim’s 
conduct, and it is accordingly unlikely that this new exclusion violates its 
provisions. 
 
Although the tariffs were revised to reflect the inflation rate (Rock, 2004: 
283), compensation was computed in the same way as the 1996 Scheme. 
Qualifying victims were consequently entitled to the standard tariff 
applicable to their injury, as well as awards for loss of earnings and special 
expenses if they were incapacitated for more than 28 weeks in “... direct 
consequence of the injury” (para 23). However, the 2001 Scheme 
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increased the tariff for child victims of sexual abuse (Rock, 2004: 283) and 
extended the rules regarding claims by close relatives of deceased victims 
to same sex partners (para 38).  
 
The 2001 Scheme retained the ceiling of £500,000 (para 24), as well as the 
rules regarding the deduction of sums received by victims from other 
sources, such as social security payments, insurance monies and court-
ordered damages (para 45 and para 48). However, the detrimental effect on 
victims in receipt of social security benefits that resulted from the 
deduction of such benefits from compensation awards, and from the fact 
that the compensation was considered capital for the purpose of assessing 
eligibility for benefits (see section 2.2.2. (i) above), was alleviated with 
effect from 1 October 2006. Although benefits continue to be deducted 
from compensation awards, such awards are excluded from the calculation 
of means-tested benefits (Criminal Justice System, 2005b: 19). 
 
(iii) The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2008 
  
After the 2001 Scheme had been in operation for about 4 years, the 
government, in a bid to cut costs, attempted to curtail the ambit of the 
CICS extensively (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 209-210). It recommended 
that the scheme be restricted by the criterion of “seriousness” so that 
compensation would only be paid in respect of the most serious injuries. It 
advocated a “clinical definition” of “seriousness”, which would draw “... 
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on the experience of the civil courts in awarding damages, the insurance 
industry … and the medical profession” (Criminal Justice System, 2005b: 
18). Less serious injuries would no longer be included in the CICS. 
Instead, support and assistance would be available from Victim Support 
Plus for victims of lesser injuries (see chapter 3). Furthermore, while 
qualifying serious injuries would attract increased tariff payments, 
compensation for loss of earnings and special expenses would no longer 
be available. In addition, the government proposed to raise the ceiling of 
£500,000 for tariff payments (Criminal Justice System, 2005b: 18). 
However, in view of the traumatic nature of sexual offences and 
homicides, it recommended the retention of the method of calculating 
compensation contained in the 2001 Scheme for these offences (Criminal 
Justice System, 2005b: 19).  
 
The rationale of these proposals was clearly to define “seriousness” in a 
way that “... ‘set the bar very high’ in an attempt to deprive many potential 
claimants of a financial award” (Sugarman, 2006: 188). Fortunately, none 
of these proposals has seen the light of day, and the new 2008 Scheme, 
with minor modifications, replicates the provisions of its predecessors (see 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, 2008). 
 
In the same way as the 1996 and 2001 Schemes, victims who have 
sustained a criminal injury on or after 1 August 1964, as well as the close 
relatives of deceased victims (para 6), are eligible for compensation, even 
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if the offender has not been convicted (para 10). A criminal injury 
comprises one or more personal injuries, such as physical and mental 
injury and disease, “... sustained in and directly attributable to an act 
occurring in Great Britain”, which constitutes, amongst other things, “a 
crime of violence” (para 8, read with para 9). Like its forerunners, the 
2008 Scheme does not contain a definition of a crime of violence, and the 
courts’ jurisprudence concerning the meaning of the concept accordingly 
continues to apply (see section 2.2.2 (i) (a) above).  
 
Furthermore, despite the criticisms of Victim Support, the 2008 Scheme 
retains the “same roof” principle (para 7(b)), as well as the provisions 
concerning the eligibility of victims of intra-familial violence who 
suffered injury after 1 October 1979 (para 17). However, these provisions 
have been extended to include same sex partners living together (para 
17(2)). In addition, with minor modifications, the 2008 Scheme replicates 
the provisions of the 2001 Scheme concerning exclusions based on the 
applicant’s conduct or failure to cooperate with the authorities (paras 13 
and 14). 
 
Although the tariffs have been revised to reflect the rate of inflation, 
compensation is calculated in the same way as the 1996 and 2001 
Schemes. Eligible victims are thus entitled to the standard tariff applicable 
to their injury, as well as sums for loss of earnings and special expenses if 
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they have been incapacitated for more than 28 weeks “... as a direct 
consequence of the injury” (para 23). 
 
The 2008 Scheme retains the upper limit of £500,000 for compensation 
claims (para 24). Apart from minor changes, the rules concerning the 
deduction of monies received by victims from other sources, such as social 
security payments and insurance monies, are the same as those in the 2001 
Scheme (paras 45 and 48).  
 
The primary change effected by the 2008 Scheme is the replacement of 
CICAP by the First-Tier Tribunal, which was established in terms of the 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 as a generic tribunal to hear 
appeals against government bodies in respect of which it has been given 
jurisdiction (Tribunals Service, undated). In terms of the 2008 Scheme, the 
First-Tier Tribunal is to act as an appellate and review body for victims 
who are dissatisfied with the decisions of the claims officer at first 
instance (see para 53ff). 
 
The above analysis has shown that, with the exception of the limits 
regarding awards for loss of earnings that prejudice victims who do not 
qualify for statutory sick leave, the 1996, 2001 and 2008 Schemes comply 
with the Compensation Convention. In addition, the “same roof” principle, 
as well as the exclusion of sexual offences involving consenting child 
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victims from the definition of violent crime, has been upheld by the 
ECtHR (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 209).  
 
The coalition government is currently engaged in a review of the 2008 
Scheme in an ostensible bid to improve the compensation of victims of the 
7/7 terror attacks in London (BBC News, 2010). However, the government 
has hitherto been unwilling to publicise the content of the review. Justice 
Minister Crispin Blunt has recently refused to accede to requests in 
Parliament for details concerning the review and the proposed date of its 
completion, merely stating that “the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Scheme is currently subject to review. We intend to bring forward 
proposals in due course” (Hansard, 2011). The government’s reticence in 
this regard has generated concerns on the part of victims’ groups that 
compensation payments are to be reduced without consultation 
(Telegraph, 2011). It consequently remains to be seen whether the revised 
compensation scheme will comply with European standards. 
 
2.3 Compensation by the offender 
 
In terms of the Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive, Member 
States must take steps to ensure that victims are given a decision 
concerning compensation by offenders during the criminal proceedings, as 
well as steps to encourage offenders to pay such compensation to victims 
(see section 2.1 above). Although the mechanisms for the payment of 
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compensation by offenders assessed in this section are consonant with the 
Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive, a number of barriers 
exist, such as the courts’ hesitance to order compensation and the 
difficulty of enforcing orders, which hamper the ability of victims to 
obtain access to such compensation.  
 
2.3.1 Compensation orders 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1972 clothed the courts with the power to make 
compensation orders requiring offenders to compensate victims for any 
loss, damage or injury due to the crime (Ashworth, 2005: 298; see 
Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 210-212). These provisions were revised in terms of 
the Criminal Justice Acts 1982, 1988 and 1991 and are presently contained 
in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (“PCCSA”).   
 
In terms of s.130(1) of the PCCSA, the court may impose a compensation 
order in the place of, or in addition to, another sentence. However, if the 
sentence is mandatory or fixed by law, it may be supplemented, but not 
replaced, by the compensation order. The court may make the order mero 
motu or on application by the victim. It may order the offender to 
compensate the victim for “... personal injury, loss or damage ...” 
consequent upon the offence, or for funeral expenses or bereavement 
payments if death occurred as a result of the offence. Section 130(3) 
requires the court to give reasons for refusing to order compensation 
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where it has the power to do so. In terms of s.130(11), the court must 
consider the offender’s means in deciding whether to order compensation 
and, if so, the amount of such compensation. If the offender cannot afford 
to pay compensation and a fine, the court must accord preference to 
compensation (s.130(12)). The same enforcement procedure applies to 
both fines and compensation orders, and offenders may be imprisoned for 
failure to pay (Ashworth, 2005: 300). 
 
Compensation orders are more effective than the adhesion procedure used 
in many European jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Germany, which joins the victim’s compensation claim and the 
defendant’s criminal trial (see chapter 4). In contrast to adhesion 
proceedings, compensation orders do not require an application by 
victims, freeing them from the burden of establishing their claims (Brienen 
and Hoegen, 2000b: 258). Furthermore, compensation orders are enforced 
by the state, while orders made in adhesion proceedings are enforced by 
the victim him/herself (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000a: 288).  
 
Nevertheless, several practical difficulties exist as regards the imposition 
and enforcement of compensation orders. Many courts do not impose 
compensation orders because the necessary information is not forthcoming 
(Victim Support, 2004a). Research demonstrates that courts frequently do 
not impose compensation orders despite having the power to do so, and 
that the use of compensation orders is decreasing (Ashworth, 2005: 301). 
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The courts’ hesitance to impose such orders is largely due to the fact that 
many offenders do not have the means to pay compensation (Spalek, 2006: 
103). However, many courts are also unwilling to order compensation 
where the offender is sentenced to imprisonment (Spalek, 2006: 103). 
 
Even where the courts do impose compensation orders, many victims’ 
access to such compensation is hampered by difficulties of enforcement. 
Payments may be delayed (Spalek, 2006: 103) or small instalments may be 
made, which victims perceive “... as insulting or as trivializing the original 
offence, as well as serving as a periodic reminder of the loss involved” 
(Williams, 2005: 98). 
 
The Labour government attempted to improve the enforcement of 
compensation orders by suggesting that the courts be given the power to 
impose orders attaching the offender’s earnings or benefits in order to 
ensure that compensation is paid (Home Office, 2004, para 32; Criminal 
Justice System, 2005b: 14)). As such orders would involve monthly 
instalments, often for small amounts (especially where benefits are 
attached), they would be unlikely to be of much value in practice. Victim 
Support has advocated the introduction of a system in terms of which the 
government initially pays the compensation monies and empowers the 
courts to recover such monies from offenders (Victim Support, 2004a; 
Victim Support, 2010b: 24). Although the Labour government indicated 
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that it was willing to do so, it subsequently decided that the cost of doing 
so was too prohibitive (Victim Support, 2004a). 
 
The coalition government has recently announced that it intends to 
increase the use of compensation orders by creating “... a positive duty for 
courts to consider imposing a compensation order in all cases where there 
is an identified victim ...” and by encouraging them “... to use 
compensation orders as a standalone punishment” (Ministry of Justice, 
2010, para 72). In addition, the coalition government aims to devise means 
of ensuring that compensation orders are enforced more effectively 
(Ministry of Justice, 2010, para 73). It remains to be seen whether any 
reforms it introduces overcome the above-mentioned practical difficulties 
with the imposition and enforcement of compensation orders. 
 
In the absence of effective reforms, despite the fact that compensation 
orders are more effective than the European adhesion procedure, these 
practical difficulties detract considerably from their value to victims. 
Consequently, the fact that, unlike many of their European counterparts, 
victims in the UK do not have to claim compensation from offenders as a 
precondition to claiming state compensation, is to be welcomed.  
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2.3.2 Surcharges 
 
In order to reduce its outlay on compensation, the Labour government 
suggested that surcharges for offenders be introduced (Home Office, 2004, 
para 40; see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 213). Section 14 of the DVCVA 
consequently provides for the introduction of such surcharges by 
amending the CJA 2003. In terms of s.161A CJA 2003, courts must 
impose surcharges when sentencing offenders. However, the amount of 
the surcharge must be decreased if the court imposes a compensation order 
and the offender lacks the means to pay both the compensation order and 
the surcharge. Section 161B contains analogous provisions regarding 
fines. Furthermore, s.15 DVCVA increases the maximum amount payable 
by way of a fixed penalty notice in order to include a surcharge. The 
income from surcharges is paid into the Victims’ Fund, which exists to 
compensate individual victims and to fund victims’ organisations 
(Williams, 2005: 97). The coalition government has recently expressed its 
intention to extend the victims’ surcharge “... to other types of sentence 
and [to increase] the amount levied” (Ministry of Justice, 2010, para 74). 
 
Victim Support has contended that, as surcharges consist of small sums, 
victims may view them as humiliating or offensive. Furthermore, 
surcharges may cause courts to reduce compensation orders where 
offenders lack the means to pay both surcharges and compensation 
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(Victim Support, 2004a). Surcharges may also be unfair to offenders 
(Williams, 2005: 97). 
 
2.3.4 Recovery orders 
  
In another cost-cutting exercise, the Labour government suggested that 
CICA ought to be permitted to reclaim from offenders the compensation it 
has paid to victims (Home Office, 2004, para 72; see Wolhuter, et al, 
2009: 213-214). Consequently, s. 57 DVCVA has amended the 1995 Act 
to allow the Home Secretary to make regulations providing for recovery 
orders, which order offenders to pay all or part of the compensation paid 
by CICA that is directly attributable to their offence. The sums recovered 
by CICA must be put into the Victims’ Fund to compensate individual 
victims and fund victims’ organisations (Williams, 2005: 97). 
 
While Victim Support is in favour of recovery orders, it has warned that 
offenders, whose victims are known to them, may try to take revenge if 
they receive a recovery order (Victim Support, 2004a). Steps must 
accordingly be taken to protect victims adequately in these circumstances.  
 
Other European jurisdictions contain provisions analogous to recovery 
orders. However, the limited financial means of many offenders bodes ill 
for the practical significance of these orders to victims (Home Office, 
2004, paras 76-77). 
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The above analysis has demonstrated that the measures for requiring 
offenders to compensate victims are ineffective in many respects. Despite 
its drawbacks, the CICS is thus an indispensable means of enabling 
victims to recover the losses consequent upon their victimisation. 
 
3. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
 
 With the support of the government, RJ processes have flourished in 
England and Wales in the last decade. The primary purpose of this section 
is to assess these processes, and the government policy that informs them, 
to determine the extent to which they meet the needs of victims. However, 
in order to facilitate the analysis, a brief examination of the central 
concepts of the emerging RJ paradigm is necessary. 
 
3.1 The restorative justice paradigm 
 
It is difficult to ascribe a single theoretical foundation to RJ (see Wolhuter, 
et al, 2009: 215-218). Instead, it may be viewed more accurately as an 
eclectic “... accretion of practical experience” (Pollard, 2000: 10). For 
proponents of RJ, crime is the result of unresolved conflict and requires 
dialogue between victims, offenders and the community in order to deal 
with its effects (Elton & Roybal, 2003: 50). The primary “stakeholders”, 
namely the victim, the offender and the community, must take part in the 
restorative process so that victims’ needs may be met and offenders may 
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be held responsible for remedying the injuries they have caused (Reimund, 
2004/2005: 670). The objective of RJ is to attain more victim 
participation, offender responsibility and community protection than the 
formal criminal process offers (Shenk, 2001/2002: 190-191). It emphasises 
the restoration of “right relations” (Thorburn, 2004/2005: 873) rather than 
the punishment of offenders. 
 
However, proponents of RJ adopt disparate concepts of restoration. Those 
who adhere to the “encounter” conception focus on restorative processes, 
highlighting the benefits of an encounter between victims, offenders and 
the community that is independent of the formal criminal process 
(Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007: 9). By contrast, proponents of a 
“reparative” conception, albeit also in favour of restorative encounters, 
nevertheless believe that “... partially restorative solutions to problems of 
crime ...” may take the form of “reparative sanctions” imposed in the 
traditional criminal process (Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007: 14). 
 
Proponents of the encounter approach maintain that restorative processes 
must encompass certain values, including “consensual participation” by 
the stakeholders, courteous dialogue, the balancing of the interests of 
victims and offenders, and the principle of voluntariness (Dignan, 2002: 
172). In their view, processes, such as victim-offender mediation, 
restorative conferencing and community conferencing embody these 
values (Obold-Eschleman, 2004: 581; see section 3.3.2 below). The 
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restorative nature of the process is vital – any outcome that follows upon it 
is regarded as satisfactory (Obold-Eschleman, 2004: 582). 
 
The encounter conception has been criticised for its failure to recognise 
the value of restorative outcomes (Dignan, 2002: 174). Proponents of the 
reparative conception, such as Bazemore and Walgrave, contend that the 
central concern of RJ is to restore the injury caused by crime (Walgrave, 
2002: 192). While deliberative processes are indeed more amenable to 
restorative outcomes, non-deliberative, coercive processes, which lead to 
partial restoration, should be employed in cases where deliberative 
processes fail or cannot be used (Walgrave, 2007: 565). The reparative 
conception thus views measures such as restitution, community service, 
victim support, victim compensation and offender rehabilitation 
programmes as restorative (Van Ness & Nolan, 1998: 54). Certain RJ 
proponents favour an approach that uses both restorative processes and 
restorative outcomes, arguing that a completely “restorative system” 
requires such a holistic approach (Van Ness & Nolan, 1998: 54; Obold-
Eschleman, 2004: 583). 
 
RJ is depicted as victim-centred, with proponents contending that justice 
must commence with the needs of victims (Williams, 2005: 58). Victims 
are empowered by being given “... a forum in which their voices are both 
heard and respected” (Green, 2007: 176). Within this forum, which is 
informal and encourages dialogue and free communication, victims are 
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able to tell their stories and give voice to their feelings (Gay, 1999/2000: 
1654). Victims are also free to ask offenders fundamental questions, such 
as why they committed the crime (Johnstone, 2002: 66). 
 
In addition, RJ proponents adopt the view that victims are in need of 
hearing offenders express remorse and apologise for committing the crime 
(Gay, 1999/2000: 1654). The likelihood of this occurring is increased by 
the interaction between victims and offenders that characterises the 
restorative process (Strang & Sherman, 2003: 28). Some proponents also 
argue that total restoration may necessitate forgiveness by victims (Strang 
& Sherman, 2003: 28). However, besides receiving healing and 
empowerment, victims need restitution for their injuries. Even if complete 
material compensation is not forthcoming, partial compensation is 
nonetheless restorative in view of its symbolic value (Johnstone, 2002: 
66). Participation in a restorative process that leads to restorative 
outcomes, such as compensation and an apology, affords victims healing 
and closure, enabling them to move forward.    
 
Proponents of RJ adopt disparate views of the relationship between RJ and 
the traditional criminal process. Abolitionists regard RJ as an alternative 
paradigm that ought to supersede the traditional process (Dignan, 2005: 
106). While this view was widely held in the nascent stages of the RJ 
movement, few presently hold it. The majority of proponents advocate 
either separatism or integrationism.  
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Separatists take the view that the objectives, processes and values of RJ 
and those of the formal criminal process are fundamentally distinct. 
Consequently, in order to prevent the contamination of RJ processes, the 
two processes ought to operate independently of each other (Dignan, 2005: 
106). The separatist approach has several drawbacks. First, independent RJ 
schemes have low rates of referral and accordingly find it difficult to 
continue to operate. Second, they may cause “double punishment” by 
working with offenders who face sanctions by the formal system. Third, 
separatism renders it likely that RJ processes will be financially insecure 
and marginalised (Dignan, 2002: 179). There are also reasons of principle 
that militate against a separatist approach. The possibility of inequalities of 
power in RJ processes renders it likely that they may lead to injustice. 
Consequently, they require the checks and balances offered by the 
traditional criminal process (Walgrave, 2007: 561). In particular, the lack 
of procedural safeguards may violate offenders’ due process rights 
(Reimund, 2004/2005: 683-684). RJ processes should accordingly take 
place within the protective framework of the formal criminal justice 
process. 
 
Various models for integrating RJ and the formal system have been 
proffered. Braithwaite advocates a “regulatory pyramid” in which RJ 
constitutes the foundation of criminal justice interventions, with strategies 
based on deterrence and incapacitation being reserved for instances in 
which RJ does not succeed. Such punitive strategies must nonetheless 
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encompass RJ values wherever possible. Furthermore, there should be “... 
de-escalation back down the pyramid to restorative justice whenever 
punishment has succeeded in getting the safety concerns under control” 
(Braithwaite, 2002: 166-167). 
 
Walgrave likewise recommends a “maximalist” approach, which employs 
restorative measures in as many cases as possible (Walgrave, 2000: 263-
264), but uses “restorative coercion” if RJ fails. He contends that there are 
limits to voluntary RJ and that coercion must consequently be used 
frequently. He thus advocates “... a system that can use coercion, 
according to due process, to protect citizens from offenders and from 
abuse of authority as well” (Walgrave, 2000: 272). 
 
Dignan takes the view that Braithwaite’s model results in increasingly 
punitive responses to “... repeat and recalcitrant offenders ...” and does not 
address the failures of the formal criminal process (Dignan, 2002: 180). 
He advocates a “systemic” model in which RJ is the basis of criminal 
justice interventions. In cases where the failure of RJ necessitates formal 
court-imposed sanctions, these sanctions must themselves be imbued with 
the values of RJ. Courts would thus be required to impose “restoration 
orders”, such as victim compensation or reparation. Nevertheless, he 
concedes that incapacitative measures ought to be used in cases in which 
there is the likelihood of serious physical harm to others (Dignan, 2002: 
180-183). 
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Although these differing theoretical views exist regarding the relationship 
between RJ and the formal system, international and European 
instruments, as well as English law, policy and practice are clearly 
founded on a state-dominated model. 
 
3.2 International and European provisions 
 
International and European forums have increasingly advocated RJ 
processes since the turn of the century (Willemsens & Walgrave, 2007: 
492; see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 218-220). This section examines the 
relevant provisions of the Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (99) 
19 on mediation in penal matters (1999; “Recommendation No. R (99) 
19”), the Framework Decision, and the Victims’ Directive, as well as the 
United Nations Resolution on basic principles on the use of restorative 
justice programmes in criminal matters (2002, the “UN Resolution”). 
While the Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive focus on 
victims, the other two instruments merely refer to victims’ interests within 
the framework of their primary concern with RJ or mediation.    
 
Recommendation No. R (99) 19 limits its provisions to mediation rather 
than RJ processes as a whole. In terms of article I, the Recommendation 
applies to processes in which victims and offenders participate actively in 
the resolution of disputes arising from crime with the aid of “... an 
impartial third party (mediator)”. In terms of article II, mediation should 
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be “... available at all stages of the criminal justice process ...” and 
mediation services ought to be granted independence within the criminal 
process. Decisions to order mediation and assessments of the outcomes of 
mediation must be made by “criminal justice authorities” (article IV). 
Mediation is thus placed under the control of the criminal justice system. 
In terms of article III, a procedural model corresponding to the court 
process must be adopted. In particular, procedural safeguards, such as the 
right to legal assistance, must be applied to mediation processes.    
 
The Framework Decision also regulates mediation rather than RJ 
processes broadly conceived. In terms of article 10, Member States are 
required to advocate mediation processes in criminal cases for suitable 
offences and to ensure that cognisance is taken of agreements reached in 
such processes. The inclusion of a provision obliging Member States to 
promote mediation indicates an intention, on the part of the framers of the 
Framework Decision, to grant victims an entitlement to participate in 
mediation. However, unlike other provisions in the Framework Decision, 
such as those concerning the provision of information and victim 
protection (articles 4 and 8; see chapter 3), article 10 does not expressly 
provide that victims have a right to mediation.   
 
The Victims’ Directive is broader than the Framework Decision insofar as 
it regulates “restorative services” as well as mediation. Like the 
Framework Decision, it does not grant victims a right to these processes. 
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However, flowing from a concern that victims may experience 
victimisation in such processes, it grants victims a “right to safeguards in 
the context of mediation and other restorative justice services” (article 11). 
In order to give effect to this right, a duty is imposed on Member States to 
“... establish standards to safeguard the victim from intimidation or further 
victimisation.” Such standards require that victims must give their “... free 
and informed consent ...” to participate in these processes; that they must 
be given “... full and unbiased information ...” before participating; that the 
offender must acknowledge responsibility for his or her conduct; that “... 
any agreement should be arrived at voluntarily and should be taken into 
account in any further criminal proceedings”; and that discussions that are 
conducted in private must be kept confidential” (article 11.1).     
      
The UN Resolution is also not limited to mediation. In terms of article I.1, 
RJ programmes are those that use “... restorative processes and [seek] to 
achieve restorative outcomes”. Restorative processes entail the active 
participation of victims, offenders, and other affected individuals or 
community members in resolving disputes arising from crime, generally 
with the aid of a facilitator. They include “... mediation, conciliation, 
conferencing and sentencing circles” (article I.2). Restorative outcomes 
are agreements reached as a result of restorative processes, “... such as 
reparation, restitution and community service ...”, the objective of which is 
to meet parties’ needs and responsibilities and to bring about “... the 
reintegration of the victim and the offender” (article I.3). Consequently, 
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this broad definition of RJ is consonant with the holistic approach to RJ 
that encompasses both processes and outcomes (see section 3.1 above).  
 
Despite its broad conception of RJ, the UN Resolution nonetheless 
provides that RJ programmes be placed under the control of the formal 
criminal justice system. In terms of article II.11, where RJ is not feasible 
or possible, cases must be referred to the formal authorities to decide. The 
UN Resolution also provides that criminal justice officials should “... 
encourage the offender to take responsibility vis-à-vis the victim and 
affected communities, and support the reintegration of the victim and the 
offender into the community”. Accordingly, it advocates an integrationist 
approach that resembles Dignan’s “systemic” model (see section 3.1 
above).   
 
Furthermore, RJ programmes must contain procedural safeguards and be 
overseen by the judiciary. While RJ programmes may be used at any stage 
of the criminal process (article II.6), “... procedural safeguards 
guaranteeing fairness to the offender and the victim ...”, particularly the 
right to legal counsel, must be adopted (article III.13). The outcomes of 
agreements reached in RJ programmes must also be overseen by the courts 
in suitable cases or incorporated into their decisions (article III.15). 
Proponents of RJ who posit an integrationist model have likewise 
emphasised the importance of due process and oversight by the judiciary 
(see section 3.1 above). 
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The current concern with RJ in international and European forums reflects 
the growing centrality of RJ in domestic jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the 
UN Resolution and Recommendation No. R (99) 19 are not binding, 
leaving domestic jurisdictions to decide upon the status of RJ. In addition, 
the provisions of the Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive 
evince an intention to grant victims a mere entitlement, rather than a right, 
to participate in mediation (see above). However, the right to safeguards 
within restorative processes enshrined in the Victims’ Directive is to be 
welcomed, as it is aimed at preventing abuses of such processes that inure 
to the detriment of victims (see section  3.3.3 below). 
 
3.3 Restorative justice in England and Wales 
 
This section examines government policy regarding RJ, and documents the 
RJ processes that are presently burgeoning in England and Wales, both 
within and parallel to the formal criminal process (see Wolhuter, et al, 
2009: 220-228). 
 
3.3.1 Government policy 
 
At its inception in the 1990s, RJ was reserved for youth justice. The 
Labour government regarded the three “Rs” of RJ, namely, responsibility, 
restoration and reintegration, as central to youth justice policy (Home 
Office, 1997). In consequence, young offenders (as well as their families) 
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were admonished to take responsibility for their offending; to apologise 
and make amends to victims; and to permit themselves to be reintegrated 
into the community after the wrong has been remedied (Dignan, 2005: 
109). The government’s primary concern was to ensure that offenders 
made reparation, or amends, for their offending. Consequently, reparation 
“... constitutes a key theoretical and practical base ...” for many RJ 
interventions concerning young offenders, including reparation orders in 
the CDA and referral orders in the YJCEA (Crawford, 2000: 296; see 
sections 3.3.2 (iv) and (v) below). 
 
The Labour government’s commitment to RJ was confirmed in the White 
Paper Justice for all (Home Office, 2002b). RJ schemes were said to 
provide “... constructive, community-based responses to crime”, 
generating the participation of all stakeholders in the resolution of issues 
relating to “... the aftermath of the offence and any implications for the 
future” (Home Office, 2002b, paras 5.8, 7.32). However, the government’s 
first holistic RJ strategy was set out in the consultation document 
Restorative justice: the government’s strategy (Home Office, 2003a). The 
government maintained that RJ gives victims a more powerful “voice” in 
the criminal process and ensures that offenders assume responsibility for 
their offending and desist from crime (para 1.4). It defined RJ broadly, 
including processes and outcomes such as mediation, family group 
conferences and reparation. It recommended the use of these measures for 
adults and young offenders, as well as for minor and serious offences, such 
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as robbery and burglary (para 2.18). This holistic approach was to be 
placed within the framework of a victim-centred process that focused on 
care and respect for victims (Home Office, 2003a: 34).   
 
The Labour government aimed to make the best use of RJ to ensure that 
victims’ needs were met and that recidivism was reduced (para 5.1). It 
advocated a dual strategy to attain this goal, namely to include RJ at all 
stages of the formal criminal process and to work towards the complete 
integration of RJ into the formal system (para 5.2). Consequently, 
notwithstanding its wide definition of RJ and its appreciation of the fact 
that RJ processes function both within and alongside the formal system, 
the Labour government’s strategy, like the UN Resolution and the 
European instruments, was predicated upon state control of RJ. However, 
its policy of “responsibilisation” paved the way for it to shirk its 
responsibility for crime by placing it on the shoulders of the stakeholders 
in RJ processes (Green, 2007: 182; Crawford, 2000: 304).  
 
The coalition government has continued the Labour government’s 
commitment to RJ. It has recently announced an intention to increase “... 
the range and availability of restorative approaches” (Ministry of Justice, 
2010, para 78). It aims to effect this, amongst other things, by ensuring 
that, where appropriate, RJ “... is a fundamental part of the sentencing 
process” (Ministry of Justice, 2010, para 79), and by including the results 
of pre-sentence restorative conferences in pre-sentence reports (Ministry 
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of Justice, 2010, para 81). These statements of intent indicate that the 
coalition government, like its predecessor, will continue to locate control 
of RJ within the state.   
 
3.3.2 Restorative justice initiatives 
 
Present policy on RJ indicates that the government has endorsed the 
numerous RJ initiatives that have emerged in England and Wales in the 
last decade. This section examines the most important of these initiatives. 
 
(i) Victim-offender mediation (“VOM”) 
 
The first informal process comprising restorative features was VOM. 
Direct mediation involves an encounter between the victim and offender in 
person in the presence of a trained mediator, who functions as a go-
between but who may not “... propose or impose a decision ...” on either of 
the parties (Dignan, 2005: 112). By contrast, “shuttle” or indirect 
mediation exists to facilitate restoration for victims and offenders who are 
not willing to meet in person (Williams, 2005: 79). Despite the fact that 
proponents of RJ view it as less satisfactory, many victims prefer to 
engage in indirect mediation as they regard it as a safer option (Williams, 
2005: 79).  
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VOM emerged in the UK in the 1980s but only became increasingly 
common in the late 1990s (Goodey, 2005: 193). The Home Office played 
a large part in the nascent stages of VOM by funding “... four pilot 
mediation projects in Cumbria, Coventry, Wolverhampton and Leeds” 
(Goodey, 2005: 191). Both the police and the courts referred cases to these 
projects, which were concerned primarily with young offenders charged 
with property offences, such as theft and criminal damage (Goodey, 2005: 
191-192). The majority of victims were corporate bodies (Goodey, 2005: 
192). Notwithstanding the fact that a study of these projects by Marshall 
and Merry showed high rates of victim satisfaction, it is an unreliable 
indicator of the benefits of mediation for victims, as very few individual 
victims participated in the mediation processes (Goodey, 2005: 192). 
 
While VOM became more widespread in the late 1990s, it has not been 
integrated fully into the formal criminal process (Dignan, 2005: 113). By 
contrast, it is run by outside agencies, such as Mediation UK (Van Ness & 
Nolan, 1998: 82), or takes place in particular criminal justice agencies, 
such as the police or the probation service (Dignan, 2005: 114). The use of 
outside agencies is regarded as advantageous to victims, as they may be 
more at ease outside the traditional system (Home Office, 2003a, para 
2.21). However, without sustained state support, independent VOM has 
experienced funding shortages, resource constraints and low referral rates 
(Dignan, 2005: 114). It has accordingly been superseded by restorative 
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conferencing programmes, which have received firmer government 
backing (Dignan, 2005: 115). 
 
Proponents of RJ maintain that VOM benefits victims as well as offenders. 
Victims are granted the freedom to ask questions about the crime and to 
give voice to their feelings about its effect on them. They may also be 
empowered and receive healing and closure (Elton & Roybal, 2003: 52). 
However, although research has demonstrated high rates of victim 
satisfaction with direct VOM, most victims in England and Wales use 
indirect VOM (Dignan, 2005: 137). In their recent study, Shapland, et al 
report that the majority of victims opted for indirect rather than direct 
VOM (Shapland, et al, 2011: 118).  
 
Victim Support has contended that VOM is riven with problems, with 
many victims feeling pressurised by courts and/or offenders to participate, 
or doing so from a sense of civic duty rather than a desire to obtain 
healing. It has emphasised that victims must not be given the wrong 
impression by promises of healing when the actual objectives of VOM “... 
are crime reduction and the re-education of the offender” (Wright, 2002: 
657). 
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(ii) RJ conferencing 
 
In the last few years, RJ conferencing has superseded VOM as one of the 
principal RJ measures in England and Wales. It began as a trial project by 
the Thames Valley Police (Johnstone, 2002: 115) and grew into a 
permanent part of their practice. Several other police forces also currently 
employ it. While the projects were used initially for young offenders, they 
have been expanded to encompass adults as well (Goodey, 2005: 200; 
Shapland, et al, 2011). RJ conferencing was used originally for relatively 
minor offences, such as theft and non-serious property offences. Recently, 
however, it has begun to be used increasingly for serious and repeat 
offenders (Fox et al, 2006: 133).   
 
The police employ RJ conferencing in three contexts. First, in suitable 
cases, a restorative caution is given to offenders who would otherwise 
stand trial (Johnstone, 2002: 115). A RJ facilitator (most commonly a 
police officer) heads the proceedings, which are attended by the offender 
and his/her family (Dignan, 2005: 121). Cautioning for young offenders 
has been reformed and entrenched in the CDA, which has been 
consolidated in the PCCSA. Two cautions may be given to young 
offenders in appropriate cases. The first is a warning or reprimand, and the 
second is a final warning. Those offenders who receive final warnings are 
required to join a “rehabilitation programme”, where suitable, in terms of 
which they may be required to apologise to victims or make reparation to 
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victims or the community (Dignan, 2005: 110). In terms of s.22 of the CJA 
2003, adult offenders may receive a conditional caution in appropriate 
cases, which imposes conditions concerning rehabilitation and the making 
of reparation. In practice, RJ conferencing may be used to facilitate such 
conditional cautions.  However, Hoyle has noted that “restorative, 
conditional cautions” are seldom used and “... almost none involve 
victims” (Cunneen & Hoyle, 2010: 27). 
 
The second context in which RJ conferencing is used relates to restorative 
conferences. A RJ facilitator heads such conferences, which are attended 
by the offender and his/her family, as well as the victim and his/her 
supporters. The third context relates to community conferences, which are 
attended by the offender and his/her family, the victim and his/her 
supporters, as well as community representatives (Dignan, 2005: 121).   
 
RJ conferences aim to confront offenders with the effects of their 
offending, to make it possible for them to understand the reasons for it, to 
encourage them to desist from further offending, and to facilitate an 
apology to victims and the making of “a reparative action plan” 
(Johnstone, 2002:115-116). Their objectives, as regards victims, are to 
make it possible for victims to give voice to their feelings about the crime, 
and to meet and, if possible, forgive the offenders (Johnstone, 2002: 116). 
While direct victims may receive both material reparation and symbolic 
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reparation, which takes the form of an apology, indirect victims may only 
receive symbolic reparation (Young, 2000: 238-239). 
 
Restorative conferencing, as used by the Thames Valley Police, is founded 
upon Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative shaming (Rock, 2004: 301-
302). Braithwaite has contended that offenders must be shamed for their 
offending. However, such shaming must not be disintegrative, such as the 
shaming that occurs in the formal criminal process, but must be aimed at 
reintegrating offenders into the community. Reintegrative shaming takes 
place in two stages. The shaming stage comprises the shaming of the 
offender in front of the victim and his/her “community of care”, namely, 
family members, friends and community representatives (Dignan, 2005: 
102). Such shaming consists of expressing disapproval of the offence, not 
of the offender him/herself (Goodey, 2005: 198). The victim’s presence 
and participation enables the offender to confront the offence and to avoid 
using “techniques of neutralization”, such as denying that there is a victim 
or that harm occurred (Dignan, 2005: 103). The presence of the offender’s 
“community of care” causes the shaming to affect the offender more 
profoundly than the presence of an impersonal judge (Dignan, 2005: 103). 
 
The reintegrative stage takes place after the shaming stage, and aims to 
facilitate agreement on appropriate reparation and the offender’s 
reintegration “... into the law-abiding community” (Dignan, 2005:103). 
The fact that the offender’s “community of care” is present is an important 
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contributory factor to the attainment of such reintegration (Dignan, 2005: 
103).  
 
Proponents of RJ maintain that reintegrative shaming benefits offenders as 
well as victims. Victims experience catharsis by listening to the offender’s 
“full story” and meeting the offender in person dissipates their fears 
(Johnstone, 2002: 117). Furthermore, victims are empowered by 
participating in the process and are able to achieve “closure” by being 
given an opportunity to forgive the offender (Johnstone, 2002: 117; 
Shapland, et al, 2011: 147). In the belief that victims benefit from 
participating in RJ conferencing using reintegrative shaming, the Thames 
Valley Police have provided victims with a greater role in their projects 
than was the case in the initial RJ processes in England and Wales (Rock, 
2004: 307). 
 
It has been contended that the use of reintegrative shaming in restorative 
conferences is inconsonant with the ideals of RJ (Morris & Maxwell, 
2000: 208). To turn victims into “shamers” does not facilitate 
reconciliation, but constitutes “... ‘victim prostitution’ in which victims are 
effectively ‘used’ in order to bring about certain effects on offenders with 
a view to reducing the incidence of offending” (Dignan, 2005: 117). 
Furthermore, it is inappropriate to expect victims to forgive their 
offenders. By contrast, the withholding of forgiveness may be “morally 
right” in certain circumstances (Johnstone, 2002: 134).  
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Some studies have demonstrated that, notwithstanding its apparent 
advantages to victims, RJ conferencing has low levels of victim 
participation. Hoyle has shown that one or more victims attended only 14 
percent of the Thames Valley Police restorative conferences that were held 
in the three years after they were introduced (Hoyle, 2002: 103). 
Consequently, many victims are excluded from the restorative process. 
Victims did not participate for personal reasons, including unwillingness 
to attend and fear of retaliation. However, the poor implementation of the 
RJ projects constituted a further reason for the lack of victim participation 
(Hoyle, 2002: 105, 116). Furthermore, victims who did not wish to 
participate directly were not given sufficient opportunities to participate 
indirectly (Hoyle, 2002: 106). Accordingly, RJ conferencing has been 
criticised for being too focused on offenders (Dignan, 2005: 143). 
However, not all studies reveal low rates of victim participation. Shapland, 
et al found that a significant number of victims participated in the 
restorative processes surveyed in their study (Shapland, et al, 2011: 118). 
  
Research has demonstrated that victims are unsure of the value of material 
reparation. Strang and Sherman found that, while RJ conferencing has a 
greater chance of leading to restitution than the formal criminal process, it 
is uncertain whether all victims regard restitution as a suitable way of 
redressing the harm (Strang & Sherman, 2003: 34). Shapland, et al found 
that, while very few RJ conferences involved financial compensation or 
reparation, most victims were not less satisfied as a result (Shapland, et al, 
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2011: 142). Instead, victims were more concerned with “... the symbolic 
reparation of offenders taking control of their lives and deciding to change 
their life patterns away from offending” (Shapland, et al, 2011: 143).   
 
A further concern with RJ conferences using reintegrative shaming is that 
the empirical evidence does not unequivocally support allegations by 
proponents that such conferences reduce recidivism (Goodey, 2005: 198). 
 
(iii) Family Group Conferences (“FGCs”) 
 
 After having been implemented successfully in New Zealand (Reimund, 
2004/2005: 676), FGCs were introduced in the UK. They are used 
principally for young offenders (Dignan, 2005: 119). While FGCs in New 
Zealand are employed for all offences except for murder (Rock, 2004: 
299), they are usually employed for less serious offences in England and 
Wales. However, certain projects are known to use FGCs for serious 
offences. For instance, the Essex Family Group Conference Service uses 
FGCs in the case of young offenders who have committed serious 
offences, offend persistently, or “... are at high risk of re-offending” 
(Home Office, 2003a, para 2.7).   
 
 A conference facilitator heads a FGC, which is attended by the offender, 
his/her family and persons invited by the family, the victim, his/her 
supporters and/or family members, and a police officer (Goodey, 2005: 
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195). Only victims and offenders are permitted to participate actively in 
the process. The other persons present play a supporting role only (Dignan, 
2005: 116-117).  
 
Proponents of FGCs contend that they are victim-centred, being premised 
on meeting the needs of victims. As such, they make victims feel better 
about the offence, encourage them to reconcile with offenders, generate 
consensual reparative outcomes, and reintegrate victims and offenders into 
the community (Dignan, 2005: 117). Research into FGCs in New Zealand 
found that most victims who participated felt better for having done so, 
and stated that the FGC had given them a “voice” in deciding suitable 
outcomes (Morris & Maxwell, 2000: 211). Nonetheless, about 25 per cent 
of victims felt worse, amongst other things, because they did not consider 
the offenders’ apologies genuine and received no reparation (Morris & 
Maxwell, 2000: 212). In light of the fact that young offenders and their 
families have insufficient financial resources, few FGCs lead to financial 
reparation (Morris & Maxwell, 2000: 210).   
 
The FGCs had relatively low levels of victim participation (Dignan, 2005: 
140) and victims who did attend expressed less satisfaction than 
professionals and families with the outcomes of the FGCs (Morris & 
Maxwell, 2000: 212). Although Morris and Maxwell contend that victims 
were dissatisfied because of poor practice rather than any intrinsic faults in 
FGCs (Morris & Maxwell, 2000: 217), Dignan maintains that practical 
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improvements are unlikely to resolve problems arising from victims’ 
beliefs that apologies were not real or from the failure to obtain reparation 
(Dignan, 2005: 141).   
 
Projects using FGCs in England and Wales have had considerable 
problems, including low rates of referral, disagreements with criminal 
justice agencies and low levels of victim participation (Dignan, 2005: 
143). Recent research has shown that there is little empirical evidence “... 
that the needs of victims received primary importance” (Zernova, 2007: 
497). Many FGCs were conducted without victims and many victims 
thought that the process existed principally for offenders’ benefit 
(Zernova, 2007: 497, 498). The research also demonstrated that 
insufficient attention was given to material reparation and that only two of 
the conferences studied incorporated a discussion of material reparation 
(Zernova, 2007: 497-498). It also referred to the fact that victims may be 
in danger of being pressurised to participate in FGCs by facilitators 
appealing to their sense of civic duty (Zernova, 2007: 498). Finally, the 
research showed that assertions by proponents that FGCs generate the 
empowerment of victims lacked empirical support and that the roles of 
victims were limited to ensure that the state retained control over offenders 
(Zernova, 2007: 503). This research provides support for the view that 
FGCs use victims to obtain the reduction of recidivism rather than the 
empowerment of victims (Zernova, 2007: 503) and that, in consequence, 
they are focused on offenders rather than victims (Johnstone, 2002: 19). 
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(iv) Reparation orders 
 
Reparation orders for young offenders under the age of 18 years were the 
first sentencing option with restorative features to receive the force of law 
in terms of the provisions of the CDA, which have since been consolidated 
in the PCCSA (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 212, 226).    
 
Section 73(1) of the PCCSA provides that a court may impose a reparation 
order for offences not carrying a sentence fixed by law. These orders may 
require young offenders to make reparation to identifiable victims or the 
community. They may not be imposed along with custodial sentences or 
community orders (s.73(4)). Making reparation does not include paying 
financial compensation (s.73(3)). Young offenders may be ordered to 
make reparation by apologising to victims or repairing damaged property 
(Home Office, 1997). The victim’s consent to the order is necessary, and 
the order may not require the offender to work for more than 24 hours in 
total (s.74(1)). The court is obliged to give reasons for deciding not to 
order reparation in cases where it has the power to do so (s.73(8)).  
 
The requirement that the victim must consent to the order is indicative of a 
measure of restorativeness, the premise being that both victims and 
offenders should benefit from reparation orders (Wasik, 1999: 471). 
Nevertheless, the government has stated that, although the victim’s 
opinion concerning the kind of reparation must be taken into account, the 
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court has the final decision-making power in this respect (Wasik, 1999: 
476). The fact that reparation orders are court-imposed rather than 
voluntarily determined by the parties detracts from their restorativeness 
(Dignan, 2005: 111) and opens them to criticism as being premised upon 
an “authoritarian” model of RJ (Williams, 2005: 67).   
 
Nonetheless, proponents of RJ contend that reparation orders do embody 
some restorative features, such as giving victims an opportunity to meet 
offenders and to come to an understanding of why the offence was 
committed (Goodey, 2005: 201). However, although victims of less 
serious offences, such as property offences, may benefit therapeutically 
from being involved in decisions about reparation and experience closure 
by receiving reparation, victims of offences against the person may be 
traumatised by the process. Furthermore, victims who need financial 
reparation are unlikely to benefit from non-financial reparation.  
 
In any event, in practice, few reparation orders require offenders to make 
reparation directly to victims. Studies have demonstrated that courts are 
hesitant to grant adjournments to enable victims to be consulted about 
reparation before the sentence is imposed. Consequently, the majority of 
reparation orders require young offenders to engage in community 
reparation (Dignan, 2005: 135). In addition, reparation orders are founded 
principally on the policy of diverting young offenders from the formal 
criminal process in order to reduce recidivism and to “... limit the costs of 
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future arrests, trials and incarceration to the public purse” (Goodey, 2005: 
202). Consequently, they are focused on offenders rather than on victims 
(Goodey, 2005: 203). 
 
(v) Referral orders 
 
Referral orders, the second statutory sentencing option for young offenders 
that has restorative features, were introduced by the YJCEA, which has 
been consolidated in the PCCSA (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 227-228). 
Referral orders may be imposed in cases where the court is dealing with an 
offender who is younger than 18 years in regard to an offence which has 
no sentence fixed by law and the court does not wish to order custody or 
an absolute discharge (s.16(1)). Referral orders may be compulsory or 
discretionary.  
 
Originally, if the offender had pleaded guilty and had not previously been 
convicted of an offence or bound over, a referral order was compulsory 
(s.17(1), read with s.16 (2)). However, the government has subsequently 
made referral orders discretionary in these circumstances if the offence is 
non-imprisonable (Dignan, 2005: 131). In addition, referral orders are 
discretionary if the offender has pleaded guilty to at least one of the 
offences with which s/he is charged, and not guilty to at least one of the 
others, and has not previously been convicted or bound over (s.17(2), read 
with s.16(3)).   
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In terms of a referral order, the young offender must be required to attend 
meetings of a youth offender panel, which consists of at least one member 
of the Youth Offending Team (s.18(1), read with s.21(3)). The panel’s aim 
is to obtain an agreement from the young offender regarding a programme 
of behaviour directed at the prevention of recidivism (s.23(1)). The 
programme may make provision for reparation, mediation or community 
work, amongst other things (s.23(2)). The terms of the agreement amount 
to a youth offender contract, which may not be shorter than 3 months or 
longer than 12 months in duration (s.23(6), read with s.18(1)).   
 
Panel meetings must be attended by the young offender and his/her parent, 
guardian or other “appropriate person” if s/he is younger than 16 years. 
“Appropriate persons” may also attend if the young offender is over the 
age of 16 years (s.20). Furthermore, the young offender may have a 
support person (s.22(3)). Victims and their supporters are permitted to 
attend (ss.22(4) and (5)). If the panel determines at its final meeting that 
the young offender has observed the terms of the youth offender contract 
satisfactorily, the referral order is discharged (s.27). If the contract has not 
been observed satisfactorily, or if it has been breached, the panel must 
refer the young offender to the court (s.27). 
 
According to the government, victims are central to the process of referral 
orders. Advantages to victims include giving them a forum to air their 
opinions, to question offenders with a view to gaining insight into the 
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reasons for the offence, and to obtain an acknowledgement of their 
injuries. They may also obtain material and/or emotional reparation 
(Dignan, 2005: 148-149). 
 
The government piloted referral orders in 11 areas in 2000 (Crawford & 
Burden, 2005: 8). An assessment of these pilots revealed high rates of 
victim satisfaction regarding the standards of procedural justice in panels, 
but dissatisfaction concerning the restrictions placed on the participation 
of victims (Crawford & Burden, 2005: 8). In the case of some of the pilots, 
for instance, victims who had participated were asked to leave after 
reparation had been discussed, but before the programme of activities for 
the young offender had been decided (Crawford, 2006: 137). Levels of 
victim attendance were also very low, with victims attending panel 
meetings in a mere 13 per cent of cases (Crawford & Burden, 2005: 8). 
Reasons for the low levels of attendance by victims included problems in 
contacting victims, resource limitations and time constraints (Goodey, 
2005: 204).     
 
A later study also revealed low levels of participation by victims 
(Crawford & Burden, 2005: 37). Reasons included the limited time-span 
for the holding of panel meetings, the holding of such meetings at times 
that were inconvenient for victims, victims’ fear of reprisals, as well as 
their unwillingness to meet with offenders in person (Crawford & Burden, 
2005: 38-39). While victims who did attend were positive about having 
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been “given a voice” and having obtained closure, many victims were 
unhappy with the limited follow-up information they were given and the 
lack of cognisance taken of their opinions (Crawford & Burden, 2005: 47, 
52-53).  
 
In addition, the study demonstrated that tension between community 
participation and victim participation contributed to the low levels of 
victim attendance. The involvement of the community may hamper the 
centrality of victims, “... particularly if the community is thought capable 
of injecting a victim perspective by virtue of its own status and role as 
indirect or secondary victim of a crime” (Dignan, 2005: 152). Youth 
justice agencies that are not in favour of the participation of victims may 
thus use community involvement as a substitute for the attendance of 
victims (Dignan, 2005: 152). This difficulty is exacerbated by the 
tendency of youth offender panels to favour community rather than victim 
reparation (Crawford, 2006: 137).  
 
Low levels of attendance by victims, restrictions on the participation of 
victims and inadequate victim reparation detract from the restorative 
features of referral orders and expose them to criticism as overly focused 
on offenders. Furthermore, they are entrenched in a coercive criminal 
justice framework that “... offends cherished restorative ideals of 
voluntariness” (Crawford & Burden, 2005: 14). 
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3.3.3 Effectiveness of restorative justice for victims 
 
The previous section has examined a number of problems that beset RJ 
processes in practice, particularly as regards victims’ experiences. This 
section considers a broader question of principle, namely whether the 
paradigm of RJ is reconcilable with the effective empowerment of victims 
or whether, as Braithwaite contends, it is at odds with “... a radical vision 
of victim empowerment” (Braithwaite, 2002: 160; see Wolhuter, et al, 
2009: 228-231).   
 
Proponents of RJ have struggled to resolve the conflict between the 
restorative value of voluntariness and the practical reality that RJ 
processes are frequently not voluntary. For some proponents, voluntariness 
is vital (see, e.g., Wright, 2002: 659). Consequently, processes embodying 
coercive features do not qualify as restorative. Nonetheless, the majority of 
RJ proponents take the view that coercion may be used to buttress 
restorative values in appropriate cases (see, e.g., Walgrave, 2007: 565; 
Obold-Eschleman, 2004: 599). For example, Walgrave maintains that 
“restorative coercion” ought to be employed, as there are limits to 
voluntariness, which require that force, within the parameters of due 
process, be applied by the criminal justice system (Walgrave, 2000: 272). 
 
However, the “... specter of punishment in the background ...” 
(Braithwaite, 2002, quoted in Williams, 2005: 66) may detract from the 
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integrity of restorative processes in the eyes of victims. Research has 
shown that many offenders who participate in FGCs in England believe 
that they are obliged to do so (Zernova, 2007: 500). Offenders who 
apologise and make reparation because they believe that they are required 
to do so, or because they wish to avoid the formal process, are unlikely to 
be regarded as credible by victims. Further research has shown that 
victims regard reparation as lacking credibility if it is made to avoid the 
prospect of criminal proceedings (Crawford, 2000: 300). 
 
The lack of integrity of processes that use “restorative coercion” may 
cause victims to decide not to participate or to participate out of a sense of 
civic duty rather than a belief that they may obtain healing or closure (see 
sections 3.3.2 (i) and (iii) above). Consequently, instead of empowering 
victims, such processes may generate secondary victimisation (Cunneen & 
Hoyle, 2010: 135). While Shapland, et al found “... no evidence of 
secondary victimisation ...” in their study (Shapland, et al, 2011: 144), it 
does not appear that the study included victims of gender-based, racially or 
religiously motivated or homophobic crime, for whom the experience of 
RJ may well generate secondary victimisation (see below). The focus of 
the Victims’ Directive on safeguards to ensure the absence of secondary 
victimisation is thus to be welcomed (see section 3.2 above).   
 
The informal nature of RJ processes constitutes another difficulty for 
victims, as the safeguards of the traditional criminal process may be 
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absent. It is true that proponents of RJ who advocate an integrationist 
approach, such as Walgrave, as well as instruments, such as 
Recommendation No. R (99) 19 and the UN Resolution, call for 
safeguards premised on due process, including legal assistance, to ensure 
that abuse does not occur in RJ processes (see sections 3.1 and 3.2 above). 
Nevertheless, it is not always possible to comply with such safeguards in 
practice, particularly as RJ processes are headed by facilitators who are not 
legal professionals. In addition, the protective measures available to 
victims, especially vulnerable and intimidated victims, in the traditional 
criminal process, such as special measures and the prohibition of cross-
examination by the defendant in person (see chapter 3) do not apply to RJ 
processes. Consequently, the informality of the RJ process may lead 
intrinsically to secondary victimisation. 
 
Besides the above difficulties, which apply to all victims, additional 
difficulties exist concerning the use of RJ processes in cases involving 
victims from unequal social groups. Notwithstanding the fact that 
proponents of RJ regard victims as central stakeholders in RJ processes, 
RJ is premised upon a neutral concept of victimhood that masks social 
inequalities based on gender, race, sexuality and age, amongst others 
(Green, 2007: 181). In light of the fact that RJ processes are “... firmly 
embedded within state practice ...”, this concept of victimhood is difficult 
to challenge (Cunneen & Hoyle, 2010: 133). The obfuscation of social 
inequalities may undermine the “... protection and promotion of [human] 
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rights in restorative justice programmes”, which may impede the 
empowerment of victims from unequal social groups (Skelton & 
Sekhonyane, 2007: 585). Furthermore, the valorisation of the concept of 
“community” by RJ proponents obscures the social exclusion, coercion 
and power imbalances that beset many communities (Crawford, 2000: 
291). The “moral authoritarianism” which informs RJ is founded upon an 
assumption that communities are characterised by consensus, and is 
resistant to a critical inquiry that draws attention to the existence of 
unequal social relations (Williams, 2005: 63). 
 
The deleterious effect of such concepts of victimhood and community is 
brought to light by the experiences of victims of gender-based violence 
and racially motivated and homophobic hate crime (see chapter 6). A 
number of RJ proponents recommend RJ processes for gender-based 
violence. They contend that RJ will empower victims by giving them a 
“voice”, validating their accounts of the crime, and “... acknowledging that 
[they] are not to blame ...” (Daly, 2006: 338). They maintain that victims 
experience the RJ process as less threatening than the traditional criminal 
process on account of its informality (Daly, 2006: 338).  
 
Hoyle argues that RJ processes may be able to contest the patriarchal 
mindsets of perpetrators, their families and friends that “excuse or 
condone” gender-based violence (Cunneen & Hoyle, 2010: 77). However, 
in order to convey official “... condemnation of the offender’s behaviour 
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...” in domestic violence cases, she contends that RJ processes should be 
imposed by the courts along with a sentence, unless the incident is “less 
serious”, in which case an RJ process should be imposed “as an 
alternative” (Cunneen & Hoyle, 2010: 79). In cases where there is no 
formal process because the victim has chosen not to give evidence and the 
criminal justice agents have decided not to compel her to do so, a 
restorative conference may be used as “... an expedient form of diversion 
from prosecution” (Cunneen & Hoyle, 2010: 80). 
 
Approaches such as these fail to consider the existence, within RJ 
processes, of fundamental barriers to the effective empowerment of 
victims of gender-based violence. Many communities are fraught with 
patriarchal attitudes. Consequently, the involvement of the community in 
RJ processes may traumatise victims by trivialising gender-based violence 
(Johnstone, 2002: 29-30). A neutral facilitator may not be able to impede 
the influence of such attitudes and the inequalities of power that inform 
them (Bannenberg & Rössner, 2003: 72). Furthermore, the use of RJ may 
render victims vulnerable to further violence, especially where victims and 
offenders are known to each other (Daly & Stubbs, 2007: 159). Hoyle 
concedes that such “pitfalls” exist (Cunneen & Hoyle, 2010: 77-78). 
 
Cunneen maintains that, because RJ regards “... an offence as a discrete, 
past event ...”, it is unable to capture the reality that domestic violence “... 
is commonly recurrent” (Cunneen & Hoyle, 2010: 151). In addition, the 
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making of apologies by offenders is particularly inapposite in domestic 
violence cases, as remorse and apology constitute part of the cycle of 
domestic violence (Daly & Stubbs, 2007: 160). Rather than empowering 
victims, forgiveness may undermine their sense of autonomy, particularly 
in sexual assault cases (Daly & Stubbs, 2007: 160-161). 
 
The use of RJ processes in the case of hate crimes is characterised by 
similar shortcomings. Nevertheless, scholars have recommended the use of 
RJ in such cases. Hudson takes the view that, in light of the limited 
number of convictions for hate crime, RJ may signal its unlawfulness more 
effectively than the traditional criminal process. It enables the victim to 
tell his/her story directly, generating comprehension on the part of the 
offender of the victim’s injuries. Furthermore, instead of being subject to 
stigmatisation and exclusion, the offender experiences reintegrative 
shaming (Hudson, 2006: 277).  
 
Hudson’s approach lacks an appreciation of the potential damage that may 
be caused to victims of hate crime by RJ processes. The involvement of 
the community generates a risk of injustice to victims. Racially motivated 
and homophobic offences are premised on prejudices that are often shared 
by the community in question (Dignan, 2005: 171). Furthermore, the 
inequalities of power that exist between victims and offenders may filter 
into the RJ process, in view of the absence, or practical inefficacy, of 
procedural safeguards and the use of a neutral facilitator. In addition, as 
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hate crimes cause injury, not only to the direct victims, but also to the 
entire social group whose characteristic is targeted, the making of 
reparation and apology to individual victims cannot restore the social 
relationship fully. As Cunneen maintains, the “public denunciation” 
pursuant to the formal criminal process may be preferable “... because it 
speaks to the broader social group more directly than a private apology to 
an individual” (Cunneen & Hoyle, 2010: 155).  
 
It is fortunate that RJ processes are not used generally for domestic 
violence, sexual assault and racially motivated or homophobic crime in 
England and Wales. However, the Thames Valley Police RJ conferencing 
programmes include domestic violence (Dignan, 2005: 170), and the Hate 
Crimes Project of the London Southwark Mediation Centre has engaged in 
direct and indirect VOM in cases of non-serious hate crimes (Cunneen & 
Hoyle, 2010: 74). It is to be hoped that these initiatives do not constitute a 
sign that the UK is to follow the recent tendency in foreign jurisdictions, 
such as the US, Australia and New Zealand, to use RJ for gender-based 
violence and hate crime (Daly & Stubbs, 2007: 160). 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter has examined the strengths and weaknesses of compensation 
and restorative justice from the perspective of victims. Its assessment of 
state compensation has demonstrated that the CICS has a number of 
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drawbacks that cause victims difficulty (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 214). 
These drawbacks include decreasing or denying victims’ claims based on 
their past conduct or criminal activity, excluding victims in terms of the 
“same roof” principle, denying compensation to consenting child victims 
of sexual offences, and failing to pay compensation for special expenses 
and loss of earnings to victims who do not qualify for statutory sick pay. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the CICS is consonant with the 
Compensation Convention in most respects and constitutes the most 
generous compensation scheme in Europe (see Rock, 2004: 266).    
 
 The chapter’s examination of RJ processes in England and Wales against 
the backdrop of European and international instruments has yielded less 
positive results (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 231). It has highlighted the 
practical disadvantages of these processes for victims and has emphasised 
a number of intrinsic theoretical difficulties with the RJ paradigm, 
particularly from the perspective of victims from unequal social groups. In 
view of these concerns, it is contended that state compensation constitutes 
a more effective manner than RJ of redressing victims’ injuries. It is 
contended further that, if the traditional criminal justice process is 
transformed in the way outlined in the thesis, it will be more conducive 
than RJ to the empowerment of victims. The recognition of enforceable 
rights for victims (see chapter 2) and the application of anti-discrimination 
law to victims from unequal social groups (see chapter 6), will alleviate 
secondary victimisation in the criminal process. In addition, the adoption 
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of auxiliary prosecution for serious offences and victims’ lawyers for less 
serious offences (see chapter 4) will empower victims procedurally during 
the trial. Furthermore, training programmes aimed at the eradication of 
prejudice and the removal of imbalances of power may be implemented 
more effectively in the criminal justice system than in the community (see 
chapter 6).  
 
While the Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive approve the use 
of mediation (and, in the case of the Victims’ Directive, also RJ more 
broadly conceived), they also require reform of the formal process to 
improve victims’ positions. The UK ought to focus on the transformation 
of the traditional criminal process rather than expending much-needed 
resources on the development of RJ processes that, by the admission of 
their own advocates (see Braithwaite, 2002: 160; section 3.3.3 above), are 
incompatible with the complete empowerment of victims.   
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CHAPTER 6: RIGHTS OF VICTIMS FROM SOCIALLY DISADVANTAGED 
GROUPS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the responses of the government and criminal justice 
agencies to gender-based violence, racially and religiously motivated crime, 
homophobic and transphobic crime, and elder abuse, within the framework of 
the UK’s international and European human rights obligations. It contends 
that, although the UK has made appreciable progress in the prevention, 
investigation and punishment of these forms of victimisation, as well as in the 
reduction of secondary victimisation, current law and policy fails to comply 
with international and European standards in several respects.  
 
Minority ethnic women’s lived experiences of domestic violence are not 
addressed adequately. The rates of prosecution and conviction for rape, 
racially and religiously motivated crime, and homophobic and transphobic 
crime, are low. Racial, religious and homophobic prejudice on the part of the 
police continues to exist. A comprehensive criminal justice policy to prevent, 
investigate and punish elder abuse is lacking.  
 
The chapter maintains that, in order to bring its law and policy into line with 
international and European standards, and to capture the dynamics of victims’ 
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lived realities, the government must correlate the victims’ rights that 
constitute the focus of previous chapters with the relevant provisions of the 
EA. 
 
2. INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS 
 
 This section engages in an overview of the UK’s obligations in international 
and European human rights law and EU law regarding the groups of socially 
disadvantaged victims under review (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 233-235, 242-
244, 250-251, 255-256).   
 
2.1 Gender-based victimisation 
 
As a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 1979 (the “Women’s Convention”), the UK is 
bound by its provisions. Although gender-based violence is not prohibited 
expressly, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (“CEDAW”) has stated that the definition of discrimination against 
women in article 1 includes gender-based violence (CEDAW, 1992: para 6). 
 
The Women’s Convention requires States Parties to adopt “… all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
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organization or enterprise” (article 2(e)). They must also take appropriate 
steps, such as enacting legislation, to alter or abolish discriminatory “… laws, 
regulations, customs and practices …” (article 2(f)). CEDAW has stated that, 
in terms of general international law, states have a positive duty to “… act 
with due diligence …” to prevent, investigate and punish acts of gender-based 
violence, not only by public, but also by private persons (CEDAW, 1992: para 
9). Consequently, it has recommended that States Parties must adopt “… 
appropriate and effective measures …” to combat gender-based violence 
committed by public or private persons (CEDAW, 1992: para 24(a)). They 
must ensure that domestic law protects women adequately and that the 
judiciary, the police and other public officials receive “gender-sensitive 
training” (CEDAW, 1992: para 24(b)). They must also ensure that domestic 
violence attracts criminal penalties, and that legislation is enacted prohibiting 
honour based defences to charges of assault or murder within a domestic 
violence context (CEDAW, 1992: para 24(r)). In addition, they must “… take 
all legal and other measures that are necessary to provide effective protection 
of women against gender-based violence …”, such as criminal sanctions, civil 
remedies and compensation (CEDAW, 1992: para 24(t)).   
 
The UK has also signed the (non-binding) Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women 1994 (the “Women’s Declaration”). In terms of 
article 1, “violence against women” is gender-based violence, which includes 
threats of such violence as well as coercion, which occurs “… in public or in 
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private life …”. States Parties are required to adopt “… a policy of 
eliminating violence …” and to use “… due diligence to prevent, investigate 
and … punish …” gender-based violence committed by the state or private 
persons (article 4). In the same way as the Women’s Convention, the 
Women’s Declaration thus imposes liability on State Parties for gender-based 
violence by public bodies as well as private persons, where the standard of 
due diligence has not been met. 
 
The United Nations Resolution on crime prevention and criminal justice 
measures to eliminate violence against women (1997) elaborates on the nature 
of the measures that states are required to adopt in order to respond to gender-
based violence effectively. For instance, states must ensure that legal 
provisions pertaining to violence against women are enforced consistently “… 
in such a way that all criminal acts of violence against women are recognized 
and responded to accordingly by the criminal justice system” (para 8(a)). 
They must make provision for a court process that is “… accessible and 
sensitive to the needs of women subjected to violence …” (para 10(d)). In 
addition, they are required to ensure that criminal justice agencies receive 
appropriate “… crosscultural and gender-sensitivity training …” (para 12(a)).       
 
The issue of gender-based violence has also received the attention of the 
Council of Europe. Recommendation Rec (2002) 5 on the protection of women 
against violence, albeit not binding, imposes far-reaching duties for the 
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protection and empowerment of victims. States are required to assist and 
support victims and to ensure the provision of services to immigrant women 
(articles 23, 24). They must guarantee that police accord victims respect and 
dignity, respond to their complaints in confidence, and provide female police 
officers wherever possible (article 29). They are required to ensure that 
victims do not “… suffer secondary (re)victimization or any gender-
insensitive treatment by the police, health and social personnel [and] judiciary 
personnel” (article 33). As regards trials, states must develop special 
conditions for victims’ evidence that obviate repetition and reduce the distress 
caused by the proceedings (article 42). In addition, they must avert “… 
unwarranted and/or humiliating questioning …” of victims and provide 
measures protecting victims from threats and revenge (articles 43, 44; see 
chapter 3 for a discussion of similar provisions for the protection of victims in 
terms of Recommendation No. R (97) 13 concerning intimidation of witnesses 
and the rights of the defence (1997) (“Recommendation R (97) 13”)). They 
must also protect immigrant victims of domestic violence by considering 
giving them an independent right of residence to enable them to leave the 
abuser (article 59).  
 
The very recent adoption of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (2011; the 
“European Women’s Convention”) signifies an increased commitment to the 
eradication of gender-based violence in Europe. In terms of article 4.1, all 
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persons, especially women, have the right “… to live free from violence in 
both the public and the private sphere”. States Parties have a duty “... to 
exercise due diligence to prevent, punish and provide reparation ...” for 
gender-based violence committed “by non-State actors” (article 5.2).  
 
In addition, States Parties have a range of duties that accord victims specific 
rights. For instance, they are required to provide victims with information 
concerning sources of victim support and legal remedies “... in a language 
they understand” (article 19). They must also provide victims with “general” 
and “specialist support services” (articles 20, 22), as well as “... rape crisis or 
sexual violence referral centres ...” (article 25), shelters (article 23) and free 
24-hour telephonic help-lines (article 24).  In addition, victims must be 
granted “... adequate civil remedies against the perpetrator ...” and against 
state agencies for failing to adopt appropriate “... preventive or protective 
measures” (article 29). States Parties must also accord victims “... the right to 
claim compensation from perpetrators ...” as well as state compensation if 
compensation is not forthcoming from “other sources” (article 30). 
 
Furthermore, States Parties have several duties in regard to the criminal 
process. For instance, article 54 provides that sexual history evidence may 
only be admitted “... when it is relevant and necessary”. Article 56 mandates 
protective measures during the criminal process, such as measures permitting 
victims to give evidence “... without being present ...” at court or in the 
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absence of the offender, using “... appropriate communication technologies”. 
It also enshrines victims’ right “... to be heard ... directly or through an 
intermediary”. Article 57 requires States Parties to grant victims “... the right 
to legal assistance and to free legal aid ...”.  
 
It is noteworthy that article 4.3 requires States Parties to ensure that the 
provisions of the European Women’s Convention, particularly as regards 
these victims’ rights, are made available “... without discrimination on any 
ground” including “sex, gender, race, colour, ... religion, ... sexual orientation, 
gender identity, [or] age.” Consequently, it engenders the space for the 
protection of victims from intersectional victimisation (see section 3.1.4 
below). In addition, cultural, customary, religious or honour-based grounds 
may not be invoked to justify gender-based violence (article 12.5). 
 
In a bid to alleviate the vulnerability of immigrant women victims of domestic 
violence whose residence status is dependent on that of their partner (see 
section 3.1.4 below), article 59 provides that States Parties must grant such 
victims “... an autonomous residence permit ...” in “... particularly difficult 
circumstances ...”. However, article 78.2 permits States to enter reservations 
in respect of article 59. 
 
The above analysis indicates that wide-ranging duties to prevent, investigate 
and punish gender-based violence and to empower and protect victims 
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constitute the backcloth to the UK government’s responses to gender-based 
violence.  
 
2.2 Racially and religiously motivated victimisation 
 
Both racial and religious discrimination are prohibited by United Nations 
instruments. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1966 (the “Race Convention”), which binds the UK, places 
obligations on States Parties to prevent and punish racial victimisation. States 
Parties must criminalise and punish incitement to racial discrimination and 
acts of racial violence (article 4(a)). They must guarantee all persons equality 
before the law regardless of “… race, colour, or national or ethnic origin …” 
in respect of their rights to security of the person and to state protection from 
“… violence or bodily harm …” by public or private persons (article 5(b)). 
They must also accord all persons “… effective protection and remedies …” 
and “… just and adequate reparation or satisfaction …” for racial 
discrimination (article 6). 
 
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 1981 (the “Declaration on 
Religion”) requires States Parties to take steps “... to prevent and eliminate ...” 
religious- or belief-based discrimination “... in the recognition, exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, 
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economic, political, social and cultural life” (article 4.1). Such steps include 
passing or repealing legislation in order to ensure that religious- or belief-
based discrimination is outlawed (article 4.2). Although it is not binding, the 
Declaration on Religion has exerted an influence on the development of 
international and national law and policy pertaining to the protection of 
religious minorities from victimisation (see further below; see also section 3.2 
below).   
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), 
which was set up in pursuance of article 8 of the Race Convention, has 
recommended that States Parties introduce sentence enhancement for racially 
motivated offences by means of legislation (CERD, 2005: para 4(a)). It has 
also recommended that States Parties require criminal justice agencies to treat 
victims who report racially motivated offences “… in a satisfactory manner 
…” and impose “… disciplinary or penal sanctions …” on police who fail to 
accept a complaint of racist conduct (CERD, 2005: paras 11, 12). 
Furthermore, States Parties must emphasise to prosecuting authorities that the 
prosecution of racist conduct is important (CERD, 2005: para 15).  
 
During the court process, victims must receive assistance, such as legal aid, 
“… information about the progress of the proceedings …”, and protection 
from intimidation (CERD, 2005: para 17).  Criminal justice agencies must 
receive training to generate attitudes of respect for human rights, tolerance, 
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understanding of inter-racial matters, and sensitivity to “intercultural 
relations” (CERD, 2005: para 5(b)). 
 
CERD has expressed disquiet about the incidence of racially motivated 
violence and harassment, as well as institutional racism on the part of the 
police in the UK, calling upon the government to ensure the effective 
implementation of its policies to address these forms of racist victimisation 
(CERD, 2001). In addition, it has voiced concern about the rise of 
Islamophobic incidents in the UK following the events of September 11, 
advocating the introduction of an offence of incitement to religious hatred 
(CERD, 2003). Although the UK is not bound by these recommendations and 
opinions, they have nonetheless exercised an influence on the direction of law 
and policy (see section 3.2 below). 
 
The provisions of several Council of Europe instruments also protect 
minorities and prohibit racism. The Council of Europe Framework 
Convention for the protection of national minorities (1995. CETS No.: 157) 
provides that national minorities have the right to equality before the law and 
freedom from discrimination (article 4) and obliges Member States to protect 
them from “… threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence …” on 
account of “… their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity” (article 
6.2).   
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Furthermore, the Framework Decision on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law 
(2008/913/JHA) imposes a duty on Member States to punish intentional, 
public incitement to violence or hatred on the grounds of “… race, colour, 
religion, descent or national or ethnic origin” (article 1.1.(a)). However, the 
obligation to punish such conduct when it is directed at religion is only 
mandatory insofar as the conduct “… is a pretext …” for a “… reference to 
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin” (article 1.3). While Member 
States may punish such conduct when it is directed at religion alone, they are 
not obliged to do so. For instance, they may choose not to criminalise 
incitement to “pure” anti-Muslim hatred or violence that is not “a pretext” for 
anti-Asian or anti-Arab hatred or violence. In view of the growing equation of 
Islamic identity and “global terrorism” (Chakraborti, 2007: 111), this lacuna 
may aggravate Islamophobic victimisation. Consequently, the inclusion of 
such “pure” religious hatred in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
(“RRHA”; see section 3.2.1 below) is to be welcomed. 
 
The Council of Europe established the European Commission Against Racism 
and Intolerance (“ECRI”) in 1993, with a mandate to monitor measures for the 
elimination of “… violence, discrimination and prejudice …” based on “… 
race, colour, language, religion, nationality and national or ethnic origin” 
(ECRI, quoted in Goodey, 2007: 425).  The ECRI has recommended that 
Member States introduce offences of incitement to racial and religious 
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violence, hatred or discrimination, as well as sentence enhancements for 
racially motivated offences (ECRI, 2002: paras IV.18, IV.21). It has 
recommended that Member States respond firmly to racial discrimination and 
misconduct on the part of the police (ECRI, 2007: para II) and ensure that the 
police investigate racist offences thoroughly (ECRI, 2007: paras III.11, 
III.14). It has also advocated the adoption of active measures by Member 
States to prevent discrimination, violence and harassment directed at Muslims 
(ECRI, 2000).   
 
The above international and European instruments oblige states to prevent, 
investigate and punish racially and religiously motivated crime and to 
eliminate racism on the part of the agents of criminal justice. Consequently, 
they are founded on an acknowledgement that private persons as well as 
public bodies perpetrate such offences. 
 
2.3 Homophobic and transphobic victimisation 
 
Contrary to gender-based and racially and religiously motivated victimisation, 
homophobic and transphobic victimisation has not received the attention of a 
specific international or European human rights instrument. However, the 
provisions of several general instruments extend protection to such 
victimisation. For example, article 7, read with article 2, of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (“ICCPR”) applies to all persons, 
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including LGBT persons. In terms of article 7, “no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. In terms 
of article 2.1, States Parties must ensure that the rights enshrined in the 
ICCPR are accorded to all persons without discrimination on the ground of 
sex, amongst other things. In Toonen v Australia (Communication No. 
488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994)), the Human Rights 
Committee (“HRC”) held that the protected ground of sex in article 2.1 
includes sexual orientation. It has also expressed the view that article 7 applies 
to acts causing both physical and mental harm (Human Rights Committee, 
1992: para 5).  The impact of homophobic and transphobic crime on victims 
may be both physical and mental (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 105-106). 
Accordingly, such crime constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment on 
the basis of sex, and contravenes article 7.   
 
According to the HRC, States Parties are under an obligation to protect all 
persons from the conduct mentioned in article 7, whether it emanates from 
public or private persons. This obligation requires that the conduct must be 
criminalised and that effective steps must be taken to prevent and punish it 
(Human Rights Committee, 1992: paras 2, 8). Amnesty International has 
argued that homophobic crime is an international human rights violation, 
which triggers the responsibility of the state (Amnesty International, 2001). 
Consequently, states have a duty to criminalise homophobic violence and 
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incitement to hatred against LGBT persons and to ensure that criminal justice 
agencies are trained appropriately (Amnesty International, 2001). 
 
The issue of homophobic victimisation has also received the attention of the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. It has voiced concern about the 
extent of such victimisation, and has recommended that ECRI’s mandate be 
broadened to encompass homophobia (Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly, 2000: paras 2, 11.ii) Furthermore, like all persons, LGBT persons 
fall within the purview of article 3 ECHR. Article 3, read with article 1, 
outlaws inhuman or degrading treatment and imposes a positive obligation on 
Member States to adopt measures ensuring that public and private persons do 
not treat vulnerable persons in an inhuman or degrading manner (A v UK 
(1999) 27 EHRR 611, para 22; see chapter 2). 
 
2.4 Elder abuse 
 
Elder abuse, which comprises victimisation of the elderly on account of their 
age, includes “… abuse and neglect in homes …” and residential institutions, 
as well as “… financial fraud and exploitation …” (Breaux & Hatch, 2003: 
208). It is not, per se, regulated by any enforceable international or European 
human rights instruments. At the international level, only the non-binding 
United Nations Principles for older persons (1991) pertain to older persons, in 
particular. Article 17 of the Principles provides that “… older persons should 
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be able to live in dignity and security and be free of exploitation and physical 
or mental abuse”. At the European level, article 23 of the Revised European 
Social Charter, which is binding, enshrines the “… right of elderly persons to 
social protection …” (Van Bueren, 2009: 3). However, it does not contain 
specific provisions concerning elder abuse, and is thus insufficient, on its 
own, to protect elderly victims.  
 
The non-binding Recommendation R (97) 13 makes provision for victims of 
elder abuse. It urges Member States to grant special protection to such victims 
(article 21), including special measures to facilitate the process of testifying 
and judicial supervision of the way in which witnesses are examined (articles 
27, 28). It also exhorts Member States to take steps to eliminate secondary 
victimisation at the hands of criminal justice agencies (article 23; see chapter 
3). 
 
While the above provisions (with the exception of the Revised European 
Social Charter) are not binding, the fundamental rights in binding instruments 
such as the ICCPR and the ECHR apply to all persons, including elderly 
victims. The right to life (article 6 ICCPR, article 2 ECHR) and the right to 
freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 7 
ICCPR, article 3 ECHR) are particularly relevant to the issue of elder abuse. 
Help the Aged has expressed the view that states have a positive duty to adopt 
measures to facilitate the effective exercise of these rights by elderly people 
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(Fitzgerald, 2006: 92).  For instance, the duty, pursuant to article 2 ECHR, to 
take reasonable steps “… to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which 
they have or ought to have knowledge” (Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245, 
para 116; see chapter 2) applies to an elderly victims in circumstances where 
the police know or ought to know that there is a real and immediate risk to 
his/her life by family members or care-givers.  Similarly, the decision in A v 
UK that article 1, read with article 3 ECHR, imposes a positive obligation on 
the state to make sure that vulnerable persons do not experience “… torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment …” at the hands of public or 
private persons (para 22) applies to victims of elder abuse, as does the state 
duty in article 7 ICCPR to prevent and punish cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing consensus on the part of the 
international human rights community that elder abuse is a human rights 
violation that merits specific attention. The erstwhile UN Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan, labelled elder abuse a violation of human rights (United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, 2002). The UN International Plan of Action 
adopted in Madrid in 2002 situated elder abuse within the framework of 
human rights (World Health Organization, 2002), recommending that states 
must enforce laws outlawing elder abuse and establish multi-agency strategies 
to respond to it (HelpAge International, 2002: 10). In 2009, the United 
Nations urged states to persist in “… their efforts to implement the Madrid 
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Plan of Action …” and to take heed of the importance of affording elderly 
people all human rights (United Nations, 2009).   
 
The International Network for the Prevention of Elder Abuse (INPEA) has 
been instrumental in generating this increase in international concern with 
elder abuse. Its objectives are to foster awareness of elder abuse and to call for 
the development of effective responses to it (Penhale, 2006: 166).  It received 
the status of a non-governmental organisation with the United Nations in 2003 
(Penhale, 2006: 168) and played a prominent role in the above Plan of Action. 
The work of the organisation, HelpAge International, has also drawn the 
attention of the international community to the issue of elder abuse.  
 
The INPEA and HelpAge International, in collaboration with other interested 
non-governmental organisations, have called for a United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Older Persons. They maintain that the instruments currently 
dealing with older persons, such as the Madrid Plan of Action, are not binding 
and are consequently ineffective, and that the protection afforded by the 
general conventions, such as the ICCPR, is insufficiently far-reaching 
(INPEA, et al, 2010: 3, 6). In a recent report, the UN Secretary-General has 
referred with approval to the possibility of introducing such a convention, 
stating that it would “… clarify and consolidate existing international norms 
with respect to the rights of older persons …” and “… provide the framework 
for national legislation” (United Nations General Assembly, 2009: para 62). 
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Speaking at a recent International Symposium on the Rights of Older People, 
Van Bueren has called for a European Convention on the Rights of Older 
Persons to “… protect the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
of older persons” (Van Bueren, 2009: 9) 
 
It remains to be seen whether the United Nations and the Council of Europe 
will respond to these calls. For the moment, however, while the non-binding 
instruments and the rights in general human rights instruments apply, in 
principle, to victims of elder abuse, in practice very few victims receive such 
rights-based protection. 
 
3. SOCIALLY DISADVANTAGED VICTIMS IN ENGLISH LAW AND 
POLICY 
 
This section evaluates the government’s responses to gender-based 
victimisation, racially and religiously motivated victimisation, homophobic 
and transphobic victimisation, and elder abuse against the backdrop of its 
international and European human rights obligations. It argues that, although, 
by and large, the government is complying with its obligations in regard to 
victims of rape and domestic violence, it is not responding adequately to 
victims who experience intersectional victimisation on the basis of gender, 
race and culture. In addition, the absence of enforceable rights for such 
 
 
 
 
 337 
victims is inconsonant with the state duties in the European Women’s 
Convention (see section 2.1 above; see also chapter 2). 
 
Furthermore, this section maintains that, in spite of the recent attempts of the 
government to prevent, investigate and punish racially and religiously 
motivated crime and to reduce secondary victimisation at the hands of 
criminal justice agencies, discriminatory attitudes and practices continue to 
exist. It also maintains that the current law and policy regarding victims of 
homophobic and transphobic crime fails to protect victims from the crimes 
themselves as well as from secondary victimisation by criminal justice 
agencies. Consequently, it argues that the UK government is falling short of 
its international and European obligations in regard to the prevention and 
punishment of these forms of victimisation.  
 
Finally, this section demonstrates that elder abuse is marginal to criminal law 
and criminal justice policy and that the UK is accordingly failing to align its 
domestic law and policy with the nascent international and European human 
rights discourse on elder abuse highlighted in section 2.4 above.  
 
3.1 Gender-based victimisation 
 
The coalition government’s response to gender-based violence, which is set 
out in its recent Call to end violence against women and girls: action plan 
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(HM Government, 2011a), and which builds on the strategy of its predecessor, 
Together we can end violence against women and girls (HM Government, 
2009), is founded on the need to comply with its international and European 
duties to prevent, investigate and punish gender-based violence, on the one 
hand, and to support, assist and empower victims, preventing secondary 
victimisation, on the other (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 235, 238). This section 
evaluates the extent to which current criminal justice law and policy, which is 
reflective of, or aspiring to fulfil, the aims of this strategy, does in fact comply 
with these international and European duties.   
 
3.1.1 Police and multi-agency services 
 
The police have devised several strategies to improve the rate of reported 
rapes and the quality of investigations (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 235-236). A 
number of forces have units specialising in rape cases. For instance, the MPS 
runs “Project Sapphire”, which is a unit in each borough of its jurisdiction 
comprising officers who are specially trained to investigate rape and to assist 
and support rape victims (Metropolitan Police Service, undated, Project 
Sapphire). In addition, all police forces have officers who are specially trained 
to deal with rape and sexual assault (HM Government, 2009: 65), and many 
have rape chaperones to support victims throughout the investigation 
(HMCPSI/HMIC, 2002: 24; Temkin, 2002: 274). Furthermore, the Forensic 
Science Service and ACPO have attempted to maximise the collection of 
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forensic evidence by introducing a “first response kit” for use in rape cases 
(Criminal Justice System, undated: 15).  
 
However, despite these signs of progress, a “culture of scepticism” persists 
(HMCPSI, 2007: 45), impeding the development of a uniformly sensitive 
response to rape victims. HMCPSI/HMIC has recommended that police 
training on the dynamics of rape must be reviewed to ensure that standards are 
improved and that appropriate services are given to victims across all police 
forces (HMCPSI/HMIC, 2002: 24). The coalition government has called for 
“... the development of learning programmes ...” for police on gender-based 
violence (HM Government, 2011a: 13). 
 
In a bid to enhance the provision of services to rape victims, the government 
has established Sexual Assault Referral Centres (“SARCs”) in several police 
areas. There are presently 30 SARCs across England and Wales, and an 
additional 15 are in the process of being established (Government Equalities 
Office, 2010a: 49). The Labour government pledged to ensure that each police 
area will have at least one SARC by 2011 (HM Government, 2009: 50).  
 
The objective of SARCs is to act as a comfortable and safe environment for 
rape victims to undergo forensic examinations, medical treatment and 
counselling. They are run jointly by the police, the health authorities and other 
statutory and non-statutory agencies, and thus constitute a multi-agency 
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partnership response to rape (ACPO, undated: 3, 6). They are staffed, where 
possible, by female forensic medical examiners, as well as nurses, counsellors 
or psychologists (ACPO, undated: 12-13). All staff must undergo specialist 
training that is appropriate to their respective capacities. HMCPSI/HMIC has 
pointed out that many forensic medical examiners are trained in general 
matters only, and has recommended, with government approval (Home 
Office, 2002a: 12), that they undergo rape-specific training (HMCPSI/HMIC, 
2002: 7). Despite this recommendation, the recent Stern Review documented 
the persistence of problems with forensic services, such as the difficulty of 
finding female forensic medical examiners and the lack of rape-specific 
training (Government Equalities Office, 2010a: 64). It recommended that the 
government should ensure that “... more appropriate accreditation ...” for 
forensic medical examiners is introduced, and that all victims are able to 
choose a male or female examiner (Government Equalities Office, 2010a: 66). 
The coalition government has endorsed this recommendation (HM 
Government, 2011b: 14-15). 
 
The government has also introduced Independent Sexual Violence Advisors 
(“ISVAs”) to work with victims of rape and sexual assault throughout the pre-
trial and trial process as well as thereafter (Ellison, 2007: 708). ISVAs exist 
“... in 38 areas in England and Wales” (Reeves & Dunn, 2010: 63) and the 
coalition government has pledged funds to “... provide for 86 ISVA posts 
across the country based on Home Office funding alone” (HM Government, 
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2011a: 15). Although many ISVAs work in SARCs, several also work in 
voluntary organisations dealing with rape (CPS, 2009b: para 7.30). As 
professionally trained rape specialists, ISVAs provide a vital link between 
victims and victim support organisations, facilitating the coordination of 
victim safety throughout all agencies (CPS, 2009b: para 7.30). The recent 
Stern Review revealed “... unanimous praise for the work done by ISVAs ...”, 
recommending that they should be viewed as central to the services to rape 
victims (Government Equalities Office, 2010a: 103, 106).  
 
The multi-agency approach to rape is matched by a multi-agency approach to 
domestic violence (Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 238-241). On the one hand, the 
police have adopted a policy of rigorously policing domestic violence. Police 
are required to investigate all domestic violence reports (ACPO, 2008a). All 
police forces have introduced a pro-arrest policy (Home Office, 2003b: 14), in 
terms of which the police are encouraged to arrest the perpetrator against the 
victim’s wishes, if necessary. Hoyle and Sanders have argued that pro-arrest 
policies negate the agency of victims by assuming that they are incapable of 
making effective choices and that the police and policy makers are better 
placed to act in their best interests (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000: 19).  In their 
view, victims should be “… empowered to make the choices which are most 
likely to lead to an end to the violence …” and pro-arrest policies do not 
always lead to this result (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000: 30). Nevertheless, the 
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pursuit of such policies is undoubtedly preferable to the previous hesitation of 
the police to become involved in domestic violence incidents.  
 
Along with the rigorous pro-arrest policies of the police, the DVCVA 
represents an attempt to “crack down” on domestic violence. In terms of s.1, a 
breach of a molestation order, which previously constituted contempt of court 
(Burton, 2003: 302), is criminalised and may be prosecuted irrespective of 
whether or not the victim consents (Bessant, 2005: 16).  In terms of s.10, 
common assault is made an arrestable offence under the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, freeing the police from having to apply for a warrant to 
arrest a perpetrator of domestic violence. Section 12 provides that a court may 
impose a restraining order where a perpetrator is convicted of any offence 
(Bessant, 2005: 25-26), and also where s/he is acquitted, if the court deems it 
necessary in order to “… to protect a person from harassment by the 
defendant” (s.12(5)). In terms of s.5, causing or allowing the death of a child 
or a vulnerable adult is made a new offence. The offence is aimed at cases 
which do not amount to the offences of murder or manslaughter, thereby 
facilitating the prosecution of deaths caused in domestic violence 
circumstances.   
 
Recent reform signifies a move to enhance the tough approach to domestic 
violence contained in the DVCVA. ACPO recommended that the police 
should be permitted to impose a “… Domestic Violence Protection Order (or 
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notice) …” for up to 14 days, in order to prevent a suspected perpetrator from 
entering the victim’s premises or contacting the victim (ACPO, 2009: 53).  
 
In response, the Crime and Security Act 2010 (“CSA”) provides that a police 
officer of the rank of superintendent or higher may issue a domestic violence 
protection notice if s/he has reasonable grounds to believe that the suspected 
perpetrator “… has been violent towards, or has threatened violence towards 
…” the victim and that it is necessary to issue the notice to protect the victim 
from such violence or threat of violence (s.24). The notice must prohibit the 
suspected perpetrator from molesting the victim, and may also, amongst other 
things, prohibit him/her from evicting the victim or entering the victim’s 
premises. If the police have issued such a notice, a constable must apply to a 
court for a domestic violence protection order within 48 hours of the service 
of the notice on the suspected perpetrator (s.27).  
 
The court may impose such an order if it is of the view, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the defendant “… has been violent towards, or has 
threatened violence towards …” the victim and that it is necessary to impose 
the order to protect the victim from such violence or threat of violence (s.28). 
The provisions concerning the content of the order are the same as those 
concerning the content of the notice (s.28(6); s.28(8)).  
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These provisions usher in a new dispensation in which the choice of the 
victim to apply for a protection order is supplanted by the power of the police. 
Consequently, while they represent a tougher stance to domestic violence, 
they are open to criticism for undermining the autonomy of victims.    
 
The governmental “crackdown” on domestic violence represented by pro-
arrest policies and tough domestic violence legislation is supplemented by a 
focus on attaining best practice in the support and assistance of victims. All 
forces receive training in domestic violence and most forces have Domestic 
Violence Units (“DVUs”), whose function is not only to investigate domestic 
violence, but also to support and assist victims (Home Office, 2003b: 25). For 
instance, the Thames Valley Police DVU has specially trained Domestic 
Violence Officers who aim to ensure the provision of a victim-centred, 
professional service that meets victims’ needs (Domestic Violence Forum, 
Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead, undated). Members of the DVU 
contact all victims by telephone or post, and will meet them in person, if 
necessary. If a victim reports an incident, it is “... formally recorded and 
investigated ...” and the DVU liaises with the CPS concerning the prosecution 
(Domestic Violence Forum, Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead, 
undated). However, the approach of Domestic Violence Officers differs from 
unit to unit. While some emphasise prosecution, others focus on supporting 
victims (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000: 28). Hoyle and Sanders note that some 
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officers assist victims significantly, empowering them to adopt courses of 
action aimed at terminating the violence (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000: 30). 
 
Over and above their independent work with victims, the police are becoming 
increasingly active in multi-agency partnerships. Many Community Safety 
Partnerships (“CSPs”, formerly known as CDRPs, which were established by 
the CDA) and Community Safety Units (“CSUs”) engage in domestic 
violence work (Home Office, 2003b: 12; Hall, 2005: 173). In addition, Multi-
Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (“MARACs”) have burgeoned in 
recent years. MARACs are multi-agency meetings focusing “... on the safety 
of high-risk domestic violence victims ...” in order to “... devise a risk 
management plan to reduce the harms faced by the victim and their families” 
(HM Government, 2009: 73). There are currently 225 MARACs across 
England and Wales, and the government has committed funds to their growth 
and expansion (HM Government, 2011a: 15).  
 
Independent Domestic Violence Advisors (“IDVAs”) constitute one of the 
central figures in MARACs as well as in Specialised Domestic Violence 
Courts (“SDVCs”; see section 3.1.3 below). IDVAs are specially trained to 
work with high risk victims and research has shown that their work has led to 
less victims refusing to participate in prosecutions (HM Government, 2009: 
49). There are currently more than 700 IDVAs in England and Wales, and the 
 
 
 
 
 346 
government has committed itself to the provision of “stable” funding for them 
(HM Government, 2011a: 15).    
 
Hoyle and Sanders emphasise the importance of multi-agency work as a 
supplement to a pro-arrest policy in order to ensure that domestic violence is 
dealt with effectively (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000: 30). However, research by 
Welsh has shown that many multi-agency initiatives are poorly attended by 
criminal justice agencies, and that they frequently “... focus on ‘joint-talking’ 
rather than on ‘joint-working’ ...” (Welsh, 2008: 171, 173). Even where work 
is being done, it tends to be restricted to the evaluation and development of 
policy rather than the provision of services “... to individual women and their 
children” (Welsh, 2008: 173).  
 
3.1.2 Crown Prosecution Service 
 
The CPS has made a commitment to the rigorous pursuit of rape and domestic 
violence prosecutions and the sensitive treatment of victims (see Wolhuter, et 
al, 2009: 236-237, 239). It has specialist rape prosecutors in each CPS area 
who are required, in principle, to have training and experience in the 
prosecution of rape and sexual assault (CPS, 2009b: para 3.6). In pursuance of 
a joint protocol between the police and the CPS, these specialist prosecutors 
“... work closely with the police” and assume responsibility for a particular 
case throughout the criminal process (CPS, 2009b: paras 3.5, 3.7). The CPS 
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also has Area rape co-ordinators who function to ensure the local 
implementation of “... national initiatives and legislative changes ...” 
(HMCPSI, 2007: 94). Despite these efforts, however, the CPS has been 
criticised for failing to ensure that all specialist prosecutors and Area rape co-
ordinators have attained an appropriate standard of training and experience 
(HMCPSI, 2007: 94-95). The CPS has committed itself to ensuring that such 
specialists will receive sufficient training (HM Government, 2011a: 20).  
 
The CPS has evinced a commitment to instruct barristers with skills that are 
appropriate to rape cases, and to require them to speak to victims before they 
testify (CPS, 2009b: para 7.24). In addition, it is negotiating with the Bar 
Council to make it mandatory for barristers to receive training in the dynamics 
of rape, including “... the ‘softer’ skills of dealing with victims ...”, thereby 
introducing a system of “.... counsel accreditation for rape” (HMCPSI, 2007: 
134).  
 
In an attempt to decrease the rate of attrition, the CPS has adopted a rigorous 
pro-prosecution policy, stating that, provided that the test of evidential 
sufficiency is satisfied, “... rape is so serious that a prosecution is almost 
certainly required in the public interest” (CPS, 2009b: para 4.5). If the CPS 
decides not to prosecute or to drop or alter the charges, it is required, in terms 
of the Victims’ Code, to offer to meet victims of sexual offences unless it 
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takes the view that the circumstances are of such a nature that a meeting ought 
not to take place (see chapter 3). 
    
If the CPS decides to prosecute and the victim withdraws her complaint or no 
longer wishes to testify, it will consider the other evidence, as well as the 
interests of the victim, and may decide to pursue the prosecution without 
requiring the victim’s testimony, if it has enough other evidence (CPS, 2009b: 
para 5.15). If the CPS believes the victim’s testimony is necessary, it will 
consider the possibility that a court may admit her statement as hearsay 
evidence (see chapter 3), which will obviate the need for oral evidence. 
However, it has emphasised the difficulty of convincing a court to permit 
hearsay evidence in cases where the victim is the only witness (CPS, 2009b: 
para 5.18). HMCPSI has criticised the CPS for failing to consider the prospect 
of requesting the court to admit hearsay evidence in sufficient cases 
(HMCPSI, 2007: 115).  
 
The CPS will only compel an unwilling victim to testify if the specialist rape 
prosecutor, having consulted “... the police and any other interested person 
...”, is of the view that it is necessary to do so (CPS, 2009b: para 5.19). 
Consequently, while the CPS is committed to a rigorous pro-prosecution 
policy, it aims to avoid forcing unwilling victims to testify wherever possible. 
However, the practical feasibility of this commitment to respecting victims’ 
wishes is difficult to determine, particularly in view of the dearth of sufficient 
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additional evidence in many rape cases. In such cases, the CPS will continue 
to be constrained to force victims to testify or to drop prosecutions, thereby 
increasing the rate of attrition.    
 
Until recently, prosecutors were not permitted to interview witnesses prior to 
the trial as the coaching of witnesses is prohibited (Ellison, 2007: 699). 
However, pre-trial witness interviews have been introduced recently to enable 
the CPS to gauge the strength of the evidence in order to make more informed 
decisions whether or not to prosecute (Ellison, 2007: 702). In terms of the 
Code of Practice regulating pilot projects using pre-trial witness interviews, 
such interviews were to be used for vulnerable witnesses in “exceptional 
cases” only (DPP, 2005: para 9.2). However, rape and sexual assault cases 
accounted for more than a third of pre-trial witness interview pilots (Roberts 
& Saunders, 2008: 835), and it is therefore likely that such cases will continue 
to constitute a prominent feature of pre-trial witness interviews. Nonetheless, 
as the aim of such interviews is the facilitation of prosecutorial decision-
making rather than victim assistance, their benefits for rape victims are likely 
to be limited.    
 
Like its rape policy, the CPS domestic violence policy is premised on the 
vigorous pursuit of prosecutions as well as the sensitive treatment of victims. 
It has specialist domestic violence prosecutors (HM Government, 2009: 65), 
as well as domestic violence coordinators in every CPS Area who “… work 
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with other agencies to implement [CPS] policy, address problems, identify 
and share good practice, and … attend multi-agency meetings” (CPS, 2009a: 
para 3.12). All prosecutors receive training in domestic violence (Home 
Office, 2003b: 27). 
 
The CPS has adopted a positive prosecution policy, stating that it will “almost 
always” prosecute domestic violence cases if the evidential sufficiency test is 
satisfied and the victim is prepared to testify (CPS, 2009a: para 6.4). It will 
also pursue prosecutions even if the victim withdraws his/her complaint or is 
not willing to testify. If it has enough other evidence, it may decide to 
prosecute without compelling the victim to testify (CPS, 2009a: para 5.18). 
However, such cases are likely to be rare, as police investigations frequently 
yield insufficient other evidence (Ellison, 2003: 765).  
 
While some police forces have attempted to enhance their methods of 
gathering evidence, introducing novel measures, such as the use of cameras to 
document victims’ injuries, most forces are nonetheless unable to gather 
enough independent evidence (Ellison, 2003: 765-766). Consequently, in the 
majority of domestic violence cases, the victim’s statement is the only 
evidence (Ellison, 2002: 836-837), which precludes a prosecution without the 
victim giving evidence. In such cases, where the victim’s evidence is 
necessary, the CPS policy regarding the use of hearsay evidence, special 
measures and the circumstances in which it will compel victims to testify 
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parallels its rape policy (see CPS, 2009a: paras 5.19, 5.20, 5.24). In addition, 
some prosecutors use pre-trial witness interviews in domestic violence cases 
to attempt to reverse “a witness retraction” (Roberts & Saunders, 2008: 835).  
 
Despite its stated policy, however, the CPS is reluctant in practice to compel 
unwilling victims to testify (Ellison, 2002: 834). Therefore, victim withdrawal 
or refusal to testify will continue to result in decisions not to prosecute in 
many cases. However, as Hoyle and Sanders contend, criminal justice 
interventions in domestic violence incidents ought to aim to terminate the 
violence rather than rigidly pursue prosecutions (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000: 32). 
Provided that they function effectively, multi-agency interventions not 
involving prosecution may be more capable of achieving this aim in cases 
where victims are unwilling to pursue charges (see section 3.1.1 above).   
 
3.1.3 Court process 
 
Chapter 3 evaluated procedures aimed at the reduction of secondary 
victimisation in rape trials, including special measures, the prohibition of 
cross-examination by the defendant in person, and restrictions on the 
admission of sexual history evidence. The chapter maintained that, while 
these procedures have ameliorated victims’ negative experiences of the court 
process, they are unable to remove secondary victimisation entirely. In order 
to ensure the most effective empowerment of rape victims, chapter 4 
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advocated the introduction of auxiliary prosecutors or victims’ lawyers. In the 
absence of such measures, secondary victimisation will persist and rape 
victims will continue to be unwilling to testify, thereby increasing the rate of 
attrition.    
 
The possible adherence to rape myths and gender stereotypes on the part of 
the jury is also cause for concern. In light of the prohibition on direct research 
concerning the manner in which juries reach their decisions (see s.8 Contempt 
of Court Act 1981), it is not possible to gauge the extent to which jurors do 
adhere to such myths and stereotypes. However, research using a simulated 
jury has demonstrated the impact of gender stereotypes on jurors’ decisions 
(see Finch & Munro, 2005: 35-36).  
 
In particular, Ellison and Munro found that mock jurors were significantly 
more reluctant to convict in simulated trials involving complainants who 
showed no signs of physical injury (Ellison & Munro, 2009a: 206). Mock 
jurors also displayed confusion in cases where complainants failed to show 
emotion while testifying (Ellison & Munro, 2009a: 211). Research such as 
this signifies the persistence of stereotypical beliefs that rape is inevitably 
accompanied by force and that lack of emotion while testifying is indicative 
of falsity. HMCPSI/HMIC has recommended that prosecutors should be 
trained to present evidence and information to the jury in a way that averts 
reliance on rape myths and stereotypes (HMCPSI/HMIC, 2002: 12). 
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Interestingly, however, the Stern Review has pointed out that the jury 
conviction rate for rape cases is higher than that for attempted murder 
(Government Equalities Office, 2010a: 91). Consequently, juror adherence to 
rape myths and stereotypes may be less than the above research on mock 
jurors suggests.  
 
Reliance on rape myths and gender stereotypes on the part of the judiciary is 
an additional source of secondary victimisation (see chapter 2). In order to 
alleviate the influence of such myths and stereotypes, judicial training 
programmes run by the Judicial Studies Board contain a section on violence 
against women and sexual offences (Equal Treatment Advisory Committee, 
2010). Furthermore, rape cases are currently allocated to “ticketed” judges 
who have received prior approval as possessing the requisite expertise 
(HMCPSI, 2007: 134). Such “ticketed” judges are required, once in “every 
three years”, to “... attend a three-day course which covers topics such as rape 
trauma, medical and forensic science, and legal and procedural issues” 
(Government Equalities Office, 2010a: 93). However, there are insufficient 
“ticketed” judges in some areas, leading to delays in the hearing of cases 
(HMCPSI, 2007: 134).   
 
A further source of secondary victimisation has been the subject of recent 
reform proposals by the government. Research has shown that many victims 
of rape experience post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) or rape trauma 
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syndrome (“RTS”). In the absence of knowledge about this disorder, judges 
and jurors may regard behaviour on the part of complainants, such as late 
reporting, oversights in evidence, and the inability to answer certain 
questions, as signifying fabrication or lack of credibility (Criminal Justice 
System, 2006: 16). In a bid to prevent such responses, the government has 
proposed the enactment of legislation permitting expert testimony on PTSD or 
RTS (Criminal Justice System, 2006: 19-20). However, these proposals have 
provoked stringent criticism from the judiciary, amongst others (Ellison & 
Munro, 2009a: 214), and the government has not yet indicated whether it 
plans to pursue them (Ellison & Munro, 2009b: 364). 
 
Reforms to alleviate the secondary victimisation of domestic violence victims 
at court have taken a different direction from reforms in rape trials. In 2003, 
SDVCs were piloted in five areas, including Leeds, Wolverhampton and West 
London (Home Office, 2003b: 28-29; Walklate, 2008: 42-43). In view of their 
reported success in improving victims’ experiences of the court process (CPS, 
2007-2008) the number of SDVCs has increased significantly. In 2009, there 
were 127 SDVCs in England and Wales (HM Government, 2009: 67). The 
coalition government has stated that it intends to facilitate the expansion of 
SDVCs (HM Government, 2011a: 30). 
 
SDVCs constitute a multi-agency strategy for responding to domestic 
violence victims, comprising partnerships between “... police, prosecutors, 
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court staff, the probation service, local authorities and specialist support 
services” (HM Government, 2009: 67). Although they are not housed in 
separate court buildings, cases involving domestic violence are grouped 
together on a specific day or are “fast-tracked” through the criminal process, 
and there are “... separate entrances, exits and waiting areas ...” to preclude 
contact between victims and defendants (CPS, 2009a: para 14.1). 
Furthermore, victims are supported and advised by IDVAs and all prosecutors 
and magistrates have received domestic violence training (CPS, 2009a: para 
14.1). Consequently, support and assistance for victims is more effective 
(Eley, 2005: 114), complex cases are more able to receive specialised 
attention and magistrates are more easily able to order perpetrators to be “fast-
tracked” to rehabilitation programmes for domestic violence perpetrators 
(Eley, 2005: 115). In addition, they are able to impose more consistent 
sentences than ordinary courts (Eley, 2005: 114). 
 
However, research has demonstrated that magistrates in SDVCs permit the 
importance of keeping families together to influence their sentencing 
decisions in much the same way as magistrates in ordinary courts. While 
magistrates in SDVCs are more willing to order custody for defendants who 
are still in a relationship with the victim in the case of serious injuries, they 
seem to be unwilling to separate these families for long periods, giving such 
defendants shorter sentences than those defendants who have also inflicted 
serious injuries but are separated from their families (Dinovitzer & Dawson, 
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2007: 666). Such reluctance highlights the importance of more training for 
magistrates in the dynamics of domestic violence in order to enable them to 
place the safety of victims above familial ideology.  
 
The foregoing analysis has shown that, despite the fact that the response of 
criminal justice agencies to rape and domestic violence victims has improved 
considerably, secondary victimisation persists, and the fear thereof continues 
to result in a high rate of attrition. In order to discharge its duty to prevent, 
investigate and punish rape, the government must ensure the wholesale 
translation of its stated commitment to eradicating secondary victimisation 
into the practical reality of the criminal justice process.  As regards domestic 
violence, however, the fact that prosecution rates are low is not necessarily 
open to criticism, as prosecution is not invariably in victims’ interests, 
particularly in cases where they are reluctant to testify. Consequently, the 
government’s duty in such cases is arguably to respect victims’ right to self-
determination rather than to pursue prosecutions rigidly. 
  
3.1.4 Minority ethnic victims of domestic violence 
 
Despite the government’s broad compliance with its international and 
European duties concerning domestic violence, it is failing to discharge these 
duties in regard to minority ethnic victims (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 241-
242). A contextual analysis of the lived realities of minority ethnic women 
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reveals that they are embedded within a complex matrix of social relations in 
which cultural concepts of appropriate womanhood intersect with racism and 
social exclusion on the part of the white community to impede the reporting 
of domestic violence (see chapter 2). Accordingly, victims are less likely to 
report their experiences of victimisation than their white counterparts (Home 
Office, 2003b: 55; Sundari & Gill, 2009: 174). 
 
While the government has taken cognisance of the fact that minority ethnic 
victims may be hesitant to report due to cultural concepts of shame (Home 
Office, 2003b: 55), it has yet to recognise or address the impact of fear of 
institutional racism on the reporting rates of domestic violence. The CPS has 
emphasised that minority ethnic victims may have experienced racism at the 
hands of criminal justice agencies, which may deter them from reporting 
offences (CPS, 2009a: para 1.14), but has not devised a policy to address such 
experiences. In addition, research has shown that SDVCs with high rates of 
successful prosecutions are located in areas with small minority ethnic 
communities, and that very few measures are in place to support victims from 
such communities. It has also demonstrated that SDVCs with lower levels of 
successful prosecutions have higher numbers of defendants from minority 
ethnic communities, which indicates “... a need for a focus on equality and 
diversity ...” (CPS, 2007-2008). Despite the fact that such inadequacies are 
noted, no measures have been taken to enhance the quality of criminal justice 
responses to minority ethnic victims. 
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However, recent criminal justice policy includes a focus on offences 
committed in the name of honour. ACPO has devised a strategy to respond to 
honour based violence (ACPO, 2008b), and the CPS has expressed its 
commitment to prosecuting perpetrators of such violence “... with the full 
force of the law” (CPS, 2009a, 1.15). The CPS is running a pilot scheme in 
terms of which cases of honour based violence are tracked and specially 
trained prosecutors are assigned to prosecute perpetrators (ACPO, 2008b: para 
6.12.2). A concerted response to honour based violence is to be welcomed. 
Nevertheless, a focus on such violence without an accompanying focus on the 
full spectrum of domestic violence in minority ethnic communities is open to 
criticism for failing to address the “continuum of violence” that minority 
ethnic women experience daily (see Spalek, 2006: 58). 
 
Over and above cultural, gendered and racist constraints, immigrant victims of 
domestic violence face an additional institutional impediment to the reporting 
of domestic violence. Women who enter the UK on a spousal visa by virtue of 
their marriage to a British citizen or permanent resident are required to remain 
in the relationship for a minimum of two years before becoming eligible to 
apply for indefinite leave to remain in the UK and hence avoid the threat of 
deportation (Chana, 2005: 25). Therefore, until recently, victims of domestic 
violence who left their abuser were vulnerable to deportation.  
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However, the Labour government introduced a concessionary rule, in terms of 
which a victim is eligible for settlement in the UK if she is able to prove that 
she left her partner on account of domestic violence (Home Office, 2003b: 
45). This concession, albeit theoretically able to enhance the position of 
immigrant victims, is insufficiently far-reaching in practice. Such victims are 
subject to the “no recourse to public funds” rule, which disqualifies them from 
access to any state benefits while they are pursuing their application for 
permission to remain indefinitely (Home Office, 2003b: 45). Accordingly, 
victims are exposed to the danger of destitution until their immigration status 
has been finalised.  
 
In a bid to address this situation, the Labour government announced a three-
month pilot scheme providing a maximum of “... 40 days’ accommodation 
and living support ...” to such victims while their applications for permission 
to remain indefinitely are being finalised (HM Government, 2009: 52). The 
coalition government extended this scheme until March 2011 (Southall Black 
Sisters, undated). Fortunately, this limited assistance will be replaced in April 
2012 by the provision of state benefits to such victims (HM Government, 
2011a: 16).  
 
The foregoing analysis has highlighted the dual disadvantage faced by 
minority ethnic victims of domestic violence. Both domestic violence law and 
policy and race relations law and policy (see section 3.2 below) fail to address 
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fully their lived realities of domestic violence. Consequently, they experience 
intersectional discrimination which causes them to fall through the cracks of 
both anti-sexist and anti-racist legal interventions (Crenshaw, 1993a: 385; see 
chapter 1). 
 
3.2 Racially and religiously motivated victimisation 
 
 This section considers the extent to which government policy regarding 
racially and religiously motivated crime is in keeping with its international 
and European human rights obligations (see section 2.2 above). It documents 
reforms to the substantive criminal law as well as the criminal justice process, 
highlighting the extent to which discriminatory attitudes and practices have 
survived the advent of such reforms. 
 
3.2.1 Racially and religiously motivated offences 
 
As the present author has documented elsewhere (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 
244-246), substantive racially and religously motivated offences have been 
introduced incrementally in English law. The Public Order Act 1986 (“POA”) 
criminalises incitement to racial hatred. Pursuant to s.18(1), a person commits 
an offence if s/he uses “… words or behaviour …” or displays material, which 
are “… threatening, abusive or insulting …”, if s/he has the intention “… to 
stir up racial hatred …” or if such hatred “… is likely to be stirred up …” in 
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the circumstances. Before a prosecution may be brought, the Attorney 
General’s consent is required (CPS, 2010b: 13). Few prosecutions have been 
brought for this offence, regardless of the fact that it has been in existence for 
many years (Hall, 2005: 123). 
 
Within the context of the growing equation of Islam and terrorism after 
September 11 (McGhee, 2005: 99), controversy surrounded the attempts of 
the government to introduce an offence of incitement to religious hatred. A 
majority of the House of Lords excluded clause 39 of the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Bill 2001, which contained such an offence, from the final 
text of the Bill (McGhee, 2005: 102). A storm also accompanied the next 
attempt to introduce such an offence in the Religious Offences Bill 2002 
(McGhee, 2005: 115-116). 
 
The government finally succeeded in introducing an offence of incitement to 
religious hatred in terms of the RRHA 2006, which inserted s.29B into the 
POA. Section 29B creates an offence of using “… threatening words or 
behaviour …” or displaying threatening material with the intention of stirring 
up “religious hatred”. The offence is committed whether it takes place in 
public or private, unless the person is inside a dwelling and is not seen or 
heard by anyone outside the dwelling (s.29B(2)). Section 29A defines 
“religious hatred” as “… hatred against a group of persons defined by 
reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief”. Unlike the offence of 
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inciting racial hatred, the offence of inciting religious hatred must be 
accompanied by an intention to do so. Unless the defendant confesses, it will 
be almost impossible to prove the existence of such an intention, which 
detracts from the enforceability of the offence (Goodall, 2007: 113). In 
addition, the Attorney General must consent to the bringing of a prosecution. 
In light of the political nature of his office, political considerations may 
impede the institution of prosecutions (McGhee, 2005: 107-109).   
 
While the offences of incitement to racial and religious hatred demonstrate the 
government’s concern to outlaw such conduct, the limited number of 
prosecutions that are likely to ensue, or to be successful, augurs ill for the 
protection of victims. In order to ensure an effective response, the government 
must develop strategies that go beyond criminalisation, such as education 
programmes and checks on media stereotyping (see Hall, 2005: 230-231), to 
eradicate discriminatory social attitudes and practices.  
 
The UK has also introduced racially and religiously aggravated offences.  A 
range of such offences are contained in s.28 to s.32 of the CDA (as amended 
by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001). In terms of s.28(1), a 
“… racially or religiously aggravated …” offence is one (a) where the 
defendant, “… at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before 
or after doing so …”, shows hostility towards the victims on the basis of “… 
the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious 
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group …” or one (b) that is completely or partly motivated “… by hostility 
towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of 
that group”. While a racial group is defined with regard “… to race, colour, 
nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins” (s.28(4)), a 
religious group is defined with regard “… to religious belief or lack of 
religious belief” (s.28(5)).   
 
A number of offences, namely assault occasioning bodily harm, assault with 
the intention to do grievous bodily harm, common assault, criminal damage to 
property and certain offences involving public order and harassment (ss.29-
32) may be aggravated on the basis of race or religion. A conviction of any of 
these aggravated offences is subject to an enhanced sentence. In terms of s.82 
(which is reproduced in s.153 of the PCCSA and contained almost to the letter 
in s.145 of the CJA 2003), racial or religious aggravation that accompanies 
offences falling outside the ambit s.29 to s.32 must be treated as an 
aggravating factor and presiding officers must indicate in open court that this 
is the case. 
 
Critics have contended that, in view of their breadth, racially and religiously 
aggravated offences capture “… low-level, surface racist incidents …” rather 
than “… deep-seated ideological hatred …” (McGhee, 2005: 30). However, 
such criticism overlooks the reality that racially and religiously motivated 
victimisation frequently constitutes an “… ongoing pattern of harassment and 
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violence …” which spans “low-level harassment” as well as serious assaults 
(Phillips & Sampson, 1998: 126-127), and which is more likely to be 
committed by “ordinary” people than by right-wing extremists (Iganski & 
Levin, 2004: 119; Garland & Chakraborti, 2006: 65). Consequently, offences 
that have a broad ambit mirror the reality of racially or religiously motivated 
victimisation more accurately than offences that are narrowly construed. 
 
However, concern has been expressed that, regardless of their breadth, these 
offences do not result in successful prosecutions. Research has revealed a high 
rate of attrition for racially and religiously aggravated offences, with only 
42,600 such offences being recorded by police in 2006, as against “… 
184,000 racially motivated incidents …” being reported by respondents in the 
2006/2007 British Crime Survey. Furthermore, of these recorded offences, 
“… only 11,500 charges of racially aggravated offending were prosecuted …” 
in 2006, and a mere 5,166 convictions ensued (Gadd, 2009: 757).  
 
Reasons for this high attrition rate include the low rate of reporting and poor 
relations between victims and the police (Malik, 1999: 412). In addition, the 
difficulty of proving the presence of racial hostility or racial motive 
encourages prosecutors to charge perpetrators with the basic offence rather 
than the aggravated one, to facilitate successful prosecutions (Burney, 2003: 
31). Consequently, defendants may not only receive lighter sentences, but 
may be freed from the stigma of a conviction for a racially motivated offence. 
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Likewise, the difficulty of proving religious hostility or religious motive may 
cause defendants to be charged with basic offences rather than religiously 
aggravated ones (Idriss, 2002: 908). Dangers such as these necessitate police 
and prosecutorial training in order to strengthen the confidence of minority 
ethnic communities in the commitment of criminal justice agencies to the 
policing and prosecution of racially and religiously motivated victimisation 
(Iganski, 1999: 392; see sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 below for a discussion of 
such training programmes). 
 
3.2.2 Police and multi-agency partnerships 
 
In the aftermath of the MacPherson Inquiry (MacPherson, 1999), which 
charged the MPS with institutional racism, several reforms designed to 
improve the responses of the police to racially motivated victimisation were 
introduced (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 246-248). Likewise, the growing 
institutionalisation of Islamophobia documented by the Commission on 
British Muslims and Islamophobia (McGhee, 2005: 99) generated a concern 
on the part of the police to transform their responses to anti-Muslim 
victimisation.   
 
ACPO has introduced principles of good practice for policing hate crime, 
including racially and religiously motivated crime (ACPO, 2005: para 2.2.8). 
Like the MacPherson Inquiry (MacPherson, 1999), it defines a racist incident 
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as “… any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other 
person” (ACPO, 2005: para 2.3.2; Mason, 2005: 842-843). Similarly, it 
defines a faith based incident as “… any incident which is perceived to be 
based upon prejudice towards or hatred of the faith of the victim or so 
perceived by the victim or any other person” (ACPO, 2005: para 2.3.5).   
 
ACPO has underlined the duty of the police to avoid secondary victimisation 
in their responses to reports of such incidents (ACPO, 2005: para 2.5.1). 
Attendance at the scene of an incident must be made mandatory and a 
“positive arrest” policy must be adopted (ACPO, 2005: para 6.2.1). 
Furthermore, victims must be treated sensitively (ACPO, 2005: para 5.1.6). 
Third party reporting measures, such as reporting sites at places of worship 
and community centres, must be used in order to encourage reporting (ACPO, 
2005: para 5.3). Victims must be accorded appropriate services (ACPO, 2005: 
paras 6.2, 6.3), such as interviewing officers from the same ethnic group and 
visits by trained Crime Prevention Officers (ACPO, 2005: para 6.3.1). 
Witnesses must be given pre-court familiarisation visits and must be 
accompanied to court on the day of the trial (ACPO, 2005: para 11.4.1).   
 
In addition, ACPO has encouraged the consolidation and development of 
multi-agency approaches to victim services and support, recommending that 
the police form relationships with local organisations, such as Victim Support, 
and statutory as well as community agencies (ACPO, 2005: para 6.3.1). In its 
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view, the statutory CSUs, acting in tandem with other agencies, such as 
housing and education authorities, are central to the provision of “… medium 
to long-term support …” for victims (ACPO, 2005: para 7.3.7). Multi-Agency 
Panels, whose functions include responding to racially and religiously 
motivated crimes, have been established in many parts of England and Wales 
(Bennetto, 2009: 34). 
 
As the immediate object of the strictures of the MacPherson Inquiry 
(MacPherson, 1999), the MPS has striven to reform its treatment of victims to 
comply with ACPO’s principles of best practice. It has introduced a hate 
crime policy that employs the MacPherson definition of a racist incident 
(Mason, 2005: 842-843; see above) as well as a victim-centred definition of 
religious hate crime (MPS, undated, Hate crime policy). It has developed a 
“Diversity Strategy” aimed at improving its response to racially motivated 
victimisation, supporting victims more sensitively, and eradicating 
institutional racism (Hall, 2005: 172).  It has established CSUs to protect and 
support victims of hate crimes, amongst other things (Hall, 2005: 177).  In 
addition, it has introduced a “Hate Crime Victim Charter”, which sets out the 
services that CSUs must provide to victims as well as other information 
concerning support for victims (Hall, 2005: 187).   
 
CSUs are not restricted to the London Metropolitan area. Suffolk County 
Council’s multi-agency Racial Harassment Initiative falls within the local 
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CSU (Jalota, 2004: 145). It supports victims through the provision of 
interpretation and translation facilities, counselling, a telephone helpline and 
pre-trial assistance (Jalota, 2004: 148-149). It acts collaboratively with the 
Suffolk CSPs, which has enhanced its victim support work (Jalota, 2004: 
152).   
 
Research has revealed that these police and multi-agency strategies have had 
some beneficial consequences. For example, the police recording and 
treatment of racially and religiously motivated hate incidents has improved in 
the aftermath of the MacPherson Inquiry (Chakraborti, 2007: 114; Editorial, 
2005: 900; Bennetto, 2009: 33-34). However, beliefs on the part of individual 
victims as well as minority ethnic and faith communities that the police are 
insensitive and indifferent continue to exist.  
 
In view of research indicating that police stops and searches are being directed 
even more disproportionately at members of minority ethnic communities in 
the period after the MacPherson Inquiry (Davie, 2007: 89), these beliefs may 
be well-founded. Between 2001 and 2002-2003, in the aftermath of 
September 11, stops and searches of Asian persons increased by nearly 400 
per cent (Mythen, et al, 2009: 738). Between July 2003 and July 2004, they 
increased by more than 300 per cent (McGhee, 2005: 99). Between 2004-2005 
and 2005-2006, the number of stops and searches of Asian persons continued 
to rise (Reid, 2009: 170). The Equality and Human Rights Commission has 
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noted with concern that, during the past fifteen years, black people have been 
between “… five [and] eight times more likely to be stopped and searched 
than a white person …”, and Asian people “… have been stopped and 
searched around twice as often as white people” (Bennetto, 2009: 21). 
 
Victims’ perceptions of police discrimination and insensitivity also mirror 
aspects of their experiences other than stops and searches. Rural victims of 
racially and religiously motivated crime receive poor services and report 
experiences of racial stereotyping and exclusion by the police and other local 
agencies (Garland & Chakraborti, 2006: 59-64). Multi-agency partnerships 
responding to racially motivated victimisation have been found to blame 
victims and to display reluctance to pursue offenders in case of “a white 
backlash” (Bowling & Phillips, 2002: 124). Furthermore, the relationships 
between the police and many members of the Asian community are 
characterised by “… lack of confidence and trust …”, which is due 
predominantly to the way in which counter-terrorism legislation is being 
implemented (Mythen, et al, 2009: 744). The persistence of discriminatory 
attitudes and practices on the part of the police and other agencies lends 
credence to Hall’s statement that “… changes to proscriptive policy are not a 
guarantee that success will be achieved ‘in the real world’” (Hall, 2005: 207). 
 
The MacPherson Inquiry (MacPherson, 1999) underlined the significance of 
training police in race relations and cultural diversity in order to transform 
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discriminatory attitudes and practices (Hall, 2005: 175). Likewise, ACPO has 
emphasised that training is necessary to ensure that the police respond 
appropriately to victims (ACPO, 2005: para 17). Consequently, issues 
pertaining to “… community and race relations …” have been included in all 
police training programmes (Hall, 2005: 175-176). Recently, new 
programmes have been established nationally, and “… post-entry race and 
diversity training …” also occurs in all forces (Bennetto, 2009: 15). However, 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission has called for evidence showing 
that such training forms part of all aspects of police training, rather than being 
separate and supplementary to it (Bennetto, 2009: 39). 
 
3.2.3 Crown Prosecution Service 
 
As the present author has shown (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 248-249), the 
CPS has manifested a commitment to the rigorous prosecution of racially and 
religiously motivated crimes. It has stated that it will prosecute such crimes 
“… fairly, firmly and robustly …”, because the importance of such crimes is 
such that prosecution is “almost always” in the public interest (CPS, 2010b: 5, 
22). It has committed itself to the establishment of “Hate Crime Scrutiny 
Panels” across all CPS areas to monitor its approach to the prosecution of hate 
crimes, including racially and religiously motivated crimes (CPS, 2010b: 52).  
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The CPS has conceded that, as the racial or religious hostility or motive 
necessary for a conviction of a racially or religiously aggravated offence is 
difficult to prove, it is sometimes necessary to charge the defendant with the 
basic offence in the alternative, in order to ensure a conviction if the requisite 
proof for the aggravated offence is lacking (CPS, 2010b: 25). However, it has 
emphasised that its intention is not to encourage guilty pleas to basic offences, 
and that it will not accept such pleas without “… proper reasons for doing so” 
(CPS, 2010b: 25, 43). If a prosecutor decides to drop or change the charge 
substantially, s/he will offer to provide the victim in person with the reasons 
for doing so (CPS, 2010b: 50; see also: para 7 of the Victims’ Code).   
 
The CPS’s firm prosecution policy, as well as the stringency with which it 
views charge reductions and guilty pleas to lesser offences, provides a 
welcome counter to research showing prosecutorial willingness to reduce 
charges or accept guilty pleas to basic offences to avert difficulties of proof 
(see section 3.2.1 above). Nonetheless, in view of the fact that it is the 
definitional elements of the offences themselves that cause these difficulties 
of proof, it is open to doubt whether the CPS will be able to transpose its 
policy into practice.  
 
The CPS has stated that, as supporting evidence is frequently not forthcoming, 
“… it will usually be necessary for the victim to give evidence” (CPS, 2010b: 
29). However, it will attempt to adduce any other available evidence to 
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support or replace the victim’s testimony (CPS, 2010b: 29). If the victim 
withdraws the complaint or is not willing to testify, the CPS policy regarding 
the continuation of the prosecution in the absence of the victim’s testimony, 
the use of hearsay evidence, and the circumstances in which it will compel the 
victim to testify replicates its policy regarding rape and domestic violence (see 
CPS, 2010b: 32, 33, 35-40; section 3.1.2 above).  
 
All prosecutors receive training in “… equality and diversity awareness …” 
(CPS, 2010b: 5). In addition, they attend training courses on the dynamics of 
racially and religiously motivated crime, which were designed with the aid of 
members of minority ethnic and faith communities (CPS, 2010b: 5).  
 
3.2.4 Court process 
  
There is much less evidence of discriminatory attitudes and practices in regard 
to minority ethnic victims in the court process (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 249-
250). This dearth of evidence may suggest that racial bias is less prevalent in 
the court process than it is in the pre-trial process.  
 
A recent study revealed that no minority ethnic witnesses reported racial bias 
in the Crown Court and that as few as 7 per cent of such witnesses reported 
racial bias in the magistrates’ courts (Hood, et al, 2003). While it is possible 
that minority ethnic victims may experience juror discrimination in the form 
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of the unfounded acquittal of white defendants, there is no indication that this 
is the case (Daly & Pattenden, 2005: 680). By contrast, a recent study has 
shown that, “white juror conviction rates overall were … highest where the 
victim was [b]lack, and where the defendant was either [w]hite or Asian (but 
not [b]lack)” (Thomas, 2007: 183). Minority ethnic victims as well as 
defendants appear to be experiencing the court process as more impartial in 
recent years (Abbas, 2004: 8). As regards the Crown Court, this may be due to 
judges’ commitment to training in race relations and diversity awareness 
(Abbas, 2004: 13). Issues pertaining to racially motivated victimisation and 
religious discrimination currently form part of the training courses offered by 
the Judicial Studies Board (Equal Treatment Advisory Committee, 2010). 
 
While the findings of the above research are encouraging, the reality remains 
that, in view of low reporting, recording and prosecution rates, very few cases 
of racially or religiously motivated crimes reach the courts (see section 3.2.1 
above).   
 
The foregoing analysis has highlighted the fact that, regardless of the plethora 
of reforms to criminal justice law and policy, the UK has not discharged its 
international and European obligations. Although there are areas of 
improvement, the recording, prosecution and conviction rates remain very 
low, revealing a failure to comply with the duty to punish offenders. The 
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continued existence of secondary victimisation at the hands of the police 
constitutes further evidence of the UK’s non-compliance with its duties.  
 
3.3 Homophobic and transphobic victimisation 
 
 Unlike gender-based victimisation and racially and religiously motivated 
crime, homophobic and (to a lesser extent) transphobic victimisation has only 
recently come to be one of the areas of focus of criminal justice law and 
policy. This section considers recent reforms against the backcloth of the 
government’s international and European obligations. 
 
3.3.1 Offences 
 
The UK has recently witnessed the introduction of offences outlawing 
homophobic hatred (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 251-252). Section 29B of the 
POA (as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008) extends 
the offences of inciting religious hatred (see section 3.2.1 above) to 
homophobic hatred. Such hatred is described as “… hatred against a group of 
persons defined by reference to sexual orientation (whether towards persons 
of the same sex, the opposite sex or both)” (s.29AB). In terms of s.29B, as 
amended, the use of “… threatening words or behaviour …” or the display of 
threatening material is an offence if it is accompanied by an intention “… to 
stir up … hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation.” Like the offence of 
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stirring up religious hatred, this offence must be committed intentionally, 
which generates the prospect of difficulties of proof impeding convictions 
(see section 3.2.1 above). 
 
These provisions, which came into force in March 2010, clearly apply to LGB 
persons but not to transgender persons (Ministry of Justice, 2010: para 4). The 
government has indicated that it is not necessary to criminalise the incitement 
of hatred on the basis of gender identity at present, but has conceded that it 
may become necessary in the future (Ministry of Justice, 2010: paras 19, 20). 
For the moment, therefore, transgender persons are left out in the cold. 
 
Unlike the position concerning racially and religiously motivated crime, the 
UK has no aggravated offences for homophobic or transphobic victimisation. 
However, ss.146(2) and (3) of the CJA 2003 provide that the demonstration 
by the defendant of hostility to the victim due to his/her “… sexual orientation 
(or presumed sexual orientation) …”, or the defendant’s full or partial 
motivation “… by hostility towards persons who are of a particular sexual 
orientation …”, is an aggravating factor, which the presiding officer must 
mention in open court. Section 146 does not apply to hostility due to “… 
gender identity or presumed gender identity” (CPS, 2007: para 3.2). However, 
the court does have “… a general power and discretion to increase sentences 
that are aggravated by transphobic hostility” (CPS, 2007: para 7.7). 
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While the specific racially and religiously aggravated offences carry enhanced 
sentences (see section 3.2.1 above), sentences for offences falling within s.146 
are not enhanced automatically. The court has discretion to determine the 
weight to attach to the aggravating factor. This disparate treatment between 
LGB victims and victims of racially and religiously aggravated offences, as 
well as the omission of transgender persons from the ambit of s.29B of the 
POA and s.146(2) and (3) of the CJA 2003, arguably amount to a violation of 
article 7, read with article 2, of the ICCPR (see section 2.3 above).    
 
3.3.2 Police and multi-agency services 
 
Changes to the attitudes and practices of the police and other agencies to 
homophobic and transphobic victimisation have been slow (see Wolhuter, et 
al, 2009: 252-254). The rate of reporting of homophobic and transphobic 
offences is extremely low (Hall, 2005: 195). A recent survey by Stonewall has 
revealed that three out of four victims of homophobic offences did not report 
the matter to the police (Dick, 2008: 20). In addition, the police frequently do 
not record homophobic offences as hate crimes (Dick, 2009: 8). 
Consequently, these offences generate very few police investigations and 
prosecutions (McGhee, 2005: 128), and there is “… a very low conviction 
rate” (Dick, 2009: 12). Many members of the LGBT community believe that 
the police and multi-agency partnerships are institutionally homophobic 
(McGhee, 2005: 129). In order to address these concerns, the police and the 
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CPS, liaising with statutory and community agencies, have introduced 
measures to improve the way they handle homophobic and transphobic 
incidents.   
 
In 1998, a statutory duty was imposed on the police to record homophobic 
crimes, to include members of the LGBT community in CSPs, and thereby to 
police such crime in a more positive way (Williams & Robinson, 2004: 217).  
ACPO has defined homophobic and transphobic incidents as those which are 
perceived as homophobic or transphobic respectively “… by the victim or any 
other person” (ACPO, 2005: paras 2.3.3, 2.3.4). The principles of best 
practice that ACPO has developed in regard to racially and religiously 
motivated incidents (see section 3.2.2 above) apply equally to homophobic 
and transphobic incidents.  
 
ACPO has taken the view that the police must respond with sensitivity to 
reports of homophobic and transphobic victimisation and must adopt positive 
measures to eliminate reporting barriers, in order to generate trust on the part 
of LGBT communities (ACPO, 2005: paras 15.9.15, 15.10.4). In addition, it 
has recommended that properly trained LGBT liaison officers must be 
appointed in all police forces to act as contact persons for both the police and 
LGBT communities (ACPO, 2005: paras 15.9.18, 15.10.7).  It has urged that 
all police officers receive training in awareness of issues concerning LGBT 
persons (ACPO, 2005: para 15.9.19).  It has also encouraged the use of self-
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reporting and third party reporting schemes as such schemes increase 
reporting rates (ACPO, 2005: para 15.9.22).  
 
However, these recommendations have not been implemented by all police 
forces. Research demonstrates that criminal justice agencies and the police, in 
particular, still do not treat homophobic offences seriously (Moran, 2004: 
928) and are still homophobic (Moran & Skeggs, 2004: 55). Nevertheless, 
there are some encouraging signs of good practice. For example, the 
Hampshire Constabulary has appointed lesbian and gay liaison officers who 
receive special training in responding to homophobic victimisation. It has also 
set up a partnership with the Southampton Gay Community Health Service to 
provide victim services, such as anonymous reporting (McGhee, 2005: 130). 
The Greater Manchester Police have “community consultation groups” which 
have led to enhanced relationships between the police and members of the 
LGB community (Williams & Robinson, 2004: 214). Police in Wales have 
also improved their treatment of the LGB community (Williams & Robinson, 
2004: 230). Although these improvements are heartening, they are unlikely to 
lead to complete trust between the police and the LGBT community without a 
broader transformation of the attitudes and practices of criminal justice 
agencies (Williams & Robinson, 2004: 217).   
 
The police response to transgender victimisation is a greater cause for concern 
than its approach to homophobic victimisation. Moran and Sharp maintain 
 
 
 
 
 379 
that the police do not understand the lived experiences of transgender persons. 
Officers may erroneously interpret transphobic incidents as homophobic 
incidents, which may affect their “… strategic and operational responses …” 
deleteriously (Moran & Sharp, 2004: 409). They may also fail to realise that 
the victimisation experienced by transgender persons may differ according to 
their chosen gender identity. The police must be trained in order to understand 
that these experiences are differentiated, not only according to gender identity, 
but also according to other structural hierarchies, such as gender and race 
(Moran & Sharp, 2004: 411). For example, a male to female transgender 
person may experience victimisation on account of their gender identity as 
well as their status as a woman (Moran & Sharp, 2004: 405).   
 
3.3.3 Crown Prosecution Service 
 
The CPS has adopted a positive prosecution policy concerning homophobic 
and transphobic crime (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 254), stating that it views 
such crime as “more serious” than non-hate offences and that prosecutions 
will consequently “almost always” be in the public interest (CPS, 2007: para 
5.8). Homophobic Crime Co-ordinators have been appointed in every CPS 
area, in order to ensure that this policy is implemented effectively (CPS, 2007: 
para 12.2).  
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The CPS has adopted a definition of homophobic and transphobic incidents 
corresponding to the ACPO definition (see section 3.3.2 above). It has 
stressed that prosecutors must treat victims with sensitivity, particularly 
concerning their fears of “being outed”, and must attempt to ensure that they 
have access to special measures to facilitate the process of giving evidence 
(CPS, 2007: paras 4.4, 10.15). Prosecutors will also ask the court to order 
reporting restrictions to protect victims’ identity in appropriate circumstances 
(CPS, 2007: para 4.4).  
 
The CPS has stated that, although the victim is frequently the sole witness in 
homophobic or transphobic offences, and that his/her testimony will 
consequently usually be required, it will attempt to use other available 
evidence “… as an alternative to the victim’s evidence …” in order to ease the 
pressure on victims who are reluctant to testify (CPS, 2007: paras 5.11, 5.12). 
In cases where the victim no longer wishes to testify, the CPS policy 
concerning the continuation of prosecutions without the victim’s testimony, 
the use of hearsay evidence and the circumstances in which it will compel the 
victim to testify parallels its policy regarding rape and domestic violence (see 
CPS, 2007: paras 9.2, 9.8, 9.7; section 3.1.2 above). Although the CPS’ 
positive prosecution policy signifies a commitment to increasing the 
extremely low rate of prosecution of homophobic and transphobic offences, 
the practical efficacy of this policy is open to doubt in light of the low 
reporting rate (see section 3.3.2 above). 
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In contrast to their responses to racially and religiously motivated crime, 
criminal justice responses to homophobic and transphobic crime leave much 
to be desired. The existence of fragmented police strategies, a CPS policy that 
is likely to be ineffective, and a dearth of cases brought to court, highlight the 
extent to which the UK government is failing to discharge its duty to prevent 
and punish homophobic and transphobic victimisation, as required by articles 
7 and 2.1 ICCPR (see section 2.3 above), or to eradicate secondary 
victimisation.     
 
3.4 Elder abuse 
 
Contrary to the other forms of victimisation discussed in this chapter, elder 
abuse is marginal to criminal law and criminal justice policy in the UK. This 
section assesses the provisions that do exist against the backdrop of the 
emerging human rights discourse on elder abuse discussed in section 2.4 
above (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 254-258). With reference to the elder abuse 
strategies adopted in the US, it argues that the effective prevention and 
punishment of elder abuse and the protection of victims necessitates a 
coherent strategy encompassing the introduction of elder abuse offences and 
the development of a multi-agency response to victims in which criminal 
justice agencies play an active role. 
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3.4.1 English law and policy 
 
There is no offence of elder abuse in English law, although offenders may be 
prosecuted for ordinary criminal offences in appropriate cases. In addition, 
there is no statutory power of sentence enhancement in cases involving an 
element of aggravation due to the victim’s age (CPS, 2008: para 11.1). 
However, the Court of Appeal has emphasised the seriousness of crimes 
against older persons, stating that the perpetrators of such crimes “… can 
expect to receive lengthy prison sentences” (CPS, 2008: para 11.1). The 
absence of specific criminal offences for elder abuse may be ascribed to the 
existence of ageist attitudes, which have marginalised the criminal dimensions 
of such abuse (Fitzgerald, 2006: 92). 
 
With the exception of the CPS (see below), no criminal justice agencies have 
developed comprehensive policies on elder abuse. Instead, responsibility for 
elder abuse has been given to Social Services, creating the impression that 
elder abuse “… is a social rather than criminal issue” (Department of Health, 
2000; Action on Elder Abuse, et al, 2004: 5). Furthermore, elderly victims are 
subsumed within the government policy applicable to vulnerable adults 
generally (Fitzgerald, 2006: 91). Consequently, local multi-agency 
partnerships have developed policies and procedures for adult protection 
(Manthorpe, 2006: 143), which generates the danger that the dynamics of 
elder abuse, and the particular needs of victims, will be ignored.   
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Although these multi-agency partnerships are headed by Social Services, 
health authorities, the police and the CPS are also members (Manthorpe, 
2006: 144). However, the police have yet to devise a national policy for the 
investigation of elder abuse offences. The CPS is currently the only criminal 
justice agency to have a policy pertaining to the elderly. It has stated that it 
views offences against the elderly as “serious” and, consequently, that it is 
“… likely that a prosecution will be needed in the public interest” (CPS, 2008: 
para 4.8). It has committed itself to ensuring that elderly victims are provided 
with support and assistance when testifying. Amongst other things, it has 
undertaken to apply for special measures in such cases, and to seek actively to 
use other available evidence to free victims from having to testify (CPS, 2008: 
paras 2.8, 5.9).  
 
In cases where victims are not willing to testify, the CPS policy regarding the 
continuation of the prosecution without the victim, the use of hearsay 
evidence, and the circumstances in which it will compel victims to testify 
replicates its policy regarding rape and domestic violence (see CPS, 2008: 
paras 10.2, 10.6, 10.5; section 3.1.2 above). If a prosecutor decides not to 
institute a prosecution, or the defendant is not convicted, the CPS has 
undertaken to work with agencies, such as Social Services, “… to ensure that 
where appropriate non-criminal or other remedies or interventions are 
pursued” (CPS, 2008, 10.13).  
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The introduction of a positive prosecution policy is to be welcomed. 
However, it is unlikely to have much practical effect in the absence of 
comprehensive policies on the part of all criminal justice agencies, 
particularly the police. In addition, it is likely to be muted by the overarching 
discourse of social policy that informs the government’s response to 
vulnerable adults. This discourse hinders the emergence in the UK of a human 
rights discourse on elder abuse that emphasises the duty of the state to take 
positive steps to recognise victims’ fundamental rights by introducing 
criminal justice policies to protect them and to prevent, investigate, and 
punish elder abuse offences. The failure to introduce such policies is not in 
keeping with Recommendation R (97) 13 or the provisions of article 7 ICCPR 
and articles 2 and 3 ECHR (see section 2.4 above).   
 
3.4.2 American law 
 
The approach to elder abuse in most American states is founded on the 
conviction that law enforcement strategies, coupled with social and health 
services, are indispensable for an effective response to such abuse (Breaux & 
Hatch, 2003: 231). Consequently, the law of most states underlines the 
criminal nature of elder abuse, and comprises statutory offences pertaining to 
the “… abuse, neglect, and financial exploitation …” of the elderly 
(Moskowitz, 2002-2003: 633). In addition, some states have sentence 
enhancement legislation in respect of certain offences, such as assault, 
 
 
 
 
 385 
committed against elderly persons, while others regard the advanced age of 
the victim as an aggravating factor (Moskowitz, 2002-2003: 633).   
 
For example, the state of California has introduced broadly defined elder 
abuse offences (see Moskowitz, 2002-2003: 634-635). In terms of s.368(b)(1) 
of the California Penal Code, a person commits an offence who knows or 
ought reasonably to know that the victim is elderly and who, in circumstances 
that are likely to cause serious bodily injury or death -  
willfully causes or permits [the victim] to suffer, or inflicts thereon 
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or 
custody of any elder …, willfully causes or permits the person or 
health of the elder … to be injured, or willfully causes or permits the 
elder … to be injured, or willfully causes or permits the elder … to be 
placed in a situation in which his or her person or health is 
endangered.  
 
The penalties for committing the above offence are increased if serious bodily 
injury or death is caused (s.368(b)(2) and (3)). Further penalties are prescribed 
in s.368 for other offences against elderly persons, such as theft and fraud 
(Luu & Liang, 2005-2006: 180).  
 
The California Attorney General’s Office has implemented policies 
supplementing these offences. They include a stated intention to investigate 
and prosecute elder abuse, the establishment of a hotline to facilitate 
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reporting, and the running of training programmes for the employees of care 
institutions (Luu & Liang, 2005-2006: 180-181). Furthermore, the California 
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training trains police in the 
dynamics of elder abuse (Moskowitz, 2002-2003: 636).  In a bid to increase 
the number of prosecutions, the state of California, as well as the majority of 
other states, have introduced mandatory reporting of elder abuse for certain 
groups, such as such as nurses, social workers and medical practitioners (Luu 
& Liang, 2005-2006: 184-185).   
 
However, the prosecution rate for elder abuse offences is low, regardless of 
the enactment of specific offences and the development of positive 
prosecution policies and mandatory reporting laws (Davidson, 2004: 339). 
This may be due to the fact that, despite the existence of criminal sanctions for 
failure to comply with mandatory reporting laws, there is a low rate of 
reporting of known abuse (Luu & Liang, 2005-2006: 185). It may be due also 
to the existence of cost and resource constraints, and to the fact that many 
cases of elder abuse are not detected because they occur in victims’ homes 
rather than in care institutions (Davidson, 2004: 339-340). Nevertheless, 
comprehensive criminal justice policies to prevent and punish elder abuse are 
a much more effective means of protecting victims’ human rights than a social 
adult protection policy that obscures the criminal dimensions of elder abuse. 
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The federal government has signified its commitment to responding to elder 
abuse at federal level. The Elder Justice Act 2009, which came into force in 
March 2010, allocates considerable funding to the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of elder abuse. It amends the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 1397) by adding a title on elder justice, which is defined as 
referring, amongst other things, to “… the recognition of an elder’s rights, 
including the right to be free of abuse, neglect and exploitation” 
(s.2011(6)(B)). It establishes an Elder Justice Coordinating Council, whose 
duties include making recommendations for coordinating the activities of the 
health service, the Department of Justice and other agencies in regard to “… 
elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation and other crimes against elders” 
(s.2021(f)(1)). It also establishes an “… Advisory Board on Elder Abuse, 
Neglect and Exploitation …” for the purpose of generating elder justice 
strategies and making “… recommendations to the Elder Justice Coordinating 
Council” (s.2022(a)). 
 
In addition, it makes provision for grants to establish and run forensic centres 
“… to develop forensic expertise regarding, and provide services relating to, 
elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation” (s.2031(a)). It imposes a duty on the 
health service to provide funding to “… adult protective services that 
investigate reports of the abuse, neglect, and exploitation of elders” 
(s.2042(a)(1)). It provides for grants to states to conduct “demonstration 
programs” testing training courses concerning the detection and prevention of 
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elder abuse, amongst other things (s.2042(c)(1), (2)). It also provides for the 
regulation of surveyors’ training concerning the investigation of elder abuse 
(s.2046(b)(1)). Furthermore, it imposes a duty on “… federally funded long-
term care facilities …” to report offences against elders to law enforcement 
agencies. Failure to discharge this duty results in the imposition of civil 
penalties (s.1150B). 
 
The establishment of a multi-agency elder abuse structure at federal level is to 
be welcomed. However, the imposition of overall responsibility on health and 
social services, and the lack of a federal criminal justice policy, marginalises 
the human rights and criminal dimensions of elder abuse. Consequently, the 
federal approach resembles the UK’s social adult protection policy rather than 
the multi-pronged strategy emphasising law enforcement that has been 
adopted by most states.  
 
The state approach to elder abuse parallels the UK’s responses to racially and 
religiously motivated crime. Both have criminalised the conduct, introduced 
sentence enhancement legislation or aggravation in sentencing, and developed 
positive policing and prosecutorial policies. Accordingly, an elder abuse 
strategy in the UK could be modelled on its existing strategies to combat 
racially and religiously motivated crime. In order to respond to the emerging 
international human rights discourse on elder abuse, and to comply with 
Recommendation R (97) 13, the UK ought to introduce such a strategy. 
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4. ENFORCEMENT OF STATE OBLIGATIONS 
 
It appears from the foregoing analysis that, with the aim of complying with its 
international and European obligations, the UK has implemented a wide range 
of reforms that seek to prevent, investigate and punish victimisation 
experienced by socially unequal groups, and to alleviate secondary 
victimisation. However, there are significant areas in which the government 
has yet to demonstrate compliance with these obligations (see Wolhuter, et al, 
2009: 258-259). Many women minority victims of domestic violence fall 
through the cracks of domestic violence and race relations law and policy. The 
rate of attrition in rape cases remains high. Racially and religiously motivated 
crimes, and homophobic and transphobic crimes, are not consistently policed 
and there are few prosecutions. Minority ethnic communities and LGBT 
persons continue to perceive the police as biased. Elder abuse victims occupy 
a marginal position in criminal law and criminal justice policy.  
 
While aggrieved victims may, in principle, approach the HRC or the ECtHR 
for redress, the process is expensive, time-consuming and consequently not 
likely to be used by many victims. Accordingly, this chapter does not consider 
these forms of redress. Instead, it is restricted to an analysis of the domestic 
remedies for victims that have been introduced in the EA, and an exploration 
of the manner in which these remedies may be correlated with the enforceable 
victims’ rights which this thesis advocates. 
 
 
 
 
 390 
4.1 Remedies for discrimination and harassment 
 
 Hepple contends that the EA signifies a move to “transformative equality”, 
which aims to remove “systemic inequalities” and eliminate “poverty and 
disadvantage” (Hepple, 2011: 10, 22). The EA protects several listed 
characteristics, including sex, race, religion or belief, sexual orientation and 
gender reassignment (s.4). When a public authority or private body provides a 
service or performs a public function, it is unlawful to engage in, amongst 
other things, direct discrimination, indirect discrimination or harassment on 
the basis of one of these characteristics (EA, Part 3; Hepple, 2011: 25). 
Consequently, all criminal justice agencies, being public authorities, are 
bound by these provisions. However, prosecutorial decisions whether to 
institute or continue prosecutions are exempt from discrimination or 
harassment claims (EA, Sched 3: para 3; Hepple, 2011: 110).  
 
 Direct discrimination occurs where one person treats another “less 
favourably” than other persons, “… because of a protected characteristic” 
(s.13(1)). In view of the significance accorded by the criminal justice reforms 
discussed above to meeting the needs of socially unequal victims (with the 
exception of victims of elder abuse), direct discrimination on the part of 
criminal justice agencies is unlikely.  
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Indirect discrimination, on the other hand, occurs where one person applies to 
another “… a provision, criterion or practice …” which is neutral, on its face, 
but which “… puts, or would put, persons with whom [the other] shares the 
characteristic at a particular disadvantage …” compared to others, and which 
“… puts, or would put, [the other] at that disadvantage” (s.19; Hepple, 2011: 
64). However, there is no indirect discrimination if the “… provision, criterion 
or practice …” is “… a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim” 
(s.19(2)(d)). An intention to discriminate is not required (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, 2011: para 5.24).  
 
Indirect discrimination is more likely than direct discrimination to occur in 
socially unequal victims’ encounters with criminal justice agencies. For 
instance, the “no recourse to public funds” rule, which precludes immigrant 
victims of domestic violence from claiming state benefits while their 
applications for indefinite leave to remain are being considered (see section 
3.1.4 above) is a facially neutral provision insofar as it applies to all 
immigrant domestic violence victims regardless of race. However, in view of 
their social and economic marginalisation, as well as the familial ostracism 
they experience for having brought shame on the family (see chapter 2), South 
Asian women are likely to be put “at a particular disadvantage” by this 
provision.  
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While indirect discrimination is likely to occur more frequently in the 
criminal justice process than direct discrimination, and its extension to all the 
protected characteristics is thus to be welcomed, it nonetheless fails to capture 
all the facets of disadvantage experienced by socially unequal groups. This is 
because, being premised on substantive rather than transformative equality, it 
does not operate to remove systemic disadvantage (Hepple, 2011: 19-20). For 
instance, the fact that there is a very low rate of reporting of homophobic 
crime (see section 3.3.2 above) due to LGB victims’ lack of trust in the police 
cannot be said to amount to indirect discrimination on the part of the police 
because the police reporting procedures do not “put” LGB victims “at a 
particular disadvantage”. By contrast, the disadvantage flows from a 
perception of institutional homophobia that cannot be linked to a specific 
police provision or practice. Fortunately, the imposition of public sector 
equality duties compensates for the “… limitations of the indirect 
discrimination provisions” (Hepple, 2011: 20; see below). 
 
 Harassment occurs, amongst other things, where a person “… engages in 
unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and … the 
conduct has the purpose or effect of … violating …” the dignity of another, or 
“… creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment for …” the other (s.26(1)). It is a form of conduct that is likely to 
occur more frequently than direct and indirect discrimination in the context of 
socially unequal victims’ interactions with criminal justice agencies. For 
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example, institutional racism on the part of the police would likely qualify as 
harassment of victims reporting racially motivated crimes (see section 3.2.2 
above). The same would apply to police service provision that was informed 
by gender stereotypes.  
 
Unfortunately, however, harassment on the basis of religion or sexual 
orientation is not unlawful when committed by a public or private body 
providing a service or performing a public function (Hepple, 2011: 80). 
Consequently, Islamophobic or homophobic attitudes and practices on the part 
of criminal justice agencies are not captured by the harassment provisions. 
 
Section 14 of the EA makes provision for “combined discrimination”, which 
occurs where one person treats another “less favourably” due to “… a 
combination of two relevant protected characteristics” (s.14(1)). Such 
combined discrimination may only take the form of direct discrimination – 
indirect discrimination and harassment do not fall within the ambit of s.14 
(Hand, 2011: 484). The exclusion of indirect discrimination and harassment 
constitutes a significant limitation of the purview of s.14. Most instances of 
intersectional discrimination amount, at most, to indirect discrimination, or, at 
least, to harassment, but rarely to direct discrimination.  
 
Furthermore, the restriction of s.14 to two grounds only precludes claims for 
intersectional discrimination that encompass a number of grounds (Hepple, 
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2011: 62). For example, the low rate of reporting of domestic violence by 
minority ethnic women, which is due to the intersection of institutional 
racism, gendered conceptions of appropriate womanhood, cultural 
conceptions of shame and age hierarchies (see section 3.1.4 above; chapter 1) 
spans more than two grounds and does not arise by way of direct 
discrimination. Consequently, s.14 fails to capture minority women’s lived 
experiences of domestic violence. 
 
The EA accords aggrieved victims a right of action for redress in the civil 
courts in respect of unlawful conduct, including direct and indirect 
discrimination and harassment (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
2011: para 14.7). In view of the fact that these forms of conduct are “statutory 
torts” (Hepple, 2011: 170), the ordinary principles of tort law apply. The 
courts are empowered to award declarations of rights, damages and 
injunctions (Hepple, 2011: 170). However, there are several difficulties with 
this right of action, in particular the fact that victims will, for the most part, 
have to pay the legal costs themselves (Hepple, 2011: 164). While the 
recognition of a right of action is to be welcomed, constituting as it does one 
of the few enforceable rights for victims, the absence of state-funded legal 
representation will render it inaccessible to many victims. 
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4.2 Public sector equality duties 
 
 In addition to rendering the above forms of conduct unlawful, the EA 
provides for the extension of public sector equality duties “… across the board 
to all protected characteristics” (Hepple, 2011: 11). Section 149(1) provides 
that public authorities are required to “have due regard” to three matters. The 
first is the need to eradicate discrimination and harassment, amongst other 
forms of prohibited conduct (ss.(a)). The second is the need to “… advance 
equality of opportunity …” between those who have, and those who do not 
have, a protected characteristic (ss.(b)). The third is the need to “foster good 
relations” between such persons (ss.(c)).   
 
 In terms of s. 149(3), “… having due regard to the need to advance equality of 
opportunity …” includes “… having due regard … to the need to …” alleviate 
“disadvantages suffered” by protected persons; to adopt measures to cater for 
the “different” needs of protected persons; and to “encourage” protected 
persons “… to participate in public life or in any other activity in which 
participation by such persons is disproportionately low”.  
 
Unlike the discrimination and harassment provisions, this public sector 
equality duty represents the beginnings of a government commitment to 
transformative equality, namely the eradication of systemic disadvantage and 
exclusion (see Hepple, 2011: 22, 134). The duty has far-reaching implications 
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for the transformation of the criminal justice response to victims from unequal 
social groups. For instance, it arguably requires the government to develop a 
comprehensive criminal justice policy regarding elder abuse (see section 3.4.1 
above). It certainly requires a focus on eradicating institutional racism and 
homophobia (see sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.2 above). In addition, it commits the 
government to ensure that its strategy to eliminate gender-based violence 
accommodates the realities of minority women appropriately (see section 
3.1.4 above). Unfortunately, however, s.156 precludes “… a cause of action at 
private law …” by victims if the government fails to discharge the duty. 
Judicial review constitutes the only avenue of redress for aggrieved victims 
with a “sufficient interest” in the matter (Hepple, 2011: 140). Apart from 
judicial review, action to enforce the duty may only be taken by the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission (see Equality Act 2006, ss.20-32). 
 
4.3 Enforceable victims’ rights and the Equality Act 2010 
 
It appears from the above analysis that the EA has ushered in a new 
framework that has the potential to empower socially unequal victims 
significantly. For the first time, such victims have access to enforceable rights. 
However, difficulties persist, the most notable being the exclusion of religion 
and sexual orientation from the ambit of harassment in the provision of 
services and the performance of public functions, and the restrictive ambit of 
combined discrimination (see above). Another lacuna concerns victims’ 
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inability to institute action against the CPS for deciding not to institute or 
continue prosecutions (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 261). Aldana-Pindell 
highlights the fact that a state duty to prosecute crimes violating the rights to 
life and personal integrity exists in international human rights law, and 
consequently that victims ought to have a justiciable right to prosecutions 
(Aldana-Pindell, 2002: 1413, 1415).   
  
 Nevertheless, the introduction of the EA has effected a fairly radical 
transformation of the legal milieu for socially unequal victims in the UK. 
However, in order to utilise this transformed milieu to greatest effect and to 
highlight the relationship between discrimination and victimisation, the rights 
of action in the EA should be extrapolated, insofar as they pertain to socially 
unequal victims, and transposed into an enforceable victims’ rights 
instrument, along with the other victims’ rights that constitute the focus of the 
thesis.  
 
The Victims’ Directive incorporates an awareness of the need to correlate 
victimisation and discrimination. Non-discrimination in the provision of 
“protection and support”, victim participation and treatment of victims is an 
aim of the Victims’ Directive (article 1). However, unlike article 4.3 of the 
European Women’s Convention (see section 2.1 above), there is no right to 
non-discrimination in the enjoyment and exercise of the victims’ rights it 
enshrines. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the reference to the importance of 
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avoiding discrimination in article 1 constitutes sufficient textual evidence for 
the fact that the EU is committed to the eradication of discrimination in its 
proposed victims’ rights regime. Consequently, the thesis contends that the 
UK ought to add a non-discrimination clause to the victims’ rights legislation 
that it advocates (see chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of this issue). 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that, although current law and policy contain 
far-reaching strategies to prevent, investigate and punish victimisation based 
on gender, race, religion and sexual orientation, and to reduce secondary 
victimisation, analogous strategies for victimisation based on gender identity 
and advanced age are limited. Furthermore, several flaws continue to beset the 
criminal justice responses to victims from all the socially disadvantaged 
groups discussed in the chapter.  
 
The chapter has also highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the rights 
accorded to these victims in the EA. It has contended that, despite its 
shortcomings, the EA represents a new dawn for socially unequal victims and 
that, in order to maximise its benefits for such victims, the UK ought to 
correlate the rights in the EA with the other victims’ rights advocated in the 
thesis. The contours of the suggested framework for these rights are 
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delineated in the three-tier model of victims’ rights that constitutes the focus 
of the concluding chapter.      
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION – A VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MODEL FOR THE 
CRIMINAL PROCESS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis has aligned itself with the critical victimological tenet that the 
agency of victims must be utilised to develop strategies to eradicate secondary 
victimisation and to empower victims in the criminal process. Along with 
critical victimologists such as Mawby and Walklate (1994), it has contended 
that victims’ agency may be channelled most effectively through the medium 
of victims’ rights (see chapter 1). Consequently, the thesis has aimed to make 
a case for the introduction of rights that clothe victims with legal standing to 
institute actions for their enforcement, and to demarcate the form that these 
rights should take and the content that they should embody.  
 
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, it outlines the main conclusions 
reached in each of the substantive chapters of the thesis concerning the extent 
to which the UK complies with European standards. Second, it devises a 
model of victims’ rights that it maintains ought to be the foundation of 
victims’ rights legislation in the UK (see Wolhuter, et al, 2009: 265-269).  
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2. COMPLIANCE WITH EUROPEAN STANDARDS 
 
 Apart from a number of significant exceptions, the provisions for victims in 
English law and policy are consonant with European standards, and, in some 
respects, even surpass these standards. In collaboration with Victim Support 
and other “unofficial” victims’ agencies, such as Rape Crisis and Southall 
Black Sisters, the UK has succeeded in establishing the best support services 
for victims in Europe (see chapter 3). In this respect, it clearly complies with 
the requirements of the Framework Decision and the proposed Victims’ 
Directive. Furthermore, with the exception of some limitations on 
compensation claims for special expenses and loss of earnings for certain 
victims, the CICS complies with the Compensation Convention and is widely 
thought to be the most generous compensation scheme in Europe (see chapter 
5). However, these achievements are confined to a space outside of the formal 
criminal process. 
 
A somewhat bleaker picture emerges regarding victims’ position within the 
formal process. The Victims’ Code imposes wide-ranging duties on criminal 
justice agencies, such as the police and the CPS, to provide victims with 
information, respect and recognition, and protection. Barring the absence of 
duties to provide non-English speaking victims with appropriate services for 
interpretation and translation, these duties are congruent with the provisions 
of the Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive (see chapter 3). 
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However, the fact that they do not give rise to enforceable rights entitling 
aggrieved victims to institute proceedings against criminal justice agencies 
detracts from their effectiveness for victims and is not in keeping with the aim 
of the proposed Victims’ Directive (see below). 
 
Within the context of the right to protection, the YJCEA, as amended by the 
CJA 2009, enshrines expansive measures, including special measures and the 
prohibition of cross-examination by the defendant in person, to facilitate the 
process of testifying for vulnerable victims. By virtue of their breadth and 
inclusiveness, these measures comply with the requirements of the 
Framework Decision and the Victims’ Declaration. However, the fact that the 
decision to grant special measures is discretionary creates a barrier to their 
effectiveness for victims, as research has documented reluctance on the part of 
the judiciary and legal professionals to accept that special measures are part of 
mainstream legal practice (see chapter 3).  
 
A difference of opinion has arisen between the ECtHR and the Supreme Court 
as regards the extent to which the provisions in the CJA 2003 concerning 
hearsay evidence and those in the CJA 2009 regarding anonymous evidence 
comply with article 6 ECHR. While Strasbourg jurisprudence insists that 
hearsay or anonymous testimony that is the “sole or decisive” evidence 
against the defendant violates article 6(3)(d), the Supreme Court has set its 
face against this conclusion (see chapter 2). Consequently, the hearsay and 
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anonymous testimony provisions are inconsistent with European standards. 
While the nature of this inconsistency inures to the benefit of victims by 
making hearsay and anonymous testimony more easily admissible, the picture 
that emerges in practice is considerably less positive, particularly for victims 
from socially unequal groups, as courts are unwilling, for the most part, to 
admit such evidence where the victim is the only witness (see chapter 6). 
 
The provisions in the YJCEA regulating the admission of sexual history 
evidence in rape trials, as reinterpreted by the House of Lords in R v A (No. 2) 
[2001] 2 Cr App R 21 to ensure compliance with the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial in article 6 ECHR, are also consistent with European standards. 
However, the reinsertion of judicial discretion that the decision in R v A (No. 
2) has entailed has re-opened the door to the admissibility of evidence of 
victims’ previous sexual relationships with the defendant, the inclusion of 
which has been subject to trenchant criticism for its reliance on rape myths 
and gender stereotypes (see chapter 3).  
 
Within the context of the procedural right to be heard, the UK has granted 
victims limited avenues for passive participation in the pre-trial and trial 
processes. As regards the former, victims’ views must be considered in 
prosecutorial decisions to prosecute and in plea bargaining negotiations, but 
they have no right to participate actively in these processes. Traditional 
conceptions of adversarialism preclude victims from participating in any 
 
 
 
 
 404 
respect in the trial itself, except to testify as witnesses for the Crown. While 
victims may participate passively at the stage of sentencing by means of 
making VPS, research has shown that VPS have had a limited impact in 
practice. Nonetheless, in view of the deference accorded by EU law to the 
dictates of trial procedure in common law jurisdictions, these restricted 
“rights” to participate passively are congruent with the Framework Decision 
and the Victims’ Directive. However, the exclusion of victims of serious 
crimes from party status in the trial process compounds their experiences of 
secondary victimisation (see chapter 4). 
 
By and large, English law and policy concerning the prevention, investigation 
and punishment of gender-based violence, and the empowerment of victims, 
accords with European standards, although some gaps remain. For instance, 
the intersectional dynamics of minority women’s experiences of domestic 
violence are not captured in criminal justice policy and, consequently, victims 
are left without adequate protection (see chapter 6). The UK’s record as 
regards the prevention, investigation and punishment of racially and 
religiously motivated crime and homophobic and transphobic violence is less 
satisfactory. Prosecution and conviction rates are low, and evidence of 
discriminatory attitudes and practices on the part of criminal justice agencies, 
particularly the police, continues to exist, despite the strictures of the 
MacPherson Inquiry (MacPherson, 1999) and the recommendations of ACPO 
(see chapter 6). Accordingly, English law and policy falls short of European 
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standards in these respects. Furthermore, the absence of a comprehensive 
policy on the prevention, investigation and punishment of elder abuse 
signifies the UK’s failure to align its law and policy with the emerging human 
rights discourse on rights for elderly victims in Europe and internationally 
(see chapter 6). 
 
Nevertheless, the rights of action accorded to victims of discrimination and 
harassment by public authorities in the provision of services and the 
performance of public functions in the EA represent a breakthrough for 
socially unequal victims. For the first time, aggrieved victims have legal 
standing to institute actions against recalcitrant criminal justice agencies. 
Despite its breadth, however, the EA has a number of shortcomings. The 
prohibition of harassment in the provision of services and the performance of 
public functions does not extend to religious belief and sexual orientation, 
leaving victims who experience Islamophobic and homophobic harassment by 
criminal justice agencies without a remedy. Furthermore, the provisions 
regarding combined discrimination are unduly restrictive, excluding indirect 
discrimination and harassment, as well as intersectional discrimination on 
more than two grounds. In addition, while the EA imposes a wide-ranging 
public sector equality duty on all public authorities, breach of this duty does 
not give rise to a right of action at civil law (see chapter 6). In spite of these 
shortcomings, however, the provisions of the EA represent a new era for the 
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rights of socially unequal victims in the UK, and testify to the UK’s 
compliance with EU law in this respect. 
 
3. A VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MODEL 
 
While the transformations effected by the EA are to be welcomed, the locus of 
the rights of action for discrimination and harassment in anti-discrimination 
legislation impedes the development of a discourse linking discrimination and 
victimisation. In addition, the absence of enforceable rights for victims 
generally renders their position unenviable. In a bid to address these concerns, 
this section outlines the contours of a three tier model of victims’ rights that it 
contends ought to be adopted in the UK. 
 
The first tier embodies a conception of victims’ rights as founded on 
fundamental human rights. The Council of Europe has recognised that 
victims’ rights flow from human rights (see Recommendation No. Rec. (2006) 
8 on assistance to crime victims, article 2). This recognition also informs the 
rights enshrined in the Framework Decision and the Victims’ Directive (see 
chapter 2).  
 
However, the significance of conceiving of victims’ rights as human rights is 
rendered devoid of substance in the UK by the government’s unwillingness to 
grant victims standing to enforce such rights. It refused to make the requisite 
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declaration recognising the ECJ’s jurisdiction “… to give preliminary rulings 
…” on framework decisions (articles 35(1) & (2) TEU), thereby preventing 
aggrieved victims from invoking the Framework Decision in English courts. 
Likewise, it has relegated to itself the power to decide not to accept the 
provisions of the Victims’ Directive, which, when in force, will give victims’ 
rights direct effect in the domestic law of Member States. Whether or not the 
coalition government decides to exercise this power is a question for the 
future (see chapter 2). 
 
The central contention of the thesis is that, in order to give effect to the first 
tier of victims’ rights, it is necessary for the UK to agree to accept the 
Victims’ Directive and, thereby, to introduce enforceable rights for victims. In 
addition, in order to give flesh to the bones of the Victims’ Directive, victims’ 
rights legislation analogous to the American CVRA ought to be enacted (see 
chapter 2). Such legislation would enable victims to ensure, by way of court 
action, that criminal justice agencies complied with their duties, such as those 
contained in the Victims’ Code. By analogy to the CVRA, a duty could be 
imposed on the judiciary to give effect to victims’ rights immediately, namely 
during the criminal proceedings themselves (Beloof, 2005: 343). Furthermore, 
the provisions concerning special measures in the YJCEA, as amended by the 
CJA 2009, could be amended to accord victims a right to such measures, 
enforceable in the relevant criminal proceedings themselves. The introduction 
of enforceable rights that give victims legal standing would facilitate victim 
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empowerment greatly and contribute to the alleviation of secondary 
victimisation in the criminal process. 
 
In light of the continued existence of discriminatory attitudes and practices on 
the part of criminal justice agencies, the persistence of intersectional 
oppression that precludes minority victims from reporting gender-based 
violence, and the absence of a concerted criminal justice response to elder 
abuse, socially unequal victims may not be in a position to access these rights. 
Consequently, the second tier of the victims’ rights model is premised on the 
importance of linking the rights of action in the EA for discrimination and 
harassment in the provision of services and the performance of public 
functions with the enforceable victims’ rights advocated in the first tier. This 
connection may be effected by means of the inclusion of a non-discrimination 
clause in the victims’ rights instrument granting victims the right to freedom 
from discrimination in the exercise and enjoyment of the substantive rights 
enshrined in it.  
 
However, the shortcomings of the provisions of the EA (see section 2 above; 
see also chapter 6) impede their effectiveness for socially unequal victims, 
particularly in cases of intersectional victimisation and victimisation on the 
grounds of religious belief or sexual orientation by criminal justice agencies. 
Therefore, the proposed anti-discrimination clause must, it is contended, be 
supplemented by the imposition of a positive duty on criminal justice agencies 
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analogous to the public sector equality duty in the EA. Very importantly, this 
duty must be given substantive legal effect by granting victims a right of 
action to sue recalcitrant criminal justice agencies for failing to discharge it. 
The inclusion of such a two-pronged second tier (comprising a right to 
freedom from discrimination as well as an actionable positive duty on 
criminal justice agencies) will inure to the benefit of socially unequal victims 
by levelling the playing field in the criminal justice process.  
 
The enactment of enforceable victims’ rights granting legal standing to 
victims, even if reinforced by a non-discrimination clause and positive state 
duties, is insufficient per se to empower victims as long as their procedural 
status remains that of mere Crown witnesses. Consequently, the third tier of 
the victims’ rights model comprises the recognition of procedural rights for 
victims in pre-trial and trial proceedings. On the basis of a comparative 
analysis of German and Swedish law, the thesis has advocated the 
introduction of auxiliary prosecutors for victims of serious offences, such as 
gender-based violence, and racially and religiously motivated and 
homophobic crime (see chapter 4). The auxiliary prosecution procedure 
transforms victims into full parties to the proceedings with procedural rights 
analogous to those of the prosecution and defence. These rights include the 
rights to legal representation, to object to judicial orders and questions from 
counsel, and to apply to have evidence adduced.  
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While victims of less serious offences should remain Crown witnesses, they 
ought to be granted the right to legal representation. Procedural rights such as 
these will make a marked contribution to the alleviation of secondary 
victimisation in the pre-trial as well as the trial process. The presence of 
lawyers will serve to buttress victims against the predations of defence 
counsel during cross-examination, and will facilitate the raising of objections 
to defence applications to admit sexual history evidence. However, the UK 
ought to follow the example of Sweden and Germany and provide victims 
with state-funded lawyers to ensure that they are able to exercise their right to 
legal representation.  
 
Opposition to the introduction of auxiliary prosecutors and victims’ lawyers in 
the UK, which is premised on an ostensible concern to protect defendants’ fair 
trial rights, finds little support in Strasbourg jurisprudence. Indeed, the 
ECtHR, while expressing commitment to adversarial trials, has not taken the 
view that upholding the rights of defendants as well as the interests of victims 
detracts from the principles of adversarialism (see Doorson v The Netherlands 
(1996) 22 EHRR 330; see also chapter 4). Furthermore, victims’ lawyers are a 
frequent and unremarkable feature of trials in civil law jurisdictions and have 
been accepted without comment by the ECtHR (see, for example, SN v 
Sweden (2004) 39 EHRR 13, where the fact that the victim had been 
represented by a lawyer was of no consequence in the court’s decision that the 
defendant had received a fair trial; see also chapter 4).  
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In addition, jurisdictions with adversarial trial processes, such as Sweden, 
grant victims procedural rights, and even the US, which is noted for its 
adversarialism, allows victims’ lawyers. Consequently, opposition to 
procedural rights for victims is founded more on traditional conceptions of 
adversarialism than on any substantive incompatibility between such rights 
and the adversarial process (see chapter 4). 
 
While this three tier model of victims’ rights is advocated as a significant 
means of ensuring the empowerment of victims and the reduction of 
secondary victimisation, it is clearly not a panacea for all evils. Rights, per se, 
are insufficient to transform discriminatory and insensitive attitudes and 
practices on the part of criminal justice agencies. Accordingly, training for the 
police, CPS and the judiciary, with particular reference to the lived realities of 
victims of gender-based violence, racially and religiously motivated crime, 
homophobic and transphobic victimisation, and elder abuse must be given 
prominence in English law and policy. Admittedly, with the exception of 
elder abuse, the UK has evinced a commitment to ensuring that such training 
occurs (see chapter 6).  
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
While the EU institutions, as well several European jurisdictions, have 
committed themselves to the entrenchment of enforceable victims’ rights, the 
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views of the English legal establishment, which are in opposition to the above 
victims’ rights model, are strong, well-entrenched and likely to be resistant to 
change (see chapter 4). Whether the transformations advocated in the thesis 
will be accepted or consigned to a space reserved for well-meaning but 
misguided academic endeavour will ultimately depend on the extent to which 
commitment to sovereignty and national identity outweighs economic and 
political pressure to achieve European uniformity. 
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Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 
Public Order Act 1986 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
 
United States  
 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act 2004, incorporated into Justice for All Act of 2004. 
Pub. L. No. 108-405 
California Penal Code 
Elder Justice Act 2009 
 
Germany 
 
Strafprozeßordnung (Code of Criminal Procedure)  
 
Sweden 
 
Rättegångsbalk Ds 1998:000 (Code of Judicial Procedure, unofficial English 
translation)   
Lag om Målsägandebiträde 1988:609, as amended (Act Concerning Counsel for 
the Injured Person/Party, unofficial English translation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 435 
Netherlands 
 
Terwee Act 1995 
 
TREATIES, DECLARATIONS AND CONVENTIONS 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
1979 G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. 
A/34/46 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 G.A. 
res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. 
A/6014 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief 1981 G.A. res 36/55 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 1994 G.A. res. 
48/104 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 
European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes 1983 
European Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence 2011 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community 2007/C 306/01 
Treaty on European Union 1992 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
